Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis

We study the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis using detailed data on monthly US imports. We show that credit conditions were an important channel through which the crisis affected trade volumes, by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time, as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors. Countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets exported less to the US during the peak of the crisis. This effect was especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external financing, have limited access to trade credit, or have few collateralizable assets. Exports of financially vulnerable industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less vulnerable industries, and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis. The quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the large real effects of financial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention.     

Did corporate governance safeguard investor interest in the global financial crisis? Evidence from Hong Kong SAR

The global financial crisis of 2008 aroused renewed interest in the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms to safeguard investor interests. In this paper, we measure the effects of the crisis from 2008 to 2009 on the share performance of 976 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the Hong Kong SAR and examine the link between share performance and corporate governance mechanisms. Our results present evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors and a greater concentration of ownership had lower share performance, but lower price volatility, during the global financial crisis. These results suggest that no single corporate governance mechanism is fit for all economic environments and time frames. To strengthen investors' confidence, companies should enhance the efficiency and adaptability of their governance mechanisms in turbulent times.     

How red is China's red capitalism? Continuity and change in China's financial services sector during the global crisis

Chinese capitalism cannot be captured by theoretical frameworks and concepts such as the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach. Despite its integration into the world economy and the financial crises, the country has kept a stable Leninist basis of formal institutions. The case of financial services shows: (i) a resilience of the sector to the ‘Great Financial Crisis’ of 2008 and (ii) the use of the crisis as an opportunity. Examining the control of Chinese financial services shows that private interests and the regulatory authorities are intimately linked to the state apparatus and that there is no radical break in sight with China's unique blend of party state-led capitalism.     

What explains default risk premium during the financial crisis? Evidence from Japan

As is well documented, subprime mortgage markets carried significant default risk. This paper investigates the relationship between default risk premium, stock market conditions and macroeconomic variables during the financial crisis. Using iTraxx Japan Credit Default Swap (CDS) index spreads covering the period from March 2006 to November 2009, we employ a time-varying dynamic factor model with Markov regime switching to generate regime probabilities for default risk. We analyze the sensitivity of default risk premium changes to stock market conditions and macroeconomic variables by using two-state Markov switching models: a crisis regime sparked by rising loan defaults in the sub-prime mortgage market, and a non-crisis regime. We found strong evidence that the relationship between default risk premium changes, stock market and macroeconomic variables is regime-dependent. Our results suggest that during periods of crisis, CDS indices behave as a higher-risk indicator and become more sensitive to stock market conditions and macroeconomic variables. This paper examines the effects of the financial crisis in explaining the default risk premium. Understanding the determinants of default risk premium is important for financial analysts, economic policy makers and credit risk management.     

Small shop survival – The financial response to a global financial crisis

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), many of which are small retail shops, remain the largest employer in the western world. Yet the financing of their fixed and working capital investments remains under-researched. This study focuses on this topic by examining Eurozone wholesale and retail SMEs enterprises at the peak of the 2008 financial credit crisis. In order to do this, an innovative analysis of existing theories in retail finance and policy research using generalised multilevel structural equation modelling is performed to establish how retail SMEs sourced capital during this period. This analysis, a first of its kind in wholesale and retail SME research, finds that pecking order theory, the independence of investment and financing, as well as the contest for financial resources between fixed and working capital do not hold for wholesale and retail SMEs. Moreover, it is found that government grants and subsidised loans were not used by SMEs in this sector of the Eurozone as primary sources of finance during the aftermath of the 2008 global credit crisis. Crucially, it is posited that a business environment characterized by stronger legal rights and deeper credit information did not improve SMEs’ access to external finance. The authors recommend that further research should be pursued in this field in order to improve current understanding of the resilience of retail SMEs for future global financial crises.     

The global financial crisis and small- and medium-sized enterprises in Japan: how did they cope with the crisis?

In this paper, we examine the nature of the shocks that hit the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan during the global financial crisis that occurred in the wake of the massive number of non-performing subprime loans in the U.S. We examine how the SMEs responded to the shocks, using the unique surveys that were conducted by the Research Institute of the Economy, Trade and Industry in 2008 and 2009. The shocks were identified as demand, supply, and financial shocks. The demand shock was the most prevalent of the shocks, while the financial shock was least frequent. The SMEs took a spectrum of measures against the demand shock by seeking help from suppliers and financial institutions. We find that the measures taken by the SMEs crucially depended on the bank–firm relationship as well as the customer–supplier relationship. The bank-dependent SMEs asked their closely-affiliated financial institutions for help, while the SMEs less dependent on financial institutions sought help primarily from their suppliers. A long customer–supplier relationship plays an important role in mitigating the supply shock.     

Can leading indicators assess country vulnerability? Evidence from the 2008–09 global financial crisis

We investigate whether leading indicators can help explain the cross-country incidence of the 2008–09 financial crisis. Rather than looking for indicators with specific relevance to the recent crisis, the selection of variables is driven by an extensive review of more than eighty papers from the previous literature on early warning indicators. Our motivation is to address suspicions that indicators found to be useful predictors in one round of crises are typically not useful to predict the next round. The review suggests that central bank reserves and past movements in the real exchange rate were the two leading indicators that had proven the most useful in explaining crisis incidence across different countries and episodes in the past. For the 2008–09 crisis, we use six different variables to measure crisis incidence: drops in GDP and industrial production, currency depreciation, stock market performance, reserve losses, and participation in an IMF program. We find that the level of reserves in 2007 appears as a consistent and statistically significant leading indicator of who got hit by the 2008–09 crisis, in line with the conclusions of the pre-2008 literature. In addition to reserves, recent real appreciation is a statistically significant predictor of devaluation and of a measure of exchange market pressure during the current crisis. We define the period of the global financial shock as running from late 2008 to early 2009, which probably explains why we find stronger results than earlier papers such as Obstfeld et al. (2009, 2010) and Rose and Spiegel (2009a,b, 2010, 2011) which use annual data.     

Multinational family firms’ internationalization depth and breadth following the global financial crisis

This study examines how large family firms react to a macroeconomic shock in terms of their internationalization depth and breadth. Building on new internalization theory and acknowledging the dysfunctional manifestations of bifurcation bias in large family-owned MNEs, we argue that an unexpected shock induces family firms to recombine their family firm-specific resources with their thus far underutilized or unequally treated nonfamily resources. This recombination allows most family firms to economize on bifurcation bias and leverage their resources as firm-specific advantages (FSAs) resulting in an increased depth and breadth of internationalization post shock (while some of them may continue to suffer from bifurcation bias). Testing our theory on a panel dataset incorporating large family-owned (compared to nonfamily-owned) MNEs headquartered in Germany before and after the global financial crisis lends support to our theory. We discuss how our study contributes to new internalization theory, to the broader IB literature on MNEs’ unexpected shock response, and to family firm internationalization research.     

What can sector accounts tell about the financial crisis?

The current sovereign debt crisis is widely believed to have been caused by insufficient budget discipline. However, the financial sector accounts reveal that public as well as private borrowing in the euro area was dwarfed by the synchronised explosion of assets and liabilities of financial corporations. The paper suggests that the current concentration on a speedy cutback of public debt is premature at best. Policy should pay more attention to the main causes of the crisis: the excesses of the financial sector and the flaws in the design of the heterogeneous currency union.     

China's slowdown and global financial market volatility: Is world growth losing out?

China's GDP growth slowdown and a surge in global financial market volatility could both adversely affect an already weak global economic recovery. To quantify the global macroeconomic consequences of these shocks, we employ a GVAR model estimated for 26 countries/regions over the period 1981Q1 to 2013Q1. Our results indicate that (i) a one percent permanent negative GDP shock in China (equivalent to a one-off one percent growth shock) could have significant global macroeconomic repercussions, with world growth reducing by 0.23 percentage points in the short-run; and (ii) a surge in global financial market volatility could translate into a fall in world economic growth of around 0.29 percentage points, but it could also have negative short-run impacts on global equity markets, oil prices and long-term interest rates.     

Coups d'état and the foreign exchange market

I empirically examine the effect of coups d'état on the foreign exchange market using a monthly panel dataset covering 150 countries over the period 1980–2015. Specifically, I investigate whether foreign exchange market's participants sanction a country following a coup d'état event by allowing depreciations of its national currency against a weighted basket of currencies of its trading partners. I combine different identification strategies and find that the occurrence of a coup d'état induces a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate in the coup d'état country and generates negative spillover effects on neighbouring countries. Once a coup occurs, a country level of financial buffers and the flexibility of its exchange rate regime allow reducing the magnitude of the depreciation. In addition, I provide evidence that coups also increase the likelihood of experiencing a currency crisis by about 2 percentage points in coup d'état countries compared to non-coup d'état countries.     

Signaling virtue: Does firm corporate social performance trajectory moderate the social performance–financial performance relationship?

Over the past 40 years, scholars have demonstrated the effects of corporate social performance (CSP) on corporate financial performance (CFP), finding mixed results on the main effect of CSP on CFP. This study moves beyond the search for a universal main effect of CSP on CFP to examine factors that drive some firms to experience greater returns from their CSP efforts. Building from the signaling and stakeholder theory definitions of reputation and the trajectory literature in psychology, this study examines the following question: what is the impact of a firm's CSP reputation on the relationship between CSP actions and CFP in the current period? Findings based on a sample of 351 US firms demonstrate that firms with either a history of growth in negative CSP, a propensity toward increasing negative CSP, or a more inconsistent history of positive or negative CSP, experience decreased returns from current period investments in CSP.     

Did Firms Manage Earnings more Aggressively during the Financial Crisis?

We investigate the extent of earnings management during the financial crisis of 2008 (The Great Recession). Based on a large sample of 14,000 observations across 15 years, our results show that firms managed earnings less aggressively during the crisis. We also show a severe decline in firm value and profitability during the crisis. Our results are consistent with the notion that, during the crisis, firm performance was so far below the target that no amount of earnings management would have been sufficient to reverse the poor earnings picture. As a result, managers were less motivated to manage earnings. Furthermore, the crisis serves as a convenient excuse for poor performance, lessening the motivation and necessity for managers to manage earnings. Additional analysis including fixed‐effects regressions, propensity score matching, and GMM dynamic panel data estimation shows that our results are robust and are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity. Further analysis documents similar findings for the Dot‐com crisis in 2001 and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–1998.     

Can structural small open-economy models account for the influence of foreign disturbances?

This paper demonstrates that an estimated, structural, small open-economy model of the Canadian economy cannot account for the substantial influence of foreign-sourced disturbances identified in numerous reduced-form studies. The benchmark model assumes uncorrelated shocks across countries and implies that U.S. shocks account for less than 3% of the variability observed in several Canadian series, at all forecast horizons. Accordingly, model-implied cross-correlation functions between Canada and U.S. are essentially zero. Both findings are at odds with the data. A specification that assumes correlated cross-country shocks partially resolves this discrepancy, but still falls well short of matching reduced-form evidence. One central difficulty resides in the model's inability to account for comovement without generating counter factual implications for the real exchange rate, the terms of trade and Canadian inflation.     

Why did the equity home bias fall during the financial panic of 2008?

Investors tend to put most of their wealth in local stocks; theories of portfolio choice and uncertainty aversion jointly predict that this home bias should increase during a financial crisis. Yet, using a sample of 45 countries, I document that the equity home bias fell during the financial panic of 2008. Exploiting bilateral stock holdings, I find that investors actively increased their home bias, but large valuation changes subsumed these trades. Across countries, the change in home bias is consistent with partial portfolio rebalancing and increased information asymmetries during the crisis.     

Did Investors Herd during the Financial Crisis? Evidence from the US Financial Industry

We examine the herding behavior of investors in the US financial industry, especially commercial banks, S&Ls, investment and insurance firms during global financial crisis of 2008 towards own sub‐sector and market consensus using augmented cross sectional absolute deviation of returns (CSAD) model. After distinguishing between fundamental and non‐fundamental information, we find a greater influence of global financial crisis on spurious herding for commercial and investment banks, and such herding increases in the down market and with conditional volatility of returns, but adverse herding is prevalent among investors during normal period in response to fundamental information. We also find that herding intensity on fundamental information is relatively high with market consensus for all financial institutions except insurance firms in high volatility regime, and intentional herding is only significant and limited to S&Ls and investment banks in high volatility regime. Our findings suggest limited spillover effects of herding when investors face non‐fundamental information.     

What drove the financial crisis? Structuring our historical understanding of a predictable evolutionary disaster

This article revisits the 2008 financial crisis, considering how we can draw on the historical record to reappraise what created the problems and inform theory. It looks in detail at neglected factors such as the nature of the selection environment, the agency of actors, and the influence of structure. On the basis of that evidence, as well as the premise that feedback, rather than foresight, drives behavior, we reach new conclusions on what drove the crisis, and open up an exciting opportunity for historical methods to inform theory. This challenges current policy in terms of the idea of ‘Too Big To Fail’ and the focus of regulation; it also helps us revisit the lessons that we should take from this crisis, taking us away from macro-economic factors and individual malfeasance towards structure. Overall, the analysis suggests that a historical, institutional, and evolutionary analysis, based in theory, can add a fresh perspective.     

How does Relationship Management Infrastructure influence performance?

The contribution of Relationship Management Infrastructure (RMI) to positional advantage, customer, market and financial performance was tested in major, organisational customer relationships through structural equation modelling. The results support a direct, significant contribution of RMI to positional advantage, however the anticipated direct contribution of RMI to financial performance resulting from efficient and productive relationship infrastructure was not supported. The contribution of RMI to the variance in customer, market and financial performance was indirect. Explanations of these findings are proposed.     

The influence of the CEO’s business education on the performance of hybrid organizations: the case of the global microfinance industry

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are typical examples of hybrid organisations, meaning organisations pursuing both a financial and social logic. This study examines the question of whether financial and social performance improves when an MFI’s chief executive officer (CEO) has a business education. We apply the random effects instrumental variable regression method to examine the influence of the CEO’s business education on the MFI’s financial and social performance. Our panel dataset that includes 353 MFIs from across the globe indicates that ‘only’ 55% of the MFIs have a CEO with a business education. The empirical results indicate that MFIs with CEOs who have a business education perform significantly better, financially and socially, than MFIs managed by CEOs with other types of educational backgrounds. The findings suggest that CEOs with a business education seem better at managing the much-debated tradeoff between providing small loans and producing healthy financial results.