Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Role of Accounting Earnings in CEO Turnover

We study whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to accounting earnings and how the impact of IFRS adoption varies with country‐level institutions and firm‐level incentives. We find that CEO turnover responds more to a firm's accounting performance after adoption. This increase in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity is concentrated in countries with stronger enforcement of financial reporting and is more prominent for mandatory adopters that have strong firm‐level compliance incentives. In addition, we link the change in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity directly to accounting changes due to IFRS adoption and find a stronger adoption effect when firms report large overall accounting changes and large de‐recognition of loss provisions upon adoption. Some of the above findings are sensitive to the exclusion of UK firms, which account for more than half of our sample.     

Financial Accounting Effects of Tax Aggressiveness: Contracting and Measurement

This study examines a setting in which a tax‐reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the firm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax‐reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness — cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax benefit — distinguish between conservative and aggressive firms.     

Reporting Bias and Monitoring in Clean Development Mechanism Projects*

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a flexible carbon market mechanism managed by the United Nations. The program grants tradable carbon emissions credits (Certified Emission Reductions) for carbon‐reducing projects in developing countries. A project can only be admitted to the program if it is not financially profitable, and thus would not take place without the emission credits granted through the CDM. In this paper, we examine how monitoring reduces incentives of companies to bias the reported expected financial viability of potential CDM projects to gain admission to the program. We find that reported rates of return, which are a key factor for admission to the program, tend to be downwardly biased and are negatively associated with the expected benefits stemming from forecasted greenhouse gas reductions. However, monitoring from various sources mitigates some of the distorted incentives and related reporting bias. Furthermore, the monitoring effect becomes much stronger after 2008, when the CDM Executive Board implemented a series of measures to strengthen the additionality testing that provides guidance for program applications.     

A Reexamination of Behavior in Experimental Audit Markets: The Effects of Moral Reasoning and Economic Incentives on Auditor Reporting and Fees*

This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third‐party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental‐markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo‐Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.     

Evidence of Manager Intervention to Avoid Working Capital Deficits

We study managers’ interventions in financial reporting by examining working capital deficits, measured as current ratios less than 1.0. Current ratios represent important balance sheet liquidity indicators to lenders and creditors, and have an identifiable and naturally occurring reference point at 1.0, analogous to the profit/loss income statement reference point. We find that distributions of reported current ratios of both U.S. and non‐U.S. firms exhibit a discontinuity at 1.0. For U.S. firms, we find that the discontinuity increases with exogenous increases in the cost of credit in the economy, and that determinants of the likelihood to achieve a given current ratio are diagnostic precisely at the 1.0 discontinuity location but not at other nearby locations in the current ratio distribution. U.S. firms that avoid working capital deficits report lower proportions of inventory and higher proportions of accounts receivable in current assets and, when credit is tight, higher proportions of cash, consistent with managers increasing sales volume so as to capitalize profit margins and thereby increase current assets. For non‐U.S. firms, the discontinuity is more pronounced for observations from common law countries, a proxy for jurisdictions where financial reports are more intended to provide decision‐useful information. The evidence suggests that managers intervene to achieve a balance sheet reporting objective that stems from stakeholder use of reference points.     

Separating the Political and Technical: Accounting Standard‐Setting and Purification

The U.S.‐based Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) emphasizes that accounting standard‐setting is not and should not be regarded as a “political process.” Employing the case of accounting for stock compensation, I examine a recent debate in which FASB appears to have successfully established and maintained a boundary between a technical accounting process and politics. This case is interesting because an earlier, failed effort to expense stock compensation was described as highly politicized. However, the boundary between technical and political processes was maintained in the more recent episode. I find that a focus on due process, characterizations of existing accounting requirements as anomalous and available measurement methods as reliable, and warnings about the dangers of injecting “politics” into standard‐setting were important to this boundary work. I also find that the boundary work required considerable interpretive flexibility in selecting (or ignoring) the evidence to be used in justifying the standard‐setting project and its conclusions. I conclude by suggesting that a different understanding of what it means to be involved in a “political process” might help all parties understand more fully what is taking place during the accounting standard‐setting process. Attention could be turned to developing processes to facilitate debates over which values should guide decisions occurring throughout the standard‐setting process. To this end, an enhanced standard‐setting process might allow for increased participation in agenda setting, in framing and scoping standard‐setting projects, and in providing opportunities for nonexperts to participate.     

Can Financialization Save Nature? The Case of Endangered Species*

The current biodiversity loss is dramatic. Over the past 50 years, more than 68% of the mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and fish on Earth have disappeared, putting the planet's survival and its inhabitants—including human beings—at risk. Financialization, or the transformation of nature into financial assets, is increasingly proposed as a solution to the biodiversity crisis. Proponents of financialization believe that assigning a monetary value to nature will incentivize human beings to protect habitats and their species. This article offers a four-mechanism model of nature's financialization, explaining why it is virtually impossible to financialize nature. We collected data through a unique two-stage data collection process, including a single case study and additional interviews with conservationists and conservation finance specialists. We analyzed the development of a calculative device, the “Index,” designed to assess the impact of conservation efforts on the survival of endangered species. Conservationists hoped to use the Index to calculate the financial return of a conservation impact bond, a financial instrument designed to finance conservation projects. However, they did not achieve their goal. We discuss the implications for the financialization and conservation literature and the role of accounting therein. We notably question previous accounts of financialization, including the need for financial numbers or financial actors. We ultimately show that a financialization project can transform practices toward financialization, even if the financialization process is not complete.     

The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs*

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.     

内部控制、法制水平与实体企业金融化——基于2011—2020年沪深A股制造业上市公司经验数据

近年来，随着资本市场的逐步审慎开放，中国金融业得到了快速发展，而实体经济则随着中国经济转向高质量发展阶段而增速放缓，实体企业基于“蓄水池”效应和“投资替代”效应而不断扩大金融投资，使得企业金融化现象成为学术界关注的焦点问题。系统研究内外部治理对实体企业金融化的作用有利于实体企业“脱虚向实”。基于2011—2020年沪深A股制造业上市公司财务数据，将其金融资产占比连续3年及以上增加界定为金融化，从内外部治理视角探究其对实体企业金融化的影响，最终发现，内部控制质量对实体企业金融化有抑制作用，并且法制水平增强了内部控制质量对实体企业金融化的抑制作用。最后提出抑制企业金融化的建议。     

Financial Reporting and Trade Credit: Evidence from Mandatory IFRS Adoption*

We investigate the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on trade credit. We document that firms in countries that adopt IFRS receive more trade credit from their suppliers, consistent with improved financial reporting quality and comparability playing a role in facilitating informal financing. This increase is larger for countries with a low level of societal trust, a poor pre‐IFRS‐adoption information environment, and stronger legal enforcement. These cross‐sectional results suggest that the conditions under which higher‐quality information is made publicly available affect suppliers' decisions to provide trade credit. This increase is also larger for firms with greater exposure to foreign markets, a finding that highlights the importance of more comparable international financial reporting standards in facilitating cross‐country trade credit. We also find that IFRS adoption has a stronger positive effect on trade credit for firms with greater liquidity needs. Finally, we find that firms in countries that adopt IFRS also extend more trade credit to their customers. Overall, our results support the notion that financial reporting can have a causal effect on trade credit.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

Changing Graph Use in Corporate Annual Reports: A Time‐Series Analysis

Graphs in corporate annual reports form part of a powerfully designed annual report package that offers considerable potential for “impression management.” The primary purpose of this paper is to determine whether graph use depends on corporate performance. Time‐series analysis, not previously used in the financial graphs literature, allows discretionary changes in graph use by companies to be identified and related to changes in individual companies' corporate performance over time. Based on the prior financial graphs and accounting choice literature, we develop two hypotheses that relate changes in graph use to changes in corporate performance. These hypotheses focus on the aggregate and individual company levels. We base our analysis on the corporate annual reports of 137 top UK companies that were in continued existence during the five‐year period from 1988 to 1992. At both the aggregate and individual company levels, we find the decision to use key financial variable (KFV) graphs, the primary graphical choice, to be associated positively with corporate performance measures. This finding is consistent with the manipulation hypothesis ‐ that is, that financial graphs in corporate annual reports are used to “manage” favorably the reader's impression of company performance, and hence that there is a reporting bias.     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

三重底线报告——政府财务报告未来的发展方向

三重底线报告是计量、管理和报告主体社会、经济和环境业绩的框架.在梳理三重底线报告理论的基础上,通过分析传统财务报告的缺陷,认为应该通过扩展传统的财务报告,考虑政府这个契约耦合中的各节点的利益相关者的利益,引入三重底线报告,将业绩评价与主体的价值观、战略、伦理等进行整合,并提出了重构政府财务报告的一些思路和面临的挑战.     

Shareholder‐ Versus Stakeholder‐Focused Japanese Companies: Firm Characteristics and Accounting Valuation*

Recent research has found that the value‐relevance of accounting variables depends not only on whether a country's accounting rules are code‐law oriented or common‐law oriented, but also on the reporting incentives created by the legal and business environment in which a firm operates. Therefore, for example, the earnings of firms in some countries with common‐law oriented rules but with code‐law incentives have more code‐law‐type characteristics. We further this research by examining whether this is true for firms facing the same accounting regime and institutional environment but different stakeholder‐related incentives. We find significant stakeholder‐related incentives across 23 Japanese firms listed in the United States and 23 Japanese firms not listed in the United States that are matched by industry and size. Although these firms face the same institutional environment and the same accounting regime, consistent with the differences in stakeholder‐related incentives, the earnings and book values of the firms listed in the more shareholder‐oriented U.S. markets have significantly more explanatory power for market value than those for firms not cross‐listed in the United States. These findings are unaffected by whether the reports are based on consolidated or parent‐only accounting or whether they are based on U.S. or Japanese GAAP, emphasizing the potential influence of reporting incentives at all levels on the effect of standardization, conversion, or harmonization of accounting methods globally.     

Audit Qualifications of Income‐Decreasing Accounting Choices*

In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.     

Cancellation of Executive Stock Options: Tax and Accounting Income Considerations*

Canadian firms face a trade‐off between reporting higher accounting income and paying lower taxes that arises from their ability to cancel in‐the‐money executive stock options and making a substitute cash payment to the executive instead of issuing shares. Firms' trade‐off hypotheses are operationalized in a multilateral framework and empirically tested using insider‐trading data. The multilateral approach is designed to control for the incentive effects of alternative compensation schemes and to determine the cancellation payment that keeps the executive indifferent between receiving cash or shares. The results show that firms consider both taxes and financial reporting costs in determining their option cancellation behavior.     

The Effect of Information on Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital

It is widely held that better financial reporting makes investors more confident in their predictions of future cash flows and reduces their required risk premia. The logic is that more information leads necessarily to more certainty, and hence lower subjective estimates of firm “beta” or covariance with other firms. This is misleading on both counts. Bayesian logic shows that the best available information can often leave decision makers less certain about future events. And for those cases where information indeed brings great certainty, conventional mean‐variance asset‐pricing models imply that more certain estimates of future cash payoffs can sometimes bring a higher cost of capital. This occurs when new or better information leads to sufficiently reduced expected firm payoffs. To properly understand the effect of signal quality on the cost of capital, it is essential to think of what that information says, rather than considering merely its “precision,” or how strongly it says what it says.     

R&D Reporting Biases and Their Consequences*

The immediate expensing of research and development (R&D) expenditures is often justified by the conservatism principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative throughout the firm's life. We therefore ask the following questions: (1) When is the expensing of R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitaliza‐tion? (2) What are the capital‐market implications of these reporting biases? To address these questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth (momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early life‐cycle companies) report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend to report aggressively under current generally accepted accounting principles. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 1972‐2003, generally supports the analytical predictions. In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice versa. This evidence is consistent with behavioral finance arguments about investor cognitive biases.