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1.
    
We investigate whether audit fees and auditors' opinions on internal controls are associated with whistleblowing allegations externally filed to regulatory agencies. We find that firms subject to whistleblowing allegations have significantly higher audit fees, regardless of the substance of these allegations, whereas an auditor is more likely to issue an adverse opinion on internal controls when the allegation is substantiated, rather than frivolous. Further, our findings suggest that auditors are involved in the auditing of whistleblowing when the allegation is still in an internal stage. We also show that firms subject to external whistleblowing allegations have a lower likelihood of restating financial statements prepared in the allegation year when greater audit effort is made in that year. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of auditors in the context of whistleblowing.  相似文献   

2.
    
High investor sentiment has been linked with opportunistic managerial behavior in the face of more optimistic investors and analysts. We extend this line of work by documenting that the likelihood of misstatements is higher when sentiment is high. Although this would suggest elevated audit risk, we posit that a contemporaneous reduction in auditors' litigation cost could drive down audit fees and going concern opinion (GCO) reporting conservatism in order to please clientele. Consistent with this notion, we document that auditors charge lower fees and report GCOs less conservatively when sentiment is high. However, this reduction in reporting conservatism is unwarranted; results reveal that auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to clients which subsequently file for bankruptcy during high sentiment periods. We conduct additional tests to examine whether auditors' litigation costs indeed vary with sentiment and document that auditors are less likely to be sued and the market reacts less negatively to misstatement announcements when sentiment is high. Collectively, our findings suggest that, although misstatement risk is increasing with sentiment, auditors' litigation risk actually declines.  相似文献   

3.
    
In this paper, we investigate how auditors respond to shareholder activism against their clients. Our study is important because activism may be viewed by auditors as a source of increased engagement risk, thereby impacting audit outcomes. The potential relationship between shareholder activism and audit outcomes leads us to predict that activism targets will pay higher audit fees and also will be more likely to receive adverse internal control opinions (ICOs) and first‐time going concern opinions (GCOs). Our results, which support all three predictions, suggest that the public scrutiny associated with activism campaigns heightens auditors' concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk. Consistent with this notion, we find that activism targets are more likely to experience accounting‐related lawsuits. We also find that the increased likelihood of adverse ICOs documented in our baseline tests reflects higher‐quality reporting rather than increased auditor conservatism. Overall, our findings suggest that activism campaigns spur auditor diligence while also increasing the possibility of negative outcomes that may not be fully anticipated by activist investors.  相似文献   

4.
Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.  相似文献   

5.
To effectively manage audit risk, auditors must correctly predict the potential litigation and reputation consequences associated with inaccurate accounting estimates. Accurate predictions are critical because underestimation of negative consequences leads to excess legal exposure and overestimation leads to overauditing. Our paper examines whether auditors correctly anticipate these litigation and reputation outcomes. We provide manager‐ and partner‐level auditors with case facts from an auditor negligence lawsuit and ask them to predict the proportion of juries that will return verdicts against their firm. We then compare auditors' predictions to the actual verdicts we observe when we provide the same set of case facts to mock jurors who deliberate as part of juries. We find that auditors overestimate the likelihood of negligence verdicts, especially when audit quality is relatively high. Our supplemental measures help explain the reasons for this overestimation: auditors tend to underestimate jurors' perceptions of audit quality and willingness to attribute inaccurate estimates to situational factors. Finally, we examine auditors' predictions about how a news article about the litigation will affect their reputation with the general public. Similar to our litigation results, we find that auditors tend to overestimate the article's negative impact on auditor reputation. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors overestimate litigation and reputation consequences resulting from inaccurate accounting estimates. This overestimation is consequential as it leads to inefficient allocation of audit resources.  相似文献   

6.
    
This study adopts a two‐step approach to highlight the disclosure quality channel that drives economic consequences of IFRS adoption. This approach helps address the identification challenge noted by prior research and offers direct evidence on the role of disclosure quality. In the first step, we document the impact of the IFRS mandate on changes in disclosure quality proxied by the granularity of line item disclosure in financial statements. We find that IFRS‐adopting firms provide more disaggregated information upon IFRS adoption, such as more granular disclosure of intangible assets and long‐term investments on the balance sheet and greater disaggregation of depreciation, amortization, and nonoperating income items on the income statement. In the second step, we link the observed disclosure changes to the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption. We show that greater disaggregated information due to IFRS adoption enhances market liquidity and decreases information asymmetry, but does not affect audit fees differentially. Our evidence has implications for standard setters as they evaluate cost‐benefit trade‐offs when considering disclosure changes in the future.  相似文献   

7.
    
Using detailed data for fieldwork hours and audit hours by rank from audit engagements in Korea, we examine whether audits conducted under workload imbalance, proxied by busy‐season audits, impair audit quality, and how auditors adjust staff assignments for busy‐season audits. We generally find that busy‐season audits are associated with lower audit quality, and that audit firms reduce the involvement of senior auditors during busy‐season audits. In addition, the greater the involvement of senior auditors and junior auditors, the lesser the deterioration in audit quality. Finally, although there is no increase in interim audits in response to workload imbalance during busy seasons, increasing interim audits can mitigate the negative impact of busy‐season audits on audit quality. Our results are relevant to auditors and regulators, who have expressed concerns about the adverse effects of workload imbalance on audit quality.  相似文献   

8.
    
This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.  相似文献   

9.
Les auteurs étudient comment l’information privilégiée et le contrôle continu influent sur le rôle de la qualité de la comptabilité dans la réduction de la sensibilité des investissements aux flux de trésorerie. Selon eux, l’accès à l’information privilégiée et les restrictions directes dont les investissements font l’objet sont susceptibles d’influer sur la mesure dans laquelle la qualité de la comptabilité réduit les contraintes financières. Les résultats de l’étude semblent indiquer que, dans le cas des sociétés soumises à des contraintes financières, l’accès des banques à l’information privilégiée atténue l’importance de la qualité de la comptabilité. Les auteurs constatent en outre que dans les sociétés, qu’elles soient ou non soumises à des contraintes financières, les clauses restrictives qui s’appliquent directement aux dépenses en immobilisations atténuent également l’importance de la qualité de la comptabilité. Les résultats de l’étude donnent à penser que, si les problèmes d’asymétrie de l’information sont susceptibles d’être très importants, la qualité de la comptabilité est elle aussi très importante. Toutefois, l’importance de la qualité de la comptabilité est moindre si les bailleurs de fonds externes ont accès à l’information privilégiée, et elle est nulle si ces bailleurs de fonds imposent à la société des restrictions contractuelles applicables aux investissements. Les auteurs démontrent également que l’accès des banques à l’information privilégiée réduit la sensibilité des liquidités aux flux de trésorerie et atténue l’importance de la qualité de la comptabilité dans la réduction de cette sensibilité. Cette preuve supplémentaire indique, semble‐t‐il, que les résultats obtenus par les auteurs en ce qui a trait à la sensibilité des investissements aux flux de trésorerie ne sont pas le fait d’une erreur de mesure de l’ensemble des occasions d’investissement.  相似文献   

10.
    
Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.  相似文献   

11.
We investigate whether the PCAOB's decision to expand the number and location of its inspection offices in 2009 improved the reliability of US audits. We use a difference-in-differences empirical design to consider the impacts of the expansion on audit quality and find that audit quality significantly improved following the PCAOB's expansion in markets where new offices opened relative to markets without an office opening. We find that the improvement in audit quality appears to be driven by auditors' reaction to real changes in PCAOB oversight and that triennially inspected auditors appear to be impacted the most by this office expansion. Our findings provide new insights into the PCAOB's operational decision-making and suggest that the regulator's additional investment in audit oversight was effective in improving audit quality.  相似文献   

12.
The elimination of goodwill amortization in 2001 brought about significant change in how companies are required to account for goodwill. This change in accounting also brought with it new challenges for auditors, namely evaluating the reasonableness of management's assumptions related to goodwill valuation. In addition to introducing technical challenges, this task is particularly difficult given the misalignment in incentives it creates between managers who likely prefer to avoid recording an impairment and auditors who seek to minimize the bias in management's impairment testing. This study focuses on the consequences of the misaligned incentives that auditors face under the current goodwill assessment process. We find that the decision to record a goodwill impairment is associated with an increase in the probability of auditor dismissal. Consistent with the presence of significant friction with clients, our results also indicate that the likelihood of auditor dismissals is negatively related to the favorability of the impairment decision. Furthermore, we find that companies impairing goodwill prior to dismissing auditors subsequently employ auditors that are, on average, more favorable to clients in their impairment decisions.  相似文献   

13.
    
In this study, we investigate whether the increase in regulatory scrutiny epitomized by the initial PCAOB inspection impacted audit quality differentially for Big 4 and non–Big 4 auditors to better understand the consequences of PCAOB inspections for different audit firm types. Because of competing views on the effect of PCAOB inspections, the relation between PCAOB inspections and the audit quality differential between Big 4 and other auditors is an empirical issue. Empirically, we take the endogenous choice of auditor as a given and utilize a difference‐in‐differences specification that takes into account the staggered timing of the initial PCAOB inspection for different‐sized auditors in the United States. Our results suggest that the initial PCAOB inspection improved audit quality more for Big 4 auditors than for other annually inspected or triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors. We also examine annually and triennially inspected non–Big 4 auditors separately, and find that the pre‐post Big 4/non–Big 4 differential audit quality effect is more pronounced for the triennially inspected non–Big 4 firms. In the larger context of the highly concentrated US audit market, our findings that PCAOB inspections accentuate the Big 4/non–Big 4 audit quality differential are of potential interest to public company audit clients contemplating an auditor change, investors interested in learning about the consequences of PCAOB inspections, regulators concerned about the Big 4 dominance of the US audit market, and academics investigating audit quality differences.  相似文献   

14.
    
We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer‐tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the PCAOB. Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision making, based on a comparison of postloan performance of firms with common auditor loans versus those with noncommon auditor loans.  相似文献   

15.
    
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material. Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.  相似文献   

16.
Les auteurs ont pour but de faire progresser la recherche dans le domaine de l’évaluation de l’audit interne en élaborant un modèle d’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne qui tient compte des relations entre les facteurs précis qu’utilisent les auditeurs externes pour évaluer la solidité de cette fonction. Le modèle repose sur trois facteurs définis par les normes d’audit et par les travaux de recherche antérieurs : la compétence, la qualité du travail et l’objectivité. Les auteurs élaborent une expression analytique du modèle à l’aide du cadre de référence des fonctions de croyance afin de dépasser les limites des études antérieures. Leurs résultats révèlent que la modélisation de la relation « et » est essentielle à l’évaluation de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne. Au chapitre des relations, l’analyse montre que, lorsque celle qui unit ces trois facteurs est solide ou parfaite, la fonction d’audit interne demeure d’une grande solidité, même en présence d’éléments probants positifs ou négatifs à l’égard de l’un des facteurs. Ce résultat persiste dans la mesure où les niveaux de croyance au sujet des deux autres facteurs sont élevés. Les auteurs démontrent en outre comment la qualité de la gouvernance d’entreprise influe sur l’évaluation de la fonction d’audit interne et comment il est possible de recourir à l’analyse coûts‐avantages dans ce contexte pour mieux déterminer la quantité de travail d’audit externe qu’exige le respect des normes. L’analyse des auteurs révèle que l’étendue du travail d’audit devant être réalisé par l’auditeur externe dépend de la solidité de la fonction d’audit interne et de l’importance des coûts associés aux litiges et au respect de la réglementation auxquels le vérificateur externe doit faire face.  相似文献   

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