The dark side of CEO social capital: Evidence from real earnings management and future operating performance

We examine the role of CEO social capital as an important driver of the widespread practice of real earnings management (REM). Using the number of social connections to outside executives and directors to measure CEO social capital, we first find that well-connected CEOs associate with higher levels and volatilities of REM. The positive relation between REM and CEO network size is stronger when the CEO connects with more informed and influential persons, and when a more severe misalignment of interests can occur. Second, we find a contagion of REM among well-connected CEOs in an industry. Third, the level of REM induced by a large CEO social network associates negatively with future operating performance. This result is consistent with social capital circulating REM-related information ex-ante and increasing the power and influence for the CEO to deviate from optimal operating policies ex-post. Social capital shields the well-connected executive in the takeover and labor markets despite possible suboptimal future operating performance. While the prior literature finds that CEO social capital reduces accrual earnings management, our findings suggest a dark side of CEO social capital: it induces excessive levels and volatilities of REM costly to the firm in the long run while imposing relatively low personal risk on the top executive.     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

The role of employer learning and regulatory interventions in mitigating executive gender pay gap

This paper examines the role of information and regulatory interventions in mitigating the executive gender pay gap. We find female executives receive about 34% less compared to equivalent males from the same cohort, which falls by half over tenure within the company, but remains systematically significant throughout. The gender pay gap is the highest for young female executives and in the financial sector. Both demand-side (board gender quotas) and supply-side (family policies) regulatory interventions are associated with a lower gender gap in executive pay. Board gender quotas are associated with lower gender pay gap for experienced female executives in the highest age bracket. In contrast, supply-side interventions are associated with lower gender pay gap for the youngest female executives. Our results have important implications for the relative effectiveness of public policies that aim to reduce gender imbalance in corporate leadership and pay.     

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.     

External social networks and earnings management

Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.     

高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角

本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。     

商业银行二级分支行经济资本管理的问题与对策

随着商业银行进入资本管理时代,经济资本管理逐渐成为商业银行核心管理模式,也是转型道路中同业经济资本管理水平和能力的博弈。商业银行二级分支行位于市场竞争最前沿,是整个经济资本管理体系执行层的着力点,其资本管理如何事关全局。本文以工商银行为例简述了工商银行经济资本管理的,主要运行情况,从二级分支行的视角,指出管理层应通过设计经济资本运作管理流程,给予二级分支行相应配套的支持和制度完善,二级分支行要将EVA和RAROC指标及意义渗透到经营管理的考核、评价和资源分配中,在资本管理流程内规范化和程序化运作,引导和约束经营行为,实现新的健康的经营转型目标。     

商业银行二级分支行经济资本管理的问题与对策

随着商业银行进入资本管理时代，经济资本管理逐渐成为商业银行核心管理模式，也是转型道路中同业经济资本管理水平和能力的博弈。商业银行二级分支行位于市场竞争最前沿，是整个经济资本管理体系执行层的着力点，其资本管理如何事关全局。本文以工商银行为例，简述了工商银行经济资本管理的主要运行情况，从二级分支行的视角，指出管理层应通过设计经济资本运作管理流程，给予二级分支行相应配套的支持和制度完善，二级分支行要将EVA和RAROC指标及意义渗透到经营管理的考核、评价和资源分配中，在资本管理流程内规范化和程序化运作，引导和约束经营行为，实现新的健康的经营转型目标。     

The impact of Say-on-Pay votes on firms' strategic policies: Insights from the Anglo-Saxon economy

This study examines evidences of executive reactions to say-on-pay (SOP) votes in terms of strategic policies which could affect firms' long-run growth and eventual survival. We employed an unbalanced panel data from 1932 firms taken from four countries in the Anglo-Saxon economy, covering time periods when different forms of SOP were implemented in these countries. Using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator to gauge the simultaneous determination of SOP votes and firm strategic policies, we find that, in line with shareholders preferences, US firms had increased capital expenditure ratio; Australian and US firms had reduced reliance on debt financing; US managers had shifted focus on current rather than long-term profit, but evidences emerged from other countries are unclear. Corroborations also suggest that excess liquidity was shunned by Canadian shareholders, but the reactions of their company executives were overly disproportionate. UK firm policies did not appear to have been affected by SOP, and vice versa. Overall, the varying effects of SOP votes on firms' strategic policies might be ascribed to either the adoption of a specific SOP practice or the effectiveness of the board.     

Tournament incentives,age diversity and firm performance

This study introduces a new dimension, age diversity of non-CEO executives, which moderates the relationship between promotion-based tournament incentives, measured as the pay gap between the CEO and non-CEO executives, and firm performance. For a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, we find that the tournament incentives for non-CEO executives relate positively to firm performance. This relationship is weaker when non-CEO executives are from different age cohorts, whereas the tournament effect is enhanced when non-CEO executives are from the same age cohort. The negative moderation effect of age diversity is more pronounced in state firms and in the Northern China Plain cultural region. The negative moderation effect disappears in firms with CEOs who have overseas experience. We reason that the peer pressure among the similar-aged non-CEO executives enhances the tournament competition and that age hierarchy reduces incentives for younger executives to compete. Our findings have important implications for firms not only in China, but also in countries and regions where seniority is highly valued when setting executive compensation and optimizing organizational structure.     

THE EFFECTS OF BORROWING ON THE RATE OF GROWTH OF CAPITAL AND THE RISK OF RUIN OF A FIRM

The research reported in this paper used Monte Carlo simulation to study the long term effects of borrowing policy on the rate of growth of capital and the risk (probability) of ruin of hypothetical firms, operating in explicitly described, realistic capital budgeting environments. The capital rationing environment is described explicitly. The debt policies modeled were based on the results of interviews with senior financial executives in eight major firms. The results indicate that three intuitively appealing ranking procedures performed equally well and all out-performed a random selection decision procedure: yielding higher rates of capital growth with lower risks of ruin. In general, an aggressive borrowing policy resulted in a higher average capital growth rate for a firm but a conservative borrowing policy resulted in a lower risk of ruin. It is believed that the results provide some interesting insights which indicate that a computer simulation model could be used to aid management in the evaluation of their capital budgeting procedures and borrowing policies.     

高管背景特征、产品市场竞争与智力资本信息披露——来自我国A股高科技行业的经验证据

以沪深两市高科技上市公司为样本,依据高层梯队理论,实证考察高管背景特征与公司智力资本信息披露行为间的相关性以及产品市场竞争对这一关系的调节效应。结果表明：高管年龄与智力资本信息披露水平显著负相关,而高管学历、任职时间与智力资本信息披露显著正相关;产品市场竞争不仅直接对智力资本信息披露行为产生显著的负面影响,而且强化了高管年龄与智力资本信息披露间的负相关程度,弱化了高管学历、任职时间与智力资本信息披露间的正相关程度。     

纵向兼任高管能提升智力资本价值创造效率吗?——基于中国A股农业上市公司实证分析

基于智力资本理论,依据中国A股农业上市公司2008—2021年年度数据,考察纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的影响。结果显示：纵向兼任高管与智力资本价值创造效率呈负相关,增加机构投资者持股可以改善这种负向效应;纵向兼任高管职位越高,对智力资本价值创造的抑制效应越明显;纵向兼任高管与智力资本技术创新专利产出呈负相关。鉴于此,农业上市公司应重视纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的负面影响,可通过增加机构投资者持股来降低对它产生的不利影响,提升智力资本价值创造效率。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。     

Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of outside options in the executive labor market on earnings management decisions. To proxy for executives’ outside options, we use the number of times other firms cite the executive’s firm as a compensation peer. We find that executives with more citations conduct less earnings management. Exploiting the 2006 SEC requirement for compensation peer disclosure as a quasi-natural shock to executives’ awareness of outside options, we show that the executives who should be more responsive to outside options significantly reduce earnings management. Cross-sectional tests support a labor market discipline channel of outside options. Finally, we exploit state-level recognition of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and enforcement of non-compete agreements as cross-sectional restrictions on labor mobility and show that the impact of peer citations on reducing earnings management is stronger when there are fewer restrictions on mobility.     

The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

Are leaders portable?

Does management talent transfer from one company to another? The market certainly seems to think so. Stock prices spike when companies announce new CEOs from a talent generator like General Electric. But how do these executives perform over the long term? The authors studied the careers of 20 former GE executives who went on to lead other major organizations, with strikingly uneven results. Even the best management talent, the authors found, is transferable only if it maps to the challenges of the new environment. More specifically, the authors identified five types of skills that may or may not transfer to a new job: general management human capital, or the skills to gather, cultivate, and deploy financial, technical, and human resources; strategic human capital, or individuals' expertise in cost cutting, growth, or cyclical markets; industry human capital, meaning the technical and regulatory knowledge unique to an industry; relationship human capital, or the extent to which a manager's effectiveness can be attributed to his or her experience working with colleagues or as part of a team; and company-specific human capital, or the knowledge about routines and procedures, corporate culture and informal structures, and systems and processes that are unique to a company. The GE executives' performance as CEOs depended on whether their new organizations were able to leverage each type of skill. The authors'findings challenge the conventional wisdom on human capital, which holds that there are two types of skill: general management, which is readily transferable, and company specific, which is not. In fact, they argue, other types of management capabilities can make a significant contribution to performance, and company-specific skills can be an asset in a new job.     

Coaches or Speculators? The Role and Impact of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

In this paper, we utilize a panel dataset that covers 1245 listed companies which accomplished their IPO during 2006 to 2014 in China to investigate the impact of venture capital (VC) firms on executive compensation, equity incentive and pay-performance-sensitivity. We make several key findings: First, we find the presence of VCs can significantly raise the executive compensation. Second, high reputation VCs and private VCs increases the likelihood of granting executive equity incentives, whereas foreign VCs are significantly negatively related with executive equity incentive. Third, the pay-performance sensitivity of government VCs and foreign VCs is significant on stock return (RET) whereas insignificant on accounting performance (ROA). Moreover, the increasing VCs share in portfolio companies enhance the pay performance sensitivity on RET. Our results show that before VCs final exiting their post-IPO portfolio companies in China, VCs’ impact on executive compensation are more consistent with grandstanding theories and intending to provide higher cash compensation to encourage executives to raise the companies’ stock price, which is indicating VCs’ changing role from a coach into a speculator after the portfolio companies’ IPO.     

高管声誉激励契约的强度、效用及作用途径——一个中国情境下的实证检验

通过对部分高管进行访谈,并运用中国上市公司2007~2013年的平衡面板数据进行实证检验,结果表明：高管声誉激励强度与公司规模显著正相关,高管人力资本在两者之间具有中介作用;声誉激励通过与显性激励的交互效应从而对公司绩效产生间接的效用,具体而言,声誉激励与薪酬激励之间存在互补效应,与股权激励之间存在互替效应;产权性质能够对高管声誉激励效用产生显著的影响。