A Quantitative Assessment of the Effect of First Contract Arbitration on Bargaining Relationships

This article investigates first contract arbitration's (FCA) capacity to foster bargaining relationships and deter misconduct by analyzing its effect on decertifications. Using time‐series cross‐sectional (TSCS) analysis with data from nine Canadian provinces over a four‐decade period, it shows: (1) FCA correlates with 20 to 37 percent fewer decertifications in provinces that have an FCA provision relative to those that do not; (2) of the various types of FCA, the automatic and fault forms have the most robust effect on decertifications while the mediation‐arbitration form may have the largest effect on decertifications; and (3) the effect of FCA is heightened in the presence of card‐check certification such that the best results for fostering bargaining relationships may be found in the presence of both policies.     

Labor Law and Reaching a First Collective Agreement: Evidence From a Quasi‐Experimental Set of Reforms in Ontario

This paper examines the effects of a major labor law reform package in the Canadian province of Ontario on the negotiation of first agreements for newly certified bargaining units using a quasi‐experimental research design. The findings indicate that first contract success rates were 8–14 percentage points higher under the regime that included automatic first contract arbitration relative to the comparison regime of “no‐fault” first contract arbitration, despite imposition rates being only 2–4 percentage points higher. Further, in the more hostile‐to‐labor regime, only 38 percent of petitions ultimately reached a first agreement despite the presence of quick‐votes, and “no‐fault” first contract arbitration.     

Interest Arbitration and the Narcotic Effect: Evidence from Three Decades of Collective Bargaining in Ontario

We study whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration, that is, a narcotic or addictive effect or, alternatively, positive state dependence, in public sector contract settlements. We use contract data from three sectors (police, firefighters and hospitals) in the Canadian province of Ontario, which covers 1981 to 2012. The length of our study period yields much longer bargaining histories than previously used, which should provide more compelling evidence on whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration to settle bargaining impasses over time. We obtain our estimates using a dynamic probit model with random effects that models the initial conditions. Our estimates indicate — across all the sectors we consider and some robustness checks — that there is a narcotic effect in interest arbitration usage despite very different average propensities to use arbitration across sectors.     

The Rise in Orientation at Collective Bargaining Without a Formal Contract

While firm participation in collective bargaining between unions and employers’ associations has been decreasing in Germany over the last two decades, orientation at collectively bargained wages has increased in popularity. Orientation implies that employers claim to set wages according to collective agreements but they are not formally bound by the respective bargaining contract, and in fact, I observe that they pay significantly lower wages than firms that are formally covered. Dynamic nonlinear panel estimation applied to establishment‐level data shows that this orientation is a stepping stone into formal participation. However, the decline in formal participation and the opposing rise in orientation are mostly due to a changing establishment composition rather than to behavioral transitions.     

Collective Bargaining in the Canadian Public Sector, 1978–2008: The Consequences of Restraint and Structural Change

We study public‐sector bargaining and contract outcomes using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. We have a number of interesting results, but our principal findings are from our analysis of wage settlements. We find that the essential services designation, which only allows non‐essential members of a bargain unit to strike, is associated with decreases in wages. Our estimates also suggest that there is an arbitration wage premium and that making adjustments to the ability to pay criterion used by arbitrators to determine awards does not affect this premium. We also discuss the implications of our estimates.     

In Whose Interest? A First Look at National Survey Data on Interest‐Based Bargaining in Labor Relations

The first national survey data on interest‐based bargaining (IBB) in labor relations reveal broad awareness of IBB, contrasting union and management views, and variation by negotiator experience and gender. A majority of negotiators are aware of IBB, and approximately one‐third of management negotiators and nearly one‐half of union negotiators report using IBB in prior negotiations. An exploratory analysis of the relationships between IBB preferences and contract outcomes suggests that the process is producing more than a simple “mutual gains” pattern of outcomes. Based on these initial results, two hypotheses are suggested as the focus for future studies of the diffusion and sustainability of IBB in collective bargaining.     

An Individual‐Level Study of Contract Ratification Support

This study uses constructs developed from theoretical models of both unit‐level ratification studies and individual‐level studies of strike support to predict individual employee ratification voting behavior and contract satisfaction. Surveys were given to union members before and after ratification voting. The results suggest that constructs assessing economic factors, employment relations, union relations, and the importance of contract information from the union all influence ratification support. While the bargaining issues are important in explaining ratification support, factors beyond the bargaining issues, such as employer and union loyalty and providing information about the contract, are related to ratification support.     

Accounting for Greenfield Union Organizing Outcomes

This paper presents a framework for evaluating and accounting for the outcomes of ‘greenfield’ union organizing campaigns. It argues that previous studies have tended to focus too much on the establishment of collective bargaining and negotiation of first contract as a campaign outcome. Instead, the effectiveness and representativeness of new union structures are emphasized, and the sustainability of those structures is emphasized as the most important outcome. A key finding from the empirical data is that campaigns that build both workplace activism and are co‐ordinated by officers create more sustainable outcomes than campaigns that focus on one or the other. The evidence shows how and why these outcomes emerge, and the paper concludes with a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications.     

Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany

This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment‐wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis‐à‐vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. We report that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs does not significantly influence these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses—statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter alia, is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.     

Pattern Bargaining: An Investigation into its Agency,Context and Evidence

Pattern bargaining stands out as both an under‐researched and controversial subject. This article is an analytical and empirical contribution to this debate. Theoretically, it provides a conceptual framework, which enables analysis to systematically differentiate between distinct forms of pattern bargaining in terms of scope, agency, development and function, which arise from differing contexts in terms of interest configuration, power relations and economic conditions. This framework is used to develop testable hypotheses on pattern bargaining as a mechanism of inter‐industry bargaining co‐ordination. The empirical part of the article examines these hypotheses for collective bargaining from 1969 to 2004 in Austria, which is commonly seen as a paradigm case of pattern bargaining. The article concludes by highlighting the broader implications its findings have from a cross‐nationally comparative perspective.     

Investments to create bargaining power: the case of franchising

Hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems join two or more independent parties under a contract. The ability of each party to achieve its goals depend upon the relative bargaining power in the relationship established by the contract. Using transaction cost economics and Porter's (1980) characterization of sources of bargaining power, this paper argues that the franchisor can make investments in activities such as tapered integration and buyer selection to increase its bargaining power and decrease conflict and litigation in a franchise system. Specifically, tapered integration (owning some units while franchising others), selecting inexperienced franchisees, and employing a long training program are predicted to increase the franchisor's bargaining power and the franchisee's compliance with franchisor standards. An empirical analysis of litigation in restaurant franchise systems supports the theoretical hypotheses. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward a social fitness perspective on contract design: Contract legitimacy and influence strategy

The effectiveness of contracts in terms of cooperative efficiency and relational outcomes in interorganizational relationships has become critical in today's volatile markets. However, extant research on the effect of contracts on trust has found inconsistent results, possibility because of its overwhelming focus on an economic fitness perspective at the expense of a social fitness perspective. Drawing insights from institutional theory, we focus on legitimacy building in interfirm contract design, investigate how contract legitimacies (i.e., regulative, normative, and cognitive) influence the effectiveness of interfirm contract design, and further explore the moderating effects of influence strategies that are applied in the process of contract implementation. Using longitudinal field survey data and archival data, this study finds that the three types of contract legitimacy play different roles in influencing compliance and trust and that noncoercive influence strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulative and normative legitimacy better than coercive influence strategies on trust. The findings offer new theoretical and managerial insights into the role of institutional environments in the effectiveness of contract design in manufacturer–distributor relationships.     

The Employment Contract: From Collective Procedures to Individual Rights

The article analyses the institutional basis and form of the employment contract in Britain using the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. It assesses the extent to which collective bargaining still regulates pay and non‐pay aspects of employment. While collective procedures have declined in importance, there has been an increase in legal governance of the employment relationship. Logistic regression analysis establishes that both contractual formalization and legal compliance are greater in larger organizations and where trade unions are present. Trade union activity is also associated with superior fringe benefits. Collective bargaining thus appears to facilitate both access to and improvement on statutory rights.     

Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence from Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross‐sectional data. Results from analyzing separate transitions show that leaving industry‐level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference approach indicate that particularly the transitions to no coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a “true” wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once we account for differences in pretransition wage growth.     

Do Public-Sector Strike Bans Really Prevent Conflict?

This article examines the effectiveness of strike-ban laws in reducing industrial conflict at the municipal level of government. Our central findings are that job actions were higher in states that had no law or no finality in the law, publicity campaigns were used as a pressure tactic in the bargaining process, and grievance delays were greatest under final offer arbitration. Thus dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no finality in dispute resolution whether or not an explicit framework for bargaining exists.     

The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion in Dispute Outcomes

The effects of risk aversion and of arbitration costs on bargaining outcomes are investigated using data from 171 simulated negotiations. The results are generally consistent with predictions from a simple economic bargaining model. We find strong evidence that directs costs of arbitration lead to higher rates of agreement. There is only weak evidence the risk aversion is related to the probability of agreement, but negotiated settlements seems to favor the less risk-averse bargainer.     

Performance of foreign subsidiaries “in” and “from” Asia: A review,synthesis and research agenda

The performance of foreign subsidiaries (FS) has been the topic of studies since the beginning of the international business (IB) field. However, research findings are contradictory because of the disparate foci of individual studies. In this review paper, we first identify key determinants of the performance of FS through a structured content analysis of 73 articles and 679 relationships since the year 2000. Second, we explain the effects of each determinant, and perform meta-analysis to determine which relationships are statistically meaningful. Third, we compare the effects of determinants across different combinations of home and host contexts, based on which, we provide possible explanations of previous inconsistent findings. We conclude by offering new theoretical directions to better understand determinants of the performance of FS.     

固定总价合同中应注意的问题

随着竞争的加剧，固定总价合同的应用越来越广泛，本阐述了固定总价合同应用中应注意的几个问题，合同的应用条件，计价应注意的事项，付款应注意的问题，分析了固定总价合同的风险分配，固定总价合同与单价合同的区别。     

Labor Contract Duration,Indexation, and Wage Adjustment: Interdependence and Inflation Propagation Mechanisms

We study simultaneously the three main outcomes of collective bargaining negotiations, namely indexation, non‐indexed wage adjustment, and contract duration. The wage adjustment equation accommodates varying degrees of wage indexation in the current and previous contracts. The elasticity of indexation, a latent variable, deals with both the incidence and intensity of wage indexation and links consistently with the wage equation. Duration, which may change between contracts, is shown to depend on indexed and non‐indexed wage adjustment, obviating the need for expected inflation in the empirical duration equations of earlier work. Complex intra‐ and inter‐contract inflation propagation mechanisms involve expected inflation and inflation uncertainty in an essential way. The model accounts for the secular doubling of contract duration and dramatic decrease in indexation and non‐contingent wage adjustment.     

WIC Contract Spillover Effects

Under the U.S. Special Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, the three major infant formula manufacturers compete for WIC supply contracts, state by state. Policy makers have been puzzled by the question of why the contracted WIC price is substantially lower than the retail (non-WIC) price. Our explanation is that winning the WIC contract is extremely valuable to a manufacturer because of a spillover effect: The increased retail shelf-space that is dedicated to the WIC brand and the WIC logo increases non-WIC sales. We identify this effect by showing the variations in market shares of winning and losing firms that follow WIC contract changes. Immediately after the contract change, there is an immediate increase in the market share of the WIC contract winner and an equal drop in the loser’s share because of new WIC purchases. Then, over an extended period, the spillover effect increases the winner’s share and decreases the loser’s share as retailers shift shelf space from the loser to the winner.