Downstream Value of Upstream Finance

We examine market value implications of managing liquidity via supplier financing. Results suggest a direct link between shareholder wealth and use of trade credit, and the relation exhibits significant cross‐sectional variation. In particular, the market value of trade credit varies with the liquidity of goods sold and competition in product markets. Evidence also indicates the value‐supplier financing association strengthens with financial constraint, which supports the financing motive for trade credit. Further findings are consistent with the transaction cost motive. Overall, we conclude that shareholders value the strategic benefits associated with supplier financing and that downstream firms’ characteristics influence this value.     

Interest Rates in Trade Credit Markets

All things equal, interest rates should increase with the borrower's risk. And yet, Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) cannot find such a positive relation in a broad sample of trade credit contracts. We shed some light on this puzzle by arguing that competition between informed and uninformed suppliers weakens the link between the trade credit cost and the borrower's creditworthiness. Our model implies that trade credit rates are more likely to increase with the borrower's risk if suppliers are less profitable, have high cost of funds, or sell inputs to firms plagued by moral hazard and financial distress.     

Trade Credit Risk Management: The Role of Executive Risk‐Taking Incentives

In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit.     

Trade credit and supplier competition

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.     

Agency costs and product market competition: The case of audit pricing in Greece

Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs are not dependent on product market competition. However, elsewhere in the economics literature, theoretical analysis and empirical research have indicated that product market competition reduces agency costs by reducing the marginal cost of eliciting effort from agents. We investigate the relationship between product market competition and audit fee, as an example of agency cost. Taking advantage of a proprietary data set for Greek audit firms, we find that the audit fee and audit hours are inversely associated with client firm product market competition. We conclude that audit effort, as an agency cost, is reduced where competitive forces reduce the need for shareholders to bear the costs of monitoring agents.     

Agency Cost,Dividend Policy and Growth: The Special Case of REITs

Dividend distribution enhances information transmission, and mitigates agency conflicts by restricting managers’ access to free cash flow, and exposing firms to the scrutiny and monitoring by market participants when raising external capital. The reduction in agency costs and improvement in information dissemination reduce the cost of funds, and investment at more competitive cost of capital enhances firm value. For REITs, because of the mandated high dividend distribution, growth depends on the availability of external capital at competitive rates, such that mitigation of agency costs is critical to sustain growth. We examine the relation between dividends and growth with a sample of U.S. equity REITs. Our data reveal a significantly positive relation between externally financed growth and dividend payments. The relation is stronger among REITs with more growth opportunities, and REITs that issue new equity and debt. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that by reducing agency costs and facilitating capital raising, dividends enhance growth.     

Product market competition and cost stickiness

Extant literature on cost stickiness has focused on how firm-specific characteristics affect the asymmetric cost behavior. In this paper, we explore how a firm’s operating environment affects the firm’s cost stickiness. Specifically, we examine the effect of product market competition on cost stickiness since a firm’s investment and cost retention decisions partly depend on how the firm interacts with its rival firms in the product markets. Using two firm-level text-based product market competition measures extracted from management disclosures in firms’ 10-K filings (Li et al. in J Account Res 51(2):399–436, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips in Rev Financ Stud 23(10):3773–3811, 2010; J Polit Econ, 2015), we find strong evidence consistent with cost asymmetry increasing in competition after controlling for known economic determinants of cost stickiness. In additional analyses, we also find that the effect of product market competition on the degree of cost stickiness increases in firms’ financial strength, likely because management in financially stronger firms has more resources for investment expenditures in spite of a sales fall. We also find that cost stickiness is increasing in competition if management is optimistic about future demand, whereas competition is not associated with cost asymmetry if management is pessimistic about future demand. Finally, we find that the relationship between competition and cost stickiness, although statistically insignificant at conventional levels, is more pronounced for single-segment firms relative to multi-segment firms.     

论高质量审计与提升负债的治理效应——基于代理成本与代理效率视角的经验检验

以2007～2010年我国A股上市公司为样本,分别从代理成本和代理效率的视角考察了高质量审计是否有助于提升负债的治理功效。研究发现:高质量审计与短期借款之间存在协同治理效应,该效应有助于提升代理效率但无助于降低代理成本;进一步地,高质量审计与短期借款之间的协同治理效应仅显著存在于金融发展水平高地区的上市公司中。此外,附加检验的结果显示,高质量审计有助于透过改进代理效率提升商业信用的治理功效且这一效应只在法治化程度较高地区的上市公司中存在。上述研究结论揭示了我国当前制度环境下高质量审计提升债务治理功效的路径及影响因素。     

How Do Firms Choose Between Intermediary and Supplier Finance?

This paper examines firms’ short‐term financing choices between intermediated loans and trade credit. I test two sets of empirical hypotheses: 1) hypotheses concerning the cross‐sectional differences in the level of intermediary finance for firms that use different levels of trade credit and 2) hypotheses concerning the dynamics of trade credit growth. I find strong evidence that for firms with high agency costs, the use of trade credit facilitates access to conventional bank loans. The evidence is consistent with theories based on the signaling role of trade credit provision and suppliers’ liquidation advantage.     

Managerial discretion and agency cost in Indian market

This paper investigates empirically the impact of managerial discretion on agency cost from the perspective of SG&A cost asymmetry and examines how corporate governance moderates this relationship. The analysis shows mixed evidence in favor for cost behavior and managerial choices in the Indian market. The cost asymmetry involves not only cost stickiness but also the anti-sticky behavior of SG&A cost under certain circumstances. The main drivers for this disparity are owing to manager's resource adjustment decision, the future expectation of sales and managers' empire-building behavior. Furthermore, findings suggest that strong corporate governance alleviates empire-building behavior of managers. Additional analysis shows, the asymmetric behavior of SG&A cost in crisis period is mainly a result of managers' resource adjustment decision and future expectation of sales change. Manager's empire-building behavior does not play an explicit role in this period. Next, the findings show that managers' discretion is influenced by future value creation potential of SG&A cost. Manager's empire-building behavior is more pronounced in low-value creation sample firms compared to high-value creation sample. Thus, manager's choice for resource adjustment decision and empire-building behavior changes according to the future value creation of SG&A cost, financial conditions and corporate governance mechanisms in Indian companies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study performed in Indian capital market where the SG&A cost asymmetry tests the managers' empire-building behavior. Overall, findings of the study indicate manager's resource adjustment decisions and empire-building behavior caused by their consideration and this results in a form of agency costs. In comparison with developed markets, Indian markets have relatively less agency problem due to managerial empire-building behavior.     

How does credit risk affect cost management strategies? Evidence on the initiation of credit default swap and sticky cost behavior

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for less liquid, financially distressed, and lower credit quality firms. We also find that CDS firms with a reduction in cost stickiness will exhibit lower future bankruptcy risk than CDS firms without such as reduction in stickiness. Collectively, our findings suggest that the CDS-induced “empty creditor problem” causes reference firms to undertake more conservative cost management practices to alleviate downside risk.     

The bright side of the internal labor market: Evidence from the labor cost stickiness of firms affiliated with privately owned business groups in China

We examine whether having an internal labor market can help a firm affiliated with a privately owned business group (POBG) reduce labor cost stickiness. Our findings suggest that, when a POBG-affiliated firm experiences a decrease in sales, it has lower labor cost stickiness than an otherwise equivalent firm that is not affiliated with a POBG. Specifically, we find that, on average, a POBG-affiliated firm entirely mitigates labor cost stickiness when it has a decrease in sales. In addition, we document that, to adjust its labor cost downward, a POBG-affiliated firm hires fewer employees, rather than paying lower wages. We show that the lower labor cost stickiness is due to movement of employees from the focal firm to other firms within the same POBG. When sales fall, the POBG reallocates excess employees at the focal firm to other firms within the business group via an internal labor market, and the focal firm thereby increases its per capita profit. Moreover, we find that agency cost mediates the impact of a POBG on labor cost stickiness. When the external market is less effective or the POBG headquarters have strong incentives, the effect of POBG affiliation on the reduction in an affiliated firm's labor cost stickiness is more salient.     

Asset redeployability and trade credit

We examine the relationship between asset redeployability and firms' use of trade credit. Using a large sample of US public firms, we document that firms with more redeployable assets use significantly less trade credit. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the negative relation between asset redeployability and trade credit is more salient for firms with more financing constraints, high levels of information asymmetry, and less corporate liquidity. These findings remain robust to alternative measures of asset redeployability, trade credit, and alternative regression specifications, and they are not driven by an endogeneity problem. Finally, we find that firms with fewer redeployable assets adjust trade credit to the target level relatively quickly when compared with firms having more redeployable assets. Overall, findings from this study provide robust evidence that asset redeployability has an important bearing on firms' short-term financing.     

会计信息可比性与企业商业信用融资——基于企业市场地位和行业竞争环境的双重考量

不同于传统的基于资本市场情境进行的会计信息可比性经济后果研究,将研究场景拓展至商品市场中企业供应链层面,考察企业会计信息可比性能否影响供应链伙伴的商业信用政策制定,进而反映到企业的商业信用融资水平.研究发现:会计信息可比性越高的企业,其商业信用融资水平也越高;会计信息可比性对商业信用融资的促进作用只在市场地位较低、所处行业竞争程度较高的企业中存在.进一步的拓展研究证实,提高会计信息可比性可以有效缓解我国中小微企业普遍存在的融资难问题.     

Assessing the credit worthiness of Italian SMEs and mini-bond issuers

A number of innovations have been introduced in the last five years to counter the devastating impact of credit rationing in Europe, particularly from traditional bank lending. This is a major problem for the small and medium size firms' sector in Europe, which has also suffered from bank regulatory concerns of capital adequacy, heightened emphasis on default risk of bank counterparties and the general malfunctioning of credit extension and private sector growth. In Italy, some of these less traditional sources of funding for SMEs have started to become more popular and the development of the mini-bond market is a clear example. We believe “mini-bonds” can be a success in Italy as long as the market supplies an attractive risk/return tradeoff to investors as well as affordable and flexible financing for borrowers. Assessments of credit risk must be convincing and objective, providing complements to the traditional rating agency process. In this study, we develop a new innovative model to assess SMEs' creditworthiness and we test it on the companies that have issued mini-bonds so far. Our findings confirm that the amount of information asymmetry is still high in the market and is affecting the level of risk/return trade off potentially reducing the number of investors and small businesses that would be interested in using this new channel to fund their business growth.     

Customer concentration and loan contract terms

We study pricing and non-pricing features of loan contracts to gauge how the credit market evaluates a firm’s customer-base profile and supply-chain relations. Higher customer concentration increases interest rate spreads and the number of restrictive covenants featured in newly initiated as well as renegotiated bank loans. Customer concentration also abbreviates the maturity of those loans as well as the relationship between firms and their banks. These effects are intensified by customers’ financial distress, the level of relationship-specific investments, and the use of trade credit in customer–supplier relations. Our evidence shows that a deeper exposure to a small set of large customers bears negative consequences for a firm’s relations with its creditors, revealing limits to integration along the supply chain.     

Industry Structure and Corporate Debt Maturity

We examine how industry competition affects firms’ choice of short‐term debt. We find that the percentage of short‐term debt is positively related to industry concentration at low levels of concentration, and inversely related to industry concentration at higher levels of concentration. This nonlinear relation is stronger in industries where firms are either more homogeneous or compete more aggressively. Moreover, we find that firms with shorter‐maturity debt are less aggressive than their rivals in the product market. The overall evidence suggests that although financial contracts alleviate agency problems, they exacerbate the risk of predation.     

Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high‐risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low‐risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high‐risk agents. Second, we identify a trade‐off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low‐risk market to the less elastic high‐risk market. Third, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further, at the cost of efficiency.     

Prospect theory and a manager's decision to trade a blind principal bid basket

We analyze asset managers' decisions to execute substantial baskets of stocks. Such transactions can be executed in two ways. The first method is through blind auctions with unique features known as blind principal bids (BPBs). The manager learns the trading cost once the auction process determines the commission. The second method is to use an agency trade. In this case, the asset manager faces an actual trading cost that is unknown before execution due to market impact uncertainty. Using proprietary data, we investigate the manager's choice between BPBs and agency trade in a natural experiment with large monetary stakes. The volume traded in each sample basket is significant, which can amount to over 0.5% of the NYSE daily share volume. Our findings show that managers' behavior is more consistent with prospect theory than the expected utility framework. When asset managers trade BPB baskets, they are reluctant to realize the potential higher cost of agency trade and opt for the fixed cost of BPBs instead. Thus, our results complement the literature on the disposition effect by demonstrating that managers' trading cost decisions exhibit “play it safe” behavior.