Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities.We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or near the first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation.     

商业银行与资本市场融合过程的风险分析

微型金融是小额信贷金融多样化和持续化的结果。微型金融理论是在小额信贷理论基础上发展而来。本文从金融深化论、金融创新论、信息不对称理论分析了微型金融理论基础,并对国内外研究状况进行了梳理。     

Market Structure, Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking

This paper discusses the effect of capital regulation on the risk taking behavior of commercial banks. We first theoretically show that capital regulation works differently in different market structures of banking sectors. In lowly concentrated markets, capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking behavior because banks’ franchise values are low and banks have incentives to pursue risky strategies in order to increase their franchise values. If franchise values are high, on the other hand, the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking is ambiguous. We then test the model predictions on a cross-country sample including 421 commercial banks from 61 countries. We find that capital regulation is effective in mitigating risk taking only in markets with a low degree of concentration. The results remain robust after accounting for financial sector development, legal system efficiency, and for other country and bank-specific characteristics.     

市场竞争、资本约束与银行风险承担行为调整

本文通过运用我国14家商业银行1996～2009年的数据,研究了市场竞争下资本约束与银行风险承担行为之间的关系。结果表明:首先,资本与风险行为之间存在弱负相关关系,且这两者之间的相互影响程度不对称。其次,产权属性和产权结构对银行风险行为无显著影响,其要害在于:股份制银行风险承担行为的"工农中建化"现象。再者,市场竞争对银行风险行为具有显著的正面影响,且它对银行风险承担行为的影响系数大于资本约束。也即,伴随着国有银行制度改革的推进,多元化产权竞争格局逐渐形成,一方面银行业市场化竞争日趋激烈,另一方面银行资产负债表中国家声誉的不可退出性,使得中国银行业在完全隐性存款保险制度的默许下,内生出风险承担偏向。     

资本充足率、市值资产比例与银行风险

基于风险和回报的基本关系,本文检验了以会计指标为主要计量尺度的资本充足率和以市场指标为计量手段的市值资产比例是否能够代表银行风险。研究发现,会计指标在没有被操控的情况下可以预测银行风险。虽然资本充足率也能够反映银行风险,但市值资产比例对银行股价回报的解释力更强,尤其在危机时期。本文建议,监管机构依然可以坚持选用资本充足率这样的会计指标监控银行风险,同时辅以市场指标,因为中国资本市场受到人为因素和政策因素干扰较多,股票价格不一定如实反映内涵价值,还应该坚持以会计指标为主。     

Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe

We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank‐level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of “equity‐friendly” market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both “equity‐friendly” and “credit‐friendly” market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely.     

商业银行市场风险的度量框架研究

本文着眼于新巴塞尔协议下商业银行的市场风险管理,分析了我国银行业最突出的市场风险因素,较为细致地研究了市场风险的模型。结合我国商业银行实践,分析了国际上对市场风险的监管要求和度量框架,为我国商业银行的市场风险管理提供了参考意见。     

Bank Capital and Risk: Is Voluntary Disclosure Enough?

This paper considers whether banks have an incentive to disclose accurate information concerning their risk and capital adequacy. State-of-the-art capital regulation relies on quantitative capital requirements, bank supervision, and public disclosure of information to the markets. Is voluntary regulatory disclosure of risk information sufficient to achieve policy objectives? The game-theoretic model of this paper suggests that voluntary disclosure can be usefully supplemented with other regulatory tools, in particular with direct supervision and financial market discipline.     

Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline

This paper develops a structural model to evaluate contingent capital notes (CCN) of Basel III under alternative regulatory closure rules. Our dynamic model has a fixed default barrier and at specific discrete time points an additional higher default barrier depending on the closure threshold. The closed-form expressions of CCN and subordinated debts (SD) in the simple Merton model are presented to understand the convex relationship between the price and capital ratio trigger of CCN and to examine the effects of closure rules on CCN and SD through their derivatives’ properties. Our numerical results in the more general model show that a lax closure rule increases the price of SD and distorts the risk information of issuing banks, but not so for CCN. The policy implications are that CCN are more effective than SD in terms of enhancing market discipline because the price/yield information of CCN is more sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk than SD and will not be distorted by regulatory closure rules.     

德意志银行风险与资本管理

德意志银行是全球最大的全能制银行,2007年资产规模超过2万亿欧元,实现利润65亿欧元,股本收益率达16%,每股收益较上年增加7%.     

资本监管与银行风险:基于联立方程模型的实证分析

本文采用联立方程模型,利用我国36家商业银行的270份面板数据样本对我国商业银行资本监管、银行资本以及风险之间的关系进行了实证分析.结果表明:在资本监管下,商业银行会同时考虑其资本与风险的变化;监管压力总体而言会显著地降低银行的风险,但对上市银行风险的影响并不明显,而监管压力对银行资本产生影响并不显著.     

证券风险转嫁为银行风险的形成路径与防范策略

近年来,由于证券市场的风险骤增以及银行的违规操作,导致证券风险向银行风险转化或转嫁,成为银行传统风险之外的主要风险.银行盲目过度垒上市公司以及对券商的违规操作是证券风险转化为银行风险的主要形成路径,强化银行对证券业融资的风险理念、规范信贷融资行为、构筑风险预警机制等,才能有效防范证券风险转化为银行风险.     

交易账户市场风险资本要求计量方法述评

为了引导和规范各银行进行市场风险管理,巴塞尔银行监管委员会提出了度量市场风险的两种方法：标准法和内部模型法,市场风险的范围包括交易账户中的利率风险、股权风险以及外汇风险和商品风险。鉴于我国传统上注重信用风险管理,对市场风险研究不够,因此,结合我国银行实际对这两种方法进行研究是必要的。     

A Theory of Bank Capital

Banks can create liquidity precisely because deposits are fragile and prone to runs. Increased uncertainty makes deposits excessively fragile, creating a role for outside bank capital. Greater bank capital reduces the probability of financial distress but also reduces liquidity creation. The quantity of capital influences the amount that banks can induce borrowers to pay. Optimal bank capital structure trades off effects on liquidity creation, costs of bank distress, and the ability to force borrower repayment. The model explains the decline in bank capital over the last two centuries. It identifies overlooked consequences of having regulatory capital requirements and deposit insurance.     

The Bank Capital Decision: A Time Series—Cross Section Analysis

This paper seeks to explain the dramatic decline in capital to asset ratios in U.S. commercial banks during the last two decades. It is hypothesized that the rise in nominal interest rates during this period might have contributed substantially to the fall in capital ratios. Time series-cross section estimation supports the hypothesis regarding the interest rate.     

Subordinated Debt,Market Discipline,and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value‐destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank.     

银行信贷、市场竞争与企业资本配置效率

市场竞争影响企业资本配置效率,银行信贷对这一竞争机制有重要调节作用.根据2007-2019年中国上市公司数据建立了投资—投资机会敏感性模型,模型结果表明:第一,市场竞争有利于提升企业资本配置效率,宽松的信贷有利于市场竞争发挥正向调节作用;第二,银行信贷调节作用明显,银行信贷与股权治理机制为替代关系,与信息披露、管理层激...     

A Test for Increased Capital Market Integration

This study examines the pricing of assets under differential ownership restrictions. A model is developed which yields a coefficient of integration that is dimension free and is directly related to the strength of all barriers to international investment. These characteristics enable an intertemporal comparison of the level of capital market integration. The model is then used to test the hypothesis of increased capital market integration over time. Using data from Morgan Stanley Capital International and analyzing them with the non-parametric Page test, support is found for this hypothesis. The results are robust to the currency numeraire used.