产品种数、寡头竞争与国际贸易摩擦

本文提出一个理论模型,探讨在寡头垄断的市场条件下,各国进行国际贸易利益分配的基本形式以及国际贸易摩擦产生的基本原因。同时,还在这个基础上,对理论研究的结论进行实证分析。     

Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism*

Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that income-increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income-decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.     

International Capital Competition and Environmental Standards

This paper examines the welfare effects of capital taxation and environmental standards with and without a government spending constraint or international tax credits. This analysis delineates the intricate linkages of the two policy measures to both private income and government welfare. Loosening environmental control leads to more capital tax revenue for the government. The optimal capital tax rate may be of any sign, depending upon the ranking of the weights of government objectives and private utility. The same criterion also applies in determining how stringent the optimal environmental standards should be.     

International Accounting: A Quest for Research*

Abstract. This article complements the 1993 report by the AAA International Accounting Section's Committee on Research Methodology. It focuses on seemingly paradoxical observations and conflicting findings reported in the international accounting literature. The purpose of this article is to stimulate our collective intellectual curiosity with the hope that it will motivate future researchers to search for explanations of the observed unexplained phenomena. Although the development of a framework for the systematic investigation of the unexplained observations is beyond the scope of this article, I offer a conjecture that might be considered in such an examination. Résumé. L'article qui suit est un complément au rapport 1993 du comité sur la méthodologie de recherche de la division de la comptabilité internationale de l'AAA. Il est centré sur les observations paradoxales en apparence et les résultats conflictuels à première vue exposés dans les publications de comptabilité internationale. L'auteur a pour but de stimuler notre curiosité intellectuelle collective dans l'espoir que cette sensibilisation incite les futurs chercheurs à s'intéresser aux explications possibles des phénomènes énigmatiques qui sont observés. Bien que l'élaboration d'un cadre de référence destiné à l'analyse systématique des observations inexpliquées dépasse le projet de l'auteur, ce dernier propose une hypothèse intéressante dans la perspective d'un tel examen.     

Optimal Contracting,Accounting Standards,and Market Structures*

In this study I use a principal-agent framework to analyze optimal contracting under two accounting standards, referred to as historical cost (HC) and market value (MV), and under differing asset market assumptions. I distinguish HC from MV by the way revenue is recognized and in the reporting discretion allowed. The MV standard recognizes both realized and unrealized holding gains; HC recognizes only realized holding gains. MV allows the manager reporting discretion; the HC standard does not. Also, distinguishing an asset's value-in-use (VIU) from its net realizable value (NRV), I consider markets where the asset's VIU and NRV are always equal as well as markets where VIU and NRV differ. I show the following. If an asset's NRV and VIU are equal and if the manager's available reporting discretion is known, the principal prefers the MV standard because it provides better information about the manager's effort. However, the principal may prefer the HC standard if sufficiently uncertain about the manager's reporting discretion or if the asset's NRV exceeds its VIU, so that expected revenue is sufficiently enhanced by selling the asset earlier. Using an example (normal distribution and mean/variance preferences with linear contracts), I provide a case where the principal prefers the HC standard. Also, I compare the optimal effort and contract under each standard, and provide comparative static results that show how expected revenue, cost, and net income change due to changes in certain model parameters.     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards Has Enhanced Chinese Company Transparency

The research reported here shows that China＇s recent adoption （ASBE） has increased the quality of Chinese financial reporting of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises With China＇s decade of World Trade Organization （WTO） membership marked by dazzling economic growth, it is useful to reflect on how financial reporting itself can assist in the country＇s future progress. Critical to the success of ensuring strength for this burgeoning economy is attraction of foreign investment capital. As China＇s internal consumption grows,     

技术标准竞争的权力结构限制与中国技术标准战略

技术标准意味着财富和国际权力,它不仅是世界高新技术产业竞争的制高点,而且是产业经营的高级形态。围绕技术标准的国际竞争日益成为市场主体间的技术、经济和政治的动态博弈。巨大产业规模、创新研发能力、庞大的市场以及国际间讨价还价能力是制定并拥有技术标准的基本条件。中国技术标准战略具备成功的基本条件并取得初步成效,但同时也面临着市场和标准制定体系两方面的权力结构限制。中国企业在国际技术标准体系中的地位只能通过符合权力结构的长期博弈逐渐得到改善。     

Game Theoretical Research on Formulation and Perfection of International Accounting Standards

This paper makes a game-theoretical research on formulation and perfection of International Accounting Standards. The implementation of lASs is not compulsory, but supported by some important international organizations, which demonstrates that the essence of lASs is a kind of quasi-international contract. IASs should be in Nash equilibrium as an international contractual arrangement; otherwise, it couldn＇t be established or self-enforcing. The phrasal characteristics of lASs＇ formulation and perfection decide that developing countries may have limited opportunities to merge into international economic circle by formulating their own high-quality Accounting Standards and cultivating their own high-quality accounting personnel.     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

寡头竞争市场下共同配送定价方法研究

共同配送采用多个企业联合组织起来实施配送活动的方式,其优势越来越受到重视,关于共同配送的理论研究也越来越多,但是对于定价问题还一直是个难题。在前人研究的基础上,引入共同配送服务质量因素,建立寡头竞争市场下共同配送定价模型,并设计粒子群算法,采用帕累托改进方法和总收益最大解方法对模型进行具体求解,得到相关的结论,最后验证了模型和算法的有效性。     

跨国公司全球竞争战略与网络型寡占市场结构

跨国公司以跨国并购、研发国际化和组织结构变迁为主要特征的全球战略,不仅推动全球化进程,也深刻地影响着国际产业组织的变迁,最终形成了国际市场中跨国公司以知识为基础的网络寡占。新型寡占的市场结构突出了跨国公司效率和福利的改进,同时也强化了跨国公司在国际市场的垄断。     

R&D Reporting Biases and Their Consequences*

The immediate expensing of research and development (R&D) expenditures is often justified by the conservatism principle. However, no accounting procedure consistently applied can be conservative throughout the firm's life. We therefore ask the following questions: (1) When is the expensing of R&D conservative and when is it aggressive, relative to R&D capitaliza‐tion? (2) What are the capital‐market implications of these reporting biases? To address these questions we construct a model of profitability biases (differences between reported profitability under R&D expensing and capitalization) and show that the key drivers of the reporting biases are the differences between R&D growth and earnings growth (momentum), and between R&D growth and return on equity (ROE). Companies with a high R&D growth rate relative to their profitability (typically early life‐cycle companies) report conservatively, while firms with a low R&D growth rate (mature companies) tend to report aggressively under current generally accepted accounting principles. Our empirical analysis, covering the period 1972‐2003, generally supports the analytical predictions. In the valuation analysis we find evidence consistent with investor fixation on the reported profitability measures: we detect undervaluation of conservatively reporting firms and overvaluation of aggressively reporting firms. These misvaluations appear to be corrected when the reporting biases reverse from conservative to aggressive and vice versa. This evidence is consistent with behavioral finance arguments about investor cognitive biases.     

国际竞争的价值分析

文章在劳动价值论的基础上,对不同发展程度国家的企业竞争的动态博弈分析证明,存在使这些国家社会福利最大化的最优竞争条件.这意味着这些国家都可以通过影响本国企业的国际生产行为,实现国际竞争的利益双赢.