关于我国国际税收情报交换工作的思考

目前,国际税收情报交换在跨国税收征管工作中发挥着越来越重要的作用,成为遏制跨国纳税人避税行为的有效手段之一。本文首先简单地介绍了国际税收情报交换的概念和作用,然后分析了我国国际税收情报交换工作中存在的一些问题,最后得出完善我国国际税收情报交换工作的一些建议。     

美国税收情报交换的经验与借鉴

税收情报交换是国际税收征管合作的重要形式之一,对经济全球化背景下打击跨国偷、逃税具有积极的意义。本文详细介绍了美国税收情报交换的机构设置、人员职责以及操作程序,并提出了学习借鉴美国经验以改进我国情报交换工作的建议。     

税收情报交换知识及案例简介

税收情报交换是我国作为税收协定缔约国承担的一项国际义务，也是我国和其他国家之间开展税收征管合作的主要方式。随着经济自由化和全球化，税收情报交换工作在加强对跨国纳税人的管理、核查国际收入和费用的分配以及跨国偷避税中起着越来越重要的作用。     

数据时代国际税收情报交换研究

经济全球化的到来,纳税人的涉税活动一般涉及多个国家,世界各国税收管辖权的重叠,带来了国际重复征税和纳税人跨国逃避税等问题,以税收情报交换为主要内容的国际税收合作积极开展。云计算的迅速发展,我国正逐渐的进入大数据时代。大数据的广泛应用给情报交换提供了新的思路。大数据完善税收情报交换网络系统,保证税收情报交换工作国际化、规范化和高效化。     

镇江市国税局提高跨国税源管理水平

江苏省镇江市国家税务局以税收征管“三化”为着力点,积极推进非居民税收、跨国税源评估、反避税、情报交换等国际税收项目化管理,提高了跨国税源管理的针对性和实效性,促进了涉外税收征管质量的提升。     

欧盟的税收情报交换

税收情报的国际交换是有关国家之间就税收的跨国征纳所进行的相互协助和为防止税收欺诈及偷漏税所进行的司法协助.税收情报的国际交换是在经济一体化、全球化和税收国际化的背景下,各国税务当局之间加强税务合作的一项重要内容,是国际税务协调的重要组成部分.目前欧盟在这一领域的实践最具有代表性.随着欧盟经济一体化程度不断深入,欧盟的税收情报交换机制也在日趋完善,并推动了欧盟的税收一体化进程.     

欧盟税收情报交换制度及启示

欧盟建立的税收情报交换法律制度基本上和OECD税收协定范本保持一致,而且更加细化和具可操作性。其特点是建立了丰富的情报交换方式,并实现了税收情报交换的电子化。它对在我国内地与香港、澳门地区间构建完善的税收情报交换制度提供了参考。     

国际税收情报交换的最新动态和启示

近年来,国际社会在税收情报交换领域采取了一系列重大行动,主要表现在:谈签税收情报交换协议成为国际税收合作的新趋势;OECD全面修订情报交换条款;税收情报交换成为全球税收论坛主题等。我国也应遵循国际惯例,谈签税收情报交换协议,维护国家权益并用好税收情报交换手段,提高国际税源管理质量。     

国际税收情报交换问题分析

国际税收情报交换是重要的反避税措施,其研究具有重要的理论和实践意义,而对于我国目前来说,在国际税收情报交换存在着很多的问题。本文将通过对我国目前国际税收情报交换存在的问题进行分析,在借鉴国外经验的基础上,提出对我国国际税收情报交换问题进行完善的政策建议。     

税收透明度和情报交换国际标准的建立及中国的应对

由于OECD反有害税收竞争运动的相关措施太过激进,因此在各国的普遍反对下,该运动的重心转为增强税法透明度和促进税收情报交换.2002年OECD全球税收论坛公布的《税收情报交换协议范本》确立了税收透明度和情报交换的高标准,这一标准后来因得到20国集团及联合国的认可而成为税收透明度和情报交换的国际标准.我国应审时度势,不进行可能有损我国利益的超出国际标准要求的情报交换,同时应尽量扩大情报交换网络,谈判修改双边税收协定中的情报交换条款.     

国际税收情报交换:发展与困境的思考

本文回顾了国际税收情报交换各种规范和内容的发展变化,对存在的问题及原因进行了分析,指出除了情报交换的技术性障碍以外,最根本的是情报交换中政府与企业之间、主权国家之间以及国家个体和国际组织之间的利益冲突,也即情报交换存在效率与公平问题。最后,文章对如何通过创新情报交换的制度和组织形式解决上述问题提出了构想。     

对OECD《为税收目的执行情报交换条款手册》的介绍与简评

税收情报交换是加强国际税收征管合作的重要形式之一,正日益引起世界各国税务当局的高度重视。为了进一步推进情报交换的开展,经济合作与发展组织(OECD)于2006年1月发表了新的情报交换操作手册。本文详细介绍了OECD新情报交换手册的内容,并对其进行了简要评析。     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

国际税收情报的证据效力

国际税收情报是缔约国的主管机关相互交换的税收信息。它对于加强国际税收征管,减少税收逃避行为具有非常重要的作用。但是,在现实执法过程中,国际税收情报如何具体运用,是否是证据,是否具有证据效力,是否可以直接作为定案的依据等问题尚没有明确的法律规定。本文就国际税收情报的证据效力问题进行初步的分析和探讨,认为税务机关应当正确认识国家税收情报的性质,一方面应重视其提供的信息和线索,另一方面又不能直接把国际税收情报作为定案的证据。     

Inclusive fiscal reform: ensuring fairness and transparency in the international tax system

In recent years, international taxation has received significant public and scholarly attention, and has been high on the international policy agenda. In this context, the work of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been central in reforming the international tax system. This paper is based on the keynote address delivered to the 2017 International Institute of Public Finance Annual Congress on 18 August 2017 in Tokyo by David Bradbury of the OECD, and highlights the OECD’s global tax agenda and how it can advance inclusive fiscal reform. The paper covers three major areas of the OECD’s work. First, it reviews the advances made by the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project to reduce BEPS, and the ongoing work to address the tax challenges of digitalisation. Second, it reviews the initiatives involving the exchange of taxpayer information, and the development of new standards on Automatic Exchange of Information and Exchange of Information on Request by the OECD. Finally, the paper considers how these international initiatives provide policymakers with more domestic tax policy options and recommendations on how tax systems can be better designed to achieve inclusive growth.     

With which countries do tax havens share information?

In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 565 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008–2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.     

Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not

The issue of capital tax competition is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital-taxation exists. However, the sustainability of residence-based capital taxation depends on the exchange of information about foreign financial investments between tax authorities. This paper analyzes the incentives of tax authorities to voluntarily provide information. We show that voluntary information exchange is an equilibrium in a standard small-country model of tax competition, whereas it may not be an equilibrium when the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy.