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要闻图片新闻中美举行首次战略经济对话首次中美战略经济对话12月14日-15日在北京人民大会堂举行。中国国务院副总理吴仪和美国财政部长保尔森作为两国元首的特别代表共同主持此次对话,对话主题为“中国的发展道路和中国的经济发展战略”。双方主管经济的官员几乎全体出席,就贸易、投资、能源、环境和可持续发展等问题,进行了广泛而深入的讨论,达成部分共识,并确定了未来六个月的工作重点。专家分析指出,首次中美战略经济对话是历史上规格最高的经济官员交流活动,其影响将远远超出经济层面,嵌入未来十几年中美两国关系的深层。第二轮中美战…     

合作创新中美共谋发展

2007年5月第二次中美战略经济对话期间,双方就《中美战略经济对话下加强创新合作的原则和成果》文件达成共识,两国同意在2007年共同举办关于创新生态系统的研讨会,组织专家讨论并分享双方在发展有益于技术创新环境方面的经验.……     

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中美举行第二次战略经济对话第二次中美战略经济对话于5月22日至23日在华盛顿举行。中国国务院副总理吴仪和美国财长保尔森作为两国元首特别代表,共同主持了此次对话。中美双方围绕服务业、投资与透明度、能源和环境、平衡增长和创新等议题进行了讨论。美国财政部长保尔森要求中方迅速缓解贸易与金融不平衡,称“美国人已经没有耐心了”。吴     

中美成功举行第四轮中美海洋法和极地事务对话

<正>根据中美战略和经济对话框架下的有关共识,2013年4月8日至9日,中美外交和海洋问题专家在美国加利福尼亚州的阿拉米达市举行了第四轮中美海洋法和极地事务对话。双方就海洋、海洋法和极地等领域的问题进行了广泛讨论,内容丰富、成果丰硕。对话由中国外交部和美国国务院共同主办,美国海岸警卫队承办,美国海岸警卫队太平洋地区司令官     

中美战略与经济对话回顾

中美战略与经济对话,是中美两国在双边性、区域性和全球范围等广泛领域内,对近期和长期战略性和经济利益方面的挑战和机遇进行磋商的一个现行加强化机制。其前身为2006年中国国家主席胡锦涛和美国前任总统布什所创立的中美战略经济对话。对话举行期间,中     

中美战略与经济对话圆满成功

为期两天的第三轮中美战略与经济对话于5月10日在美国首都华盛顿落下了帷幕。与前两轮中美战略与经济对话相比,本轮中美战略与经济对话紧紧围绕胡锦涛主席访美期间取得的成果展开,双方达成一致,共同确立了中美关于促进经济强劲、可持续、平衡增长和经济合作的全面框架。本次对话出现了四大精彩亮点。     

中美战略与经济对话圆满成功

为期两天的第三轮中美战略与经济对话于5月10日在美国首都华盛顿落下了帷幕。与前两轮中美战略与经济对话相比，本轮中美战略与经济对话紧紧围绕胡锦涛主席访美期间取得的成果展开，双方达成一致，共同确立了中美关于促进经济强劲、可持续、平衡增长和经济合作的全面框架。本次对话出现了四大精彩亮点。     

聚焦中美战略与经济对话

中美战略与经济对话是两国间的定期高层对话机制,是中美双方就事关两国关系发展的战略性、长期性、全局性问题而进行的战略对话。中美战略与经济对话机制建立在此前中美战略对话与中美战略经济对话两大机制的基础上。2006年12月至2008年12月,中美举行了五次战略、经济对话。从2009年开始合并为中美战略与经济对话。     

凝聚信心恢复经济增长,加强中美经济合作

中美战略与经济对话建立在"中美战略对话"及"中美战略经济对话"这两大机制的基础之上。2009年4月,中国国家主席胡锦涛与美国总统奥巴马在20国集团伦敦金融峰会上首次会晤,两国元首一致同意共同努力建设     

历次中美战略经济对话

第四次中关战略经济对话17日在美国马里兰州安纳波利斯举行。2006年以来。中美战略经济对话已先后举行过三次。通过对话，中美双方增进了了解，扩大了共识，加强了互信，有力地推动了中美经贸关系的发展与合作。     

Auric Goldfinger,Henry Morgenthau,and Camp David: August 1971

There were two dramatic changes in United States (U.S.) government policy toward the monetary role of gold in the last 100 years. The first was in 1933-34. Private holdings of gold were nationalized in March 1933. Then, the U.S. Treasury adopted a new parity for the U.S. dollar of $35.00 an ounce at the end of January 1934. Gold production surged, the private demand for gold fell sharply and the U.S. experienced large increases in the foreign demand for U.S. dollar securities. There was a massive flow of gold to the U.S. The second change in U.S. gold policy followed a meeting at Camp David in August 1971 when the U.S. Treasury closed its gold window because of the perception that there might be a run on its gold holdings as they declined toward $10 billion. Some U.S. officials sought to diminish the monetary role of gold, which was accomplished by, in effect, setting the U.S. monetary price at zero. The anticipation of some U.S. officials at the Camp David meeting was that the persistent U.S. payments problem would disappear once foreign currencies no longer had parities in terms of the U.S. dollar. The prices of these foreign currencies would increase and the U.S. trade surplus would become larger. Instead, many foreign central banks became even larger buyers of U.S. dollar securities, which led to a higher price of the U.S. dollar and a U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. international investment position morphed from the world’s largest creditor country to the world’s largest debtor.

     

后危机时代美国财政可持续性研究

美国国债绝对额已跃居世界首位,美国财政可持续性受到世界各国的广泛关注。通过构建财政可持续性分析框架,结合经验数据实证分析,结果表明,尽管美国财政现阶段仍然处于可持续水平,但已经出现偏离稳态的迹象。进一步研究发现,未来美国债务货币化程度将不断加深,由此促使未来国债利率负担不断攀升,同时债务高位运行将导致经济增速回落,财政偏离可持续性水平的现象难以改变,如果美国没有调整财政政策,那么财政发生危机的概率极高。     

美国产业结构变动与服务业的发展

20世纪80年代以来,美国积极调整发展战略,国民经济取得了长足发展。本文在介绍美国产业结构变化的基础上,对美国服务业的发展以及美国与服务业和服务贸易相关的政策措施进行探讨。由于我国目前正处于产业结构调整的关键时期,因此学习美国的经验对我国产业结构调整和产业政策制订具有一定的理论和现实的借鉴意义。     

United States-China two-way direct investment: Opportunities and challenges

There is surprisingly little cross investment between the U.S. and China, the two largest economies in the world. Only 1.5% of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad was in China at end-2015. The stock of Chinese direct investment in the U.S. is also lower than would be expected given that the U.S. is the world’s largest recipient of FDI. In recent years, however, the flow of direct investment from China to the U.S. has accelerated rapidly, and if current trends persist within a short time there will be a larger stock of Chinese investment in the U.S. than of U.S. investment in China. The small amount of U.S. investment in China can be traced to two primary factors: first, poor protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights (IPR), which limits the potential benefits that U.S. firms can receive from their technology and brands; and China’s restrictions on direct investment in many sectors important to U.S. firms. Among G-20 countries, China is the most restrictive in terms of openness to direct investment. The relatively small amount of Chinese investment in the U.S. can also be traced to two factors: first, much of the initial impetus for Chinese firms to go out was to secure natural resources, while the U.S. is not a resource-rich country relative to its GDP or population; and second, the national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. have soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market. The two countries have agreed to negotiate a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). This could open the doors to large amounts of investment in both directions if it addresses key issues. For U.S. firms, access to more sectors and better protection of IPR are crucial. Chinese firms seek a less politicized environment in which to invest. In its Third Plenum decision of 2013 the Communist Party leadership indicated its intention to open more sectors to foreign investment and competition. A BIT could help lock in these necessary reforms.     

The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly

The U.S. government is the dominant player in the global arms market. Existing literature emphasizes the many benefits of an international U.S. government arms monopoly including: regional and global balance, stability and security, the advancement of U.S. national interests, and domestic economic benefits from international sales. The purpose of this paper is to balance this largely one-sided treatment of the U.S. government’s dominant position in the international arms market. We discuss several negative consequences and costs associated with U.S. arms sales which call into question the net benefit of the U.S. government’s control over global arms.     

Factor adjustment implications of a free trade agreement between the United States and Thailand

Changes in intra-industry specialization indicators are used to assess factor adjustment pressures that may be experienced by U.S. and Thai industries from a proposed U.S.–Thailand Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Many industries experienced large increases in intra-industry trade over the 2000–2008 period. Ten U.S. industries are found to be candidates for factor adjustment pressures based on past experiences. These industries account for 38% of all U.S. imports from Thailand and 4% of imports from all trading partners. Results also show that nine Thai industries face possible adjustment pressures. These industries account for 9% of Thai imports from the United States. An FTA should result in a larger increase in U.S. exports to Thailand than U.S. imports from Thailand because Thai exporters face much lower tariffs in the U.S. market than do U.S. exporters in the Thai market.     

中美贸易对美国就业影响研究——基于美国制造业面板数据的分析

本文通过建立国际贸易对就业影响的理论模型,利用美国制造业面板数据分析中美贸易对美国就业的影响问题。实证结论表明,美国进口中国制成品对美国就业没有显著影响,也不是美国失业的Granger原因;美国制成品出口对增加美国就业虽有显著影响,但作用不大;影响美国国内就业的主要因素是实际工资、企业发展状况等实际因素。这些结论充分说明,美国的失业问题不是由美国进口中国制成品引起的,美国减少中国制成品进口也解决不了美国的失业问题。     

美元贬值对美国经常账户影响的估值效应分析

本文运用资产组合模型和协整计量方法,论证了美元汇率变化所带来的估值效应对美国经常账户调节的影响。分析结果表明,美元贬值引致的估值效应很小,再加上美元贬值可能使美国短期债务利率上升,这就很容易抵销掉贬值所带来的估值收益。因此,美国巨大的贸易赤字不可能通过美元贬值所带来的估值效应得以纠正。     

评美国贸易代表对人民币汇率调查申请的拒绝

人民币汇率问题已经成为当前中美贸易中的一个非常突出的问题。美国国内,尤其是美国国会内的一些人,经常拿这一问题来说事。近几年来,他们多次以中国操纵货币、中国汇率制度违反1974年美国贸易法301条款为由,向美国贸易代表提出调查申请,但均遭到拒绝。本文以WTO规则为依据,分析301条款的性质、地位和作用,结合中美贸易的实践,特别是近几年来有关301条款的人民币汇率特定争端案件的具体内容,分析了美国贸易代表驳回调查申请的表面理由和内在原因,并提出了应对301条款的一些观点和建议。     

The role of U.S. naval power in the Asia‐pacific region: From regional protector to regional balancer

For more than four decades, U.S. engagement in the Asia‐Pacific was centered on two premises: a Cold War commitment to Asian security and the remarkable economic power of the U.S. The U.S. Navy provided a symbol of the United States’ commitment to protect its interests and those of its major Asian‐pacific allies. Despite the end of the Cold War, the security environment of the Asia‐Pacific region is still less changed and even a new threat of a regional naval arms race emerged in the 1990s. In this context, although forward deployments of U.S. military power in the Western Pacific have been scaled down, it is certain that the U.S. naval force will continue to play an important role as a key “regional balancer.” Amid the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the post‐Cold War era, the U.S. has still emphasized the maintenance of a U.S. forward‐deployed presence and strong defense alliances with U.S. allies in order to prevent the emergence of regional hegemonic powers and to contribute to regional stability as well as improve U.S. economic interests. Moreover, in the face of a multitude of threats from state and non‐state actors, the U.S. Navy is increasingly focused on and driven by the demands of peacetime and crisis forward presence.