Budget-constrained Pareto-efficient allocations

This paper is concerned with a study of budget-constrained Pareto-efficient (BCPE) allocations, i.e., allocations which given a price system satisfy a given income distribution. We prove existence, show structural stability, and establish a sufficient condition for uniqueness of BCPE allocations. These properties of the BCPE allocations are deduced from similar properties of Walrasian equilibria by a duality theory which is of independent interest.     

Dynamic adjustment of labor allocation between collective,state, or cooperative farming and private farming in a planned economy

How collective and state farm workers dynamically adjust their labor allocations between farm and private plot is analyzed by adopting a behavioralist (as opposed to a marginalist) approach. Farm workers shift their labor allocations for a given season toward that operation which rewarded them with a better rate of return during the preceding season. This approach is then applied to a hypothetical case where the farm is a cooperative venture between state and farm workers, and farm workers can decide to work exclusively on private plots, or on the farm, or divide their labor in some way between these two operations.     

Work incentives and uncertainty on a collective farm

The collective farm household's optimal allocation of time among work on both the collective and private plots and leisure is analyzed in certain and uncertain environments. The examination of static equilibrium solutions indicates that the collective farm need not be inefficient nor provide poor work incentives. Uncertainty is shown to exert a distinctive influence on work allocations. Implications are drawn from comparative static analysis to discuss the effects of government policy, e.g., increased crop quotas, on work incentives. The Soviet development period, recent agricultural reforms in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev era, and general policy implications are considered in the light of these new analytical results.     

Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information

We consider a Radner-type (e.g., Radner, 1968, Econometrica36, 31–58) pure exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of agents. We show that under appropriate assumptions the set of Aumann–Shapley private value allocations in such an economy coincides with the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51, D82.     

Retrading in market games

When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations, consistent with Edgeworth's idea of recontracting. We show (a) there are Pareto optimal allocations, including competitive equilibrium allocations, that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilibrium at every round of retrading; (b) any converging sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading can be supported along some retrade-proof subgame perfect equilibrium path when traders anticipate future rounds of trading.     

On Rothschild–Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos (Q J Econ 117:1529–1570, 2002) have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique. We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.     

Processes and patterns in transitions and system innovations: Refining the co-evolutionary multi-level perspective

This article investigates transitions at the level of societal functions (e.g., transport, communication, housing). Societal functions are fulfilled by sociotechnical systems, which consist of a cluster of aligned elements, e.g., artifacts, knowledge, markets, regulation, cultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance networks and supply networks. Transitions are conceptualised as system innovations, i.e., a change from one sociotechnical system to another. The article describes a co-evolutionary multi-level perspective to understand how system innovations come about through the interplay between technology and society. The article makes a new step as it further refines the multi-level perspective by distinguishing characteristic patterns: (a) two transition routes, (b) fit–stretch pattern, and (c) patterns in breakthrough.     

Pairwise kidney exchange: Comment

In their recent paper, Roth et al. [Pairwise kidney exchange, J. Econ. Theory 125 (2005) 151-188] consider pairwise kidney exchanges, and show within this subset of feasible exchanges that a priority mechanism is strategy-proof. We show that this result can be broadened to allow much more general mechanisms and restrictions on the feasible set of allocations, including allowing three-way exchanges, regional specifications, and others. The key requirement is that the choice mechanism be consistent, i.e., if an allocation is chosen from some set of feasible allocations, it is also chosen from any subset of that set.     

Sociability and the Market

This paper addresses two classroom activities for exploring sociability and the role it plays in market and non-market allocations. Adam Smith’s moral sentiments theory provides a conceptual framework for understanding such behavior. In the Desert Island activity students have conversations about competing allocation methods (e.g., rationing, lottery, competition, brute force) that provide a backdrop for learning about market mechanisms and behavioral economics. Beginning students consistently pick egalitarian distributions that signal the implicit willingness to share for reasons that might be instinctual, reputational or other. Fairness in allocations mimics that found in the playing of the Ultimatum Game. The results suggest that economic instructors can successfully bring into the classroom concepts of sociability and the roles it serves in human institutions when introducing a new and different institution—the market.     

A simple dynamic general equilibrium model

We analyse a single sector economy with H > 1 infinitely-lived agents that operate in a continuous-time framework. Utility functions are recursive but not additive. Both efficient and perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are considered. The existence and stability of such allocations are investigated locally, i.e., in a neighbourhood of steady-state allocations. The model is shown to be useful for explaining the distribution of wealth and consumption across agents, and for analysing the way in which wealth redistribution can affect the dynamics of aggregate economic variables.     

Responsive pricing

We study the efficiency property of responsive pricing, a scheme that proposes to increase prices as a function of the level of capacity utilization in environments where traditional allocation schemes (e.g. competitive markets, non-linear pricing) cannot be implemented in practice. We show that although responsive pricing implements allocations that are arbitrarily close to full capacity utilization (no wasted capacity and no excess demand), these allocations are not always efficient. We identify conditions under which efficiency occurs and discuss implications for the use of responsive pricing. We would like to thank seminar participants at the LSE, Venezia, Toulouse, and Copenhagen as well as Piero Gottardi, Karel Mertens, Marco Ottaviani, Markus Poschke, Karl Schlag, and Sanne Zwart for useful comments.     

Teaching Marginal Cost,Supply, and Efficiency with an English-Auction Experiment

Using a discrete time control model, the authors suggest that faculty may be able to improve their teaching effectiveness by a reallocation of the inputs devoted to teaching (e.g., using student evaluations early in the course), by increasing the level of the resources used in teaching, or by changing the characteristics of the inputs (possibly through such things as teaching practicums, seminars, or sabbaticals). Alternatively, reducing the instructor's opportunity cost of the resources devoted to teaching may increase teaching effectiveness (i.e., reducing the research requirements for promotion). Empirical estimates of the effectiveness of these strategies are not presented.     

Equity in exchange economies

Let ψ be a “fair” choice correspondence, i.e., ψ associates to every economy in some initial position a set of final allocations at which the gains from trade have been fairly distributed. We propose to declare equitable any final allocation which is invariant under arbitrary permutations among the agents of the components of the initial allocation, followed by the operation of ψ. We also formulate a series of other criteria patterned on this model, and we investigate the existence of allocations satisfying these criteria for several natural choices of ψ.     

Nutrition,health, birth order and seasonality: intrahousehold allocation among children in rural India

"Nutrients available to children are determined largely by intrahousehold allocations. There are a number of reasons why birth order may affect these allocations. A model is developed to estimate critical parameters of parental preferences regarding the allocation of nutrients among their children. Latent variable estimates for rural south India indicate that parental preferences have productivity-equity tradeoffs and parents favor older children. The productivity-equity tradeoff, however, is much less for the lean season. Therefore, when food is scarcest, parents follow more closely a pure investment strategy, exposing their more vulnerable children to greater malnutrition risk."     

CONDITIONING AID ON SOCIAL EXPENDITURES

Aid conditionality forces countries to adopt policies that they would not otherwise choose. We examine how government discretion should be so constrained when the donor cannot fully control public expenditures, but instead can influence a less disaggregated indicator of public policy, namely the allocation of public spending between the social sectors (e.g. education, health, etc.) on the one hand and more traditional public goods (e.g. infrastructure) on the other. We first show how budget allocations will be altered when recipient government preferences are known – i.e. we characterize what policies the donor should "buy"– and how a given aid budget should be allocated between different types of countries. When recipient government preferences are not known by the donor, the permitted policies are distorted due to incentive constraints, and the extent to which aid flows are optimally differentiated between different countries is reduced.     

Education,sectoral composition,and growth

Growth accounting exercises using standard human capital measures are limited in their ability to attribute causal effects and to explain growth. This paper develops a model of growth and schooling consistent with these decompositions but with less unexplained growth. The theory distinguishes between three different sources of education gains: (1) supply shifts, (2) skill-biased technical change increasing demand within industries/occupations, and (3) skill-biased technical change caused by the introduction of new skill-intensive industries/occupations. The third source leads to the large sectoral shifts and the largest growth effects. Quantitatively, schooling contributions account for 24 percent of wage growth, with both the direct (i.e., supply driven) causal contribution of schooling and the indirect causal (i.e., technology induced) contribution playing substantial roles.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

Technology-based environmental health risks in developing nations

This paper addresses two questions: 1) To what extent are developing nations vulnerable to technology- related environmental health risks? 2) To what extent does the export of hazardous technologies and products contribute to overall levels of environmental health risk in developing nations? The paper focuses on three major types of environmental health risks: the failure of large-scale technological systems; the use or misuse of consumer goods, mechanical devices, and chemicals; and industrial emissions of toxic substances. In addition, three categories of hazardous exports are examined: hazardous products (e.g., pesticides), hazardous production processes (e.g., asbestos processing), and hazardous wastes (e.g., chemical and radioactive waste). The paper concludes that technology-based environmental health risks pose a significant public health problem in most developing nations, even when compared to much larger public health problems such as tropical and gastrointestinal diseases. Technology-based risks are growing in number and frequency. If developing and developed nations continue their current policies, these risks will grow at a significantly greater rate.     

Parchment,guns, and the problem of governance

The genuine problem of governance is one that pays equal attention to both incentive and knowledge issues in private and public contexts. This work brings together Austrian, Public Choice and theory of the firm insights to address such problem. By taking into account incentives and knowledge, it proposes a framework that accommodates comparisons not just of kind (firm or market), but also of degree (e.g., among different types of internal organization). Moreover, although the suggested framework derives from considerations about private governance, it equally accommodates public and private settings. (89 words.)     

Individual account investment options and portfolio choice: Behavioral lessons from 401(k) plans

This paper examines how the menu of investment options made available to workers in defined contribution plans influences portfolio choice. Using unique panel data of 401(k) plans in the U.S., we present three principle findings. First, we show that the share of investment options in a particular asset class (i.e., company stock, equities, fixed income, and balanced funds) has a significant effect on aggregate participant portfolio allocations across these asset classes. Second, we document that the vast majority of the new funds added to 401(k) plans are high-cost actively-managed equity funds, as opposed to lower-cost equity index funds. Third, because the average share of assets invested in low-cost equity index funds declines with an increase in the number of options, average portfolio expenses increase and average portfolio performance is thus depressed. All of these findings are obtained from a panel data set, enabling us to control for heterogeneity in the investment preferences of workers across firms and across time.