Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

Optimal pension plan default policies when employees are biased

What is the optimal default contribution rate or default asset allocation in pension plans? Could active decision (i.e., not setting a default and forcing employees to make a decision) be optimal? These questions are studied in a model in which each employee is biased regarding her optimal contribution rate or asset allocation. In this model, active decision is never optimal and the optimal default is, depending on parameter values, one of three defaults. The paper explores how the parameters affect the average loss in the population at the optimal default.     

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle-aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump-sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.     

Why Sweden's pension reform was able to be successfully implemented

Governments that do not reform pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems will eventually face a pension crisis. In a democracy, reforms require majority support. The problem is that pension reform requires today's generation to bear the burden to avoid burdening tomorrow's generation. Sweden recently passed pension legislation that specifies a gradual transition from a public defined-benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. Why was Sweden successful in reforming its pension system? We find that a political economy perspective helps to answer this question: there are more winners who would vote in favour of the reform than non-winners who would vote against it. When comparing the net effect (present value of expected benefits minus present value of remaining contributions) of the new and old systems, contributions of the working generation (age < 53) are reduced by more than their expected benefits.     

Collective Annuities and Redistribution

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual's survival probabilities. We show that such a system may be welfare improving (with a utilitarian social welfare function) even when private annuity markets are perfect and when life expectancy and earning abilities are positively correlated (i.e., in a setting that is  a priori  biased against collective annuities). We first concentrate on linear pension systems and contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension. We show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then we analyze nonlinear pension schemes. We show that the solution can be implemented by a pension scheme associated with annuities that reflect some degree of "collectiveness." Unlike under pure collective annuities, benefits do depend on life expectancy but to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities. In other words, the impact of survival probabilities is mitigated rather than completely neutralized.     

Contribution-based vs. earnings-related retirement pension systems: some policy proposals for Italy

This paper analyses the relationship between contributions paid and benefits received within the current old age pension scheme, evaluating the implications of reinforcing the link between individual contributions and benefits, in a framework where welfare assistance and social security are kept separate. Section 2 describes the theoretical model, adopted to examine the factors affecting the contribution-based and the earnings-related annual pension or the total pension benefits over the entire retirement period. The consequences that different levels of relevant parameters have on the ratio between the two yearly pensions are, then, analysed. Section 3 illustrates the longitudinal sample of private employees belonging to the National Institute for Social Security (INPS–FPLD), in particular of those who will retire between 1995–96 and 2001: it is used to calculate the annual earnings-related and contribution-based pension. In aceteris paribussituation, allowing for all intragenerational redistribution transfers currently provided by the pension system (through a supplement to an established minimum pension, through ceilings and reversory rights), the annual contribution-based pension appears to be in 1995 about two thirds of the annual earnings-related one. This implies that the State could currently save one third of its expenditure for new FPLD pensioners, by simply switching to a criterion of social security fairness (giving each to his own in actuarial terms) without relinquishing any of the distributive corrections currently enacted within the pension system. Through this potential reform, in the next 7 years total State savings at constant prices would reach 14 000 billion lire, or 2·2% of the stock value of pensions in the same time interval.     

Expectations,uncertainty and institutions. An application to the analysis of social security reforms

The aging process that many developed economies will face in the medium-term is leading to reforms in the public pensions systems in order to solve the potential financial unsustainability generated by the foreseeable increase in the expenditure in pension benefits (assuming that the current social security contributions and the eligibility conditions will remain unchanged). Neoclassical economics defends a radical reform of these systems, substituting the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems by funded systems. In this paper, using the Post-Keynesian theory as a theoretical framework, we provide an alternative reflection to that proposed by the neoclassical economics about the choice between the alternative pension systems. The focus of the paper is the advantages of the PAYGO pension systems to stabilize the expectations of future income.     

Public employee pensions and the local labor budget

This paper examines the causes and consequences of public employee pension funding by local governments. The pension funding decision is analyzed within the context of two models: one where current taxpayers stay and pay employees' future retirement benefits and a second model where current taxpayers move and thereby hope to avoid paying future retirement benefits. The empirical results test the alternative models for a sample of 60 large U.S. cities using data for local police and fire services. The effects of underfunding on local wages and employment is then examined and found to be significant. Implications for national pension funding policy are drawn.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Pension expectations,reforms and macroeconomic downturn in Italy. What can microdata tell us?

We use different years of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explore how Italian workers’ expectations regarding their future level of pension benefits and retirement age changed from 2000 to 2014. Comparing expected and statutory values for future pension benefits and retirement ages, we find that knowledge of the pension system and its rules are not evenly distributed among workers. Some sections of the population, in particular, younger workers, women and the self-employed, are less precise in estimating their future pension benefits. As for retirement age, a large share of the working population still has not completely assimilated the implications of the linkage with the evolution of lifetime expectations at 65. Expectations in the final part of the period observed are dominated by increasing pessimism, which may be related to the macroeconomic crisis of the Italian economy and to the approval of a severe pension reform in 2011. Checking whether a household’s total wealth is consistent with lifetime consumption, we find that households where the head overestimates the future value of the pension benefit accumulate fewer resources than the remaining part of the population.     

Occupation pension for public employees in the People's Republic of China: A new approach with defined benefit underpin pension plan

The State Council of the People's Republic of China announced a reformed pension plan for public employees with the occupation pension plan in January 2015, officially disclosing that the social pension systems for private and public employees will be unified. Our proposed occupation pension plan for public employees is one of the important components in transiting from a dual‐track pension system to a sustainable and unified system. We aim at providing a pension design, that is, the defined benefit (DB ) underpin pension with estimates of the costs and benefits. We have used a financial engineering approach to calculate the hedge contribution for a DB underpin hybrid pension plan benefit. We also treat pension benefit and salaries in aggregate. Therefore, we propose a stochastic and exogenous salary model. Employees’ total benefits can be determined by multiple factors, such as inflation, economic environment, and employer's preference. However, the expectation of employees’ total benefits should not be affected by the change of salary and pension benefits. Our results could facilitate the ongoing pension reform in the People's Republic of China, providing a rigorous benchmark with public policy implications as to plan design, cost estimation, as well as risk management approach.     

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good

This paper analyzes the efforts made to influence a decision that can have two outcomes. First, the agents on the same side designate an agent to play the contest for them. The inactive agents can then decide to support this active agent, i.e. pay a percentage of his effort. It is optimal to designate either the agent with the lowest stake (who will receive support from everyone else) or the agent with the highest stake (who will not receive support) as the active agent. We find that the side with the higher aggregate stake may have the lower success probability.     

Risk-return preferences in the pension domain: Are people able to choose?

This paper presents new evidence for the Netherlands on pension preferences and investor autonomy in the pension domain using a representative survey of about 1000 Dutch citizens. Our main conclusions are the following. Risk aversion is domain dependent and highest in the pension domain. The vast majority of respondents favours the currently dominant defined benefit pension system. If offered a combined defined benefit/defined contribution system, the majority would like to have a guaranteed pension income of at least 70% of their net labour income. Self-assessed risk tolerance and financial expertise are important individual explanatory variables of pension attitudes. The average respondent considers himself financially unsophisticated and is reluctant to take control of retirement savings investment, even when offered the possibility to increase expertise. Respondents who have chosen a relatively safe portfolio tend to switch to the riskier median portfolio when they are shown future income streams. This again suggests that many respondents currently lack the skills to have investor autonomy over investment for retirement.     

Pension Reform during the Demographic Transition

The aim of this paper is to quantify the welfare effects of some currently discussed pension reform proposals in Germany. The analysis is based on an extended overlapping-generations model which accounts for intra-generational heterogeneity, rising life expectancy and declining fertility. Given a baseline path of the economy under the existing unfunded pension system, the model calculates the macroeconomic impact as well as the distributional and efficiency effects of various pension reform measures aimed at reducing the level of the future unfunded pension system. Simulations reveal that pension reforms cannot be evaluated solely in terms of inter- and intra-generational equity. Substantial efficiency gains or losses might arise if the linkage between contributions and benefits is improved or weakened.     

Social security generosity,budgetary deficits and reforms in North Cyprus

This paper estimates the fiscal burden of the historical pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) Social Insurance Pension System in North Cyprus and analyzes the appropriateness of the 2008 reforms that introduced the new Social Security Pension System. Estimates are made of the system deficit. To bring the magnitude of the unfunded cost of the pension system down to a sustainable level, major parametric reforms will need to be made to the system. These include increasing the age of retirement, increasing the rate of contributions, changing the method of indexing of pension benefits and decreasing the theoretical replacement rate of the pension benefits.     

On the optimal design of pension systems

The present paper aims to quantify efficiency properties of flat and earnings-related pay-as-you-go financed social security systems of various institutional designs in order to identify an optimal pension design. Starting from a benchmark economy without social security, we introduce alternative pension systems and compare the costs arising from liquidity constraints as well as distortions of labor supply versus the benefits from insurance provision against income and lifespan uncertainty. Our findings suggest an optimal replacement rate of about 50 % of average earnings. In our model a single-tier earnings-related pension system yields the highest efficiency gains dominating flat benefits as well as two-tier systems of any form. We also show that the negative correlation between pension progressivity and pension generosity of real-world social security systems can be justified on efficiency grounds. Finally, our results indicate a positive impact of means-testing flat benefits against earnings-related benefits within multi-pillar pension systems.     

The Political Power of the Retirees in a Two-Dimensional Voting Model

We show that the retirees are able to obtain favorable pension policies whereas they belong to a minority in the population. The argument relies on the multidimensional nature of the political process. We consider a two‐dimensional collective choice problem. The first of these choices is the level of the contribution rate to the Pay‐As‐You‐Go pension system. The second is a noneconomic decision, unrelated to the pension system. Using a political agency model, we show that, as soon as the retirees are sufficiently numerous, the equilibrium tax rate may be higher than the tax rate preferred by the young, who yet constitute a majority over the pension issue.     

PENSION WEALTH AT MIDLIFE:COMPARING SELF-REPORTS WITH PROVIDER DATA

This paper evaluates the accuracy of estimates of pension wealth based on self-reports by comparing them to estimates based on provider data. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we found that few workers are well informed about their future pension benefits. Self-reports were often incomplete and typically varied widely from those based on information from providers. In defined benefit (DB) plans, discrepancies were greatest for workers who had limited education, earned low wages, and did not expect to retire soon. Differences in median pension wealth were smaller at the aggregate level than the individual level, because individual differences tended to offset each other when aggregated. Provider data appear better than self-reports for DB plans, but not for defined contribution (DC) plans. Where both are available, the best method of computing pension wealth may be to estimate DB wealth from provider data and to estimate DC wealth from self-reports.     

论降低缴费率对养老金给付的影响——基于现收现付制度的视角

在现收现付制中,当前养老金缴费的减少对养老金的给付不一定有消极的影响。由于养老金的给付水平取决于资本份额的分配和跨主观贴现因子,利用简化的戴蒙德的叠代模型证明,当生产资本权重较高和主观贴现因子较低时,当前年轻一代缴费率的减少会提高养老金的给付水平。     

The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement

This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.