A theoretical analysis of institutional investors' trading costs in auction and dealer markets

This paper compares trading costs for institutional investors subject to liquidity shocks, in auction and dealer markets. The batch auction restricts the institutions' ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously submit orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. In the dealership market, competition between traders is absent but private information is revealed by observing the flow of successive orders and so reduces aggregate trading costs. We analyse the relative effects on trading costs of competition and information revelation in the two systems and derive a parameter inequality which determines which system has lower costs.     

Equilibrium in Auction and Bargaining Markets When Agents Can Wait and Search

The paper studies two market structures and two modes of trade. The agents, buyers and sellers, can choose whether to stay or search. The meetings take place randomly, and trades are consummated by auction or by bargaining. There are altogether four possible markets but in equilibrium at most two markets are active simultaneously. There is almost always a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium which consists of an auction market when the numbers of buyers and sellers differ greatly, and two simultaneous auction markets when the numbers are relatively close.     

B股向境内居民开放对A、B股市场分割的影响

从信息流动的角度 ,研究了B股向境内居民开放前后的A、B股两个市场之间的分割程度 ,并与同期的A股和H股市场的分割程度作比较。实证结果显示 ,在B股向境内居民开放之前 ,A、B股市场之间基本上处于完全分割状态 ,而开放之后两个市场趋于半分割状态 ;A股和H股之间一直处于完全分割状态。研究结论表明 ,投资主体的不同是造成A、B股市场分割的关键因素 ,B股向境内居民开放一定程度上缓和了两个市场的分割局面 ,但离一体化还有相当差距。     

Ownership structure,monitoring, and market value of companies: evidence from an unusual privatization mode

This study analyses the impact of ownership structure and market liquidity on company value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different aspects of ownership on company value.     

Inducing liquidity in thin financial markets through combined-value trading mechanisms

Asset pricing theory hypothesizes that investors are only interested in portfolios; individual securities are evaluated only in terms of their contribution to portfolio risk and return. Yet, standard financial market design is that of parallel, unconnected markets, whereby investors cannot submit orders in one market conditional on events in others. When markets are thin, this exposes them to substantial execution risk. Fear of ending up with unbalanced portfolios after trading may even keep investors from submitting orders, further eroding liquidity and the ability of markets to equilibrate. The suggested solution is a portfolio trading mechanism referred to as combined-value trading (CVT). Investors are allowed to submit orders for packages of securities and the system matches trades and computes prices by optimally combining portfolio orders in an open book. We study the performance of the CVT mechanism experimentally and compare it to the performance of parallel, unconnected double auctions in experiments with similar parametrization and either a similar number of subjects or substantially thicker markets. We present evidence that our portfolio trading mechanism facilitates equilibration to the extent that the thicker markets do. Inspection of order submission and trade activity reveals that subjects manage to exploit the direct linkages between markets enabled by the CVT system.     

Towards equilibrium offers in unit commitment auctions with nonconvex costs

We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a startup cost and a variable energy cost. Self-committed markets force generators to incorporate their startup costs into a one-part energy bid. The system operator in a centrally committed system ensures that each generator recovers the startup and energy costs stated in its two-part bid, while no such guarantees are made in self-committed markets. The energy cost ranking and incentive properties of these market designs remains an open question. While the system operator can determine the most efficient dispatch with a centralized market, the auction mechanism used to solicit generator data compels generators to overstate costs. Self commitment might involve less efficient dispatch but have better incentive properties. We derive Nash equilibria for both market designs in a symmetric duopoly setting. We also derive simple conditions under which the two market designs will be expected cost-equivalent.     

Does money impede convergence?

Inspired by Clower’s conjecture that the necessity of trading through money in monetised economies might hinder convergence to competitive equilibrium, and hence, for example, cause unemployment, we experimentally investigate behaviour in markets where trading has to be done through money. In order to evaluate the properties of these markets, we compare their behaviour to behaviour in markets without money, where money cannot intervene. As the trading mechanism might be a compounding factor, we investigate two kinds of market mechanism: the double auction, where bids, asks and trades take place in continuous time throughout a trading period; and the clearing house, where bids and asks are placed once in a trading period, and which are then cleared by an aggregating device. We thus have four treatments, the pairwise combinations of non-monetised/monetised trading with double auction/clearing house. We find that: convergence is faster under non-monetised trading, implying that the necessity of using money to facilitate trade hinders convergence; that monetised trading is noisier than non-monetised trading; and that the volume of trade and realised surpluses are higher with the double auction than the clearing house. As far as efficiency is concerned, monetised trading lowers both informational and allocational efficiency, and while the double auction outperforms the clearing house in terms of allocational efficiency, the clearing house is marginally better than the double auction in terms of informational efficiency when trade is through money. Crucially we confirm the conjecture that inspired these experiments: that the necessity to use money in trading hinders convergence to competitive equilibrium, lowers realised trades and surpluses, and hence may cause unemployment.     

COINTEGRATION OF STOCK MARKETS BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE G7 ECONOMIES: SEARCHING FOR CO-MOVEMENT UNDER STRUCTURAL CHANGE

This paper examines whether the New Zealand equity market is integrated with the equity markets of Australia and the G7 economies by applying both the Johansen (1988 ) and Gregory and Hansen (1996 ) approaches to cointegration. The Johansen (1988 ) test suggests that there is no long-run relationship between the New Zealand stock market and any of the other stock markets considered in the study. The Gregory and Hansen (1996 ) test finds that the New Zealand and United States stock market is cointegrated, but the New Zealand stock market is not cointegrated with the other stock markets in the study. This suggests that in order to avoid some of the risk through international portfolio diversification there is potential for investors to purchase shares in the New Zealand market and either the Australian market or most of the world's leading equity markets.     

Market segmentation and information values of earnings announcements: Some empirical evidence from an event study on the Chinese stock market

This paper investigates the trading activities of two distinct classes of shareholders, namely, the Chinese domestic investors and the foreign investors in the segmented Chinese A- and B-share markets, respectively. We conduct an event study on the annual earnings announcements based on two different accounting standards: International accounting standards (IAS) and PRC generally accepted accounting principles (PRC GAAP). The earnings announcements based on IAS and PRC GAAP are value relevant. The investors in the B-share market react to both the IAS and PRC GAAP earnings announcements, while the investors in the A-share market pay more attention to the PRC GAAP earnings reports. In the B-share market, positive abnormal returns are associated with positive earnings surprise and negative abnormal returns go with negative earnings surprise. We find preevent abnormal trading volumes without significant price changes for the A shares, which may be due to existing information in the A-share market prior to earnings announcements. The postevent abnormal trading volumes last for a longer period in the A-share market than in the B-share market.     

我国证券市场融资管理改革中几个关键问题的思考

合理的融资管理制度，对资本市场的健康发展及保护国内外投资的利益起着极其重要的作用，但若照搬国外市场管理运作制度，有时会人为地加剧市场动荡。本对我国股票发行的两种改革方案利弊进行了比较分析，同时提出了在股票增发、配股及国有股减持中避免一种市场系统风险的审核及定价建议。     

Asset return dynamics and the FX risk premium in a decentralized dealer market

The paper proposes a continuous time model of an FX market organized as a multiple dealership. The dealers have costly access to best available quotes. They interpret signals from the joint dealer-customer order flow and decide upon their own quotes and trades in the inter-dealer market. Each dealer uses the observed order flow to improve the subjective estimates of relevant aggregate variables, which are the sources of uncertainty. The risk factors are returns on domestic and foreign assets and the size of the cross-border dealer transactions in the FX market. These uncertainties have diffusion form and are dealt with according to the principles of portfolio optimization in continuous time. The model is used to explain the country, or risk, premium in the uncovered national return parity equation for the exchange rate. The two country premium terms that I identify in excess of the usual covariance term (consequence of the “Jensen inequality effect”) are: the dealer heterogeneity-induced inter-dealer market order flow component and the dealer Bayesian learning component. As a result, an “order flow-adjusted total return parity” formula links the excess FX return to both the “fundamental” factors represented by the differential of the national asset returns, and the microstructural factors represented by heterogeneous dealer knowledge of the aggregate order flow and the fundamentals.     

Credit quality, the intensity of regulation and the segmentation of debt markets

Some debt markets have a “competitive advantage” over others due to easier regulatory requirements. Our model explains changes in the market shares of different debt markets. In particular, borrowers may choose between highly regulated and relatively unregulated placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the highly regulated market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk class. In unregulated markets there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market is segmented between less regulated and other, more strictly regulated, placements. Raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of unregulated debt. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.     

创值论及其对企业绩效的评估

本文从理论角度探讨了创值与创利概念的关系及差异 ,并对我国上市企业的创值能力做了实证估算。另外 ,本文从经济和财务两方面进行的分析发现 ,由于造假成本较低 ,企业造假的高度嫌疑面达上市企业的 2 0 %左右。在剔除这些造假嫌疑观测值的基础上 ,我们发现上市企业目前正处于一种资本与利润并增 ,但创值显著下降的状况。反映了企业”圈钱买利润”的资本粗放行为在加剧 ,企业资本规模过度膨胀 ,远远偏离了其创值的优化水平。面对目前企业耗值面达 70 %的股市 ,理性选择必然是投机而非投资 ,因为投资不带来创值收益。因此 ,股市过度投机的真正根源是大量的耗值企业充斥于市。     

基于搜寻的有限参与、事件风险与流动性溢价

本文在一个简单的投资决策框架内对投资者面对国有股全流通这一事件风险时的最优决策问题进行建模 ,得到一个基于流动性的资本资产定价模型。结论表明 ,相对于不存在事件风险的情形而言 ,国有股的存在使得更多投资者不愿进入市场 ,导致市场流动性进一步下降。同时 ,这一事件风险使得选择进入市场的投资者要求更高的流动性溢价。由此 ,这一模型为最近几年来中国股市持续低迷的状况提供了一种理论解释     

Strategic pricing of equity issues

Summary. Consider a general equilibrium model where agents may behave strategically. Specifically, suppose some firm issues new shares. If the primary market price is controlled by the issuing institution and investors' expectations on future equity prices are constant in their share purchases, the share price on the primary market cannot exceed the secondary market share price. In certain cases this may imply strict underpricing of newly issued shares. If investors perceive an influence on future share prices overpriced issues may occur in equilibrium. This provides an example of strategic price manipulation in general equilibrium models with sequential markets. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: May 15, 2001     

基于可获供给的资产价格动态

通过引入疏忽投资者,本文初步探讨可获资产供给引起的价格波动,对比经典资产价格理论,结果显示市场积极参与度及入场时机引发的交易廷迟都将导致价格波动,而具有更高流动性的市场,其产品供给更丰富,价格也相对更低。     

Investment banks' stock ratings,call warrant issuance,and responses from heterogeneous investors: Evidence from Taiwan

We investigate the responses of the different types of investors on stock rating change announcements made by investment banks around call warrant issuances in Taiwan. The unique characteristics of the Taiwan warrants market allow investment banks to make stock rating change announcements around call warrant issuances for the same stocks they rate. In Taiwan, investment banks are also dealers of call warrants, and thus, the profit and loss results from their warrant business are potentially in conflict-of-interest for their stock ratings. Another feature of the Taiwan stock market allows us to disentangle the types of investors initiating the stock trades. We identify three types of investors: institutional investors, experienced retail investors, and ordinary retail investors. Our findings suggest that institutional investors are able to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest in investment banks; experienced investors are able to partially “see-through” the conflict-of-interest, and ordinary retail investors are unable to “see-through” the conflict-of-interest of investment banks.     

Inefficient arbitrage in inter-regional electricity transmission

This paper analyzes the efficiency of an explicit ex ante auction for network access to facilitating trade between two separate, but linked, electricity wholesale markets. It is generally assumed that greater regional interconnection will mitigate the exercise of local market power by dominant generators, but we show analytically that when a dominant player has access to a more competitive neighboring market, and is also the lowest cost producer, the exercise of market power becomes attractive and can have negative consumer welfare implications. For an empirical analysis, we use a unique data set of daily company-level flow nominations on the Anglo-French Interconnector (IFA). This provides a clear case study, “free of loop flows” (with the IFA being the only link between the UK and France). We are able to identify evident inefficiencies in the market behavior, for which several explanations, including market power, may contribute.     

Exogenous shocks,dynamic correlations,and portfolio risk management for the Asian emerging and other global developed and emerging stock markets

ABSTRACT

This study examines the potential influence of exogenous shocks on time-varying correlations and portfolio strategies between the Asian emerging and other global stock markets including developed and other emerging markets. Using the ARMA-cDCC-FIEGARCH model with and without exogenous shocks, our results highlight the usefulness of including other global stock assets in the traditional portfolio for Asian emerging market investors. However, investors have limited opportunities to diversify their assets during the global financial crisis. Moreover, the shocks from the U.S. stock market have a greater influence on global stock markets compared to that from U.S. economic policy. Fortunately, the model with exogenous shocks improves its accuracy, which plays the same role of controlling structural breaks in the model. More importantly, incorporating exogenous shocks in our model also provides better value-at-risk performance results and hedging effectiveness. These results have several important implications for investors, researchers, and policymakers.     

Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities

When an auction is followed by an opportunity for resale, bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. These valuations vary with the resale market structure, can differ across auction types, and may be lower or higher than if resale were impossible. Although resale introduces a common value element to the model, revenue equivalence can hold; when it fails, this is due not to affiliation but to differences in information conveyed to the secondary market. Information linkages between markets can also lead to signaling and, in some cases, preclude separation in the auction.