管理防御视域下的管理者特征与公司业绩研究

在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。通过选择管理者年龄、管理者任期、管理者学历、管理者持股比例和管理者薪酬等特征变量,选取2003-2008年间6年连续上市的A股上市公司面板数据,从管理防御视角考察管理者特征与公司业绩的相关性。研究表明管理者年龄、管理者学历和管理者薪酬与公司业绩显著正相关,管理者任期与业绩显著负相关,管理者持股对业绩有负面影响。     

管理防御与公司业绩的实证研究——基于高新技术企业与非高新技术企业上市公司数据

文章以中国上市公司2013—2017年相关数据为研究样本,分类探究高新技术企业和非高新技术企业经理人管理防御行为对公司绩效的影响,为抑制管理防御动机和行为,提高企业绩效提供经验证据。实证研究结果表明:高新技术企业中,管理者的年龄、任期、学历、薪酬、公司股权集中度、独立董事所占比例和董事长总经理两职设置情况对公司业绩有显著影响;非高新技术企业中,管理者年龄、学历、薪酬和两职设置情况与公司业绩有显著影响;不同因素在不同类型的企业中对公司业绩的影响作用程度也不尽相同。     

管理防御影响零售企业资本结构调整速度的机理分析

对于零售企业而言,资本结构是决定其发展潜力的重要因素.因此,许多大型零售企业在发展至一定规模后,往往会更加重视对于资本结构的再调整.然而,在实际经营中,部分零售企业管理者可能出于管理防御动机,通过降低资本结构调整速度来为维护自身利益,这势必会对企业长远发展造成不利影响.基于此,本文将通过实证分析探究管理防御与零售企业资...     

管理者超额薪酬与资本结构动态调整

在最优契约假说和管理者权力假说的框架下,从资本结构调整速度和实际资本结构偏离目标资本结构程度两个方面,实证考察管理者超额薪酬对资本结构动态调整的影响。研究发现:管理者超额薪酬越高,资本结构调整速度越快;非国有上市公司的管理者超额薪酬越高,实际资本结构偏离目标资本结构的程度越低,但这一关系在国有上市公司并不成立,这可能是由于预算软约束等原因导致国有上市公司资本结构异化所引起。整体而言,管理者超额薪酬更多地反映了管理者能力的大小,领取高薪的管理者更有可能根据内外部环境的变化迅速调整公司的资本结构决策,表明最优契约假说仍然具有很强的适用性。     

创业板上市公司资本结构实证分析

本文以在深圳证券交易所上市的267家创业板公司为样本,选取资本结构的多种影响因素,采用2010年横截面数据进行多元线性逐步回归分析,指出资本结构的主要影响因素,为创业板上市公司的资本结构优化和管理者融资决策提供参考依据。     

管理防御对真实盈余管理的影响

近年来,盈余管理一直是学术界和实务界的研究热点。 真实盈余管理相较于应计盈余管理,其隐蔽性更强,因此管理者通常会采用真实盈余管理行为来干预会计信息。 而管理者作为会计信息的主要提供者,受防御动机的驱使,可能会影响会计信息的生成和披露。 在治理环境的监督下,管理者通过真实盈余管理进行防御的动机会被削弱,这在一定程度上会调节管理防御对真实盈余管理的影响。 文章以 2012~2019 年沪深 A 股上市公司为样本,研究管理防御对真实盈余管理的影响,并以此为基础探究治理环境对二者关系的调节作用。 结果表明:管理防御与真实盈余管理显著正相关。     

中层管理者实施相适应策略对绩效的影响——社会资本的作用

本文是为了更好的阐明中层管理者在实施相适应的战略时,社会资本对绩效的影响。一些研究表明,中层管理者在实施相适应的战略和绩效之间的关系取决于正式和非正式的组织结构。从相关的研究来看,在公司这个复杂的网络结构中,声誉社会资本对提高中层管理者的绩效起着向上的作用;信息社会资本对提升绩效起着向下的作用,同时业务单元区域规模对绩效有着不同的调节作用。     

打造中层管理者执行力

企业中层管理者是企业战略实施的中坚力量。从内、外两个方面对影响中层管理者执行力的因素来看,其中外在影响因素主要包括战略、人员和制度流程,内在影响因素主要包括中层管理者的管理能力、领悟能力和应变能力。企业应从培训、企业文化、团队建设、制度流程和权力机制五个方面,采取措施提升中层管理者的执行力。     

管理者影响行为及其有效性分析

管理者对于下属的影响一般情况下会经历顺从、认同、内化三个阶段(层次)。下属的态度决定了管理者影响行为的有效性。本文分别从影响力和领导力的视角对管理者影响行为及其有效性进行了深入分析。就影响力而言,理性或软性的影响行为会产生积极的影响效果;从领导力的视角看,变革型领导而非交易型领导行为更有效。影响行为的适用性受到任务特征、下属特征以及管理者特征等权变因素的制约。     

管理者自我效能感与工作绩效的关系研究

自我效能感是影响工作绩效的重要因素之一。以组织中的管理人员为研究对象,构建了管理者自我效能感与工作绩效的关系模型,并以有效回收152份问卷为样本进行分析。实证结果显示：管理者自我效能感与工作绩效呈显著正相关,且管理者自我效能感对工作绩效有一定的预测力。进而为组织在日常管理活动中,提出上级对下级应采取激励性沟通、建立科学有效和公平的考核机制和良好的企业文化氛围,培养管理人员稳定、积极和健康的情绪等建议,增强管理者的自我效能感来提高工作绩效。     

Management commitment to innovation and esop stock concentration

The separation of ownership and control can lead to managerial entrenchment and a convergence of decision making and decision control. Decision-making refers to management's authority to make strategic and operating decisions while decision control refers to the ratification and monitoring of management decisions. Managers that possess decision control may behave in a risk-reducing manner relative to the behavior of owner managers because of management's desire to maximize job security Amihud and Lev 1981, McEachern 1975. For example, the managers of such firms may choose to diversify the firm into a wide variety of industries in an attempt to smooth revenues and earnings and avoid a series of peaks and valleys in the company's financial performance. These managers may believe that stable earnings will be viewed positively by shareholders and should help lessen the risk of stockholder action to replace upper-level management. Managers that possess both decision-making and decision-control capabilities may pursue a variety of risk-reducing strategies in addition to broad diversification.The existence of large outside investors has been shown to result in management becoming less risk-averse; management is more willing to adopt a wide range of strategies that present greater risk, but offer greater returns to shareholders. Hill and Snell (1988) found a significant, positive correlation between stock concentration and R&D intensity, indicating that large outside beneficial owners or dominant stockholders can influence management to pursue higher risk-higher return strategies. R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation and is generally operationalized as a firm's industry-adjusted R&D expenditures as a percentage of its sales. Findings of other studies also suggest that large investors are associated with decreased risk aversion by management. When controlling for the effects of time, previous R&D spending, liquidity, market share, diversification, market concentration, industry, and leverage, Hansen and Hill (1992) found a mild positive correlation between institutional stock concentration and R&D spending.This paper examines management's ability to utilize employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to facilitate managerial decision control or the capability to ratify and monitor decisions and subsequently adopt greater risk-reducing behavior. It is possible that management may adopt an ESOP to enhance entrenchment by placing a large block of the company's shares under the control of company managers and employees that are under the supervision of management. As a result, some ESOPs may not be effective alignment mechanisms since participants may find it difficult to organize a vote against management proposals or generate adequate enthusiasm and momentum to replace top-level managers. The paper anticipates that a positive relationship exists between the degree of ESOP stock concentration and the reduced risk-taking behavior of management. Specifically, the study argues that as ESOP stock concentration increases, management will likely behave in a risk-reducing manner and decrease its commitment to innovation, as measured by R&D intensity.Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are qualified retirement plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and are treated similarly under the Act to other qualified pension plans with the exception of portfolio diversification. Employee stock ownership plans consist only of shares of the employer's stock and the performance of an ESOP-based retirement fund hinges with the market performance of that single stock. An agency theory framework would suggest that ESOPs that control large blocks of outstanding shares have an effect on management similar to that of other large investors and act to encourage management to craft and implement strategies that will yield superior financial and market performance. As ESOP stock concentration increases, agency theory proposes that ESOP participants would readily act to protect their interests and the interests of other shareholders. However, some previous research suggests that large ESOPs are not alignment mechanisms, but further entrench current management into their positions.Gordon and Pound (1990) found that management can use large ESOPs to increase effective insider ownership to protect against unwanted changes in corporate control. The authors suggested that ESOPs were less effective than other types of large investors at monitoring management decisions since ESOPs are unilaterally undertaken by management, ESOP shares are held only by incumbent managerial and non-managerial employees, and ESOP trustees are frequently appointed by management. The market has been shown to view an ESOP as a management entrenchment mechanism when the ESOP was adopted as a possible takeover defense Chang 1990, Dhillon and Ramirez 1994. The market reacts more favorably to an ESOP adoption when other large outside shareholders are present who have the capability to offset the influence of inefficient managers who might choose to use the ESOP to further entrench themselves into their positions (Park and Song 1995).The results of this study find that after the implementation of an ESOP, R&D intensity decreases as ESOP stock concentration increases. A significant negative relationship exists between ESOP stock concentration and change in industry-adjusted R&D intensity at the 0.05 level when controlling for firm size and change in profitability. The sample included firms where ESOP stock concentration represented as little as 3% of the employer's outstanding shares and as much as 67% of all outstanding employer stock. The sampled firms with the greatest ESOP stock concentration were associated with the greatest decreases in industry-adjusted R&D intensity after the implementation of the ESOP. The results suggest that management of high ESOP stock concentration firms became more risk-averse in regard to commitment to innovation after implementation of the ESOP.Agency theory adequately explains the effect of large outside stockholders on management's choice of strategy. Hill and Snell (1988) and Hansen and Hill (1992) have found that as stock concentration increases, incentive alignment becomes increasingly likely. The independent nature of large outside blockholders contributes to a separation of decision making from decision control, a reduction in agency costs, and a minimization of managerial risk-reducing behavior. As highly independent blockholder size decreases, decision making and decision control converge, and management entrenchment is more probable.Agency theory fails to adequately explain the effect of employee stock ownership on managerial risk-reducing behavior. Employee stock ownership does have the capability to align shareholder and employee interests under the proper conditions. However, ESOPs lack independence from managerial influence and are much less likely than outside institutional investors to monitor management decision-making and pressure management to adopt strategies that incorporate greater risk and an opportunity for greater returns. The study found that increased ESOP stock concentration was associated with greater managerial risk-reducing behavior. The results suggest that agency effects are more likely in firms with modest ESOP stock concentration since the ESOP does provide incentives for an alignment of interests, but does not provide management with a mechanism to block the actions of other large blockholders. ESOPs with higher levels of stock concentration are likely to facilitate management entrenchment by preventing some large percentage of shares from aligning with other large shareholders to challenge management decision-making. If other investors lack the capability to put full pressure on management, the monitoring and ratification of management decisions has been yielded to management. Therefore, a managerial entrenchment hypothesis is better suited than agency theory in explaining the effect of large ESOPs on management's risk-reducing behavior.     

Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from Bangladesh

This study examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm agency costs among listed firms in Bangladesh. This is an institutional setting that features a mixture of agency costs. This institutional setting has a concentration of ownership by managers, but the firms are not solely owned by managers. The extant literature suggests that the sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. This study uses three measures of agency cost: the ‘expense ratio’, the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’, and the ‘asset utilisation ratio’. The finding of the study is that managerial ownership reduces the firm agency cost only under the ‘asset utilisation ratio’ measure of agency cost; this is robust with regard to a number of robustness tests. Furthermore, the non-linearity tests suggest that the convergence of interest is evident with very high and low levels of managerial ownership. The entrenchment effect by the owners is evident at moderate levels of managerial ownership. Although there has been great scepticism among management researchers on the validity of agency theory, overall, the findings of this study do not reject the validity of agency theory. Given that the entrenchment by managers is evident at certain levels of ownership and that the agency problem may still exist between insiders and outsiders, legislative guidelines for controlling share ownership may be required.     

Dual entrenchment and tax management: Classified boards and family firms

This study examines whether and how multiple managerial entrenchment devices within a firm, specifically the structure of the board of directors and family firm status, interact to influence tax management. Using a sample of 4,000 U.S. public firm-year observations covering the period 1999–2013, we find that the classified board structure and family firm status are both negatively related with tax avoidance. However, accounting for the interaction between board structure and family firm status, we also find that the negative associations between both entrenchment measures and tax management apply only where the other entrenchment mechanism is absent. In further analysis, we find that higher levels of monitoring by institutional investors neutralize the interaction between the presence of a classified board and family firm status. Our evidence highlights that governance/monitoring mechanisms can interact in complex ways, including an offsetting effect between potentially redundant dual-level entrenchment mechanisms, to influence tax management behavior.     

China's managers

This is a preliminary attempt to look at the environment within which senior executives in the People's Republic of China (PRC) operate and to throw some light on their managerial behavior. It tries to compare the way in which they allocate their time between various activities with Mintzberg's findings on the behavior of Western managers. The spread of Western-style management training in China during the last decade is discussed, and the fact that the managers studied made the effort to set aside significant amounts of uninterrupted time for their own personal education is pointed out.     

China Speaks Out: How and Why Chinese Employees Use Their Voice toward German Managers

Existing management literature on voice has primarily focused on examining who uses their voice and when it is used, ignoring why employees speak out and how they do so. We examine the conditions under which Chinese employees use their voice toward their German managers at German companies in Mainland China. The findings from our empirical study emphasize the importance of Chinese employees' personal identification with their German managers as a precondition for voice behaviors. Our results suggest that Chinese employees utilize indirect voice behavior in addition to direct voice behavior when interacting with their German managers. This indirect guanxi‐voice behavior has neither been recognized nor investigated in the literature. The theoretical and managerial implications of the results are discussed. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

会计信息质量与公司治理：基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据

本文通过Jones模型计算出可操纵盈余,并以之作为会计信息质量的代理变量,验证了会计信息质量与公司治理各要素之间的关系,结果发现股东大会和董事会会议次数与盈余管理程度正相关,内外部审计机制并没有发挥保护股东的作用,管理层持股比例、两职分离与否、债务治理机制、独立董事比例以及法律环境对盈余管理程度并无显著影响。在划分为正负盈余管理的基础上,发现了第一大股东存在显著的掠夺动机。     

A Cross-Cultural Study of Managerial Work Values in Singapore

ABSTRACT

The paper presents the findings of a research conducted on work values of expatriate and local managers in Singapore. The sample included about 600 expatriate and local managers of 30 American, Canadian, British, Swedish, and Korean companies operating in Singapore. The selected companies represented 13 industries. The managers were identified on the basis of their ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Hofstede's Value Survey Module was used as the major data collection instrument. The findings revealed some significant differences between the managers of the Western and the Eastern (Oriental) cultures regarding their work values, preferred management styles, and their perception of existing managerial practices. The findings also largely substantiate the “crossvergence” argument of managerial work values.     

Strategic Responses to Resource Management Pressures in Agriculture: Institutional,Gender and Location Effects

Management ownership has ethical consequences because it has an interest alignment effect or an entrenchment effect. In this paper, we investigate the ethical consequences of management ownership in China using accounting conservatism as the direct measure of entrenchment and alignment between shareholders and managers. We argue and find that the ethical effect of management ownership differs significantly in firms with different ultimate controlling shareholders. Specifically, management ownership in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) has an alignment effect, while management ownership has less of an alignment effect in state-owned enterprises than in NSOEs. These results show that the ethical consequences of management ownership are moderated by the nature of ultimate controlling ownership.     

高管持股与盈余稳健性:协同效应与堑壕效应

本文研究了高管持股与盈余稳健性的协同效应与堑壕效应。研究发现,上市公司对盈余稳健性的需求与高管持股呈非线性的关系。在高管持股水平较低和较高的区间,高管持股具有协同效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈负相关关系;在高管持股的中间水平,高管持股具有堑壕效应,高管持股与盈余稳健性呈正相关关系。