我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励有效性研究

我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励存在一些不足,原因在于薪酬激励的自身因素和薪酬环境因素两方面。自身因素主要包括忽视长期行为激励、缺乏同业竞争优势、轻视普通员工激励;环境因素主要有银行治理结构不完善、市场非充分有效、法规制度不健全等。本文通过对商业银行高管人员及普通员工的薪酬与业绩相关性进行实证检验,认为我国商业银行薪酬激励基本上是有效的,但是其有效性并不十分理想。据此,本文提出了提升我国商业银行薪酬激励有效性的具体建议:从微观层面看,优化薪酬激励机制;从中观层面看,强化商业银行治理结构;从宏观层面看,改善外部相关环境。     

我国商业银行薪酬激励实证研究

薪酬激励是激励机制的重要组成部分,亦是商业银行治理结构的重要组成部分。其有效性直接影响到对代理人的激励效果,进而影响银行的经营效率。本文通过介绍和运用薪酬激励的基本理论和设计原则,对当前我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的现状进行了分析,认为存在如下现状：员工薪酬水平和银行效益水平较低,薪酬形式单一且结构不合理,高级管理人员薪酬与员工薪酬差距逐步较大,薪酬与业绩相关性存在差异。通过对薪酬激励有效性进行实证分析,认为我国商业银行薪酬激励基本有效。最后提出了完善我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的建议。     

我国企业高管薪酬激励机制研究

企业高管人员作为一种稀缺的资源,对企业的持续健康发展起着至关重要的作用.本文在分析我国企业薪酬激励模式现状的基础上提出完善治理结构、多元化激励、优化薪酬结构等方法来留住优秀高管人员,促进企业发展.     

中美大型商业银行薪酬激励机制比较

薪酬机制不仅是商业银行激励机制重要组成部分,也是商业银行治理结构的重要组成部分。文章通过对中美大型商业银行薪酬激励机制进行比较分析,提出进一步完善我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的建议。     

我国商业银行管理者薪酬"激励过度"的制度完善

本文利用2005～2008年我国15家商业银行年报的混合数据,就我国商业银行管理者薪酬与银行业绩的关系进行实证研究.研究结果表明,管理者薪酬与商业银行业绩之间呈现显著的倒U型关系.本文还发现,当前我国商业银行管理者薪酬较高,即存在所谓的"激励过度".本文认为,我国商业银行应适当降低管理者薪酬以充分发挥正向激励作用,而规范管理者薪酬的关键在于制度,特别是监督机制的完善.     

薪酬激励对公司治理的影响文献综述

薪酬激励自20世纪初就一直被学术界广泛关注。本文通过相关文献,概括了我国上市公司薪酬激励的现状,从公司治理角度分析了我国上市公司薪酬激励对财务行为和公司业绩的治理效应,并提出了改进建议与思路。     

当前国有商业银行员工重视的激励因素

笔者对当前国有商业银行员工普遍看重的激励因素进行了问卷调查，结果显示按注重程度高低排列依次为：薪酬、管理制度、同事关系、领导水平、晋升与培训、工作条件、工作本身、信息、奖励等。相比较而言，普通员工更看重“薪酬”的激励，而管理人员则更看重“管理制度”和“晋升与培训”的激励。激励机制所依托的制度形式中，薪酬制度是核心，而现行薪酬制度体系，“公平”不足和“透明”欠缺，使激励初衰难以完全实现，其根本在于未能很好地解决“为什么我不能当”和“为什么我不能做”的问题，为此，需要以“公平”和“透明”为原则，以系统化为准绳，以岗位职级认定为基础，以业绩价值管理为导引，进一步改进薪酬制度安排。     

国有商业银行薪酬体制改革及激励目标改进

本文对人民银行广州分行辖区金融业员工收入水平、分配结构和薪酬体制进行了调研，调研结果表明，我国国有商业银行员工收入水平处于较低层次，这不利于其外部市场人力竞争能力的提升，其分配结构有欠合理，阻碍了其内部激励效率的发挥。要改变其人力竞争劣势，国有商业银行必须改革其薪酬制度：一方面，国有商业银行薪酬决定体制应该规避政府的管制政策，真正建立企业薪酬体制；另一方面，银行应该强化绩效和人力资本在收入决定体制中的权重，以保证其薪酬体制能够真正激励员工努力。国有商业银行人力资源管理模式的改进必须关注员工职业价值取向的转变，这是外资银行进入所带来的最大的挑战。     

上市银行高管过度激励与风险承担水平的实证研究

本文基于我国14家上市银行2007-2013年的数据,通过考察不同性质银行的高管所面临的过度激励与风险承担之间的关系,检验了我国商业银行高管薪酬激励机制的有效性.实证结果表明:第一,我国上市商业银行高管薪酬存在过度激励,且过度激励会造成银行风险承担水平的提高.第二,不同性质银行高管的过度激励对风险承担水平的影响是不同的.国有控股银行高管若受到过度激励,有可能会盲目扩大经营规模,增加银行的经营风险;而非国有控股银行的高管相对而言,这种激励作用会较弱.为此,要进一步推进商业银行高管薪酬改革,防止过度激励.尤其是国有控股银行高管薪酬机制设计要更加关注风险因素.     

高管薪酬外部公平性对代理人行为激励效应的实证研究

高管薪酬外部公平性是社会公平研究的重要问题。本文重新定义和区分了高管薪酬外部公平性概念,并基于相对分位数计量方法对高管薪酬外部公平性激励效应进行了研究。实证结果表明:我国高管薪酬分配总体服从右偏分布,分配总体上不公平;分配的公平性趋势逐年恶化;分配不公平的公司集中度加强;相对于普通员工薪酬,高管薪酬的市场定价相对更公平;高管薪酬外部公平性显著影响企业业绩,且存在区间效应,从而导致了公平分配的机会成本。本文为评价高管薪酬分配的外部公平性和估算公平分配的机会成本提供了计量参考。     

武汉市某软件有限公司薪酬满意度对员工离职倾向影响的实证分析

本文对武汉市某软件有限公司员工进行问卷调查,运用SPSS软件进行分析,探索了薪酬满意度对员工离职倾向的影响。结果表明:员工薪酬满意度的四个维度"薪资水平"、"福利"、"加薪"、"薪酬管理"与离职倾向呈显著负相关,并提出了相关建议。     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation

Using scaled wealth‐performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross‐sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long‐term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three‐stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options‐based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long‐term economic benefits.     

Capped hospital budgets,risk-influencing activities and financial consequences

It has long been recognized in the health economics literature that increased financial incentives for better-informed health care providers not only lead to desirable efficiency gains and cost savings but may have unintended consequences. Accounting-based cost containment instruments like capped budgets or prospective payment may induce physicians and hospitals to systematically avoid high-cost patients. Our paper uses an empirical approach backed by theoretical arguments to study a small German hospital’s reactions to a major increase in financial incentives. We first describe essential features of the German hospital sector and developments that led to the introduction of capped budgets for hospital care in 1993. Next, incentives to treat high-cost patients before and after the reform are analyzed in more detail. Using an anesthesia-related patient severity score (ASA score) as a proxy for financial patient risk, we empirically address the question of how the distribution of ASA scores has changed over time at the hospital for the 1989–2002 period. Our analysis of detailed operating room data reveals that the number of high-risk patients (high-ASA score) showed a systematic and significant decrease after the introduction of capped budgets. Using data from the new German DRG-reimbursement system, we also gain some preliminary evidence of the possible financial consequences of such practices.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).     

Determinants of Regional Investment Decisions in China: An Econometric Model of Tax Incentive Policy

This paper examines whether concessionary tax rates and tax incentives can attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into certain designated areas in China. Since China opened its doors to foreign investors in 1979, tax benefits have been used extensively to attract FDI into different areas. In 1991, a new tax law was introduced which superseded two previous income tax laws. This new law provides additional tax benefits which improve the investment environment for foreign investors. This study investigates the effect of China's tax rates and tax incentive policy on FDI and on the locational choices of foreign firms. Our empirical results indicate that tax rates and incentives are important determinants of regional investment decisions in China, after controlling for potential confounding variables covering infrastructure, unemployment rate, wage rate and agglomeration economics. Specifically, areas offering lower tax rates and increased tax incentives are found to attract greater amounts of FDI. The impetus of the tax effect on FDI is more apparent in the post-1991 period due to changes in the tax laws. Our results also suggest that infrastructure variables are important determinants of regional investment decisions.     

Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment

We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the wrong firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.     

我国中小民营企业薪酬管理问题探讨

近些年来,在国家的政策指引下,民营企业得到了飞速发展,成为经济社会发展的一支重要力量。民营企业在我国的众多经济成分中,具有特殊的企业特征,本文就我国民营企业在薪酬管理方面存在的普遍性问题进行了分析探讨,对如何建立科学合理的薪酬体系,提出了实施对策。     

CEO过度自信对薪酬的影响研究

CEO过度自信是影响其自身薪酬的重要因素。本文以2008—2018年A股上市公司CEO的薪酬情况为研究样本,实证检验了在中国情境下CEO过度自信对薪酬水平和薪酬结构的影响。研究发现:过度自信的CEO比非过度自信的CEO拥有更高的总薪酬和股权激励强度以及更低的现金薪酬比例;同时,相比非国有企业,国有企业中CEO过度自信对薪酬的影响更为显著。进一步研究发现:企业面临的风险大小和创新程度会强化过度自信与CEO薪酬之间的关联关系。     

Large Infrastructure Investments: Financing Mechanisms and Incentives in Decentralised Countries*

Infrastructure services crucially affect competitiveness and efficiency. They are essential but they usually require important amounts of public funds. In decentralised countries, regional governments cannot usually afford large infrastructure projects, so co-financing with the central government is required. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the influence of the central government financing mechanisms on the contract offered by the regional government for the construction, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. We prove that if the central government uses certain financing mechanisms (total cost coverage), the regional government may have no incentives to offer an efficient contract to the firm.