Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Taxation In The Two‐Sector Neoclassical Growth Model With Sector‐Specific Externalities And Endogenous Labour Supply*

This paper examines the long‐run impacts of selective (or sector‐specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with sector‐specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. We analytically show that the stability properties of the long‐run equilibrium critically affect the long‐run effects of these selective taxes, which may reverse the standard results of the growth effects of distortionary taxes.     

Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy

This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist’s location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus, government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving.     

TAX DISCOUNTING VS. CROWDING OUT

The “crowding out” effect of debt-financed government spending on the private sector consumption-saving decision and on private investment behavior has been a controversial subject for several years. Do increases in debt-financed government spending stimulate private consumption and saving in the short run, as well as private consumption in subsequent periods? Or does the realization that future taxes must be raised to finance repayment of the debt result in a lack of stimulus for consumption as well as no detrimental impact on subsequent private saving? This article empirically tests for the presence and/or magnitude of tax discounting and crowding out, carefully distinguishing between the two, and decomposes government debt instruments according to their maturities in order to determine impact due to a reorientation of debt structure. The results do not support the existence of tax discounting, suggesting instead that government deficits do stimulate current consumption.     

Ecological dumping under foreign investment quotas

In this paper, we examine the discrimination of emission taxes between the export and nontradable sectors in a small open economy. A few articles indicate that there should be no differentiation of environmental policies between sectors in the economy if the government uses indirect instruments such as emission taxes. However, we show that discrimination of emission taxes may occur in an economy that imposes foreign investment quotas. In particular, the possibility that ecological dumping occurs is higher if export goods are more labor intensive than import goods (as in developing countries). Moreover, in the case where import goods are the most capital intensive, both emission tax rates may be lower than the marginal environmental damage, and ecological dumping may occur. It is also shown that easing foreign capital quotas may deteriorate the country’s welfare.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a model with inherited aspirations and habit formation

In this paper, we analyze optimal fiscal policies in an overlapping generations framework, where preferences exhibit aspirations in consumption and environmental quality as well as habit formation. We focus on the second best policies when the government needs to finance a given stream of public expenditures by using distortionary taxes. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the competitive equilibrium is characterized by levels of capital and environmental quality that are too small and a level of labor supply that is too large. Our numerical simulations show that an optimal fiscal policy can be used as an effective stabilization device and that when consumption taxes are fixed, the planner implements maintenance investment and capital income subsidies while financing public spending through labor and fixed consumption taxes.     

Banks with market power,sectoral structure and the big push

Due to complementarities between different investment projects, simultaneous implementation of many investment projects (big push) may be needed to avoid coordination failures. This paper examines potential and limitations of private coordination by banks with market power. Our analysis shows that such private coordination may not work if banks with market power find it more profitable to finance firms in the traditional sector than in the modern sector. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral policies in addressing coordination failures.     

Discretionary fiscal policy and economic activity in Greece

This paper investigates the effects of discretionary fiscal policy changes on economic activity and its subcomponents in Greece in the period 2000–2011. Changes in government spending and net taxes have Keynesian effects. An increase in government consumption has the most pronounced positive effects on output growth, private consumption and non-residential investment, while it reduces residential investment. Cuts in the public investment programme crowd in private investment, but are associated negatively with the net exports ratio. Both indirect and direct tax hikes lower private consumption, private investment and output growth. However, higher direct taxes by lowering disposable income they reduce import demand, thus, improving the trade balance.     

Boosting confidence: Is there a role for fiscal policy?

This paper investigates the widely held view that expansionary fiscal policy can boost consumer and business confidence, which will stimulate private spending and sustain economic activity. We find evidence in favor of this conjecture, i.e., cuts in direct taxes generate a positive effect on consumer and business confidence, while the same applies in cases of higher non-wage government consumption. However, higher government wage bills and government investment reduce confidence, with the effect being more pronounced when the Debt to GDP ratio is high, possibly because they entail a permanent increase in the size of the public sector, which would have to be financed by higher future taxes.     

Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes,Even If They Do Not Take Climate Change into Account

Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes, the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter’s ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs—instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

The Third Way and the third sector: New Labour's economic policy and the social economy

This paper reviews the relationship between Labour's economicpolicy and the third sector. Since 1997, the third sector hasreceived significant government support and has gradually movedfrom the economic periphery towards the centre such that itis now instrumental in the delivery of a range of governmentpolicies. It operates alongside both the private and publicsectors in delivering employment, education, health and socialcare, housing and environmental policies. The impact of thishas been seen in measures of social exclusion, poverty, theenvironment, social capital, as well as GDP and employment.Future policies should strive to maintain and develop the distinctivecapabilities of third sector organisations and the balance betweeneconomic, social and environmental objectives.     

International production chains and the pollution offshoring hypothesis: An empirical investigation

Most analyses of the impact of heterogeneous environmental policy stringency on the location of industrial firms have considered the relocation of entire activities – the well-known pollution haven hypothesis. Yet international enterprises may decide to only offshore a subset of their production chain – the so-called pollution offshoring hypothesis (POH). We introduce a simple empirical approach to test the POH combining a comprehensive industrial mergers and acquisitions dataset, a measure of sectoral linkages based on input-output tables and an index score of environmental policy stringency. Our results confirm the impact of relative environmental policy stringency on firms’ decisions to engage in cross-country M&As. Our findings also indicate that environmental taxation have a stronger impact on international investment decisions than standards-based policies. Further, we find that transactions involving a target firm operating in a sector upstream of the acquirer are more sensitive to environmental policy stringency, especially when that sector is highly pollution-intensive. This empirical evidence is consistent with the pollution offshoring hypothesis.     

The effects of environmental policies on the abatement investment decisions of a green firm

This paper focuses on environmental policies aimed at rising investment in pollution abatement capital. We assume that ecological uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the dynamics of pollution, affects firm investment decisions. Capital irreversibility is not postulated but endogenized using a quadratic adjustment cost function. Using this framework, we study the effects of environmental policies considering taxes on polluting inputs and subsidies to reduce the cost of abatement capital. Environmental policies promoted to enforce abatement capital may generate the unexpected result of reducing the abatement investment rate.     

Endogenous Growth,Taxes and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence*

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the simultaneous effects of taxes and government spending on long‐run economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. A two‐sector model is considered: one sector produces physical output and the other produces human capital. Government expenditure is divided into several categories, and several types of taxes are included. The property tax is especially interesting because it is a major source of revenue for local government. The theoretical model is estimated using annual panel data from North Carolina counties. This study finds that state‐level fiscal policies affect economic growth but county‐level fiscal policies do not.     

Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&D and result in a cleaner environment?

In this paper we explore whether privatization helps to catalyze a firm's environmental research and development (ER&D) and improve environmental quality. By defining ER&D as the effort undertaken by a firm to reduce its pollution per unit of output, we find in a duopoly framework that privatization cannot catalyze both public and private firms’ ER&D efforts simultaneously; it can increase one but decrease the other firm's investment, or it may even lower both firms’ ER&D investments. Moreover, when production causes severe environmental damage, or the imposition of environmental taxes poorly internalize the pollution externality, privatization may result in a poorer environment. For the sake of having a cleaner environment, policy-makers can impose higher environmental taxes on a highly polluting industry when it is being privatized.     

You are suffocating me: Firm-level analysis of state-owned enterprises and private investment

Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.     

Dynamic comparative advantage: Some implications for trade policy in North America

This paper explores the implications of changing North American trade policies for dynamic comparative advantage and shows, with examples from the energy and high-technology sectors, how a new policy based on interdependence might work. Newly industrializing countries such as Mexico should aim to break into industries with progressively higher technological and value-added components, such as computer manufacturing—industries that are entering a period of expanded demand and going beyond the period of greatest capital intensity. Although few Mexican firms might be expected to enter such oligopolistic markets alone (at least in the short run), they could combine forces with established enterprises abroad in order to permit gradual market penetration. The examples in the paper illustrate the need for a stable macroeconomic framework for policymaking that includes exchange rates, investment incentives, relative price behavior, taxes, intellectual property rights, labor and environmental regulations, capital market policies, harmonization of standards, and other measures. There is also a need for policies that anticipate the potential private and social returns of activities that might be overlooked in a static framework.