Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

This paper shows that if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies, as embodied by a reduction in the emission per output ratio, may either improve or jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. A small change in the emission per output ratio can result in a discrete jump in the stable size of a coalition and global welfare evaluated under the stable coalition size. In the case of three countries, the grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. In the case of more than three countries, implementing cleaner technologies may result in a discrete jump, either upward or downward, of the largest stable coalition size and welfare. We examine both, the case of a flow and that of a stock pollutant. In the latter case, we show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that a grand coalition of three countries is destabilized. Measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants are shown to have similar effects on the size of stable coalitions to reductions in the emission per output ratio.     

Policy Framework for Transition to a Low-Carbon World Economy

Climate change mitigation policy is the most difficult to come before our polity in living memory. There can be no solution without international agreement involving all substantial economies, and yet each country has an incentive to free ride on others. The international agreement must have five parts: agreement on the objective in terms of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, agreement on allocation of an emissions entitlements budget among countries, agreement on rules for international trade in entitlements, agreement on developed countries taking the lead on development of low-emissions technologies, and agreement on assistance from developed countries for climate change mitigation in developing countries. Two sources of market failure must be corrected to achieve emissions reduction targets efficiently: the external costs of emitting greenhouse gases and the external benefits of private investment in innovation in relation to low-emissions technologies.     

Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?

International emission trading is an important flexibility mechanism, but its use has been often restricted on the ground that access to international carbon credits can undermine the domestic abatement effort reducing the incentive to innovate and, eventually, lowering the pace of climate policy-induced technological change. This paper examines the economics that is behind these concerns by studying how a cap to the trade of carbon offsets influences innovation, technological change, and welfare. By using a standard game of abatement and R&D, we investigate the main mechanisms that shape these relationships. We also use a numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental and technology externalities to quantify how limits to the volume, the timing, and the regional allocation of carbon offsets affect climate policy costs and the incentive to invest in innovation and low-carbon technologies.Results indicate that, for moderate caps on the amount tradable emissions permits and sufficiently high technology spillovers, global innovation and technical change would increase and that this additional innovative effort could lead to economic efficiency gains. The numerical analysis confirms that when constraints are close to 15% of domestic abatement, efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological spillovers and lower energy prices. Under a broad range of parameters, restrictions are costly for the constrained countries, but always beneficial for unconstrained ones.     

Environmental Policy and the International Diffusion of Cleaner Energy Technologies

Technology transfer is an important channel of technological change and sustainable development for countries with less innovative ability than technological leaders. This paper studies whether domestic environmental policies affect the inward technology transfer of cleaner innovation from abroad. We focus specifically on the power sector, for its important role in the decarbonization process, by looking at zero-carbon (renewable) and carbon-saving (efficient fossil) technologies for energy production. Using data on cross-country patent applications, we provide evidence that environmental policy contributes to attracting foreign cleaner technology options to OECD markets but not to non-OECD markets. We show that this is due to the nature of the implemented policy instruments. Market-based approaches positively impact technology transfer to both OECD and non-OECD economies, while non-market based approaches have at best only a weak effect in OECD countries. Domestic environmental policies may provide too weak a signal for foreign innovators in countries off the technological frontier. This calls for a strengthening of policy incentives for technology transfer in light of pressing climate change objectives.     

Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement

For international environmental problems involving many countries, such as, e.g., the climate problem, it is unlikely that all countries will participate in an international environmental agreement. If some countries commit themselves to cooperate, while the remaining countries act independently and in pure self-interest, it appears to be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement if the non-signatory countries reduce their emissions, in exchange for transfers from the countries which sign an agreement. However, the paper shows that the prospect of receiving a transfer for reducing one's emissions provided the country does not commit itself to cooperation, tends to reduce the incentive a country might have to commit itself to cooperation. Moreover, if the disincentive effect of such side payments is strong, total emissions will be higher in a situation with side payments than in a situation in which the signatory countries commit themselves to not give transfers to free riding countries.     

Should the north make unilateral technology transfers to the south?: North–South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change

Whether developed countries should make unilateral technology transfers to developing countries in order to address global environment problems is debatable. This paper discusses the issue in a framework that recognizing nations' joint production of environmental externalities. Unlike the existing literature on unilateral transfers, this paper presents a North–South environmental–economic optimal growth model that allows transfers to mitigate externalities only. The paper derives criteria that would make such transfers feasible. By solving the transfer problem in a modified RICE model [Nordhaus, W.D., Yang, Z., 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies, Am. Econ. Rev., 86 (4) 741–65], this paper also provides information on the timing and the amount of unilateral transfers from North to South to address potential global warming problem, one major global environmental externality. A policy implication from this study is that moderate employment of unilateral transfers would benefit North along with the world as a whole.     

Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.     

The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

The need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made, as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market, to analyze the North’s incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement. Technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement, but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus. The only impacts are distributional, technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments.     

Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems

This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. We call this behaviour precautionary commitment. Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue.We also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinatedglobal co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.     

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders? final utility possibly depends on the winner?s identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels? structures (not) observed in practice.     

CO2-Stabilization May Be a 'No-Regrets' Policy

Restricting CO₂ emissions requires changing today's consumption pattern away from energy and emission intensive commodities towards cleaner goods. The cost of stabilizing CO₂ emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000, say, as compared to a business-as-usual trend, is estimated by several researchers to be on the order of 1% of GNP. We will argue that the cost may be overestimated because of a too simple model describing the working of the economic system and the evaluation of welfare. We demonstrate that by expanding a model to include the actual tax system and negative externalities, the cost to present generations from restricting emissions by a CO₂ tax may be negative. That is, some reduction may actually correspond to a 'no-regrets' policy. The reasons are inefficiencies in today's tax system and non-optimal handling of negative externalities. Our analysis suggests that a CO₂ tax and reduced emissions will lessen such inefficiencies.     

Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe

Non-employment rates in all central and eastern European countries have increased dranatically thoroughout the transition and are currently larger than those of the lowest income OECD countries. Non-employment benefits other than unemployment benefits are providing income support to this growing number of able-bodied individuals out of work. Under the present design of unemployment benefits and social assistance, there may be serious incentive problems related to the shift from unemployment benefits to other, means-tested, non-employment benefits and this shift occurs in transition countries at rather early stages of an unemployment spell; these incentive problems are bound to become particularly acute in a less inflationary environment.     

Is nuclear energy clean? Revisit of Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis in OECD countries

A transition towards the adoption of clean energy sources in electricity generation is essential to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. The present study aims to examine the EKC hypothesis by taking into account nuclear energy in 18 OECD countries for the period 1995–2015. This study employs panel dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and panel Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) to investigate the effects of electricity production from nuclear source, electricity production from non-renewables and trade openness on CO₂ emissions. The empirical findings suggest that EKC hypothesis is valid in OECD countries where nuclear energy plays a pivotal role in protecting the environment. On the contrary, non-renewable energy sources tend to increase CO₂ emissions. Our results support the notion that electricity generated by nuclear source leads to lower CO₂ emissions without retarding the long run growth in OECD countries. The findings also provide important policy insights and recommendations not only for OECD countries, but also for developing countries in designing appropriate energy and economic policies.     

绿色与非绿色技术对后续创新影响的比较——“厚此薄彼”还是“双赢策略”

尽管绿色技术一直被认为具有广阔的发展前景,但这些技术在企业间的扩散率却很低。企业在非绿色与绿色技术创新关系上存在“厚此薄彼”的现象。基于1992—2019年中国制造业上市公司专利数据研究发现,相较于非绿色技术,绿色技术的前向引用次数更多,且产生了更大的知识溢出效应,对整个社会后续创新具有更大的正向影响力。此外,由于高能耗行业存在转化成本高、自身知识储备不足等问题,随着能耗水平提升,绿色技术对后续创新的正向影响力逐渐减弱。相较于非国有控股企业,国有控股企业绿色技术对后续创新产生了显著正向影响。该结论对政府设计绿色与非绿色创新“双赢策略”,促进企业从“厚此薄彼”转向绿色与非绿色技术双创新具有重要意义。     

Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers

We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between developed and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by developing countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not sufficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance their absorptive capacities.     

Project Mechanisms and Technology Diffusion in Climate Policy

The paper deals with the diffusion of GHG mitigation technologies in developing countries. We develop a model where an abatement technology is progressively adopted by firms and we use it to compare the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with a standard Cap and Trade scheme (C&T). In the presence of learning spillovers, we show that the CDM yields a higher social welfare than C&T if the first adopter receives CDM credits whereas the followers do not. The analysis leads us to suggest two CDM design improvements: relaxing the additionality constraint for projects which generate significant learning externalities, and allowing collective CDM projects which could internalize learning externalities.     

ICT stochastic externalities,technology innovation and business services: is there an evidence of missed opportunity growth?

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present an analysis of the production process for some OECD countries and consider the new technology of the ICT capital as driver of growth. In doing so, the production function approach adopted allows to disentangle the externalities not exploited. In line with the general-purpose technology theory, we attribute such externalities to the new technology ICT capital. Business services are a relevant vehicle to use better the innovative capital embedded in the production process. We develop and implement a methodology for the evaluation of the effect on growth related to the interaction between innovative capital and business services. The main conclusion of the paper is that the potentials of new technologies in use are almost completely exploited during the productive process. Then, even if a competitive solution is viable, there are small, though possible, margins to improve a sustainable European growth in the long run linked to externalities. We also point out some conclusions on the capital and labor shares showing that the latter is ‘too small’ both in the long and short run.     

Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties

Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Minimum participation constraints are particularly frequent in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to “tie their hands” through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This article addresses the above issues by modeling the formation of an international treaty as a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. Both the equilibrium minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories—the coalition size—are determined. This article, by showing that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium, explains the occurrence of minimum participation clauses in most international environmental agreements. It also analyses the endogenous equilibrium size of the minimum participation constraint.     

Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation

We investigate conditions that amplify market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that ‘small’ market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a ‘lock-in’ into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies including subsidies, quotas, and taxes with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations.     

The clean development mechanism versus international permit trading: The effect on technological change

The clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol may induce technological change in developing countries. As an alternative to the clean development mechanism regime, developing countries may accept a (generous) cap on their own emissions, allow domestic producers to invest in new efficient technologies, and sell the excess emission permits on the international permit market. The purpose of this article is to show how the gains from investment, and hence the incentive to invest in new technology in developing countries, differ between the two alternative regimes. We show that the difference in the gains from investment depends on whether the producers in developing countries face competitive or noncompetitive output markets, whether the investment affects fixed or variable production costs, and whether producers can reduce emissions through means other than investing in new technology.