Audit report information content and the provision of non-audit services: Evidence from Spanish lending decisions

This study examines whether auditor economic independence affects the information content of going concern audit reports in the European setting. We conduct an experiment where 80 experienced Spanish loan officers from the second largest European commercial bank review a loan request under two lending scenarios: (1) a potential borrower receiving an unqualified but modified going concern opinion, and (2) a potential borrower receiving a qualified going concern opinion. Auditor economic independence, measured by the provision of non-audit services (NAS), is manipulated (absence vs. presence of significant NAS). We find that a qualified going concern audit report is interpreted as a primary warning signal (death penalty). However, the provision of NAS acts as a second order mechanism that only activates loan officers’ professional skepticism in the case of an unqualified but modified going concern report scenario. Therefore, we find evidence suggesting that the potential negative impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence depends on the nature of the audit report. Our findings have important implications for the European regulator, which is currently considering establishing an auditor independence regulation framework similar to that in the United States of America.     

Business Firms as Adaptive Entities: The Case of the Major Australian Banks 1983–94

The conventional accounting notion of 'going concern', that a firm will continue business operations in the same manner indefinitely, has influenced accounting thought and practice throughout this century. An alternative view, widely upheld in the literatures of economics and organizational behaviour, is that firms are generally innovative and adapt to changes in market and economic conditions. These conflicting ideas are put under inquiry by examining the business policies and practices of the four major Australian banks over the period 1983 to 1994. We conclude on analytical grounds that conventional cost allocation and deferral practices, being based on the static or conventional idea of a 'going concern', are flawed and yield balance sheets that are not indicative of the financial capacity of firms to engage in commerce at any time. We conclude on empirical grounds that the Australian banks, at least, are generally innovative and adaptive enterprises.     

A Web Of Shocks: Crises Across Asian Real Estate Markets

The behaviour of real estate markets during the 1997–98 Financial crisis in Asian economies has received little attention despite the extensive research on other asset markets over this time. This paper examines the transmission of shocks across national real estate markets prior to and during the Asian crisis using a multivariate latent factor framework. The results reveal that diversification opportunities prior to the crisis are much reduced during the crisis. A comparison with regional equity markets shows that the transmission of shocks differs across the real estate and equity markets, providing evidence that investment in multiple asset classes provides some protection from large market downturns.     

非标意见与债务融资——基于银行借款和债务期限结构的经验证据

理论上,年报被出具非标意见会降低企业的债务融资能力。但本文发现非标意见对企业新增银行借款和债务期限结构没有显著负面影响,不支持理论预期。我们认为,在中国,银行是一个并非完全以利润最大化为目标的独立市场主体,他们会为了地方社会稳定和经济发展向企业提供贷款;另外,企业有政府的隐性支持,银行不需要太关注企业的偿债风险。因此,虽然非标意见传递出会计信息质量低或未来经营风险高等问题,但它对银行借款的影响相当有限。本文的研究有助于我们理解中国上市公司会计造假盛行、非标意见比例过高的现象。     

Real Estate Prices and Corporate Investment: Theory and Evidence of Heterogeneous Effects across Firms

In this paper, we investigate the effect of real estate prices on productive investment. We build a theoretical framework of firms' investment with credit rationing and real estate collateral. We show that real estate prices affect firms' borrowing capacities through two channels. An increase in real estate prices raises the value of the firms' pledgeable assets and mitigates the agency problem characterizing the creditor–entrepreneur relationship. It simultaneously cuts the expected profit due to the increase in the cost of inputs. We test our theoretical predictions using a large French database. We do find heterogeneous effects of real estate prices on productive investment depending on the position of the firms in the sectoral distributions of real estate holdings.     

Return Relationships between Listed Banks and Real Estate Firms: Evidence from Seven Asian Economies

This paper studies the return relationships between listed banks and real estate firms in seven Asian economies before and after the Asian financial crisis. We find that listed banks were exposed to real estate risk both before and after the crisis, but that the exposure increased in the post-crisis period. After the crisis, the hidden risk of real estate collateral in the bank lending process was explicit, as was evidenced by the increased sensitivity and the structure break. In terms of causality, the returns of listed real estate firms are found to Granger-cause the returns of listed banks. However, there is mixed evidence as to whether listed bank returns Granger-cause the returns of listed real estate firms. The study is significant because it indicates the importance of lending policies in relation to the real estate market in establishing a healthy financial system.     

货币需求的投机性动机还是预防性储蓄：来自房地产行业的证据

从公司货币需求的视角考察货币政策对房地产市场的影响,为货币政策的有效性提供了微观的研究视角。基于凯恩斯的流动性偏好理论和现金持有的权衡理论分析发现,公司的货币需求与货币供给的关系,随不同的动机而不同。实证的结果发现,房地产公司货币需求更多的体现了投机性动机。因此,针对货币政策对房地产公司影响的复杂性,必须与其它调控措施更加紧密的协调以形成合力,才能对房地产市场实施有效管理。     

谁更关心关键审计事项:管理层还是分析师

学术界对披露关键审计事项能否提高审计报告的信息含量展开了大量的研究,但主要集中于对股票市场信息传递的探讨,鲜有文献从管理层行为的角度考察披露关键审计事项对资本市场的影响。本文利用新审计报告的过渡期设定,以实施新审计报告准则对分析师预测准确度的影响为切入点,考察了披露关键审计事项究竟是作为增量信息改进分析师预测,还是作为监督压力抑制管理层迎合分析师预测的行为。研究结果支持监督效应,但这种监督效应存在局部性和补充性,即只能对管理层在薪酬激励较低和权力受到制衡的情境下发挥作用;且仅能对管理层在审计质量较低、利润操纵事项难以分辨的情境下发挥补充监督作用。这些结论为监管者和政策制定者完善审计准则提供了些许借鉴。     

Net Asset Value Discounts for Asian-Pacific Real Estate Companies: Long-Run Relationships and Short-Term Dynamics

This study investigates the time series behavior of real estate company net asset value discount/premium (NAVDISC) in eight Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets from 1995 to 2003. We postulate that if there is a stable NAVDISC for real estate companies in the long-run, then there should be a long-run cointegrating relation between their stock prices (Ps) and net asset values (NAVs). Employing panel data cointegration econometrics that comprises three approaches; panel unit root test, heterogeneous panel cointegration test and dynamic panel error-correction modeling (ECM), we find that long run NAVDISCs persist in individual Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets and the regional market. All the NAVDISCs exhibit mean reversion and that the respective disequilibrium errors fluctuate around the mean values. Moreover, NAV is an important factor that statistically explains the price variations in real estate stock prices regardless of their speed of mean-reversion in the NAV discount /premium.     

物业税开征的先决条件之一:房地产产权制度的改革与完善

明晰的房地产产权关系以及相应完善的管理制度是开征物业税不可缺少的重要条件。本文探讨了物业税与房地产产权管理的一般关系,针对我国房地产产权管理现状存在的问题,提出了开展房地产产权登记普查、逐步统一城乡房地产产权管理制度等政策建议。     

Think Twice Before Going for Incentives: Social Norms and the Principal's Decision on Compensation Contracts

Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice of an incentive contract that may discourage misrepresentation, compared to a fixed‐salary contract, affects the honesty of his or her agents’ cost reporting. Results show that, besides an incentive effect and a principal trust effect, the active choice for incentives produces a negative “information leakage” effect. When principals use incentives, their choices not only incentivize truthful reporting and signal distrust, but they also leak important information about the social norm, namely, that other agents are likely to report dishonestly. Agents conform to this social norm by misrepresenting cost information more. Our results have important practical implications. Managers must recognize that their decisions can leak information to their agents, which may produce unanticipated consequences for the social norms of the organization.