Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.     

Violations of Independence under Amendment and Plurality Rules with Anonymous Voters

Under the impartial anonymous culture assumption (IAC), we evaluate the proportion of anonymous profiles at which the amendment and plurality voting procedures violate the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). We also examine the relation to single-peakedness of preferences and election of a Condorcet winner.      

On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure

We study in this paper some features of a new voting rule recently proposed by K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush. The (conjectural) optimality of this voting rule with respect to statistical manipulability by coalitions is discussed under two alternative probabilistic assumptions, namely the impartial culture condition (IC) and the impartial anonymous culture condition (IAC). We also analyze the ability of Kim and Roush procedure to fulfil the Condorcet conditions. Some representations of its Condorcet efficiency in three-alternative elections are obtained.     

Approval voting in scientific and engineering societies

Approval voting is a system in which members can vote for as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising some 350,000 members, used this election reform for the first time. Their reasons for adoption varied but centered around efforts to elect consensus candidates. Approval voting has indeed elected so-called Condorcet candidates, who can defeat all other candidates in pairwise contests. Moreover, these winners generally enjoy support among different classes of voters, so they are not merely lowest common denominators, as some analysts had feared. In at least one instance, approval voting would have led to a different winner from plurality voting (in which voters can vote for exactly one candidate); arguably, this winner would have been the better social choice because he had wider support than his closest opponent. On another occasion, approval voting led to ideological voting—in which the voting patterns reflected an underlying ordering of the candidates—but voting in most societies tends to be nonideological. Overall, the recent experimentation with approval voting has shown that it not only may make a difference but also elects broadly acceptable candidates.     

Rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions

This paper is about the determination of common external tariffs (CETs) in customs unions (CUs). We first examine how the relationship between preferences over CET levels, technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a CU is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues. We then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium CET. Among other things, we find that, when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members’ imports, tariff preferences may be polarized, the trade patterns of some CU members may be endogenous, and, as a result, their payoff functions may not be single-peaked. This leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules (e.g., the ‘population’ and ‘consumption’ rules) and raises the possibility of a Condorcet paradox.     

DIRECT PRODUCT PROFITABILITY AND RETAIL SHELF‐SPACE ALLOCATION MODELS

Given an assortment of k products, a retailer must make an important decision on the percentage of space allocated to each of them. Optimization models for this problem have previously shown that an item's space should not simply be given in proportion to its sales or its gross margin (GM). Calculations of Direct Product Profitability (DPP) have improved upon the GM concept, but the present paper is the first (of which we are aware) to integrate the DPP approach into a shelf‐space optimization model.     

Information,individual errors,and collective performance: Empirical evidence on the Condorcet Jury Theorem

The Condorcet Jury Theorem implies that the collective performance of a group, in arriving at a “correct” judgment on the basis of majority or plurality rule, will be superior to the average performance of individual members of the group, if certain apparently plausible conditions hold. Variants of the Jury Theorem are reviewed, particularly including the politically relevant variant that allows for conflicting interests within the group. We then examine two kinds of empirical data. First, we compare individual and collective performance in a large number of multiple-choice tests, and we find that collective performance invariably and substantially exceeds average individual performance. Second, we analyze American National Election Study data to create dichotomous-choice tests concerning positions of candidates on a variety of political issues; Condorcet-like effects are again evident. Finally, continuing to use NES data, we construct, on each political issue, a simulated referendum (direct voting on the issue) and election (indirect voting on the issue by voting for candidates on the basis of their perceived positions on the issue), and we compare the two results. Despite high rates of individual error, electoral error is quite small, and collective performance is fairly high, providing evidence of Condorcet-like effects in situations of conflicting preferences.     

Public Bad Prevention by Majority Voting on Redistribution – Experimental Evidence

We present an experimental study on voting behavior in groups of seven persons where public bad prevention depends on redistributing income by qualified majority voting. Although a payoff-maximizing voting pattern exists which guarantees a qualified majority – thus maximizing both individual and group payoffs – the qualified majority is failed in 27% (relatively costly public bad), respectively 46% (relatively cheap public bad) of all decisions. Controlling for different degrees of social distance when casting votes (i.e. anonymous versus with identification) we find that social distance matters when stakes are relatively low, inducing less efficient outcomes for the group when voting behavior is revealed. The endogenously determined status of subjects with respect to redistribution (unlucky subjects lose, lucky subjects win) systematically influences subjects' voting strategies and the collective outcomes, such that a higher number of unlucky subjects leads to less efficient outcomes for the group.     

A new view of shareholder voting in the nineteenth century: evidence from Brazil,England and France

Business corporations in the nineteenth century often imposed limits on the voting rights of large shareholders. Economic historians have generally interpreted these voting restrictions as a contractual mechanism designed to protect small shareholders in a legal environment that afforded insufficient investor protection. This dominant account, however, fails to explain the variation in the incidence of voting restrictions across different industries and firm ownership structures, as well as their eventual disappearance from corporate charters over time. In this Article, we advance an alternative interpretation for these early voting schemes as efforts at consumer protection employed primarily by firms that were local service monopolies and collectively owned by their principal customers, none of whom wished the firm to come under the exclusive control of their competitors or of profit-maximising investors. We explore and test this proposition by analysing data on shareholder voting rights in the nineteenth century in Brazil, England, and France.     

CSR development in post‐communist economies: employees' expectations regarding corporate socially responsible behaviour – the case of Romania

Drawing on stakeholder theory and the evolutionary approach to institutions, this paper investigates the channels through which corporate social responsibility (CSR) is developed in post‐communist economies by focusing on the employee background factors that shape the employees' expectations with regard to corporate socially responsible behaviour. We identify three channels through which exogenous and endogenous CSR are developed: employees with work experience in multinational enterprises (MNEs) (leading to exogenous CSR), employees with CSR knowledge (leading to exogenous CSR) and employees with experience of the socialist system (leading to endogenous CSR). Furthermore, we argue that the interactions between these channels lead to hybrid CSR in transition economies. We use a questionnaire‐based survey with employees of domestic and MNEs in Romania and we conduct regression analysis. We find that employees with work experience in MNEs act as channels for exogenous CSR, while employees with experience of the socialist system act as channels for endogenous CSR. Furthermore, employees with experience of the socialist system and CSR knowledge or work experience in an MNE act as channels for hybrid CSR in transition economies. Based on our results, we put forward implications for theory, managers and policy makers.     

Construct heterogeneity and proliferation in advertising research

Abstract

This paper presents results from a study of measurement practice in leading advertising journals. The focus is on heterogeneity in measurement operationalizations of the same construct and construct proliferation (i.e. when constructs have different names but overlapping content). These issues were addressed by analyzing the measurement operationalizations in all articles published in three leading advertising journals between 2012 and 2014. Results show considerable heterogeneity in the operationalizations of three common advertising constructs (ad credibility, ad irritation and perceived humour) for which almost every study used a unique operationalization. Results also show considerable construct proliferation as different names were used for the same constructs and there was overlap in the operationalizations of several advertising constructs. The paper offers a discussion of implications for advertising research and suggests steps that can be taken towards improving measurement practice.     

A Voting Mechanism Designed for Talent Shows in Mass Media: Weighted Preference of Group Decision Makers in Social Networks Using Fuzzy Measures and Choquet Integral

As the development of social networks tends to shape people’s view about choices, decision making theories are challenged by numerous unprecedented difficulties, from both the theories and practice. One hot topic is how to design a voting mechanism for talent shows in mass media that not only attracts public attention but also reflects an objective and fair principle. Weighted voting, where the voting power of a representative is proportional to the population in his or her district, has been widely adopted in legislative selections and talent show competitions. However, weighted voting system may cause disenfranchisement of some representatives and reduce the entertainment and interest of talent shows because of the ignorance of complex interactions among the representatives. In this paper, possible interactions among representatives are analyzed by investigating the associated social networks and subsequently some fuzzy measures are utilized to quantify these interactions. Specifically, the weights determination model is adopted in this situation for defining fuzzy measures to avoid the disenfranchisement, and a multiple-group hierarchy decision model is developed to solve social network group decision making problems where the Choquet integral is employed to reduce the impact from synergy and redundancy between representatives. Moreover, a voting mechanism for talent shows in mass media is provided. Finally, an illustrative example, and a close look at the current algorithmic issues and future trends from different angles are provided.

     

COMPARING LOCAL RISKS BY ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION

It is said that risky asset h acceptance dominates risky asset k if any decision maker who rejects the investment in h also rejects the investment in k. While in general acceptance dominance is a partial order, we show that it becomes a complete order if only infinitely short investment time horizons are considered. Two indices that induce different variants of this order are proposed, absolute acceptance dominance and relative acceptance dominance, and their properties are studied. We then show that many indices of riskiness that are compatible with the acceptance dominance order coincide with our indices in the continuous‐time setup.     

Purchase power: An examination of consumption as voting

Abstract

There has been a reported increase in political activity through the marketplace in the form of ‘consumer votes’. The use of marketplace votes by consumers to address their concerns about societal issues is a phenomenon that has growing relevance for firms, since they are often affected by such consumer citizenship. Therefore, this paper aims to enhance our conceptual understanding of the consumer voting phenomenon. It explores marketplace power relations and the constraints and enabling mechanisms they may pose to consumers seeking change through consumer voting. Consumer voting practices, consumer sovereignty discourses, and power tensions in marketplace encounters are examined in relation to Foucault's notions of power, technologies of the self, and governmentality. Foucault provides a critical lens to illuminate the potential for consumer resistance, an approach that so far has been somewhat neglected by the extant marketing and consumer research literature.     

Application of the Information Bottleneck method to discover user profiles in a Web store

ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the problem of discovering groups of Web users with similar behavioral patterns on an e-commerce site. We introduce a novel approach to the unsupervised classification of user sessions, based on session attributes related to the user click-stream behavior, to gain insight into characteristics of various user profiles. The approach uses the agglomerative Information Bottleneck (IB) algorithm. Based on log data for a real online store, efficiency of the approach in terms of its ability to differentiate between buying and non-buying sessions was validated, indicating some possible practical applications of the our method. Experiments performed for a number of session samples showed that the method is capable of separating both types of sessions to a large extent. A detailed analysis was performed for the number of clusters ranging from two to seven, and the results were compared to those achieved by applying the most common clustering algorithm, k-means. Increasing the number of clusters generally leads to better results for both algorithms. However, IB demonstrated much higher average efficiency than k-means for the corresponding number of clusters, and this superiority was especially clear for lower number of clusters. The IB-based division of user sessions into seven clusters gives the mean entropy value of 0.28, which means the 95% separation of sessions of both types. Furthermore, a big advantage of our approach is that it gives a possibility to analyze the probability distribution of session attributes in individual clusters, which allows one to discover hidden knowledge about common characteristics of various user profiles and use this knowledge to support managerial decisions.     

Trust and the don't‐want‐to‐complain bias in peer‐to‐peer platform markets

This paper addresses peer‐to‐peer (P2P) digital platform markets, often associated with the “sharing economy” or the “collaborative economy”. Such digital platforms, facilitating new purchasing channels for consumers by matching P2P supply and demand, can be considered new market places challenging the conventional markets. How are P2P platform markets evaluated by the consumers? Based on a comprehensive survey‐data material, five different P2P service markets are considered by peer buyers and the results compared to consumers’ evaluations from similar conventional service markets according to trust, comparability and consumers’ satisfaction with the transactions. Comparability seems to be one advantage for the platform markets, while trust could become a problem. Conditions for trust in P2P platform markets is particularly interesting to study because contrary to conventional markets P2P transactions cannot rely on governmental laws, regulations and security net. This trust problem has been solved by a trust‐generating rate and review system. Our data material, however, distinguishes a mechanism that we have coined as the don't‐want‐to‐complain bias. More precisely, people do not like to complain, hence buyers of P2P services often hesitate to give negative ratings when they are discontent with a service or a supplier. Therefore, positive ratings become overestimated. If consumers recognize this bias, ratings and reviews will lose credibility and no longer be considered trustworthy. Eventually, this may threaten the well‐functioning of P2P markets.     

TIME‐CONSISTENT AND MARKET‐CONSISTENT EVALUATIONS

We consider evaluation methods for payoffs with an inherent financial risk as encountered for instance for portfolios held by pension funds and insurance companies. Pricing such payoffs in a way consistent to market prices typically involves combining actuarial techniques with methods from mathematical finance. We propose to extend standard actuarial principles by a new market‐consistent evaluation procedure which we call “two‐step market evaluation.” This procedure preserves the structure of standard evaluation techniques and has many other appealing properties. We give a complete axiomatic characterization for two‐step market evaluations. We show further that in a dynamic setting with continuous stock prices every evaluation which is time‐consistent and market‐consistent is a two‐step market evaluation. We also give characterization results and examples in terms of g‐expectations in a Brownian‐Poisson setting.     

MULTIDIMENSIONAL DYNAMIC RISK MEASURE VIA CONDITIONAL g‐EXPECTATION

This paper deals with multidimensional dynamic risk measures induced by conditional g‐expectations. A notion of multidimensional g‐expectation is proposed to provide a multidimensional version of nonlinear expectations. By a technical result on explicit expressions for the comparison theorem, uniqueness theorem, and viability on a rectangle of solutions to multidimensional backward stochastic differential equations, some necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the constancy, monotonicity, positivity, and translatability properties of multidimensional conditional g‐expectations and multidimensional dynamic risk measures; we prove that a multidimensional dynamic g‐risk measure is nonincreasingly convex if and only if the generator g satisfies a quasi‐monotone increasingly convex condition. A general dual representation is given for the multidimensional dynamic convex g‐risk measure in which the penalty term is expressed more precisely. It is shown that model uncertainty leads to the convexity of risk measures. As to applications, we show how this multidimensional approach can be applied to measure the insolvency risk of a firm with interacting subsidiaries; optimal risk sharing for ‐tolerant g‐risk measures, and risk contribution for coherent g‐risk measures are investigated. Insurance g‐risk measure and other ways to induce g‐risk measures are also studied at the end of the paper.     

Decisional Power in Group Decision Making: A Note on the Allocation of Group Members' Weights in the Multiplicative AHP and SMART

Many complex decisions are made in a group environment, where the decision is made jointly by a committee or group structure. The individual group members are often not equally qualified to contribute equitably to the decision process, or may have different saliences (desires) to influence the decision. A quantitative knowledge of the players' decisional power is useful for better understanding of the group decision process, and could even be used in weighted voting within the group structure. We adapt the REMBRANDT suite of decision models (multiplicative AHP and SMART) to measure decisional power in groups, and we generalise this to cater for the case where power itself is deemed to be multidimensional in nature, and the case of uncertain subjective judgements of power amongst group members.     

Wise Up: Creating Organizational Wisdom Through an Ethic of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kaitiakitanga</Emphasis>

Organizations are searching for innovative business approaches that deliver profits and create shared value for all stakeholders. We show what can be learned from the relational wisdom approach of Indigenous Māori and reframe the prevailing economic argument that has seen companies profit and prosper at the expense of communities and ecologies. We develop an ethic of kaitiakitanga model premised on Māori values which holds the potential to enrich and further humanize our understanding of business. The Māori economy is a globally connected, prosperous, and profitable sector of the New Zealand economy. By drawing on Māori values, we present a wisdom position through an ethic of kaitiakitanga or stewardship to emphasize and illustrate the interconnectedness of life in a woven universe. Through practicing kaitiakitanga, organizations can build businesses where wisdom is consciously created through reciprocal relationships. In this worldview of business, humans are stewards endowed with a mandate to use the agency of their mana (spiritual power, authority, and sovereignty) to create mauri ora (conscious well-being) for humans and ecosystems—and this commitment extends to organizations.