防止农药包装物污染环境的路径探讨

分析了农药包装物的污染现状,介绍了国内外防止农药包装物污染的经验做法,对建立政府主导、企业主体、农药使用者参与的三位一体的农药包装物回收利用体系进行了探讨。     

循环经济下包装物逆向物流体系构建探析

文章构建了循环经济下的包装物逆向物流体系,指出要保持该体系有效运行,必须引导消费者做好包装废弃物的分类回收工作,同时包装物使用商参与包装设计、生产环节,并规范回收机构,最后建立包装物逆向物流体系中的营销网络,提高相关企业的经济效益。     

零售商主导的快递箱回收模式研究

近年来,随着快递行业的迅速发展,快递箱的回收越来越引起大家的关注。首先,对回收相关文献进行研究和总结发现关于快递箱回收的相关文献较少;其次,根据实际情况建立了零售商主导下零售商自营回收和第三方回收这两种模式;最后,从零售商的角度,针对回收量来选择回收方式,其中回收量中主要分析了消费者环保意识以及零售商前期投入这两个因素。研究发现,只有在消费者环保意识足够高或者零售商前期投入足够低的情况下,零售商才更有可能选择自营回收。     

财政补贴的供应链决策效率与社会福利研究

在再制造供应链中,受限于回收能力以及高昂的投资成本,废旧产品的回收前景并不乐观。文章基于Stackelberg博弈方法,建立了政府分别补贴制造商、零售商和第三方回收商三种不同模型下的闭环供应链决策模型,并从回收率、市场价格以及企业利润等角度分析了在三种不同模型下政府实施补贴对闭环供应链各成员决策的影响。研究发现：只要政府实施补贴,闭环供应链各方的收益均与政府补贴成正比;而从政府层面来看,政府补贴给零售商能达到最高的回收率、最低的市场价格、最大的企业总利润,即补贴零售商时的效率最高;因此以政府补贴零售商为例,对政府不同决策目标下的最优补贴进行了探讨。最后,通过数值模拟分析发现,当政府追求的目标由经济效益扩展到社会福利再到社会效益时,其所支出的最优补贴越来越大。     

需求依赖销售努力情形下过度自信零售商的决策

研究了市场需求随机且受零售商努力行为因素影响的情形下过度自信零售商的决策问题。通过模型推导得到过度自信零售商的最优订货量和最优销售努力水平,讨论了过度自信零售商与理性零售商在最优订货量和最优销售努力水平上的偏差。通过比较静态分析,研究了零售商的过度自信水平对其最优订货量和最优销售努力水平的影响,对需求方差进行了敏感性分析,分析了市场环境参数对零售商最优决策的影响。结果显示:当零售商面临低收益市场环境或更高收益市场环境时,过度自信行为可促使零售商做出趋近于理性决策的选择。     

考虑回收质量不确定的闭环供应链碳减排与定价策略研究

在碳交易机制的背景下,综合考虑消费者的低碳偏好性和废旧产品回收质量的不确定性,通过构建由制造商和零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究回收质量与碳交易价格对产品定价、最优减排量及减排投资成本上限的影响。研究表明:市场规模越大,最优单位碳减排量越大;当废旧产品回收质量较低时,系统总利润随碳交易价格的升高而降低,当废旧产品回收质量较高时,系统总利润随碳交易价格的升高而升高,此时,零售商应采取薄利多回收的策略。最后,通过数值算例对主要参数进行灵敏度分析。     

政府规制下电器电子产品闭环供应链回收模式决策研究

为研究电器电子产品闭环供应链的最优回收模式,在政府规制的前提下,利用博弈论构建了制造商和零售商混合回收(M-R模式)、制造商和第三方混合回收(M-T模式)以及零售商和第三方混合回收(R-T模式)三种完全信息动态博弈模型,最后求解并对三种模式的最优决策对比分析。研究结果表明:(1)M-R模式和M-T模式对制造商最有益,即制造商参与回收对其自身效果最佳;M-T模式对第三方最有利;R-T模式则可以使零售商利润和系统利润同时最大化。(2)敏感性分析表明:各成员利润随政府补贴的增加而增长,随处理基金的增加而减小,其中处理基金的负作用非常明显。     

买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策

本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式（线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持（RPM））之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优干RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。     

制造商与零售商废弃食品回收处理努力分析——成本削减比例信息对称和非对称的不同情况

针对制造商与零售商的废弃食品回收处理行为,在制造商因废弃食品回收处理获取的成本削减比例是对称信息与非对称信息的不同情况下构建博弈模型,分析了废弃食品回收处理努力、价格和需求量等相关决策及其影响因素。结果表明:当制造商因废弃食品回收处理获取的成本削减比例是对称信息时,消费者对废弃食品回收处理具有良好的市场反馈,能够激励零售商和制造商为废弃食品回收处理付出更多努力;当制造商因废弃食品回收处理获取的成本削减比例是非对称信息时,良好的市场反馈仅能激励零售商付出更多努力。     

政府补贴下的电子废弃物回收处理模型分析

通过Stackelberg博弈理论构建政府补贴下的四种电子废弃物回收处理模型,包括制造商回收处理(MM)模型、零售商回收—制造商处理(DM)模型、回收处理一体商回收处理(U)模型和第三方回收商回收—制造商处理(RM)模型,并对模型中各主体的相关决策和利润函数进行比较分析。从理论和数值研究结果可知:四种模型中的最优批发价格和零售价格相等且与政府补贴无关,但回收价格、回收率、各主体利润和系统总利润会随着政府补贴的增加而增加;相对于其他三种模型,MM模型下的回收价格、回收率、制造商利润和系统总利润是最优的,但在零售商利润方面不及DM模型。建议从补贴方式、回收处理主体和政策制度等方面来优化电子废弃物回收处理系统。     

Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases

A common view in retail electricity markets is that retailers discriminate based on consumers’ loyalty: loyal consumers pay more and switchers can (and do) select the cheapest offers) when they switch. The premium is colloquially known as a “loyalty tax” or “loyalty premium”. Reflecting this understanding Australia’s governments, regulators and consumer advocates have encouraged consumers to switch electricity retailers. Using a sample of 47,114 household electricity bills we test whether consumers that had switched in the previous 12 months (“switchers”) pay less than consumers who remained with their retailers (“remainers”) in the previous 12 months. We find that the annual bills of switchers are expected to be AU$48 (4%) lower than remainers and that the median switcher could reduce their bills by 21% by selecting the cheapest offer. Classifying retailers into tiers however provides some nuance to the main conclusion: the third tier of retailers (the new entrants with market shares of less than 3%) impose higher loyalty taxes than the other two tiers (incumbents and mid-sized retailers). The middle tier of retailers impose the lowest loyalty tax, and in fact for many consumers they may reward loyalty. These findings suggest that the loyalty tax is (typically) smaller than widely considered, it varies across tiers of retailers and even engaged consumers typically do not select the lowest priced offer. This raises the question of whether switchers are motivated by lower bills as well as other factors or whether the main challenge is search difficulties.

     

隐私关注与中国B2C电子商务客户忠诚度实证研究

个人信息对于B2C电子商务网站商家改善服务水平和促进销售有较大促进作用,但是当个人信息披露给网站商家后,还少有研究消费者不同的隐私关注程度对其网络购物行为和客户忠诚度是否或如何影响。本文通过问卷调查方式,基于沟通隐私管理理论,发现消费者在提供更多个人真实信息给网站商家后,隐私关注程度高的用户具有更强的网络购物忠诚倾向,而隐私关注程度低的用户具有较低的网络购物忠诚倾向。结果显示在线零售商应该重视对隐私关注度高的用户,并通过改善个人消费者隐私保护、网站安全水平,从而改善与消费者的信任关系,促进网站销售。     

产业链的合作机制选择与低碳产品定价及碳减排策略

生产链上下游企业选择合适的合作机制对低碳产品定价及碳减排有重要影响。通过构建博弈模型分析三种不同合作机制下的低碳产品定价及碳减排问题:第一种合作机制即制造商与零售商进行合作,当两条生产链都选择这种合作机制时,能带来较高的碳减排率和较低的零售价格,这对制造商、零售商、消费者和环境都是有利的。第二种合作机制即两条生产链的制造商之间、零售商之间分别合作,这会带来较低的碳减排率和较高的零售价格,对两个制造商有利,而对零售商和消费者不利。分析前两种合作机制的利与弊提出第三种合作机制,即零售商和制造商共享利润下的有利于碳减排的策略。最后,结合案例讨论和数值分析的研究结果表明:当制造商和零售商收入共享比在一定范围内时,第三种合作机制可以给制造商和零售商带来更高的利润。由此为企业选择最佳的合作机制及合理的碳减排策略提供了理论指导。     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

This article evaluates the distribution of public expenditure on subsidized goods and services over income categories. It is argued that undifferentiated application of usual measures of dispersion must be rejected when judging the distribution of these expenditures, because there are hardly any subsidized goods and services for which the government aims at equal consumption. Such an application requires a normative distribution of expenditure. The normative distribution of expenditure is derived from a normative distribution of consumption and the distribution of normative charges. Central elements are needs of consumers and their financial capacity. The normative distribution of consumption is based on government intentions with respect to the goods and services under consideration.     

“Market Power and Inflation: A Short-Run Target Return Model”—Comment

Recent facts involving food products and their effects on consumers' health have amplified risk and uncertainty in their markets. A new practice has emerged as an attempt to deal with such problems, the so-called third-party certification (TPC). In the perspective of consumers, TPC is supposed to give transparency and legitimacy concerning food safety. But TPC has become increasingly subject to encapsulation by big retailers. By combining institutional (Veblenian) and evolutionary (Schumpeterian-Penrosean) theoretical elements related to the behavior and interaction between firms and consumers, we attempt to provide an overview of how such an encapsulation process takes place.     

Local monopsony and free riders

In an industry with upstream economies of scale in the distribution of differentiated products to retailers which have monopoly power within separate local market areas, the retailers have an incentive to exert monopsony power due to the divergence between average and marginal costs in the distribution of those inputs. The retailers increase their ability to exert monopsony power by forming coalitions (that is, chains) across local markets. Sufficiently large retail chains may force input price below the seller's average cost, thus ‘free riding’ on the level of product variety supported by other retailers. Vertical integration, cartels, or other cooperative behavior, however, can be means to control the level of product variety, and may increase both industry profits and economic welfare. Policy applications to the cable television, motion picture, and pharmaceutical industries are discussed.     

Buyer power and quality improvements

This paper analyses the sources of buyer power and the effect of buyer power on sellers’ investment in quality improvements. In our model, retailers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to a producer and each of them in equilibrium obtains its marginal contribution to total profits (gross of sunk costs). In turn, the individual marginal contribution depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process. Rivalry increases when retailers are less differentiated and when decreasing returns to scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus affects the incentives of the producer to invest in product quality, an instance of the hold-up problem. An increase in buyer power not only makes the supplier and consumers worse off, but it may even harm retailers that obtain a larger share of a smaller surplus.     

消费者跨渠道购买行为研究评述与展望

消费者跨渠道购买行为是指多渠道零售环境下,消费者在购买决策过程的不同阶段运用不同渠道的行为。文章基于文献研究法,从定义、影响因素和企业管理策略三个方面对消费者跨渠道购买行为的国内外相关研究进行了梳理和评述,阐述了消费者跨渠道购买行为的定义,总结了消费者跨渠道购买行为的影响因素,归纳了企业对消费者跨渠道购买行为的管理策略并进行了评述,分析了未来研究方向,得出消费者跨渠道购买行为可以细分为消费者跨渠道搭便车行为和消费者跨渠道保留行为,研究结果为多渠道零售企业进行渠道设计和多渠道顾客管理提供了决策参考。     

Manufacturers and retailers in the global economy

We develop a model with multi‐product retailers acting as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. We show that the rise in retailer product assortment, the rise of up‐front payments in many retail markets and the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing may be the consequence of the global integration of product markets. We also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain.     

Retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles

Abstract.  We analyse an independent private-value model, where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second-price auctions. In this heterogeneous game, bidders may have differently distributed valuations, and some have multi-unit demand with decreasing marginal values (retailers); others have a specific single-unit demand (consumers). By examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences, we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect. The study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders.