财富、企业家才能与最优融资契约安排

本文认为企业家是企业发生的逻辑起点 ,是最初的“中心签约人” ,因此力图站在企业家的角度来考察企业家的融资行为。我们证明理性的企业家往往会将企业残值的优先索取权让度给外部投资者 ,从而否定了关于“投资者是最后的剩余索取者”的先验观点。在认识到“提供担保服务”是企业家自有资本的基本功能的基础上 ,我们揭示出一些关于企业家选择融资契约的规律。最后 ,我们还进一步发现即便未受财富约束 ,企业家也不会完全依靠自有资本来创业 ,因为很可能存在一个最优的企业家自有资本比例。     

Optimal Contracting of Separable Production Technologies

We analyze the class of agency problems with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, in which hidden actions and hidden information (on the agent's efficiency) are jointly present. Technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule. We show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent's inputs. Together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs, separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent's actions and indirect utility.     

财富能力:现代财富生产的核心

历史上人们的财富观念以及获取财富的方法随经济活动方式的改变而改变。在经济全球化和虚拟经济迅猛发展的今天,财富生态发生了重大变化,同时使得我国的财富生产面临新的危机。增强国家和企业的财富能力,包括财富生产的能力、控制财富"食物链"的能力以及确保财富安全的能力等已成为当务之急。     

Wealth Distribution and Optimal Inheritance Taxation in Life-cycle Economies with Intergenerational Transfers

Intergenerational transfers are introduced into a general equilibrium life-cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity. In our overlapping generations model, heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their children. Furthermore, agents face stochastic employment opportunities. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy. Our results indicate that bequests only account for a small proportion of observed wealth heterogeneity. The introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare, as measured by the average lifetime utility of a newborn, and equality of the wealth distribution.
JEL classification : D 31; D 91; H 21; C 68; E 21     

Optimal Financial Structure: An Incomplete Contracting Model

The financial structures of firms observed in practice typically consist of debt claims of different priority and maturity, and outside equity with unconditional control. A simple model is developed in which this type of complex financial structure arises endogenously as a mechanism to allocate control and cash flow rights among the firm's manager and its investors. While short-term debt commits the manager to liquidate the firm in low profit states, outside equity with unconditional control allows investors to seize control in states where the manager otherwise would pursue low profit projects with high private benefits of control. Finally, long-term (junior) debt creates a debt overhang that protects the manager from excessive shareholder involvement.
JEL classification : G 32     

知识是财富生产的精神力量

知识在社会生产与生活中的作用,在人类社会发展的不同阶段是不同的。在近代科学产生和机器大工业出现以前,谈不上有真正的科学知识的合并于生产和科学力并在生产中发挥作用。18世纪以来的机器大工业生产方式的发展,标志着科学向生产要素、生产方法转化和被合并于生产过程的时期的到来。知识积累是一种生产力,达到一定临界点的知识积累,成为推动知识创新和科学进步的内在力量。积累——创新——再积累——再创新的累进式发展,是知识进步的规律也是知识产品扩大再生产的规律。信息革命和当代知识密集的高技术生产方式的到来,标志着人的智能开发和人类向发达的智能人的转换进入了一个新阶段。     

民营企业的持久竞争优势--企业文化

改革开放20年来,民营企业迅速成长起来,但我国民营企业普遍存在生命周期短的问题,一般35年一个民营企业就会走向灭亡。为此我们不得不思考,什么是民营企业的持久竞争优势,如何保持民营企业的持久竞争优势——企业文化。     

Contracting with externalities and outside options

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options, all Markov perfect equilibrium may be inefficient. This formulation encompasses many economic models, and we analyze the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications.     

知识经济与新型人才培养

知识经济对人才培养提出了新的要求,为了适应知识经济的要求,必须变革人才培养的途径,拓宽培养的渠道,突出能力培养,实施素质教育,培养出全面的新型人才     

Contracting with capacity constrained suppliers

This paper characterizes the optimal and efficient mechanisms to allocate simultaneously two substitute tasks to two suppliers. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, even under some regularity conditions efficiency and optimality do not systematically coincide. Efficiency can always be achieved using some second price auctions which are optimal when both suppliers compete for the same task. When there is competition for different tasks the optimal production is distorted from efficiency over a nondegenerate interval of types so as to extract the full surplus over that interval. Second, full extraction of the surplus may still guarantee incentive compatibility. Received: November 2, 1998; revised version: March 2, 2000     

Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

In standard contract-theoretic models, the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters, and the principal's objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type. We study a contract-theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a "cognitive" nature. In our model, the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences. Agent types differ only in their degree of "sophistication", that is, their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes. We fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent's sophistication. The menu does not exclude any type: it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types, and "exploitative" contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types. More naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal. Our results allow us to interpret real-life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries.     

Public Knowledge,Private Property and the Economics of High-tech Consortia

The management of knowledge in research consortia raises new appropriability issues, such as copying with the tension between individual protection and data sharing which is required in any process of collective invention. Based on case studies carried out in the field of biotechnology, the paper discusses these issues and develop some policy implications.     

有效提高上海民营企业的自主创新能力

民营企业是上海经济的重要组成部分,但由于创新资金不足,专业人才缺乏,激励机制单一,技术创新服务体系不健全以及其它原因,造成竞争力低下.因此为民营企业的自主创新提供政策支持,建立面向民营企业的技术中介服务体系,加大对民营企业的金融支持力度,注重高素质人才的培养和引进是提高民营企业自主创新能力的有效对策.实践证明,只有创新民营企业才能突破制约自身发展的不利因素,从而获得进一步发展的动力,实现做大做强做优的目标.     

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality

In both the NHS and Medicare, recent emphasis has been on contracts with payment based only on the number of patients treated. It is shown that, without direct monitoring of quality or effort to reduce costs, such contracts are efficient only when it is efficient to treat all patients wanting treatment. It may not be when treatment costs are insured or subsidised. Such contracts can then be improved by including payments for the number of patients wanting treatment, as well as for the number actually treated. Even then, the outcome will not generally be efficient if quality is multi-dimensional.     

基于隐性知识的核心能力的维度分析

核心能力是企业竞争优势的源泉。根据核心能力不可模仿特征，本文认为核心能力实质上就是隐性知识。核心能力是一个系统。这一结构由个体技能、组织知识和技能、管理系统、价值观与规范等四个维度组成。本文对核心能力的隐性知识结构进行了分析。     

虚拟科技创新团队内部知识流动能力影响因素研究

虚拟科技创新团队是一种新兴的组织形式,以创新性任务为纽带整合优势资源,能够跨越时间、地点和组织边界的障碍.知识流动是知识通过一定媒介和路径在知识主体间运动的过程,在知识流动的过程中实现了知识的共享和创造.知识的共享和流动是虚拟科技创新团队成功的关键,研究虚拟科技创新团队知识流动的影响因素,从而有针对性地促进其内部知识流动,对虚拟科技创新团队的运作具有重要意义.本文界定了虚拟科技创新团队的概念,分析了其知识流动机制,指出虚拟科技创新团队的知识流动分为宏、微观两个层次,并在此基础上系统的研究了影响其内部知识流动能力的影响因素,提出了知识特性、主体因素、交互因素和情境因素四个维度,为提高虚拟科技创新团队的知识流动效率提供了指导.     

创新环境下企业知识创造能力的实现路径

从理论上概述了工作环境因素、自主知识创造能力与创新绩效三组变量的内涵、类型及其理论联系,构建了工作环境因素、自主知识创造能力与创新绩效间关系的整体概念模型,提出了三组变量间关系的研究假设。采用问卷调查方法对300家建立合作关系企业的自主知识创造状况进行问卷调查,利用问卷调研数据实证分析了三组变量间的影响关系和作用路径。实证结果表明:企业工作环境与自主知识创造能力之间、自主知识创造能力与创新绩效之间存在显著的相关关系;组织学习在自主知识创造能力之间发挥着明显的中介效应。