Individual welfare,majority voting,and the properties of a linear income tax

A fundamental problem in public finance is the determination of parameters of income tax functions. This paper focuses on this problem in the context of a linear tax function whose parameters are chosen according to majority vote by the taxpayers. The possibility of conflict between high national income and distributional equity is explored and it is found that, even when the distribution of earning power is rightward skew, majority voting does not necessarily lead to the adoption of a tax function which has the average tax rate rising with income.     

Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation

I develop a model in which altruistic agents vote over quadratic income tax schedules. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and productivities, and the model incorporates the incentive effects of taxation. The main result of the paper establishes the existence of a self-confirming majority rule equilibrium in which agents' labor supply decisions are optimal given their tax liabilities and the tax policy is a majority rule equilibrium given the labor supply decisions. In equilibrium the actions by all agents confirm their expectations, but such expectations may be incorrect out of equilibrium. The model generates majority rule voting equilibria that involve progressive taxation.     

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research, but little empirical support. The empirical literature has concentrated on cross-country studies and the size of the public sector, and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality. This analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution (here tax structure). New data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in Norway are exploited. We show how the multi-dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences. In the econometric analysis, instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution. The estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution.     

Tax havens,income shifting,and redistributive taxation

This paper investigates the effects of tax havens on nonhaven countries’ redistributive policies. We consider that a nonhaven country contains individuals with different labor productivities. A tax is imposed on the income, and the revenues are evenly distributed. The tax rate is determined by majority voting, which reflects the median voter’s preferences. The presence of havens gives rise to the mobility of tax bases, which may increase the nonhaven country’s tax rate in two ways. First, it leads to a median voter with a lower productivity; second, it may enlarge the marginal tax revenue from raising the tax rate. In addition, we find that a stricter antihavens regulation may lower the tax rate. We further show that income shifting is likely to reduce the amount of the transfers. The case of tax evasion is also taken into consideration.     

The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement

This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.     

Taxpayers' attitudes, behavior, and perception of fairness

This paper investigates taxpayers' attitudes, behavior, and perception of fairness with respect to taxation using data drawn from a survey among German employees. It is shown that there is a large gulf between subjects' attitudes towards taxation and their behavior. Although most subjects profess that their own taxation is either too high or far too high, up to 60 percent of them judge tax burdens to be fair which exceed actual taxation by far. Moreover, the great majority of those subjects opting for a proportional tax scale implicitly state tax burdens which are consistent with a progressive tax scale only. Finally, we find overwhelming rejection of one of the core elements of the German income tax system, namely spouse tax splitting.     

The distribution of abilities and the progressive income tax

This paper develops a model of endogenous labor supply, where agents are uncertain about their future wages. Assuming risk aversion, some redistributive taxation is thus warranted. It is shown that, for a particular parameterization of the tax system, an optimally progressive income tax exists. Comparative ststics analysis demonstrates how this tax system is effected by changes in the wage distribution. The paper ends with a discussion of whether an optimally progressive income tax can be politically sustained. It is shown that generally this is not the case in a political system with majority voting.     

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.     

Multistage public education,voting, and income distribution

This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.     

Higher Tax for Top Earners

The literature can justify both increasing and decreasing marginal taxes (IMT & DMT) on top incomes under different welfare objectives and income distributions. Even when DMT are theoretically optimal, they are often politically infeasible. Then a flat tax seems to be a constrained optimal solution. We show however that, given any flat tax we can increase the total utility of a poor majority by raising the top income tax rate under a simple condition, which can be checked with empirical data. We further generalize our main results allowing different welfare weights, declining elasticity of labor supply and more tax bands.     

Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology

This paper investigates the relation between tax mimicking and electoral accountability against the background of data on Spain. The results confirm the presence of tax-mimicking behaviour and indicate a relation between tax mimicking and electoral accountability. Tax rates are found to be higher and the reaction to neighbours' tax rates lower when the electoral margin is high and when left-wing parties control government. Coalition governments do not tax heavily and mimic more than single party majority governments.     

On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated

The paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majority voting. Voters differ by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases with income. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and benefits, and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal tax rates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates are supported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalition for high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. “Ends against the middle” equilibria are also possible.     

The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects

This paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome. In our model with endogenous income, there is no majority (Condorcet) winning tax schedule. We then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions. We follow three strategies: (i) reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter; (ii) elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard Downsian two-party competition game; (iii) assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority. Although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior, they point to the same (simulation-based) conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle.     

On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives

Taxation in an economy containing land and labor is studied. The tax system is a compromise based on the relative power of all groups of individuals. (The model extends one of Aumann and Kurz.) In response to the threat of taxation by a majority, individuals can evade taxation of their labor-time (by destroying it), but cannot avoid taxation of the land they own. One result is that the compromise tax rate on land is higher than that on labor. This contrasts with the classical normative result that in order to minimize the efficiency loss, this tax rate should be higher.     

The applying functions of tax regulation for state development

Taxes are a complicated and influential category affecting all the economic phenomena and financial processes. To ensure a stable flow of funds to the state and local budgets, all the participants of the tax legal relations should properly perform their obligations before the state and observe the applicable legislation. The aim of the paper is to make an analysis of the positive experience of European countries in the field of taxation and their possible application in developing countries. The considered practice in the part of the luxury tax showed that almost all the developed foreign countries introduced this kind of tax, however, in some of them, it has not been established for some reasons. The experience of the majority of countries shows that social contributions are paid in the majority of cases both by the employer and the employee in a compound and in some cases – by the employee and the employer separately. In the sphere of taxation of transport, the authors suppose that the experience of the foreign states is rather progressive and has a number of positive peculiarities.     

Export tax refund and the misreporting by Chinese exporters

We document how Chinese exporters misreport their exports to China's customs in order to benefit from export tax refunds. We estimate the response of the logarithmic difference between the exports reported in China's customs data and the imports reported in destination countries' customs data to export tax refund rates. We find that with an increase of 1 percentage point in export tax refund rates, the logarithmic difference increases by 0.051. Additionally, with an increase of 1 percentage point in the export tax refund rates of similar products, this gap decreases by 0.024. Further study reveals that quantity manipulation accounts for the majority of the export reporting distortion.     

On the optimal income taxation: Some further numerical results

Using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (?=0.5) leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973). The marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear. A new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin, as done by Atkinson (1973). We study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion: this result is really very local. We also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability. An important methodological remark analogous to Sen's critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations.     

A theory of development controls in a ‘small’ city

This paper analyzes the implications of an institutional structure in which current residents of an urban area have the power to exercise control over the level and pattern of new residential development. We develop a general equilibrium spatial model of a ‘small’ urban area in which the current residents can control new residential development through a zoning policy determined by majority vote. The current residents are modeled explicitly as home owners, and are allowed to be arbitrarily different in tastes and endowments. The urban government is assumed to provide a public good for its residents, the level of which is also determined by majority vote.The ‘optimal’ development control policy from the point of view of a particular current resident is determined and the allocation resulting from a majority vote of the current residents is described for both head tax and property tax systems. Efficient development control policies are also analyzed.     

Non-discriminatory donation relief and strategic commitment under political competition

Tax relief for private donations towards the provision of collective goods can protect minorities from majority-driven outcomes in which tax revenues are exclusively used to finance the provision of public goods that are only valued by the majority. In this paper we show that non-discriminatory tax relief for private donations can arise in political equilibrium as a strategic commitment device aimed at creating and supporting political alliances that would not otherwise be able to coalesce.