Brexit,the City and the Contingent Power of Finance

Brexit poses a profound challenge to the economic fortunes of the financial services sector in the United Kingdom (UK) because it threatens to sever access to the single market in the European Union (EU). Recognising this, the City of London’s largest financial firms and main representative bodies supported a Remain vote in the June 2016 referendum, and subsequently lobbied for a ‘soft’ Brexit policy to preserve the City’s lucrative passporting rights. Despite this, the government led by Theresa May pursued a ‘hard’ Brexit policy which threatened to leave the UK outside the single market. How can we explain the City’s apparent failure to influence the UK’s Brexit policy? We argue that whilst the UK financial sector wielded formidable latent structural power, its capacity to translate this into instrumental influence in the policy process was constrained by three factors: the political statecraft of Brexit, leading the government to downgrade the concerns of the financial industry; the reconfiguration of institutional structures, which undermined the City’s voice within government; and constraints on business organisation, caused by collective action problems and heterogeneous preferences. These three factors constitute important scope conditions which highlight the contingent power of finance in liberal market economies.     

The case of the United States: Energy as a political good

This paper presents an analysis of energy as a “political” good in the U. S. market economy. Political status is said to be acquired if a good is systematically and persistently allocated by criteria other than efficiency. The mechanics of allocating energy are examined in terms of interaction between market and command institutions. Then the energy-policy process is analyzed to determine why and how energy became a political good. An observed reversal of equity roles in the 1970s is traced to an economic source—the sharp change in world oil prices—rather than to changes in political power.     

谈中国石油进口定价权缺失及对策建议

随着中国经济的迅速发展,石油进口量不断攀升,而中国在国际石油市场上微乎其微的价格话语权与自身石油大买家的地位极不相称。石油进口不可避免地面临着国际石油市场价格动荡局面下的价格风险以及相对进口价格较高的被动局面。什么原因导致了中国石油进口价格的困境,如何解决这一问题成为中国石油进口面临的一个重要课题。针对国内石油市场现状,从石油进口成本出发,分析了中国石油进口定价权缺失的原因,并探讨了相应对策。     

Market concentration and competition in OECD mobile telecommunications markets

This study analyses the progress of market concentration in OECD member states’ mobile telecommunications markets and evaluates the relationship between market concentration and performance. Using annual panel data from 24 OECD member states for the 1998–2011 period, the study estimates regression equations for market concentration, mobile prices and profits. The empirical results indicate that the more concentrated the mobile market, the higher the prices and profits, providing support for the market power hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds, then market concentration can be a useful indicator of market performance. On the other hand, the applicability of the hypothesis is unclear for the second half of the sample period. The results provide evidence that regulatory policies influence the structure and performance of mobile markets.     

How Low Can It Go? Analysing the Political Economy of Carbon Market Design and Low Carbon Prices

Despite the ascendency of carbon pricing as a key regulatory strategy for governing anthropogenic climate change, insufficient attention has been paid to the issue of price discovery in emission trading schemes, now the dominant form of carbon pricing globally. By analysing the political economy of carbon market design, this paper highlights a number of design features that are instrumental in depressing carbon prices across the world’s emission trading schemes, keeping them well below those considered necessary to spur deep emission reductions in order to avoid catastrophic global warming. In doing so, it advances critiques of carbon trading by illuminating the extent to which carbon markets manifest as expressions of specific power relations rooted in the political economy of advanced capitalism, with low prices ensuring minimal disruption to business as usual.     

Market power in distribution and pass‐through for consumers and producers

We examine the differential pass‐through of import prices into consumer and producer prices. We develop a framework with distribution costs and distribution market power. We then examine pass‐through from import prices to consumer and producer prices in the euro area using the U.S. import price as instrument. We find that pass‐through rates to producer prices are more sensitive to changes in distribution margins than pass‐through to consumer prices. Furthermore, only a portion of import price changes translate into domestic price changes limiting potential consumer benefits from tariff liberalization, with market power in distribution services being one important factor reducing pass‐through.     

Price Dynamics in a Network of Decentralized Power Markets

In this paper, we model the dynamic behavior of prices in a network of interconnected, but decentralized, electric power markets—an architecture very different from the centralized exchanges and power pools currently being implemented by many state regulators. We estimate dynamic equations of unregulated, wholesale power prices at spot markets scattered over an eleven-state trading region. The results indicate that this decentralized system of power and transmission trading produces prices that are efficient and dynamically stable over this vast network. Price convergence in the power market is similar to what has been observed in the recently deregulated natural gas market.     

Determinants of the premium in forward contracts

Whilst the benefits of forward contracting for goods and services have been extensively researched in terms of mitigating market power effects in spot markets, we analyse how the risk in spot price formation induces a counteracting premium in the contract prices. We consider and test a wide-ranging set of propositions, involving fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components, on a long data set from the most liquid of European electricity forward markets, the EEX. We show that part of what is conventionally regarded as the market price of risk in electricity is actually that of its underlying fuel commodity, gas; that market power has a double effect on prices, insofar as it increases spot prices and induces a forward premium; that oil price sentiment spills over and that the premium reacts to scarcity and the higher moments of spot price uncertainty. We observe that considerations of the scale and determinants of the forward premium are at least as important as the market power effects in spot market price formation when evaluating the efficiency of wholesale power trading.     

Privatization,regulation and airport pricing: an empirical analysis for Europe

This paper examines factors determining airport charges. Using data for 100 large airports in Europe, we find that they charge higher prices when they move more passengers. Additionally, competition from other transport modes and nearby airports imposes some discipline on the pricing behavior of airports. Low-cost carriers and airlines with a high market share seem to have a stronger countervailing power. We also find that private airports not regulated charge higher prices than public or regulated airports. Finally, the regulation mechanism does not seem to influence substantially the level of airport charges.     

The determinants of retail petrol prices in Greece

The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between retail prices of petrol, international oil prices and tax rates in Greece. We examine not only the hypothesis that retail prices act asymmetrically to crude oil price changes and the pass-through rates of tax increases, but also use the cross-sectional dimension of the data to explore whether the existence or otherwise of market power affects retail prices. Our results provide little evidence for asymmetric behaviour. However, the degree to which prices overreact to tax changes and the significance of market power across the different regions suggests that the market for petrol/diesel is not very competitive.     

PARTIES, ELECTIONS AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY

This paper examines whether movements in the stock prices on the Athens stock exchange can be partly explained by the dynamics of the political environment. On the basis of a partisan structure, with two main political parties and a high density of elections, we find that the conditional mean and variance of the stock market index are affected by political developments in Greece. In particular, we find that different political regimes affect the conditional variance of the stock market index, and also that the stock market index is asymmetrically affected by past innovations.     

Investigation of institutional changes in the UK housing market using structural break tests and time-varying parameter models

This paper investigates the effects of institutional changes within the UK housing market in recent decades using structural break tests and time-varying parameter models. This approach is motivated by models of institutional change drawn from the political science literature which focus on the existence of both fast-moving and slow-moving institutional changes and the interactions between them as drivers of the dynamics of asset prices. As a methodological contribution, we use several time-varying parameter models for the first time in investigations of institutional change. Our findings support the existence of both structural breaks and continuous variance in parameters. This contributes to our understanding of the housing market in two respects. Firstly, the dates of structural breaks appear to better match unexpected market shocks rather than remarkable political events, and this supports prior institutional theory. Secondly, assessment of the effect of slow-moving institutional changes shows that people’s biased expectations rather than the economic fundamentals have increasingly played an important role in driving housing prices in the short run although fundamentals continue to drive house prices to converge to their long-run equilibrium.     

Expectations Heterogeneity and Excessive Price Sensitivity in the Land Market

This paper analyses price behaviour in the land market in which the Walrasian auctioneer is absent. Sellers are informed about the land value and post their asking prices; buyers are uninformed, have different opinions, and decide whether or not to accept the sellers' offers. In this market, sellers are "price-makers" with probabilisitic market power : they can influence the sale probability through their asking price. Price may be excessively sensitive to unexpected changes in market conditions. Moreover, buyer heterogeneity may accentuate the excessive price sensitivity. It has been shown that, the more heterogeneous their opinions, the more sensitive are prices.
JEL Classification Numbers: D40, D43, D82, D84, E44, G12.     

Do German renewable energy resources affect prices and mitigate market power in the French electricity market ?

Several empirical studies show that renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power, typically supplied at low marginal cost, can cause electricity market prices to fall. Recent theoretical research and simulations also highlight the link between the integration of renewable energy and market performance in an oligopolistic energy market. This article looks at these dynamics in the context of cross-border effects between two highly interconnected electricity markets, France and Germany. Using a rich panel dataset for hourly data from November 2009 to July 2015, I estimate the impact of German wind and solar power production on both prices and market power in the French wholesale market. The findings highlight the importance of coordinating energy policies via joint renewable energy support schemes among interconnected European electricity markets.     

中国行业垄断的收入分配效应

收入分配差距过大是中国社会发展的难点和热点问题,行业垄断已经成为加剧中国收入分配矛盾的重要原因。为此,本文构建新的垄断-竞争两部门利润分享模型,揭示行业垄断影响收入分配的内在机制,并结合中国的经验数据进行实证分析。研究表明,行业垄断在产品与要素市场中,通过最终产品消费的福利转移、要素的区别定价以及垄断利润在不同就业者之间的非均衡分享导致收入分配差距的扩大;在行业垄断力量对经济干预较多的阶段,收入差距扩大问题较为严重,并且往往表现为劳动总收入的下降。因此,持续提升劳动者收入,保持收入分配的合理化,必须配合行之有效的行政垄断部门改革,打破行业垄断所形成的二元经济结构,降低行业垄断在生产和分配领域中的影响。     

企业家核心能力拓展与市场势力构建——基于越商群体的实证研究

本文从技术、市场、社会三个维度建立了一个理论框架来分析企业家核心能力在市场势力构建中的作用和机理,并运用浙江省绍兴市的201份企业家调查问卷进行了实证研究。结果显示,企业家的技术获取能力、市场渠道控制能力和社会关系网络能力对于企业市场势力的构建有显著的正向影响;企业家核心能力的各个子能力与市场势力的各个子能力的关联强度和影响程度存在显著差异;将企业家的出身、年龄、学历、行业等作为控制变量引入模型后,一定程度上弱化了企业家的社会关系网络能力对于市场势力构建的影响程度和解释力。     

The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices,Profits and Emissions in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the COMPETES EU20 Model

This paper analyses the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on electricity prices, in particular on wholesale power markets across the EU. To study this impact, this paper discusses the major results of a bottom-up modelling analysis of the implications of emissions trading for the performance of the wholesale power market in 20 European countries. The analyses show that a significant part of the costs of (freely allocated) CO₂ emission allowances is passed through to power prices, resulting in higher electricity prices for consumers and additional (‘windfall’) profits for power producers, even in cases of full auctioning. In addition, they show that the ETS-induced increases in power prices depend not only on the level of CO₂ prices but also on the structure of the power market, i.e., the incidence of market power, and the price responsiveness of power demand. Finally, the analyses show that the internalization and pass-through of carbon costs are crucial elements in a policy regime to reduce CO₂ emissions by both changing the mix of power generation technologies and lowering total electricity demand.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power as a Catalyst for Countercyclical Markups

This paper presents and tests a simple model of competitive and unilateral market power regimes that yields countercyclical markups. Following a decrease in demand in the short run, capacity-constrained firms may have a strong incentive not to lower their prices to the new competitive price. Demand shocks may introduce market power into a previously competitive market. Experimental posted offer markets support this conjecture with complete information on the market structure. With only private information, there appears to be a hysteresis effect concerning supracompetitive prices, i.e., markets with a history of supracompetitive pricing continue to generate supracompetitive prices following demand shocks. However, competitive markets also remain competitive following demand shocks when firms only have private information on costs and capacities.