Bargains Followed by Bargains: When Switching Costs Make Markets More Competitive

In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price‐discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock‐in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs, firms' discount rate, and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate lower (higher) equilibrium prices when switching costs are small (large) or when a firm's discount rate is large (small). Unlike previous studies, this paper demonstrates that the number of firms also determines whether switching costs are pro‐ or anticompetitive, and with a sufficiently large (small) number of firms switching costs are pro‐ (anti‐) competitive.     

Cash Position, Credit Risk and Hedging

In choosing between forward and spot hedging, cash constrained and/or high credit risk firms are more likely to hedge foreign currency transactions forward than firms of greater quality. This arises because the cost of the levered component of a spot hedge is greater than the cost of the unlevered component and this premium increases with higher credit risk. For given cash and credit characteristics, importers are more (less) likely to hedge forward than exporters if transactions costs in the home security market are less (more) than the corresponding costs in the foreign security market.     

Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

Abstract

This paper studies tax competition in an economic geography model that allows for agglomeration economies with trade costs and heterogeneous firms. We find that the Nash equilibrium involves a large country charging a higher tax than a small nation. Lower trade costs lead to an intensification of competition, a drop in Nash tax rates and a narrowing of the gap. Since large, productive firms are naturally more sensitive to tax differences in our model, large firms are the crux of tax competition in our model. This also means that tax competition has consequences for the average productivity of big and small nations' industries; by lowering tax rates, a small nation can attract high-productivity firms.     

Bank efficiency and access to credit: International evidence

This paper examines the impact of bank efficiency on access to credit. We test the hypothesis that higher bank efficiency, meaning a better ability of banks to operate at lower costs, favors access to credit for firms. To this end, we perform a cross-country analysis with firm-level data on access to credit and bank-level data to compute bank efficiency, using a sample of about 54,000 firms from 76 countries. We find that greater bank efficiency improves access to credit for firms. The beneficial impact of bank efficiency to alleviate credit constraints takes place through the demand channel by reducing borrower discouragement to apply for a loan. Whereas the positive impact of bank efficiency on credit access is observed for firms of all sizes, the effect tends to be more pronounced in countries with a better economic and institutional framework. Our results therefore support policies favouring bank efficiency to enhance access to credit.     

Compositional change,aggregation, and dynamic factor demand. Estimates on a panel of manufacturing firms

Most empirical research on investment and dynamic factor demand has used aggregated data. The large number of authors who have cited this as a source of problems strongly suggests possible benefits from analyzing individual firm data. This paper presents an analysis of a panel dataset of US manufacturing firms. Several models, based on cost minimization and a three-factor Cobb–Douglas technology, are developed. The differences concern whether the technology varies across two-digit SIC industries, the presence of fixed adjustment lags, and the determinants of adjustment costs. Identification relies on the rational expectations hypothesis, and estimation on non-linear 3SLS. The estimates indicate that versions with the adjustment lag perform better than others. Conditional elasticities reveal that factor demand responds rapidly to anticipated changes in output and factor prices, a finding consistent with other recent work. It appears that the factor demand of large firms is more price sensitive and less sensitive to output than small firms, consistent with recent work on credit market imperfections. Comparison of the results based on the pooled and the industry varying technologies indicate that the use of aggregate data is indeed a source of problems.     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?

In this paper, I explain two “puzzles” that have been observed in firm level data. First, firms that display a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow (commonly believed to be an indicator of liquidity constraints) usually have large unutilized lines of credit which, presumably, could be used to overcome the shortage of funds. Second, firms that are perceived to be extremely liquidity constrained actually show very little sensitivity of investment to cash flow.I show how a dynamic model of firm investment with liquidity constraints and non-convex costs of adjustment of capital can explain these facts. These two features together imply that firms need to have a certain threshold level of financial resources before they can afford to increase investment. Once they cross this threshold, firms’ investment will be positively correlated with their financial resources until they reach their desired level of capital stock. However, even if investment is sensitive to cash flow, firms may borrow below their credit limit to guard against future bankruptcy or binding liquidity constraints.     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Environmental performance and bank lending: Evidence from unlisted firms

Growing public concerns about sustainability and adopting environmentally responsible practices increase risks as well as opportunities for firms and banks. It is unclear whether being environmentally responsible matters for unlisted firms, which are significant contributors to the degradation of the environment but which are not under strict scrutiny like public listed firms. Using a sample of 3915 firms from developing economies, we investigate whether the superior environmental performance of unlisted firms leads them to better loan conditions. After controlling for endogeneity and sample selection bias, we find that firms with better environmental performance received approximately 6.4% higher loans (as a ratio of total sales) and that this effect is more prominent in small and medium firms. This finding supports an information asymmetry view of agency costs. Our results, however, show that environmental performance does not affect loan duration and collateral requirement, indicating no spillover economic effect of corporate environmental performance on loan conditions. This partially supports a new perspective of legitimacy theory in relation to the ‘greenwash strategy’. Overall, our study shows that strategically engaged environmental activities that are integrated with core business objectives represent an important business strategy for firms to enhance credit access.     

Competitive Mixed Bundling and Consumer Surplus

Mixed bundling in imperfectly competitive industries causes some prices to rise and others to fall. This paper studies under what conditions mixed bundling works for or against the consumer interest. We find that if buyers incur firm-specific costs or have shop-specific tastes then competitive mixed bundling lowers consumer surplus overall and raises profits—the same is true of competitive volume discounts. Competition without these volume discounts causes all prices to be kept low as larger customers are targeted; with volume discounts the prices for heavy users drop, but more is extracted from small users. The consumer surplus result is reversed if the differentiation between components as opposed to firms is key.     

The Tracking of Environmental Costs: Motivations and Impacts

Abstract

Most accounting systems separately capture and accumulate one portion of the overall environmental costs of firms, while the remainder is embedded in other cost pools, such as general overhead costs or administrative costs. Little empirical evidence has been provided to explain the impacts of cost accounting systems that make a larger portion of firms' total environmental costs visible. The aim of this study is to conceptually and empirically examine the relationships among the tracking of environmental costs (TEC) by firms, their environmental motivations, and the impacts in terms of environmental and economic performance. Using survey data from a large sample of manufacturing firms, the results suggest two main conclusions. First, the TEC has an indirect influence on economic performance through environmental performance. Second, this indirect effect is influenced by the environmental motivations of the firm. More specifically, this indirect effect is greater (lesser) for firms whose motivations are predominately business-oriented (sustainability-oriented).     

Quality Diversity and Prices in Markets for Experience Goods

We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to customers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied by a competitive fringe of firms. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed. To provide firms with incentives to actually deliver promised quality, prices must exceed unit variable costs. We show that for a large class of customer preferences there is “quality polarization,” that is, only minimum and maximum feasible quality are available in the market. For the case without quality polarization we derive sufficient conditions for the incentive constraints to completely determine equilibrium prices, regardless of demand, for all intermediate quality levels.     

金融发展对企业技术创新模式影响研究——基于中国高技术产业的实证分析

运用中国高技术产业统计数据,实证分析了金融发展对不同技术创新模式的作用机制,并探讨企业所有权性质对这种作用机制是否存在以及存在何种影响。实证分析结果表明：我国信贷市场发展比股票市场发展对自主创新的促进作用更大,并且这种促进作用并不受到企业所有权性质的影响;信贷市场发展对于增加国有企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的作用更大,而股票市场发展对于增加民营企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的促进作用更大、更显著;我国金融发展对于国有企业的自主创新与模仿创新的促进作用较大,而对民营企业的促进作用相对较小。     

MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: SURVEYING THE SURVEYABLE

Abstract.  This paper surveys recent advances in empirical studies of the monetary transmission mechanism, with special attention to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Our results indicate that the strength of the exchange rate pass-through substantially declined over time mainly due to a fall in inflation rates and to some extent due to the so-called composition effect. The asset price channel is weak and is likely to remain weak because of shallow stock and private bond markets and because of low stock and bond holdings of domestic households. House prices may become an exception with booming mortgage lending and with high owner occupancy ratios. While the credit channel could be a powerful channel of monetary transmission – as new funds raised on capital markets are close to zero in CEE – it is actually not, as both commercial banks and non-financial corporations can escape domestic monetary conditions by borrowing from their foreign mother companies. The moderately good news, however, is that those banks and firms are influenced by monetary policy in the euro area because their parent institutions are themselves subjected to the credit channel in the euro area.     

Collusive equilibria with switching costs: The effect of consumer concentration

I study the ability of two competing firms to set collusive prices in markets where consumers have switching costs. In consumer markets (with a small number of consumers), I find an antifolk result in which collusion, in the presence of switching costs, does not arise with patient firms. Patient firms compete aggressively and consumers expect a large utility. A collusive equilibrium is unstable because a deviating firm incorporates the future consumer utility in its deviating price. Also, consumers have a strategic impact so, with the prospects of large utility, they decide to switch to destabilize the firms' collusive agreement. These results do not eventuate in markets with a large number of consumers. In mass markets (a continuum of consumers), a single consumer lacks a strategic impact to destabilize a collusive agreement and a deviating firm cannot appropriate the consumer utility when deviating from collusion. Collusion, then, becomes straightforward to achieve. We show that for any number of consumers, switching costs make collusion easy to sustain.     

Maximizing public value for subsidized non-profit firms: a mathematical economic model

In many public service industries, firms are assumed to maximize certain public goals and are not allowed to make any profits. These public service firms are financed by fixed and variable subsidies and fees-for-services paid by users. Standard economic models, such as the profit maximization and cost minimization model, are not suitable for describing the production structure and the economic behavior of these firms. Productivity and efficiency measures derived from these models therefore are not accurate. This paper derives a model that fits this type of firm and its economic context. It derives the exact mathematical relationships between public value, services delivered, (money) revenues, costs, service prices, resource prices and subsidies. In an empirical setting the model can be used as a reference to calculate productivity and efficiency scores. The usability of the model is demonstrated by an application to Social Labor Services in the Netherlands.     

Assessing the effects of measurement errors on the estimation of production functions

This article explores to what extent the poor results that are often found when estimating parameters of production functions can be attributed to measurement errors, due to the use of common price deflators across firms. Because of the lack of detailed micro‐economic data, econometricians have to rely on industry‐wide deflators when computing outputs and intermediate inputs. A unique feature of the longitudinal data used in this paper is that it reports firm‐level prices. This allows for a comparative assessment of production function parameters where the outputs and intermediate inputs are computed using both firm‐specific prices and industry‐wide deflators. The empirical results presented in this paper show that the use of common deflators across firms leads to lower scale estimates, mainly because of a large downward bias in the estimated coefficients for labour. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The transformation of the German vocational training regime: evidence from firms’ training behaviour

The German system of industrial relations has undergone significant changes in the last decade. This article reflects on and provides empirical evidence for how these changes have affected the training behaviour of firms. Conventional perspectives would predict a general decline in training investment when the constraints of collective wage bargaining are loosened. Relying on a large data set on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training for the years 2000 and 2007, we do find evidence for this hypothesis but would add that the strength of the effect varies strongly across different types of firms. Large firms have benefited much more from participating in training than have small firms and have therefore maintained their investment in training because they are able to reduce net costs by expanding the productive contributions of apprentices. This finding may help to explain the apparent resilience of the German training system in the recent economic and financial crisis.     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.