Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered

We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers diversify their firms for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We test the comparative static predictions of our model. In contrast to previous work, we find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. Further, the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not. Our findings suggest that managers diversify their firms in response to changes in private benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk.     

Risk regulation,community pressure and the use of management accounting in managing climate change risk: Australian evidence

This exploratory study is amongst the first to investigate how companies perceive the regulation of carbon emissions and the pressure exerted by the community in an environment characterised by risk and uncertainty. Semi-structured interviews were conducted among 39 executives who were directly involved in carbon emissions management in 18 large listed Australian companies. Consistent with Prospect Theory, we find that decision-makers are threat biased and are more likely to take immediate actions when climate change issues are framed as threats as opposed to opportunities. From the interview data, it is seen that managers use management accounting techniques as a risk management tool in mitigating risks associated climate change issues. Furthermore, this use of management accounting appears to be driven primarily by the protection of economic interests, regulatory pressure and reputational pressure. The study provides insights into how perceptions of climate change uncertainties and external pressure for disclosure of emissions information influence companies to use management accounting in managing climate change risk.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

Special purpose entities and bank loan contracting

In this study, we show that a firm's use of special purpose entities (SPEs) is associated with unfavorable loan contract terms, including higher loan rates, collateral requirements, and restrictive covenants. Further analyses suggest that the association between the use of SPEs and unfavorable loan contract terms is primarily due to the increase in the information risk faced by lenders, as firm managers can easily use SPEs to manipulate earnings and hide losses. Specifically, we find that the use of SPEs has a more pronounced effect on increasing the cost of loans and causing more stringent non-price loan terms when managers have a stronger incentive to manipulate earnings and when banks have less knowledge about the SPE sponsor firms due to the lack of prior lending relationship. In addition, we find that the use of SPEs is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting restatements and greater information asymmetry between inside managers and outside capital suppliers.     

The effect of cost management knowledge on the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance

This study investigates the relationship between budget participation (BP), cost management knowledge and managerial performance. It draws on relevant previous research in the theory of work performance and accounting to formulate the research questions. Eighty-three managers from Finnish companies participated in the study. Data were collected from the managers using a mail questionnaire. The results indicate that managers’ cost management knowledge, and especially the balanced perspective of cost management knowledge, moderates the effect of BP on self-perception of managerial performance. It was specifically found that the effect of BP on perceived managerial performance becomes more positive when managers’ cost management knowledge increases. High perception of managerial performance is obtained when both the BP and managers’ cost management knowledge are high. Our results suggest that organizations should improve the cost management knowledge of managers who participate in the budgeting process.     

For which purposes do managers use Balanced Scorecards?: An empirical study

The accounting literature frequently publishes articles that establish the adoption rates of accounting information systems, such as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) or Activity-Based Costing, and subsequently examines the factors that drive this adoption. However, much less is known about the specific purposes for which these systems are used.In this paper, I examine the purposes for which managers use the Balanced Scorecard. Data was collected from a survey administered in 19 Dutch firms which had indicated that they used a BSC. The survey resulted in 224 responses from individual managers. Using exploratory factor analysis on Doll and Torkzadeh's [Doll, W.J., Torkzadeh, G., 1998. Developing a multidimensional measure of system-use in an organizational context. Information and Management 33, 171–185.] instrument of multidimensional MIS usage, I find that managers use the BSC for: (1) decision-making and decision-rationalizing; (2) coordination; and (3) self-monitoring.In the second step, I consider drivers of BSC usage for the three different purposes. These drivers are dimensions of evaluation style, alternative controls that are used in the organizational unit, and the receptiveness of managers to new types of information. I find that BSC usage for decision-making and decision-rationalizing purposes is driven by the degree of action controls used and manager's receptiveness to new information types. BSC usage for coordination purposes is driven by the emphasis placed on managerial evaluation of subordinates and the manager's receptiveness to new types of information. Finally, BSC usage for self-monitoring purposes is driven by the emphasis placed on managerial evaluation.     

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999–2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short‐term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs.     

Enabling control and the problem of incomplete performance indicators

To which extent do managers care about the design characteristics of performance indicators and other control systems? The paper examines this question with the help of the framework of enabling and coercive control. Drawing upon data from a longitudinal field study in a manufacturing organisation, we study operational managers’ attitudes towards the incompleteness of performance indicators. Managers are likely to perceive performance indicators as enabling if the latter facilitate their actions without unduly constraining them. This is true even for incomplete performance indicators as long as managers can handle these indicators in a flexible way, treating them as means rather than ends when carrying out their work. Our case also shows, however, how a flexible use of indicators becomes more difficult to sustain once top management signals an increased importance of the indicators. Incompleteness then becomes a more pressing concern for managers. We illuminate the various forms of top management sense-giving through which such tightening of control is achieved and we show how they translate into managers’ perception of the control system as being a coercive rather than enabling one. Taken together, the findings of the present paper add to our understanding of enabling and coercive forms of control and also extend previous studies that have addressed the problem of incomplete accounting information.     

Reverse logistics in the UK retail sector: A case study of the role of management accounting in driving organisational change

This paper illustrates how interventionist research can be helpful in providing managerially relevant solutions and furthers the debate about the relationship between social science research and practice. Through this use of interventionist methods, the paper contributes to knowledge by illustrating the way in which management accounting was used alongside other managerial disciplines in a UK retail organisation to promote change and influence outcomes. Specifically, the paper focuses on changes to the reverse logistics processes of the organisation and the important role that management accounting played. It also illustrates the use of management accounting in the pursuit of strategic and commercial advantage. As researchers, our work was grounded in action rather than being just observers.     

AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY AND BUSINESS STRATEGY

Sound managerial decision making often requires “putting yourself behind your rivals' desk.” Assuming rivals are rational and acting in their selfinterest, what decisions are they likely to make and how are they likely to respond to your actions? A complicating factor is that rivals' optimal choices typically will depend on their expectations of what you will do; their expectations in turn depend on their assessments of your expectations about them. This type of circularity or recursive thinking might appear to make the overall problem completely intractable. Yet, this situation is precisely where game theory is most useful. This article introduces the basic elements of game theory within the context of business strategy and shows how managers might use these tools in decision making. This analysis also provides managers with a richer understanding of competition within different market settings. For example, it provides insights into why there is fierce competition in some concentrated industries (such as commercial aircraft), but not in others. Although the authors focus primarily on interactions among rival firms in product markets, these concepts also are useful to managers when dealing with other parties, such as suppliers, employees, or gov‐ernment officials.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Nonfinancial performance measures,externalities and target setting: A comparative case study of resolutions through planning

This paper presents an analysis of the resolution of organisational externalities through the use of nonfinancial performance measures for planning. Using a comparative case study, this paper illustrates how centralised controllers’ choice of nonfinancial performance measures and target setting in two companies provides critical information to decentralised agents regarding how to balance their performance with the performance of other decentralised agents in their organisation. This work complements current management accounting research in that it focuses on the role of nonfinancial performance measures with respect to the design of performance plans for decentralised agents that can be used to internalise externalities. To date, discussions of externalities in management accounting research have primarily focused on how performance measurements can be used as a price mechanism to provide decentralised agents with incentives to internalise externalities. In addition, this case study illustrates some of the difficulties related to acquiring general knowledge about the externalities of nonfinancial performance measures and, therefore, about whether specific nonfinancial performance measures are appropriate for a particular type of organisation.     

Management accounting systems, task uncertainty and managerial performance: A research note

This study examines the interactive effects of management accounting systems (MAS) design and task uncertainty on managerial performance. MAS design was defined in terms of the extent to which managers use broad scope MAS information. The responses of 42 managers, drawn from a cross-section of Australian manufacturing companies, to a questionnaire survey were analysed by using a multiple regression technique. The results showed that under a high task uncertainty situation, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to effective managerial decisions and hence to improved managerial performance. On the other hand, under low task uncertainty situations, the extent of use of broad scope MAS information led to information overload which was dysfunctional to managerial performance.     

Does the midpoint of range earnings forecasts represent managers’ expectations?

The accounting literature has used the midpoint of range forecasts in various research settings, assuming that the midpoint is the best proxy for managers’ earnings expectations revealed in range forecasts. We argue that given managers’ asymmetric loss functions regarding earnings surprises, managers are unlikely to place their true earnings expectations at the midpoint of range forecasts. We predict that managers’ true expectations are close to the upper bound of range forecasts. We find evidence consistent with these predictions in 1996–2010, especially in the recent decade. Despite their role as sophisticated information intermediaries, analysts barely unravel the pessimistic bias that managers embed in range forecasts. Furthermore, we find that the upper bound rather than the midpoint better represents investors’ interpretation of managers’ expectations in recent times. Our study cautions researchers to refine their research designs that use management range forecasts and sheds light on the role of financial analysts in the earnings expectations game.     

Modelling Transparency in Disclosure: The Case of Foreign Exchange Risk Management

Abstract:  When managers choose not to disclose all the relevant information in their possession in their financial statements, there is an information gap between the managers and users and consequently a lack of transparency. We model the degree of transparency observed when disclosures of foreign exchange (FX) risk management in financial statements are compared to managerial information on FX risk management policy, as evidenced in questionnaire responses. In this comparative study of US and UK firms we find incomplete disclosure in both samples but with differing aspects. In the US case, the information gap is lower where the information has higher relevance or firms with higher financial risk (greater leverage) are signalling the extent of risk, but the gap is greater where firms are in competitive product markets. For the UK sample, the information gap is significantly lower where firms have higher financial risk or higher liquidity but the gap is greater where the shares are more closely held. We conclude that modelling and explaining this aspect of incomplete accounting disclosure in an international setting must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate national differences in managerial behaviour.     

Institutionalising multiple accountability logics in public services: Insights from Australia

This paper reports on a field study of how a range of inter-institutional and inter-organisational forces shape the evolving rhetoric and practice of multiple accountabilities in public services. Drawing on the institutional logics perspective, we carried out a qualitative field study in the Australian Commonwealth Public Service involving semi-structured interviews, two focus group discussions, and the examination of internal accounting, management reports, and government archival records. The findings suggest that emphasis on conventional instrumental mechanisms and reporting tools, such as budgeting and accrual-based reporting, support managerial (instrumental) accountability through compliance logics. We conclude that an emphasis on public (relational) accountability through public dialogue is central to the public sector accountability debate, and that more attention needs to be paid to the question of how to balance the dual logics (instrumental and relational) in public services. The findings provide practical insights for public sector managers, policymakers and governments responsible for designing and implementing reforms, accounting tools, and accountability practices.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Succeeding in managerial accounting. Part 2: a structural equations analysis

Does the type of knowledge, and levels of ability and experience needed, depend on rank in managerial accounting? Are the knowledge, ability, and experience needed for managerial accounting success, consistent with the Libby & Luft (L&L) model (1993) of the determinants of judgment performance in accounting? We explore these questions using structural equation models of the performance evaluations of 2941 practicing managerial accountants. Results indicate that technical managerial accounting knowledge, ability, and experience predict job performance success for junior managerial accountants; industry knowledge, tacit managerial knowledge (TMK) and experience predict success for seniors; and, industry and TMK predict success for managers. The results suggest significant (though not identical) commonality in the predictors of success in managerial accounting and the determinants of judgment performance identified in the L& L model.     

The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.