The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors’ risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.     

The influence of litigation risk and internal audit source on reliance decisions

External auditor reliance on the work of internal auditors in an integrated audit of the financial statements and internal control is an important audit planning procedure that can impact audit efficiency and effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to examine how perceived auditor litigation risk and internal audit source affect external auditors' reliance decisions in an integrated audit environment under varying levels of risk of material misstatement. In an experimental study using 89 practicing Big 4 auditors, this study finds that auditors who perceive low litigation risk from placing reliance on the work of internal auditors will rely more on outsourced internal auditors than in-house internal auditors. The results also show that auditors' reliance decisions are sensitive to the level of account risk consistent with the risk-based approach to the integrated audit encouraged by the PCAOB.     

Corporate social responsibility and the assessment by auditors of the risk of material misstatement

This paper investigates whether, and how, firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance influences the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, at the financial statement level by analysing their pricing decision (i.e., audit fees). Using a panel data set of 12,330 firms from 28 countries over the period 2003–2012 and different measures of CSR performance, we find a U‐shaped relationship between firms’ CSR performance and audit fees. This result suggests that there is an optimal level of CSR performance that minimizes the auditor's assessment of the risk of material misstatement, which in turn lowers the need for greater auditor effort; that is why auditors charge firms significantly less when their CSR performance is at the optimal level. Finally, we also show that the optimal level of CSR performance varies with the degree of environmental dynamism, ownership concentration and leverage.     

Improving the Interpretation of Complex Audit Evidence: The Beneficial Role of Order Effects

A principal element of business risk (or strategic systems) auditing is the goal of evaluating the degree of concordance between management representations and expectations derived from an understanding of the business environment. Peecher et al. (2007) argue that an effective means by which auditors may achieve this goal is through a process of evidentiary triangulation. In this exploratory study, we investigate whether the order with which auditors evaluate business environment, information systems and financial statement representations evidence has the potential, as suggested by belief function theory, to improve the effectiveness with which they interpret the complex interrelationships between these three sources of evidence. Analyzing judgements made by practicing auditors in an experimental setting, our results reveal that, when faced with negative business environment evidence that is in conflict with positive information systems and financial statement representations evidence, auditors assess the risk of material misstatement to be higher when they are presented with the critically important business environment evidence last, rather than, as is traditionally the case, first. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that the positive order effects may be attenuated by the requirement to document reasons underlying the judgements made. The results raise a number of practical and theoretical issues that give direction to future research in this important area.     

An Examination of the Effect of Hypothesis Framing on Auditors'Information Choices in an Analytical Procedure Task

Libby (1985) contends that auditors'search for and evaluation of audit evidence, particularly during analytical procedures, is influenced by an explicitly or implicitly formulated hypothesis. Often a hypothesis may be'framed'in alternative ways. For example, an auditor may frame analytical procedure results in terms of a'misstatement'or a'non-misstatement'frame. The concern arises that alternatively framed, but otherwise identical, audit issues may be treated differently. This concern has led Kinney and Haynes (1990) to propose modifying auditing standards to direct auditors to adopt a'misstatement'frame. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether alternative analytical procedure frames affect auditors'information choices in an analytical procedure task. An experiment was conducted in which auditors listed which information cues were relevant to explain an unusual financial statement fluctuation. Half of the information cues made a misstatement explanation more plausible whereas half of the information cues made a non-misstatement explanation more plausible. The results indicate that hypothesis frame significantly affected auditors'information choices. Specifically, auditors in the misstatement (non-misstatement) frame select more misstatement (non-misstatement) cues as relevant. The hypothesis frame, however, did not significantly affect probability assessments.     

The dominant senior manager and the reasonably careful, skilful, and cautious auditor

This paper examines a paradox in corporate audit history that threatens the credibility of the current audit as a means of protecting stakeholders from corrupt senior managers. Using a historical analysis of legal cases of fraudulent reporting and subsequent public accountancy responses, the study reveals the paradox of a corporate auditor denying or limiting responsibility to detect material accounting misstatement (MAM) facilitated by dominant senior managers (DSM), while relying on the honesty of senior managers. The primary finding of the legal case analysis is the persistent presence of a DSM or team of DSM in the context of various contributing features, and the creation by Victorian lawyers of a model of excuses for the corporate auditor. The primary finding from the responses of public accountants is, within the context of the model of excuses and the assumption of managerial honesty, continuous denial, or limitation of auditor responsibility for detecting MAM facilitated by DSM. The consequence of this history is that DSM intent on MAM currently face corporate auditors generally untrained to assess the audit risk of managerial domination facilitating MAM. The paper's single recommendation is that corporate auditors be educated and trained to assess the audit risk associated with DSM facilitating MAM. The paper's contribution to corporate auditing is its use of historical analysis to bring together previously known but relatively disparate matters into a coherent whole that signals a fatal flaw in existing practice.     

Ted's Teas: A Two-Part Accounting and Audit “Crossover Case”*

This fictional case is based on a real specialty tea company in Nova Scotia. Ted's Teas is a two-part crossover case that illustrates the integration of financial accounting and audit learning outcomes applied to real-world scenarios. In Part 1, students assume the role of an internal accountant and apply knowledge of the Chartered Professional Accountants (CPA) of Canada's CPA Way to identify how to treat leases, changes in policy, and estimates as part of accounting knowledge under both Accounting Standards for Private Enterprises and IFRS frameworks. In Part 2, students “cross over” and change roles, so they are now external auditors for Ted's Teas, tasked to provide an analysis of risk of material misstatement, recommend an audit approach, and develop substantive procedures. This two-part case presents opportunities for students to demonstrate technical competence in multiple areas, either separately in two different courses or combined in one “capstone” or case course. The case and teaching notes, including the marking rubrics, were adapted from principles used to train and evaluate CPA Professional Education Program candidates, tailored to an appropriate level for undergraduate and graduate learners.     

The effect of general counsel prominence on the pricing of audit services

We investigate the effect of corporate general counsel (GC) ascension to the senior management team on the pricing of audit services. Prior research suggests that the GC position may have a significant influence in setting the tone at the top by promoting corporate integrity, ethics, and serving as a governance and monitoring mechanism, but also recognizes that prominent GCs may face ethical dilemmas, causing them to disregard professional responsibilities to curry the favor of the CEO and other executives. Using audit fees to proxy for audit engagement risk, we find a negative association between GC ascension to top management and audit fees. We investigate the mechanisms behind this relation and find GC ascension is associated with a reduction in both default risk and financial misstatement risk, which supports auditors’ perceived reduction in client business risk and audit risk, respectively.     

How do auditors respond to low annual report readability?

We show that increased audit effort is associated with lower annual report readability to compensate for a perceived increase in the risk of financial misstatement for United States (US) firms. In particular, we find that lower annual report readability is associated with longer audit delays and higher audit fees for Form 10-K for US auditors, suggesting that auditors spend more effort auditing clients when annual reports have lower readability. We also find that low readability increases the likelihood of auditors using more explanatory language in unqualified audit reports.     

Assessing business risk: The case of Premier Punch, Inc

The recently issued Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109, Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, emphasizes the need for auditors to understand the client’s business and environment, particularly the client’s business risk [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (2006a), understanding the entity and its environment and assessing the risks of material misstatement, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109. New York, NY: AICPA]. However, the manner in which auditors obtain such an understanding, especially an auditor’s assessment of a client’s business risk, is often challenging for students because they lack the business experience necessary to perform such an assessment. This case provides students with an opportunity to assess business risk in a realistic context that includes evidence beyond the content of the financial statements. Company information is provided via a webpage (www.premierpunch.com) with content similar to that of an actual investor relations site. Students must evaluate the information presented in the company’s annual report, press releases and other sources, and consider the impact of that information on several facets of business risk. Students also perform an analytical review of the company’s financial statements and synthesize the case information into a professional memo containing their assessment of business risk.     

The effects of disclosure type and audit committee expertise on Chief Audit Executives’ tolerance for financial misstatements

This study involves an experiment where 73 Chief Audit Executives and deputy Chief Audit Executives determine the amount of adjustment required to correct a misstatement. We manipulate the financial reporting location of the misstatement (recognized vs. disclosed) and the level of audit committee expertise (high vs. low). The results indicate that financial reporting location has significant effects on internal auditors’ decisions to correct misstatements. Specifically, internal auditors are more willing to waive disclosed misstatements relative to recognized misstatements. Contrary to expectations, the results do not indicate that increased audit committee expertise and associated increases in audit committee members’ perceived powers cause internal auditors to be less willing to waive misstatements.     

Audit Effort and Market‐perceived Risk: Evidence from South Korea

Auditors incur a loss of credibility and/or status or litigation costs only when investors recognise audit failures. In this respect, auditors may be concerned about an increase in market‐perceived risk even though the total amount of audit risk is constant. Consistent with this reasoning, I find that auditors increase audit effort in response to increases in market‐perceived information risk. This suggests that the expected costs of audit failures are a function of investors’ recognition, and thus increased market‐perceived risk causes auditors to become more concerned about their audit failures and to increase audit effort. Further, this study shows that audit effort is effective in reducing market‐perceived information risk, suggesting that auditors contribute to the information environment.     

The Effects of Business Risk on Audit Pricing

This paper examines the pricing of business risk by homogeneous auditors in a two period model. Incumbent auditors learn the client's business risk type during the course of the engagement. They subsequently compete in prices with prospective auditors. In such an environment, we show that equilibrium audit fees do not fully reflect the cost of business risk. Moreover, there exists differential auditor turnover between high and low risk firms; cross-subsidization of the audit fees of high risk firms by low risk firms; and low-balling by auditors.     

Triangulation of audit evidence in fraud risk assessments

Drawing on the triangulation framework of audit evidence ( and ), we experimentally test for the conditions, if any, under which financial-statement auditors alter their fraud-risk assessments based on whether external evidence provides positive or negative news about underlying business performance. We focus on the condition in which two kinds of management-controlled audit evidence – evidence from the financial statements and evidence from internal data depicting performance of a key business process – is contradicted by external evidence suggesting that a key business objective has not been attained. According to the triangulation framework, such contradictory external evidence should heighten auditors’ skepticism about the veracity of management-controlled evidence and increase their assessment of fraud risk.     

Internal audit reporting lines,fraud risk decomposition,and assessments of fraud risk

The main purpose of this research is to examine the effects of internal audit reporting lines on fraud risk assessments made by internal auditors when the level of fraud risk varies. Significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of reporting lines in maintaining the autonomy of internal auditors, but the perceived benefits of requiring internal audit to report directly to the audit committee have not been validated or systematically investigated. Results of an experiment involving 172 experienced internal auditors and additional survey findings indicate that internal auditors perceive more personal threats when they report high levels of risk directly to the audit committee, relative to management. Perceived threats lead internal auditors to reduce assessed levels of fraud risk when reporting to the audit committee relative to when reporting to management. This finding runs counter to the anticipated benefits of requirements that the internal audit function report directly to the audit committee, and it reveals potential conflicts of interest and independence threats created by the audit committee itself. We also investigate the effects of fraud risk decomposition on risk assessments made by internal auditors. We find that fraud risk assessment decomposition does not have the same effects on internal auditors as it has on external auditors, and the effects of decomposition do not align with the expected benefits of decomposition.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

Nationality and differences in auditor risk assessment: A research note with experimental evidence

This study examines whether auditors from different countries come to different conclusions when they perform analytical procedures to assess the risk of misstatement in accounts. During a laboratory experiment, auditors who worked for the same firm in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States performed analytical procedures on identical case materials. Although auditors from all three countries came to similar conclusions about the overall risk of misstatement, they attributed risk differently across the individual financial statement accounts they evaluated.     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

Effects of audit partners on clients’ business risk disclosure

We empirically investigate audit engagement partners’ involvement in business risk disclosure. Specifically, we examine whether the quality of business risk disclosure is influenced by engagement partner tenure and knowledge. We also examine whether the effects of partner tenure and knowledge are similar for Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 firms. Since fiscal year 2003, listed companies in Japan have been required to disclose business risk information. Although the business risk information is not audited, auditors concerned about their audit quality may seek to influence clients’ business risk disclosure practices. Giving advice to management on the narrative business risk disclosure can contribute to improving the perceived value of the auditor’s services which can be a competitive advantage. Using a sample of Japanese listed companies from 2003 to 2010, we find that if the engagement partners’ tenure is shorter, a company discloses more business risk information and the disclosure is more detailed. Furthermore, companies with audit partners who have a larger number of client engagements disclose larger amounts of business risk information in more detail. However, the engagement partner effects are mitigated if they belong to a Big 4 firm.     

The business risk audit: Origins, obstacles and opportunities

Is the business risk audit a better way to assess risks leading to focused audit testing, or is it simply a tool for generating opportunities to sell nonaudit services? Many feel strongly that the latter is more representative of the manner in which business risk audits were implemented. In this paper, I argue that the development of the business risk audit methodology in the 1990s was a complex process that arose naturally from the need to compensate for the commoditization of audits that occurred in the 1980s. The contemporaneous growth of risk management theories and processes provided a powerful perspective on which to base the re-engineering of the audit. However, the process of developing and implementing business risk audits was extremely difficult and may have run up against a number of unforeseen and unmanaged obstacles, particularly in regards to the existing rituals of the traditional audit. Given that the sales culture of consulting was taking hold among auditors at about the same time, it is possible that the well-intentioned efforts to revitalize the audit process were derailed by these difficulties and then diverted to support revenue growth via nonaudit services. When Enron and ensuing scandals occurred, questions arose as to whether the business risk audit was effective, or even appropriate. Regulatory initiatives that followed from the aftermath of Enron, such as an increased focus on management incentives for fraudulent reporting and greater in-depth analysis of internal controls, may provide a viable foundation for reconsidering business risk methods and melding the best of traditional substantive audits with the best of business risk auditing.