Judgment effects of familiarity with an analyst’s name

We conduct an experiment with MBA students where we manipulate whether participants are exposed to an analyst’s name in Stage 1, and whether they are given a cue in Stage 2 about the particular analyst’s prior performance as an All-star analyst. We find that in the absence of a favorable performance cue about the analyst, mere exposure to the analyst’s name enhances perceived analyst credibility, which in turn influences the investors’ earnings estimates. This suggests a benefit to analysts in terms of building credibility merely through media exposure that cannot be explained by performance. In fact, a diagnostic cue such as the analyst’s high prior performance no longer matters to investors once they have prior exposure to the analyst’s name. However, this enhancement of an analyst’s credibility through investors’ prior exposure to his/her name is reversed when the analyst’s forecast turns out to be inaccurate.     

Level of business insights in the MD&A and nonprofessional investors' judgments

This study examines how the level of business insights in a firm's MD&A interacts with its current financial performance to influence nonprofessional investors' judgments. Following the observations and guidance of the ASIC and SEC to define low‐and high‐insight MD&A, this study finds that low‐insight MD&A, when provided for a negative earnings surprise, increases investors’ judgments of the negative earnings persistence and hurts management reputation more than if no MD&A had been provided. High‐insight MD&A, when including a plausible external attribution, increases investors’ judgments of management reputation in the negative earnings surprise condition and decreases investors’ judgments of positive earnings persistence.     

An investigation of nonprofessional investors’ qualitative materiality judgments incorporating SEC listed vs. non-listed events

When the SEC began listing specific potentially material events in its Regulation FD [Regulation Fair Disclosure, 2000. SEC Release 33-7881, Rules 101–103], it deviated from its long-time “policy” of not providing materiality guidance to auditors and managers. What is currently unclear in the materiality literature is which factor(s) – information-based characteristics or user-based characteristics – has an effect on nonprofessional investor qualitative materiality judgments. Using a series of experimental markets, we examine and find no evidence that an information-based characteristic (distinguishing between listed and non-listed events) has an effect on nonprofessional investors’ materiality judgments. Our evidence regarding user-based characteristics is mixed. We do not find evidence of the direction of disclosed events impacting investors’ judgments, but we do find evidence of an anchoring effect. Our findings indicate that the content of the information disclosed to nonprofessional investors is not as important as the timing of the disclosure. Our investigation is unique in that we consider the (qualitative) nature of the event, rather than simply its (quantitative) magnitude.     

Information immobility,industry concentration,and institutional investors’ performance

This paper examines foreign institutional investors’ portfolio allocation and performance in US securities. We test how information immobility, proxied by information barriers between the investors’ home markets and the US, influences portfolio strategies. Consistent with theoretical predictions, foreign institutional investors’ total investment in the US is negatively related to information immobility. Similarly, information immobility is a significant driver of portfolio under-diversification across industries. Industry concentration has declined over time, consistent with declining search costs. Industry-concentrated portfolios outperform more diversified portfolios for both foreign and US institutional investors. Concentration especially helps institutional investors with the easiest access to information.     

Management reporting incentives and classification credibility: The effects of reporting discretion and reputation

In this study we investigate how the level of discretion in the reporting environment and management’s reporting reputation influence the extent to which management’s reporting incentives are important in determining the perceived credibility of management’s classification choices. Consistent with prior research, we show that users view incentive-inconsistent classifications as more credible than incentive-consistent classifications. We extend this finding by showing that the strength of this relationship (i.e., the extent to which users consider the consistency between the classification and management’s reporting incentives) depends on the level of discretion in the reporting environment and management’s reporting reputation. We find that users rely less (more) on the consistency between management’s reporting incentives and the classification in a mandated (discretionary) reporting environment and when managers have a good (poor) reporting reputation. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings and potential future research.     

The effect of auditors’ internal control opinions on loan decisions

We examine the effect of internal control reports on lending officers’ assessments of a company’s creditworthiness. We suggest that an adverse internal control opinion can undermine the assurance provided by an unqualified opinion on financial statements taken as a whole and have a negative affect on lenders’ assessments. In addition, we investigate whether auditor size plays a role in determining the effect on lenders’ judgments.     

Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

Reprint of Investors’ distraction and strategic repricing decisions

In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ performance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior.     

Specialists as risk managers: The competition between intermediated and non-intermediated markets

We develop a model that analyzes competition between a non-intermediated market (such as an electronic communications network) and an intermediated market (such as via the market specialist’s structure within the NYSE) when both markets are allowed to trade the same securities. Specialists are viewed as providers of a “volatility dampening” service, a mechanism for reducing round-trip trading costs, as well as an “order execution risk management” service. The economic value of these three specialist services is determined by five key factors (the difference in spreads between the two financial market types, investors’ holding periods, the specialist’s quoted spread in relation to the asset’s price, the relative probability of executing an order in the intermediated market, and the short-term risk-free rate).     

The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence.     

The association between financially expert independent directors and the accounting for employee stock options

This study investigates how the financial expertise of independent directors is associated with voluntary accounting policy decisions. As representatives of a company’s shareholders, financially-expert independent directors are more likely to cause management to pursue higher quality accounting policy decisions. The policy decision investigated involves the expense/non-expense policy choice for employee stock options as previously permitted under SFAS No. 123. Using a sample of 174 option-expensing firms and a matched control sample of 174 non-expensing firms, the results indicate a significant, positive association between the decision to expense employee stock options and the financial expertise of a company’s independent directors. Further, a significant, negative association was found between the option-expensing decision and whether the chief executive officer was the largest internal blockholder.     

Accruals and the performance of stock returns following external financing activities

This paper investigates the relation of the external financing anomaly with the accrual anomaly, by focusing separately on working capital accruals and long-term accruals. We find that external financing and accrual hedge portfolios not only generate superior returns, but they also constitute statistical arbitrage opportunities. Portfolio-level analysis and firm-level cross-sectional regressions show that the ability of external financing measures in predicting future returns remains strong, after controlling for working capital accruals. However, this ability is substantially reduced after controlling for long-term accruals. Our results appear to be consistent with investors’ failure to recognise agency-related overinvestment and/or opportunistic earnings management.     

Information content of repurchase signals: Tangible or intangible information?

The outperformance of repurchasing firms with a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio is usually explained by investors’ undervaluation of the firm’s past performance. However, several studies suggest that the underestimation of future intangible value may explain the high return associated with the share repurchase. To better understand the actual information content of repurchases, I decompose the B/M ratio into past tangible information and future intangible information and find that repurchase signals an undervaluation of the intangible return. In addition, I investigate several potential proxies for intangible information—R&D expenses, intangible assets, and future operating performance. My results show that intangible information signals the undervaluation of future operating performance.     

Alternative work arrangements and perceived career success: Current evidence from the big four firms in the US

This study examines the influences of alternative work arrangements (AWAs), subordinate gender, and supervisor attitudes and beliefs regarding AWAs on performance evaluation judgments in public accounting. One hundred and forty-two experienced professionals from two US Big Four firms evaluated a hypothetical subordinate’s performance in an experimental setting. Results indicated that subordinate gender and AWA participation were significantly related to supervisors’ perceptions of the subordinate’s career success. We also found that individual differences in supervisors’ attitudes and beliefs regarding AWAs were systematically related to their performance evaluation judgments, and indicate that cultural support for AWAs is not uniform among experienced Big Four professionals. Further, the association between these attitudes and beliefs and performance evaluation judgments are consistent with an organizational justice interpretation of AWA use. Implications of these results for the Big Four’s work-life balance initiatives in the US are discussed.     

Performance evaluation inflation and compression

We provide a behavioral account of subjective performance evaluation inflation (i.e., leniency bias) and compression (i.e., centrality bias). When a manager observes noisy signals of employee performance and the manager strives to produce accurate ratings but feels worse about unfavorable errors than about favorable errors, the manager’s selfishly optimal ratings will be biased upwards. Both the uncertainty about performance and the asymmetry in the manager’s utility are necessary conditions for performance evaluation inflation. Moreover, the extent of the bias is increasing in the variance of the performance signal and in the asymmetry in aversion to unfair ratings. Uncertainty about performance also leads to compressed ratings. These results suggest that performance appraisals based on well-defined unambiguous criteria will have less bias. Additionally, we demonstrate that employer and employee can account for biased performance evaluations when they agree to a contract, and thus, to the extent leniency bias and centrality bias persist, these biases hurt employee performance and lower firm productivity.     

Pro forma disclosure and investor sophistication: External validation of experimental evidence using archival data

Insights on how ordinary, less-sophisticated investors interpret and process management-issued pro forma earnings numbers are useful to regulators because of concerns that pro forma disclosures are misleading to ordinary investors. Two recent experimental studies [Frederickson, J. R., & Miller, J. S. (2004). The effects of pro forma earnings disclosures on analysts’ and nonprofessional investors’ equity valuation judgments. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 667–686; Elliott, W. B. (2006). Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations in earnings announcements? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 113–133] find that the existence of a pro forma number in the earnings press release as well as the relative placement of the pro forma and GAAP earnings figures within the press release affect the judgments of less-sophisticated investors but not those of more-sophisticated investors. Experimental and archival methodologies complement one another and results that persist in both settings are likely to be robust to both internal and external validity concerns. Therefore, we complement experimental evidence using trade-size-based proxies constructed from intraday transactions data to distinguish the trading activities of less-sophisticated investors from more-sophisticated investors. Our results suggest that less-sophisticated investors rely significantly more on quarterly earnings press releases that include a pro forma number than on those that do not, while more-sophisticated investors exhibit the opposite behavior. This result is consistent with Frederickson and Miller’s experimental evidence. Further, consistent with Elliott’s results, we find that less-sophisticated investors rely more on the pro forma figure when it is placed before the GAAP earnings number in the press release, while more-sophisticated investors’ trading behavior is unaffected by the relative placement of the two earnings metrics. We conclude that the existence of a pro forma number as well as its strategic placement in the press release generally affect the judgments of less-sophisticated (but not more-sophisticated) investors and these inferences are robust because they persist in both experimental and archival settings.     

Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and relative performance

We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents with heterogeneous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the concern with relative performance leads agents to trade more similarly, a development that has two effects. First, similar trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact of dominant agents. The second effect dominates the first when agents expect large differences between their final performances, and vice versa when agents expect small differences between their final performances. Compared with the case in which agents are unconcerned about relative performance, the stock return volatility is higher when the second effect dominates, and lower when the first effect dominates. This paper also demonstrates that the concern about relative performance influences investors’ holdings, stock prices and risk premia.     

Reputation concerns and herd behavior of audit committees - A corporate governance problem

This paper offers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate governance context. The management of a firm sets up financial statements that are possibly biased. These statements are audited/reviewed by an external auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their work, the auditor acting first. Both use an imperfect technology that results in a privately observed signal regarding the quality of financial statements. The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build up reputation in the labor market. Given this predominant goal they report on the signal in order to maximize the market’s assessment of their ability. At the end of the game the true character of the financial statements is revealed to the public with some positive probability. The market uses this information along with the agents’ reports to update beliefs about the agents’ abilities. We show that a herding equilibrium exists in which the audit committee “herds” and follows the auditor’s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest. This result holds even if the audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, performance based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.