Environmental policy and stable collusion: The case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly

We show that the imposition of a Markovian tax on emissions, that is, a tax rate which depends on the pollution stock, can induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. This does not hold for a uniform tax. Thus, accounting for the feedback effect that exists within a dynamic framework, where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time, changes the result obtained within a static framework. Moreover, the cartel formation can diminish the welfare gain from environmental regulation such that welfare under environmental regulation and collusion of firms lies below that under a laissez-faire policy.     

Russia: Firm entry and survival barriers

Why are there so few new firms in Russia? This paper provides further insights into the specific Russian business landscape and how it impacts the low level of new firm entry. As this paper indicates, internationally comparative data do not provide many clues, since in terms of purely formal constraints Russia fares comparatively well. However, a deeper analysis uncovers the informal impediments associated with the lack of rule of law, inconsistent enforcement of regulations, regional autonomy and pervasive corruption. These informal constraints form impediments not only for new firm creation but also for firm survival and firm exit.     

Entry and barriers to entry in emerging markets

This note briefly introduces the symposium on entry and entry barriers in emerging markets edited by Nauro Campos and Saul Estrin. The symposium contains four inter-related case studies focusing in depth on the relationship between entry of new firms and institutional arrangements in four major emerging markets: Brazil, China, India and Russia. We find that entry rates are not necessarily low in emerging markets, and that institutional quality is a complex and “fuzzy” notion so that its impact on the entry process is not straightforward.     

Information acquisition,foreign bank entry,and credit allocation

This paper presents a theoretical framework to understand the impact of foreign bank entry on the access to and the price of credit for different types of firms. A major point of departure from the previous literature is that incumbents’ information about firms is endogenous in the model; previous screenings and lending relations of incumbents determine which type(s) of firms they can identify. I show that incumbents’ information is negatively correlated with the quality of borrowers. Moreover, although a priori entrants have a comparative advantage in lending to transparent firms, previous lending relations of incumbents might reverse this relation. In particular, given that transparent firms are the only type screened before the entry and therefore they are the only type distinguishable by incumbents, entrants might have a comparative advantage in lending to opaque firms. The analysis provides new insights into the inconclusive evidence of the literature regarding entrants’ credit allocation.     

Institutional barriers to firm entry and exit: Case-study evidence from the Brazilian textiles and electronics industries

What are the main barriers to firm entry and exit in developing countries and how do they differ from barriers to firm operation and growth? How important is the institutional and regulatory framework in this respect? This paper examines such questions using case-study evidence from the Brazilian textiles and electronics industries. We find that not only these institutional barriers are high in Brazil but also that they seem to have risen since the early 1990s, and that their effects vary across sectors. We also provide evidence from a survey we carried out in 2005 suggesting that institutions are more important as barriers to entry than as barriers to firm operation and growth.     

竞争企业的技术许可与市场进入策略研究

本文对在位企业和潜在进入企业同时选择技术许可费并决定是否进入市场的策略进行了分析和讨论。我们证明如果在位平台企业收取的许可费小于某一临界水平,则潜在进入企业的的最优反应是不进入;如果收取的许可费大于某临界水平,则进入企业的最优反应是进入。另外,如果在位平台企业的初始网络规模和网络外部性足够强,则在位企业选择垄断的技术许可价格,并且进入企业选择不进入。如果初始网络优势不是很大,则潜在进入者的出现使得在位企业会降低技术许可费,以形成进入壁垒。     

Firm entry and exit in Italian provinces and the relationship with unemployment

This study investigates the influence of the unemployment rate on firm entry, exit and net entry in Italian provinces. We attempt to explain these market dynamics in six different sectors, including manufacturing, construction, commerce, hotels and restaurants, transport and financial services. We control for other regional factors, such as patenting activity, economic growth, economic welfare, tourism, industrial districts and whether being a major city. Findings indicate that the effects of unemployment on entry and exit are dependent upon the sector under study, but are mainly negative. This suggests a lack of dynamics in the Italian regional labor markets.

Price discrimination and the location choice of a durable goods monopoly

Delivered pricing by a spatial monopoly amounts to third degree price discrimination. Well known results in spatial economics show that the monopolist location choice is efficient under delivered pricing and generally inefficient under mill pricing. By contrast, the present paper shows that if the monopolist sells a durable good, the location is also inefficient under delivered pricing.     

Firm entry, credit availability and monetary policy

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates firm entry under credit rationing. Goods-producing firms in this model are bank dependent in the sense that they have no choice but to borrow funds from banks to cover labor wages that must be paid in advance of production. The results show that a cut in the policy rate enhances firm entry by mitigating the severity of credit rationing. This policy transmission is different from the conventional balance sheet channel in that a change in the policy rate directly affects borrowers' credit availability. I also show that a sudden stop in the credit supply to new firms is most likely to occur shortly after a credit boom. This is because endogenous downward wage rigidity prohibits the credit risk of prospective firms from decreasing enough to re-equilibrate the loan market.     

Strategic location choice under dynamic oligopolistic competition and spillovers

This paper investigates firms׳ optimal location choices explicitly accounting for the role of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms that are heterogeneous in their ability to carry out cost-reducing R&D. Firms can either locate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. Technological spillovers are exchanged between the firms located in the cluster. It is shown that a technological leader has an incentive to locate in isolation only if her advantage exceeds a certain threshold, which is increasing in firms׳ discount rate, in industry dispersion, and in the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Scenarios are identified where although it is optimal for the technological leader to locate in isolation, from a welfare perspective it would be desirable that she locates in the cluster.     

Barriers to entry in the healthcare markets: Winners and Losers from certificate-of-need laws

In states with Certificate of Need (CON) laws, medical services providers must file an application and demonstrate community need before being permitted to start or expand a service. We examine CON laws for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), computed tomography (CT), and positron emission tomography (PET) scanners to test the hypothesis that the approval process favors established incumbent hospitals over new hospital entrants and nonhospital providers. Using Medicare claims data in 2013, we find that states with CON laws have 20 to 33% fewer providers, depending on the type of scanners to which the laws apply. As a result, residents of CON law states are 3.4–5.3 percentage points more likely to travel outside their home county to obtain imaging services than residents of non-CON states. In addition, there is a notable shift in the type of provider: CON laws are associated with 27–53% fewer scans by nonhospital providers per beneficiary, 23 to 70% fewer by new hospitals, but 6 to 21% more scans in older hospitals.     

Market entry of firms with different legal forms: an empirical test of the influence of institutional factors

Drawing upon institutional theory we develop a conceptual model and investigate the determinants of market entry for worker cooperatives, publicly traded and limited-liability companies. Our results show that formal institutional conditions (i.e., mercantile legislation) influence the start-up choice of entrepreneurs regarding the legal form of their new venture. In addition, we take into account the influence of informal institutional conditions (i.e., local corporate culture) on the market entry rate of firms with different legal structures. Findings show that, while market entry is sensitive to the general economic climate, entry rates of firms with a different legal structure respond differently to the same economic conditions.

A dynamic oligopoly game of the US airline industry: Estimation and policy experiments

This paper studies the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the estimation of a dynamic game of network competition using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information on quantities, prices, and entry and exit decisions for every airline company in the routes between the 55 largest US cities. As methodological contributions of the paper, we propose and apply a method to reduce the dimension of the state space in dynamic games, and a procedure to deal with the problem of multiple equilibria when implementing counterfactual experiments. Our empirical results show that the most important factor to explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks is that the sunk cost of entry in a route declines importantly with the number of cities that the airline connects from the origin and destination airports of the route. For some carriers, the entry deterrence motive is the second most important factor to explain hub-and-spoke networks.     

Inter-firm cooperation and the problem of free riding behavior: an empirical study of voluntary retail chains

This article explores the problem of free riding behavior in voluntary retail chains. Based on agency theory and group theory, the authors analyze the antecedents to free riding behavior in voluntary retail chains and examine whether it is possible to handle the problem of free riding behavior by the use of monitoring arrangements. Hypotheses are developed and tested on a sample of 70 voluntary chains. The empirical findings show that both the size of the chain (the number of retailers being members of the chain) and the level of goal conflict within the chain are associated with free riding problems. It is also demonstrated that the implementation of monitoring arrangements is effective in lowering free riding behavior in voluntary retail chains.     

Relatedness and entry mode choice in the context of entrepreneurial business entries

In this research we aim to study how established firms develop new entrepreneurial business entry. We based our hypotheses on the theoretical propositions arising from the entrepreneurship strategic management interface. Specifically, we analyse which factors influence the entry mode choice in entrepreneurial business entries. We consider three groups of determinant factors: industry, firm and transaction-related factors. We test our hypothesis in a Spanish firm sample of 197 entrepreneurial business entries. Our results allow us to describe in which circumstances firms are more likely to perform entrepreneurial business entries by low resource commitment and control modes, such as strategic alliances. As a result, a theoretical model is proposed to assess the entry mode choice in this type of entry. Thus, this study contributes to generating debate in this topic.

The importance of consumer multihoming (joint purchases) for market performance: Mergers and entry in media markets

Consumer “multihoming” (watching two TV channels, or buying two news magazines) has surprisingly important effects on market equilibrium and performance in (two‐sided) media markets. We show this by introducing consumer multihoming and advertising finance into the classic circle model of product differentiation. When consumers multihome (attend more than one platform), media platforms can charge only incremental value prices to advertisers. Entry or merger leaves consumer prices unchanged under consumer multihoming, but leaves advertiser prices unchanged under single‐homing: Multihoming flips the side of the market on which platforms compete. In contrast to standard circle results, equilibrium product variety can be insufficient under multihoming.     

Housing-choice hindrances and urban spatial structure: Evidence from matched location and location-preference data in Chinese cities

In a monocentric city with a well-functioning residential market, Pareto-efficient spatial equilibrium entails the sorting of residents according to their bid–rent gradient in descending order away from city center. Violation of this sorting condition creates opportunities for Pareto-improving trading of locations and can be sustained only if the market is hindered. We propose a simple ordered-location-choice model using matched location and location-preference data of individual households to examine violations of the Pareto-efficient spatial sorting condition. In so doing we are able to identify population groups facing housing-choice hindrances. We find in a sample of Chinese cities undergoing housing market liberalization that poor marketability of the previously state-provided homes, inadequate provision of housing finance, and spatial mismatch between job-market and housing-market opportunities contribute to a Pareto-inefficient spatial structure.     

A minimum expected response model: Formulation, heuristic solution, and application

Responding to true emergencies in the shortest possible time saves lives, prevents permanent injuries and reduces suffering. Most covering models consider an emergency cover if an ambulance is available within a given time or distance threshold. From a modeling perspective, shorter or longer responses within this threshold are all tallied as covered; conversely, the emergencies immediately outside the threshold are considered uncovered. However, if the shorter responses are given more weight along with the volume of such incidents, while still meeting system-wide coverage requirements, both customers and providers can benefit from reduced response times. We formulate a model to determine the locations for a given set of ambulances to minimize the system-wide expected response distances while meeting coverage requirements. We solve the model with a heuristic search algorithm and present computational and comparative statistics using data from an existing Emergency Medical Services agency.     

城市大型超市网点布局研究——以哈尔滨为例

超级市场网点布局问题是超市企业经营决策的主要问题。超级市场作为现代城市中的主要商业零售组织形式,其布局对于政府科学合理的设计城市商业网点的规划与布局也有非常重要意义。本文对哈尔滨超市网点布局的现状采用聚类分析等手段进行研究,提出城市超市网点布局的主要影响因素包括商业区位因素、人口分布因素、交通因素和竞争因素。结合发达国家的经验和相关理论本文认为,在我国城市的经济发展水平和城市化的进程的影响下,我国城市超市网点布局在未来将呈现大超市逐渐退出核心商圈、超市店铺的服务半径逐渐扩展两大趋势。     

Behavioural Economics: A Virginia Political Economy Perspective

Behavioural economics offers a critique of modern neoclassical economics by providing empirical evidence that the model of rational choice does not accurately describe human decision‐making processes. The existence of cognitive biases, what we might term ‘agent failure’, becomes reason to doubt the efficacy of unhampered markets, and is seen by some as a sufficient condition for government intervention. This article offers a critique of this argument from an Austrian and public choice theory comparative institutions perspective. Agent failure arguments are analogous to market failure arguments of the mid‐twentieth century and the same kinds of responses made against the latter are applied to the former. Behavioural economics arguments for intervention ignore the cognitive biases of political actors, neglect the comparative perspective that results from such biases, and do not examine the ways in which markets are superior to politics in providing the information and incentives actors need to become aware of their errors and correct them. The existence of imperfectly rational agents, like the existence of imperfect markets, is therefore not a sufficient condition for government intervention into the market.