Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital Accumulation

This paper analyses the impact of public investment on the dynamics of private capital formation in an intertemporal optimising market-clearing framework. The key feature characterising the analysis is that the public good is treated as a durable capital good, subject to congestion. We show how in the presence of congestion the effect of government investment on private capital formation involves a tradeoff between the degree of substitution between private and public capital in production and the degree of congestion. Both lump-sum and distortionary tax financing are considered, with this tradeoff being tightened in the latter case     

A Markup Interpretation of Optimal Investment Rules

We re-examine the basic investment problem of deciding when to incur a sunk cost to obtain a stochastically fluctuating benefit. The optimal investment rule satisfies a trade-off between a larger versus a later net benefit; we show that this trade-off is closely analogous to the standard trade-off for the pricing decision of a firm that faces a downward sloping demand curve. We reinterpret the optimal investment rule as a markup formula involving an elasticity that has exactly the same form as the formula for a firm's optimal markup of price over marginal cost. This is illustrated with several examples.     

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

Public Investment Rules and Endogenous Growth with Empirical Evidence From Canada

This paper examines theoretically and empirically the effects of public investmentrules on output growth in an economy with private and public capital. It is shownthat the decisions on public capital formation are closely associated with the growthrate of output and generate endogenous growth. A permanent change in the policyrule implies a new long-run growth rate of output, but the economy will onlygradually approach the new steady-state due to adjustment costs in private capitalaccumulation. The model predictions are tested using data from Canada for theperiod 1955-1999. The data support the endogenous growth hypothesis and thetwo central assumptions of the model: (i) the growth rate of output follows closelythe rate of infrastructure formation and (ii) private capital formation also followsthe rate of infrastructure formation but adjusts with a delay.     

Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy affects growth in two respects: first, work time reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modifies knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances labour efficiency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance Expenditure: Optimal Allocation Rules in a Growing Economy

This paper studies the allocation of public expenditure between infrastructure investment and maintenance in an endogenous growth framework. In the basic model, maintenance spending affects both the durability and efficiency of public capital. The balanced growth path is derived and transitional dynamics associated with a revenue-neutral increase in expenditure on maintenance are analyzed. The model is then extended to account for the possibility that public spending on maintenance affects also the durability of private capital. The growth-maximizing tax rate and share of infrastructure investment are calculated in both cases. First- and second-best welfare-maximizing solutions are also discussed.     

FDI的技术外溢性与我国的可持续发展

可持续发展对科技创新提出了更高的要求,实证分析表明FDI为了保持技术上的垄断地位提高了新技术进入的成本,使我国的技术被锁定在了低水平的陷阱中。从产业分布可以看出,FDI对外输出的是高耗能、高污染的生产能力,阻碍了技术外溢。我国可持续发展所依存的技术条件必须通过自我有意识投资的提高来实现;同时,只有贯彻科学的发展观,提高利用FDI的质量和水平,优化其产业布局,才能最终实现发展的可持续性。     

Optimal Management of Environmental Externalities with Time Lags and Uncertainty

Many environmental externalities occur with time lags that can range from a few days to several centuries in length, and many of these externalities are also subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we examine the key features of an optimal policy to manage environmental externalities that are both lagged and stochastic. We develop a two-period, two-polluter model and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal emissions levels under different combinations of damage functions and stochastic processes. These solutions show that it is not obvious whether greater control should be exerted on polluters that generate externalities with longer lags or on polluters that generate externalities with shorter lags. We find that the optimal ranking of polluters with respect to the length of the time lag associated with their externality will depend on (a) the discount rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the polluted resource, (c) persistence of the pollutant, and (d) initial conditions.     

Intergenerational Allocation of Government Expenditures: Externalities and Optimal Taxation

This paper studies optimal capital and labor income taxes when the benefits of public goods are age‐dependent. Provided the government can impose a consumption tax, it can attain the first‐best resource allocation. This involves the uniform taxation of the cohorts' labor income and a zero capital income tax. With no consumption tax and optimally chosen government spending, labor income should be taxed nonuniformly across cohorts and the capital income tax should be nonzero. Deviations of the public goods from their respective optima create distortions. These affect the labor supply decisions of both cohorts and capital accumulation, providing a further reason to tax (or subsidize) capital income.     

国际合作、外部性与全球性公共品融资

全球性公共品存在供给不足,而融资是其中的一个重要环节。从全球性公共品融资的特点与存在的问题、国际合作的视角、外部性观点出发,分析了全球性公共品融资的相关机制,对目前的融资状况作了简要评论。     

Stable Assignment of Public Facilities under Congestion

We study the problem of locating multiple public facilities when each member of society has to be assigned to exactly one of these facilities. Individuals' preferences are assumed to be single‐peaked over the interval of possible locations and negatively affected by congestion. We characterize strategy‐proof, efficient, and stable allocation rules when agents have to be partitioned between two groups of users and discuss the normative content of the stability property. Finally we prove that when more than two groups have to be formed, even with common information on the distribution of the peaks, there is no strategy‐proof, efficient, and stable allocation rule.     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.     

企业研发投资财税激励检验的实证分析

本文基于企业投资行为的理论框架,运用企业R&D投资行为模型分析财税政策对企业研发投资行为的影响机理,同时对我国2000—2009年财政税收激励政策以及大中型工业企业的研发投入情况进行实证检验,目的在于对我国激励企业研发活动财税政策的实施效果进行理论与实证的对比性分析。研究结果表明,我国税收优惠政策和政府采购政策对企业的研发投入有明显的激励效应,此项政策需要继续加强,而我国的财政科技投入政策在规模和方式等方面需要进一步完善。     

Public and Private Hospitals,Congestion, and Redistribution

This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as both an in‐kind and in‐cash redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in productivity and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a noncongested private one at a higher price. With pure in‐kind redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public hospital is higher than optimal. When productivities are not observable but the social planner can assign agents across hospitals, the optimal congestion is higher than in the full information case in order to relax incentive constraints and foster income redistribution. Finally, if agents can freely choose across hospitals, the optimal subsidy on the private hospital price may be negative or positive depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns. In this case, redistribution is limited if the quality of the public facility depends on the number of users.     

效率与公平兼顾的最优所得税:理论框架及最优税率估计

最优所得税主要探讨税收如何兼顾公平与效率问题,以及给定公平偏好程度下,如何确定最优边际税率水平。即使在崇尚罗尔斯社会福利函数的社会里,政府同时兼顾再分配和财政收入目标的基础上,只要略加考虑税收对劳动供给的效应,哪怕是微弱的考虑和兼顾,最高边际税率都不会达到100%。而且,借鉴斯特恩最优线性所得税模型及美国个人所得税制度,估计我国现行个人所得税最高边际税率还可以适当降低到36%左右。     

Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income

In this paper we reconcile and extend previous results on the collectively optimal taxation of international investment income. The “weighted average” rule of Horst (1980), for example, is shown to rest on unattractive assumptions on the set of instruments available, ruling out any need for distorting taxes. The principal contribution is to establish a new and strikingly simple weighted average rule — encompassing the other key result in this area — for the general case in which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, the ability to tax pure profits is perhaps restricted and distorting taxes on both domestic and border-crossing capital income are optimally deployed.     

税收刺激消费和投资的政策选择

税收刺激居民消费要从缓解其预期消费压力入手, 将住房购建费用、医疗费用和教育费用列入个人所得税的费用扣除范围, 并通过税收配合降低预期消费重心的价格, 以解决人们的后顾之忧, 再就是以税收调节高收入者的收入水平, 限制私人财富积聚。税收刺激企业投资主要应建立具有刺激投资机制的税制模式, 将增值税向消费型转型是当前最主要的选择, 同时,用调整投资方向调节税和实施投资性减免税来加以配合。另外, 税收刺激消费和投资效果的实现, 有赖于加强税收征管, 规范税收分配秩序     

Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies

Since Sandmo (1981) , many articles have analyzed optimal fiscal policies in economies with tax evasion. All share a feature: they assume that the cost of enforcing the tax law is exogenous. However, governments often invest resources to reduce these enforcement costs. In a very simple model, we incorporate such investments in the analysis of an optimal fiscal policy. We characterize their optimal level and we show numerically how they interact with the other dimensions of the optimal fiscal policy. Finally, we highlight the differences between our results and those obtained in a model without investment in the tax administration.