Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital Accumulation

This paper analyses the impact of public investment on the dynamics of private capital formation in an intertemporal optimising market-clearing framework. The key feature characterising the analysis is that the public good is treated as a durable capital good, subject to congestion. We show how in the presence of congestion the effect of government investment on private capital formation involves a tradeoff between the degree of substitution between private and public capital in production and the degree of congestion. Both lump-sum and distortionary tax financing are considered, with this tradeoff being tightened in the latter case     

A Markup Interpretation of Optimal Investment Rules

We re-examine the basic investment problem of deciding when to incur a sunk cost to obtain a stochastically fluctuating benefit. The optimal investment rule satisfies a trade-off between a larger versus a later net benefit; we show that this trade-off is closely analogous to the standard trade-off for the pricing decision of a firm that faces a downward sloping demand curve. We reinterpret the optimal investment rule as a markup formula involving an elasticity that has exactly the same form as the formula for a firm's optimal markup of price over marginal cost. This is illustrated with several examples.     

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.     

Tax Competition,Investment Irreversibility and the Provision of Public Goods

This article studies the effects of tax competition on the provision of public goods under business risk and partial irreversibility of investment. As will be shown, the provision of public goods changes over time and also depends on the business cycle. In particular, under source‐based taxation, in the short term, public goods can be optimally provided during a downturn. The converse is true during a recovery: in this case, they are underprovided. In the long term, however, tax competition does not affect capital accumulation. This means that the provision of public goods is unaffected by taxation.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy affects growth in two respects: first, work time reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modifies knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances labour efficiency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Public Investment Rules and Endogenous Growth with Empirical Evidence From Canada

This paper examines theoretically and empirically the effects of public investmentrules on output growth in an economy with private and public capital. It is shownthat the decisions on public capital formation are closely associated with the growthrate of output and generate endogenous growth. A permanent change in the policyrule implies a new long-run growth rate of output, but the economy will onlygradually approach the new steady-state due to adjustment costs in private capitalaccumulation. The model predictions are tested using data from Canada for theperiod 1955-1999. The data support the endogenous growth hypothesis and thetwo central assumptions of the model: (i) the growth rate of output follows closelythe rate of infrastructure formation and (ii) private capital formation also followsthe rate of infrastructure formation but adjusts with a delay.     

Congestion and Optimal Immigration Policy

This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large.     

Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance Expenditure: Optimal Allocation Rules in a Growing Economy

This paper studies the allocation of public expenditure between infrastructure investment and maintenance in an endogenous growth framework. In the basic model, maintenance spending affects both the durability and efficiency of public capital. The balanced growth path is derived and transitional dynamics associated with a revenue-neutral increase in expenditure on maintenance are analyzed. The model is then extended to account for the possibility that public spending on maintenance affects also the durability of private capital. The growth-maximizing tax rate and share of infrastructure investment are calculated in both cases. First- and second-best welfare-maximizing solutions are also discussed.     

FDI的技术外溢性与我国的可持续发展

可持续发展对科技创新提出了更高的要求,实证分析表明FDI为了保持技术上的垄断地位提高了新技术进入的成本,使我国的技术被锁定在了低水平的陷阱中。从产业分布可以看出,FDI对外输出的是高耗能、高污染的生产能力,阻碍了技术外溢。我国可持续发展所依存的技术条件必须通过自我有意识投资的提高来实现;同时,只有贯彻科学的发展观,提高利用FDI的质量和水平,优化其产业布局,才能最终实现发展的可持续性。     

Intergenerational Allocation of Government Expenditures: Externalities and Optimal Taxation

This paper studies optimal capital and labor income taxes when the benefits of public goods are age‐dependent. Provided the government can impose a consumption tax, it can attain the first‐best resource allocation. This involves the uniform taxation of the cohorts' labor income and a zero capital income tax. With no consumption tax and optimally chosen government spending, labor income should be taxed nonuniformly across cohorts and the capital income tax should be nonzero. Deviations of the public goods from their respective optima create distortions. These affect the labor supply decisions of both cohorts and capital accumulation, providing a further reason to tax (or subsidize) capital income.     

Optimal Management of Environmental Externalities with Time Lags and Uncertainty

Many environmental externalities occur with time lags that can range from a few days to several centuries in length, and many of these externalities are also subject to uncertainty. In this paper, we examine the key features of an optimal policy to manage environmental externalities that are both lagged and stochastic. We develop a two-period, two-polluter model and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal emissions levels under different combinations of damage functions and stochastic processes. These solutions show that it is not obvious whether greater control should be exerted on polluters that generate externalities with longer lags or on polluters that generate externalities with shorter lags. We find that the optimal ranking of polluters with respect to the length of the time lag associated with their externality will depend on (a) the discount rate, (b) conditional expectations of future states of the polluted resource, (c) persistence of the pollutant, and (d) initial conditions.     

国际合作、外部性与全球性公共品融资

全球性公共品存在供给不足,而融资是其中的一个重要环节。从全球性公共品融资的特点与存在的问题、国际合作的视角、外部性观点出发,分析了全球性公共品融资的相关机制,对目前的融资状况作了简要评论。     

Optimal Regulation of Private Production Contracts with Environmental Externalities

We address the problem of optimal regulation of an industry where the production of a polluting output is contracted with independent agents. The provision of inputs is divided between the principal and the agent such that the production externality results from their joint actions. The main result shows that in the three-tier hierarchy (regulator-firm-agent) involving a double-sided moral hazard, the equivalence across regulatory schemes generally obtains. The only task for the regulator is to determine the optimal total fiscal revenue in each state of nature because any sharing of the regulatory burden between the firm and the agent generates the same solution. The equivalence principle is upset only when the effects of regulation on the endogenous organizational choices are explicitly taken into account.JEL Classification: D82, H23, Q50We thank Bob Chambers, Emma Hutchinson, David Martimort and Katleen Segerson as well as the participants of the 2nd World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Monterey, 2002; the 2nd Annual Workshop on the Economics of Contracts in Agriculture, Annapolis, 2002; and the 1st CIRANO-IDEI-LEERNA conference on Regulation, Liability and the Management of Major Industrial Environmental Risks in Toulouse, 2003 for their comments on previous versions of the paper. Support from the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development is gratefully acknowledged.     

Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be suboptimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade‐off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.     

社会保障税、投资动机与海外投资

在中国国外投资流入量增速放缓的背景下,如何应对劳动力成本的快速增长造成的东道国优势下降是亟待研究的问题.本文使用134个国家2008—2018年11年的面板数据,采用双向固定效应模型,实证考察了企业社会保障税对海外直接投资的影响.研究结果表明,企业社会保障税率对外国直接投资产生负向影响;企业社会保障税对外国直接投资的负向影响受投资动机的调节作用影响,在生产要素获取动机、非自然资源获取动机与非技术获取动机国家样本中更为显著;企业社会保障税对外国直接投资的负向影响存在经济体和地域差异,在G20国家、亚洲、美洲及非洲国家样本中更为显著.基于实证研究结果,本文提出了基于企业社会保障税率的促进中国海外投资流入的相关政策建议.     

A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty

In this paper we use a real option model for assessing uncertain investment projects and we show that—due to a flexibility premium—taxes asymmetrically affect the option value of projects that differ in their riskiness. Hence, this may generate distortions. We analytically identify a set of neutral tax rates (a tax regime) that preserve the post‐tax investment threshold if taxes change, and determine normal and paradoxical settings for investments. Unlike other tax paradoxes neither depreciation rules nor loss offset restrictions cause these paradoxical reactions. Taxes affect each project individually, depending on the project risks involved. This implies that, for a variety of uncertain projects, taxes cannot be neutral on aggregate.