高管薪酬与公司业绩的关系

公司高级管理层的薪酬问题越来越受到社会的普遍关注。高管薪酬问题是由于控制权和所有权的分离而产生的。高管的薪酬进而又产生了代理成本问题。本文研究的目的是分析高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系。经研究发现:高管薪酬与公司业绩之间存在显著正相关。     

内部控制缺陷与公司业绩

基于公司业绩角度,分析内部控制对公司业绩的影响机制,并利用2012-2015年A股上市企业的经验数据进行实证检验.研究发现:相较于内部控制健全的公司,存在内部控制缺陷的公司业绩较差;且内部控制缺陷程度对公司业绩有显著影响,内部控制缺陷越严重的公司业绩越差.     

高管集权、内部控制与会计信息质量

伴随我国金融市场的发展,国家内部的资本市场也在不断的发展,会计信息在整个金融经济中所处地位越来越重要,其中高管集权也不得不正面对,而内部控制作为一种常规制度以及手段,对整个企业内部的会计信息的质量具有非常重要的影响,实现有效的内部控制,不仅可以提高企业收益,而且还会提会计信息的质量,但是相反方面,如果企业内部缺乏相应的内部控制制度,就会对整个会计信息质量造成负面影响,甚至导致会计信息出现漏洞。因此合理有效的调整高管集权、内部控制以及会计信息质量三者之间的关系,可以有效的推动我国企业发展,促进国家经济向不断的朝向良性轨迹发展。     

内部控制和政府审计对高管隐性腐败的联合影响

在新时代背景下,腐败的形成原因和影响因素也变得更加复杂化,目前的文献研究主要聚焦于单一要素对高管隐性腐败的影响,忽略了多种作用机制之间的相互关系,无法应对复杂、隐蔽的高管隐性腐败。通过分组检验,分析内部控制和政府审计在抑制高管隐性腐败上的联合影响,探究内部控制和政府审计是否存在相互促进或相互替代的关系。研究发现,内部控制和政府审计在抑制高管隐性腐败上存在互补关系,当企业内部控制质量较好时,加大政府审计力度可以更好地抑制高层隐性腐败。进一步研究发现,内部控制和政府审计在抑制高管隐性腐败上存在的互补关系并不是源于中介效应,即政府审计对高管隐性腐败的影响不是通过影响内部控制实现的。     

高管变更、产权性质与内部控制缺陷

文章选取2012—2016年全部A股上市公司作为研究样本,从公司治理的角度,运用公开数据实证检验了高管变更与内部控制缺陷披露间的相关关系.研究结果显示:高管非正常变更能够传递公司存在内部控制缺陷的信号.进一步区分企业产权性质发现,高管非正常变更与内控缺陷披露的正相关关系,在非国企中得到加强.研究结论为探究高管变更事件背后的深层动因提供实证支持,进而对规范高管变更的相关信息披露机制进行补充和拓展.     

控股股东利益侵占、信息不对称与高管更换

本文从高管更换视角考察控股股东侵占上市公司利益的行为是否以及如何影响其高管激励效率。我们检验发现:(1)控股股东利益侵占会降低公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性。(2)当信息不对称程度较高时,公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性受控股股东利益侵占的负向影响更大。(3)当市场化程度较高时,控股股东利益侵占对公司高管更换效率的损害更小。这些实证结果表明,控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突会损害高管激励效率,并且在信息不对称程度较高时更为严重,但市场化程度的提高可以在一定程度上抑制这种负面影响。     

高管薪酬与公司业绩关系实证研究——基于我国中小企业板的实证研究

本文以583家中小企业板上市公司2007-2010年间的数据为样本,讨论并检验了高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的相关性。研究结果表明:无论最终控制人是国有法人还是非国有法人,中国中小企业上市公司的高管薪酬与公司业绩、公司规模之间都存在着显著的正相关关系;无论是国有控股还是非国有控股,高管持股比例均与高管薪酬显著正相关;在国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度正相关,在非国有股控股的中小企业中,高管薪酬与股权集中度负相关;在国有控股的中小企业板上市公司中,公司的成长性与高管薪酬同步变化,而非国有控股的中小企业板上市公司的成长性与高管薪酬负相关。     

第一大股东性质、控制模式与公司业绩

本文以上海证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象，以第一大股东在股东会和董事会两个层面的控制权组合界定为控制模式，考察在各种控制模式下，第一大股东为政府和自然人的上市公司业绩差异。研究结果表明，对于第一大股东超强控制和完全竞争的控制模式，政府和自然人性质的上市公司业绩不存在差异；在第一大股东高股权低控制模式下，政府性质的上市公司业绩优于自然人性质的上市公司；而在第一大股东低股权高控制模式下，自然人性质的上市公司业绩优于政府性质的上市公司。     

内部控制与高管激励相关性研究的文献综述

内部控制制度在现代公司治理中发挥的重要作用,影响着高管激励机制的选择,最终影响到激励的效用。目前关于内部控制对高管激励的效用问题还没有形成完整、一致的研究结论,因此有必要梳理回顾有关文献。本文从薪酬激励、薪酬粘性、内部控制缺陷等方面入手分析了内部控制与高管激励研究概况以及针对二者关系的已有研究,并据此提出以后的研究方向。     

Corporate Performance,Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover in Finland

This paper empirically investigates how corporate governance forces and firm performance affect top executive turnover in Finnish listed companies. I document an increase in CEO, top management, and board turnover in response to poor stock price performance and operating losses. The sensitivity of the relation between stock price performance and CEO turnover is significantly higher in firms with a two‐tier board structure (when the CEO is not the chairman), but significantly lower when the CEO or a board member is the controlling shareholder. These results suggest that both the ownership structure and the board design have implications for the disciplining of managers.     

补助初衷与配置效率

基于异质性视角,本文在界定政府补助初衷的基础上,系统地考察了不同补助初衷下政府补助资源的配置效率问题。研究发现,相对于初衷明确的政府补助,初衷不明确的政府补助效率较低,对公司业绩的负面影响较大。这说明,政府补助资源的配置效率受制于补助初衷,政府补助初衷越明确,资源配置效率越高。而且,这一影响因产权性质不同而存在差异,相对于非国有企业,初衷不明确的政府补助在国有企业中的配置效率更低。政府质量则增强了政府补助初衷的明确性,提高了政府补助资源的配置效率。进一步研究发现,初衷不明确的政府补助增加了企业的无效率投资和寻租成本,从而降低了资源配置效率。本文为理解政府补助资源的配置效率提供了新视角,研究结论对于政府如何提高资源配置具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

Repricing and Executive Turnover

We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.     

The Effects of Executive,Firm, and Board Characteristics on Executive Exit

We estimate a hazard model of the probability of top corporate executives exiting their firms over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are that: (1) female executives have greater likelihoods of exit than males, (2) the likelihood of exit increases with the independence of the board and decreases with the fraction of the board that is female and the average age of board members, and (3) a higher percentage of independent directors on the board lowers the probability of exit more for females than for males. Further, controlling for exit risk reduces the well‐documented compensation differential between men and women.     

International Cross-Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis

We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross-listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross-listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non-cross-listed firms. Cross-listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs.     

Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms

The results of this paper reveal a significantly negative relationship between the equity stake owned by a senior executive and the likelihood that this executive will be removed from office. We also establish the existence of a strong positive relationship between poor company performance and the likelihood that the top managers responsible will be forced out of their firms; this forced departure only tends to occur when the managers' stake in the firm is less than 1%; as the level of ownership rises, managers become increasingly entrenched in their posts. The stock market reaction to management change is greatest (a) when the departure is unexpected and (b) when the dismissed executive owns more than 5% of the equity of his company. This study also examines the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and board composition upon the likelihood of a top executive dismissal.     

The Executive Turnover Risk Premium

We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, accounting for various other factors, industry risk is unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification strategy, we document that CEO turnover risk is significantly positively associated with compensation. This finding is important because job‐risk‐compensating wage differentials arise naturally in competitive labor markets. By contrast, the evidence rejects an entrenchment model according to which powerful CEOs have lower job risk and at the same time secure higher compensation.     

企业业绩组合业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择--管理层信息披露的组合动机与信息操作

本文主要考察企业业绩组合、业绩差异与季报披露的时间选择之间的关系以及季报披露时间的信息内涵。实证研究显示,上年年报和一季度季报均为“好消息”,一季度每股收益、净资产收益率和主营业务利润率高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔大;上年年报为“好消息”而一季度季报为“坏消息”,上年年报为“坏消息”而一季度季报为“好消息”,上年年报和一季度季报均为“坏消息”,一季度每股收益比上年度高的上市公司季报披露时间间隔小。这可能是由于一季度季报和上年年报均要求在4月30日之前披露的特殊性,上市公司管理层在信息披露的过程中可能存在组合动机与信息操作行为,一季度季报披露的时间选择可能关键取决于上年年报和一季度季报披露的“好消息”或“坏消息”带来的积极影响或消极影响的组合与权衡。