公允价值变动列报的市场反应——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

在新会计准则下,上市公司金融资产公允价值的变动需要在不同的位置列报,本文考察了这一改革的市场反应。经验研究表明,金融资产公允价值变动是否进入损益以及不同列报位置,会带来不同的市场反应:市场对于同时在资本公积和利润表下"其他综合收益"中列报的公允价值变动反应充分,而对于仅列入资本公积的情形则反应不足,对仅计入利润表的情形则会过度反应。本文结论验证了利润表引入综合收益列报的重要性,并为"功能锁定"假说提供了进一步的经验证据。     

公允价值变动损益的性质及其后果——来自股票报酬和高管薪酬视角的重新发现

基于财务会计数据生成逻辑,本文首先讨论了利润表"公允价值变动损益"项目的确认及其"转回"特征,并以此为基础构造变量,重新检验了"交易性金融资产、交易性金融负债及公允价值变动直接计入当期损益的其他金融资产或金融负债"产生的损益信息对股票报酬和高管薪酬契约的影响,避免了直接利用利润表的"公允价值变动损益"信息检验造成的错误解释公允价值涨跌信息价值的后果。我们提供的证据并不支持以前的研究发现。总体上,这类项目的公允价值信息对股票年度报酬及高管薪酬总额都没有显著影响。这一新的发现与公允价值会计的实施对我国非金融行业上市公司财务报表影响较小的事实一致。该研究重申了会计信息生成过程对设计研究变量的重要性。     

完善可供出售金融资产计量政策披露的建议——上市公司运用公允价值探析

<正>上市公司为提高资金使用效率、促进战略目标实现,持有金融资产是一比较普遍现象。金融资产的重要内容是可供出售金融资产,按新准则要求,资产负债表日,可供出售金融资产以公允价值计量且公允价值变动计入资本公积(其他资本公积)。显然,公允价值计量政策将对企业净资产和股价有较大影响。而公允价值取得途径广泛性及计量技术多样性使取得公     

浅议公允价值在新准则中的运用

一、公允价值在《金融工具确认和计量》准则中的运用在《金融工具确认和计量》准则中,交易性金融资产应当按公允价值计量,公允价值变动形成的利得或损失,应当计入当期损益;可供出售金融资产应当按公允价值计量,公允价值变动形成的利得或损失,应当直接计入资本公积,直至该金融资产终止确认时再确认损益。交易性金融资产的初始交易费用直接计入当期损益,而持有期间公允价值的变动计入"公允价值变动损益",期末处置时计入"投资收益",所有的这些都体     

公允价值计量与管理层薪酬契约

本文以2007、2008年持有公允价值变动损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析了公允价值收益、公允价值损失与管理层薪酬之间的敏感系数。研究结果表明,A股上市公司存在着对公允价值变动损益的"重奖轻罚"现象。"重奖轻罚"现象表明我国上市公司激励有效而约束乏力的薪酬不对称特征也存在于盈余分项目层面,这将会助长管理层的机会主义行为,放大企业风险。本文还发现,公允价值"持有收益"并不必然增加股东财富,委托人不能辨别新增财富的可实现性与现实性的差异,也不能辨别市场优势地位与管理层努力程度对业绩的影响,常见的公司治理机制在该问题上并没有发挥应有的控制作用,表明中国的公司治理机制仍有待完善。     

金融业务会计准则对银行的影响分析

一、银行会计业务的主要改变(一)按持有意图或能力对金融资产和金融负债进行分类,并采用不同的计量属性。CAS22金融工具确认和计量根据企业持有意图或能力,将金融资产分为四类,金融负债分为两类,改变了《金融企业会计制度》(2001年)按流动性对金融企业资产和负债分类的方式。首先是金融资产分为四类。第一类是以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产,包括交易性金融资产和指定以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产,该类金融资产应以公允价值进行后续计量,公允价值变动计入当期损益。第二类是持有到期投资,该类金融资产应…     

公允价值计量与企业价值的相关性研究

本文选择A股市场上的金融类上市公司为研究对象,检验以公允价值计量的金融资产与金融负债与企业价值的相关性,研究表明,公允价值变动损益与企业价值之间相关性不显著,公允价值计量通过资本公积(其他资本公积)影响企业资产负债表进而影响企业价值且呈正相关关系,公允价值计量是顺应经济社会发展的要求而诞生和应用的,其与企业价值的相关性也得到了证实,能够提供更多相关的决策信息。     

新金融工具准则下金融资产公允价值计量探析

在新的金融工具准则中,要求按照公允价值计量的金融资产主要包括以摊余成本计量的金融资产、以公允价值计量且其变动计入其他综合收益的金融资产、以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产。本文重点针对以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产公允价值计量存在的问题进行具体分析,同时提出与之相对应的建设性意见。     

新金融工具会计准则对我国银行业金融机构损益的影响分析

<正>一、新会计准则对银行业金融机构损益的影响(一)金融资产、负债重分类带来的影响资产负债分类的不同及分类的变更直接影响损益的计算。比如对于持有至到期投资,应以摊余成本计算,一旦该分类资产部分出售或重分类的金额较大,剩余部分重分类为可供出售金融资产,以重分类日的公允价值结转,剩余部分的摊余成本与其公允价值之间的差额,需计入资本公积,直至该可供出售金融资产终止确认或发生减值时转出才能计入当期损益。     

公允价值计量下金融资产的递延所得税会计处理

以公允价值计量的金融资产包括交易性金融资产和可供出售金融资产,笔者从会计准则出发,通过举例法、对比分析法、归纳法等方法,得出了在资产负债表日,交易性金融资产的公允价值变动产生暂时性差异,计入当期应纳税所得额;可供出售金融资产的公允价值变动产生暂时性差异,但不计入当期应纳所得税额,也不影响当期所得税费用,递延所得税仅影响所有者权益等结论.     

Profits and losses from changes in fair value,executive cash compensation and managerial power: Evidence from A-share listed companies in China

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value (CFV) and levels of executive compensation. In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value (PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value (LCFV). Furthermore, we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.     

Recognition versus Disclosure of Stock Option Compensation: An Analysis of Judgements and Decisions of Nonprofessional Investors*/CONSTATER OU PRÉSENTER PAR VOIE DE NOTE LA RÉMUNÉRATION SOUS FORME D'OPTIONS D'ACHAT D'ACTIONS: UNE ANALYSE DES JUGEMENTS ET DES DÉCISIONS DES INVESTISSEURS NON PROFESSIONNELS

Given the importance of stock options in the aggregate compensation of chief executive officers and other firm employees in the 1990s and early 2000s, the International Accounting Standards Board issued an International Financial Reporting Standard on stock‐based payments on February 19, 2004, requiring that all share‐based payment transactions be recognized at fair value in entities' financial statements. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board had already agreed to this principle and amended section 3870 of the CICA Handbook (stock‐based compensation) for financial periods beginning on or after January 1, 2004, making Canada the first major jurisdiction to require all public companies to expense employee stock‐based compensation awards. The revised section eliminated the possibility of disclosing pro forma net income and earnings per share only by way of a note. This research, conducted as a between‐subjects experiment with executive MBA students as nonprofessional investors, examines whether changes in the way stock option compensation is reported (recognition as an expense in the income statement or note disclosure of pro forma net income and earnings per share) affect financial statement users' judgements and investment decisions. Our results indicate that, consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, the reporting method does indeed significantly influence subjects' judgement of the expected stock price direction, but has no material influence on their investment decisions.     

Executive compensation and corporate risk management

We provide the first evidence on the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management for insurers. Our unique data set allows the construction of a new, more complete measure of corporate risk management behavior. Specifically, we include hedging-driven usage of not only derivatives but also insurance. To address potential endogeneity, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach, based on the implementation of FAS 123R that required firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. We find that the decline in the convexity of executive compensation following FAS 123R led firms to significantly increase corporate risk management, primarily through increased demand for insurance.     

What is a fair amount of executive compensation? Outrage potential of two key stakeholder groups

The public discussion of executive compensation often centres on ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ amounts and the public outrage over compensation that is deemed too high. The academic literature states that such outrage can lead to outrage costs, pressuring firms to adjust compensation levels. However, it is unclear what a ‘fair’ compensation is for various stakeholders and how their fairness concerns relate to outrage constraints. Based on surveys among two key stakeholder groups (representative eligible voters and investment professionals), we provide evidence that fairness is an important criterion for both groups but that opinions on how large a fair compensation amount should be are widely dispersed. Moreover, personality traits systematically influence fairness opinions through self‐serving interpretations of distributive justice and personal risk attitudes, indicating that a ‘fair’ amount of executive compensation may strongly depend on the involved stakeholders. Investigating thresholds for outrage, i.e., amounts above which compensation is judged ‘unfairly’ high, we show that even though investment professionals care for fairness as well, ‘capital market outrage’ might not equate to ‘public outrage’. Our paper contributes to the literature on outrage constraints by linking individual fairness concerns to outrage potential and has implications for transparency of executive compensation and research on shareholder activism.     

Executive ownership,corporate value,and executive compensation: A unifying framework

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the firm, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation. Overall, the results of the study support the notion that a firm's market value, executive stock ownership, and executive compensation are jointly determined. Further, the findings suggest that executive stock ownership and executive compensation may serve as a type of bond by which top executives are induced to act in the best interests of shareholders. The study also finds that a firm's q ratio and an executive's job-specific experience (as well as firm size) are important determinants of executive compensation. This result is generally consistent with the view that the firm optimally establishes its managerial compensation plan in response to both its operating environment and the specific personal characteristics of its chief executive(s).     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

IRC Section 162(m) and the law of unintended consequences

In 1993, Section 162(m) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code was passed into law with the intent to reign in outsized executive compensation by eliminating the tax-deductibility of executive compensation above $1 million unless the excess compensation was performance-based. An unintended consequence of the legislation was that executives' total compensation actually increased in the post-1993 period, largely due to a dramatic increase in employee stock options. Employee stock options have unintended consequences of their own. The economic value of stock options may be influenced by executive decision-making when the options are valued using the Black-Scholes model or some variant thereof. Our findings suggests an unintended consequence that executives used their discretion to positively impact the performance-based component of their compensation through actions increasing share price volatility and reducing dividend yields, assumptions implicit in option valuation models.     

Companies' Modest Claims About the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula. Theoretical support for these adjustments is often thin, and companies universally ignore reasons that the Black-Scholes formula might underestimate the value of executive stock options. The findings not only cast light upon how corporations value executive stock options, but also provide a means of forecasting compliance with controversial new FASB requirements for firms to disclose the compensation expense represented by executive stock options.     

A perspective on regulatory paradigms: The case of IRS and Sarbanes-Oxley approaches to executive compensation-related regulation

In this paper we explore two regulatory paradigms, with an emphasis on the regulation of executive compensation. An example of the traditional rule-based paradigm is Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) in which a tax-deductible cap was passed into law to limit executive compensation. We demonstrate that this approach yielded mixed results. While stronger pay/performance sensitivity has been documented, Section 162(m) appears to have actually exacerbated the level of executive compensation. We contrast the rules-based paradigm with an alternative paradigm illustrated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in which the US Congress introduced a series of corporate governance initiatives into federal securities law. The transformation of the mode of regulatory intervention as reflected by SOX is shown to be fully consistent with recent changes in the generally accepted conceptual framework for financial reporting.     

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.