完全信息下供应链数量折扣设计

文章讨论了供应链数量折扣存在的可能性和必要性,并表明:供应链各方的独立决策不是最优决策,联合决策可以提高系统的利润、降低交易成本,数量折扣是能够实现联合决策的一种有效供应链契约。     

Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations

It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization.     

Third Parties and Contract Design: The Case of Contracts for Technology Transfer

Given the challenges associated with drafting technology‐transfer contracts, we examine decisions to involve third parties offering technical or legal support in the contract‐drafting process. We first argue that the attributes of the transaction are key drivers of third‐party involvement. We then draw on the behavioral theory of the firm to develop arguments regarding the influence of third parties on contract complexity. Our results reveal that the involvement of legal third parties tends to magnify the contract's overall complexity. In contrast, the involvement of technical third parties reduces the inclusion of monitoring provisions and increases the inclusion of coordination provisions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate

A production process involves a principal and two privately informed agents. Production requires coordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the performance of different organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (resp. control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (resp. most) important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a tradeoff between centralization and delegation.     

公路工程建筑合同管理的风险防范策略探究

公路工程建筑合同是工程施工的双方在进行工程施工前拟定的,指明双方各自需要遵循的义务和享有的权利的书面文件,对公路工程建筑合同的管理尤为重要。论文阐述了工程建筑合同管理的重要意义,分析了目前企业管理合同时存在的问题,及其可能导致的工程风险,最后对如何避免这些问题,从而预防风险的发生提出了一系列的建议。     

Risk Preferences and Asset Ownership: Integrating Prospect Theory and Transaction Cost Economics

We integrate prospect theory into the discussion of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to illustrate how risk aversion may affect integration decisions. In particular, we argue that risk aversion creates incentives to acquire assets in situations where neither opportunism nor transaction‐specific investments are present, provided the assets in question can change in value unpredictably during their use. Our theory illustrates that risk aversion could connect opportunism, asset specificity, and uncertainty with integration decisions in the presence of incomplete contracts. Our theory complements and extends TCE by showing the role of risk aversion in integration decisions under bounded rationality and contract incompleteness. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Contracts for Long-Term Decisions and the Threat of Dismissal

This paper studies a simple agency model where an agent's decision can affect his or her own future payoffs as well as the principal's. The threat of dismissal becomes an important part of an incentive scheme even if the principal can use the performance-based wage contract. However, if the agent's future payoffs depend on the past realized performance, but not on the past decision directly, or if the agent is risk-neutral, it is not optimal to use the threat of dismissal. As the agent's discretion over his future payoffs increases, the principal relies more on the threat of dismissal but less on the wage contract.     

Debt renegotiation under reputation concerns and tolerance for failure

We propose a career concern model where a privately informed entrepreneur reports the firm financial situation. On this basis, the creditor may offer debt renegotiation. Due to reputation concerns, the entrepreneur may feel reluctant to restructure and may manipulate information. We analyze how creditor attitude towards failure and entrepreneurs reputation concerns interact and influence the restructuring decision. We show that debt renegotiation under more lenient conditions discourages manipulation because entrepreneurs are ensured that their reputation will not suffer from revealing financial difficulties. Intolerant creditors make entrepreneurs more concerned about reputation weakening their incentives to restructure, leading to inefficient continuation of investments.     

THE USE OF CONTRACT BY GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENTS

Given that the provision of a service is being controlled by the state, the decision whether to contract out that service provision to the private sector is essentially a business decision. A number of economic advantages and disadvantages need to be offset against each other. Governments are poorly placed to make such decisions and it is no surprise that PPPs are often inefficient and steered by political objectives.     

Contract stability in European road infrastructure PPPs: how does governmental PPP support contribute to preventing contract renegotiation?

In the last decade a considerable number of PPP contracts in Europe turned out to be instable and were renegotiated. This paper studies which combinations of conditions in terms of macro-level business environment and governmental PPP support and at project-level (remuneration scheme, risk allocation, project age and contract duration) contribute to avoid contract renegotiation, by conducting a qualitative comparative analysis of twenty five European road infrastructure projects. Results show that although the broader macro-level business environment has a clear contribution, contract stability can benefit from an availability-based remuneration scheme and a well-developed governmental PPP support in combination with other conditions.     

Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem

Abstract.  This paper surveys the literature on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem which has addressed the issue of how to design the optimal contractual arrangement to achieve efficient investments in the presence of contract incompleteness. Although scholars have argued that renegotiation design is a necessary condition to avoid the hold-up problem, some recent papers have seriously questioned this condition. We mainly show that renegotiation design remains a necessary condition to implement efficient investments.     

Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model

Risk‐neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk‐neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes relatively more likely to arise from desirable than from undesirable actions. The resulting decisions may be less, rather than more, risky. Making a decision after acquiring information provides an additional reason to those in the classic principal‐agent literature for using contracts with pay increasing in the return. Further results on the form of contracts are also derived.     

城市基础设施项目市场化融资研究——基于专用性投资不足的视角

在我国基础设施项目市场化融资中,由于地方政府与民间资本之间签订的特许经营协议为不完全合同,导致双方均倾向于专用性投资不足。为了实现城市基础设施市场化融资的健康发展,本文利用"拿住"理论,对专用性投资不足进行分析,并从完善政府监管体制、加强特许经营协议管理等方面提出解决专用性投资不足的对策。     

国家建设项目审计决定与承包合同的法律效力及其协调

审计决定、承包合同各自具有公法、私法属性,在各自范围内发生法律效力。协调合同和审计决定法律效力的明智之举是：审减合同确定的价款须征得承建单位的书面认可,证明合同无效。但治本之策则是完善立法,找到合法行使公权力和依法保护私权利的平衡点。     

Two-period supply chain coordination strategies with ambidextrous sustainable innovations

This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a two-period game setting. We design a two-period game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and two-part tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed two-part tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the two-period contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decision-makers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures.     

The tests of just cause: What price predictability in arbitral decision making?

The common law of just cause consists of the accumulated decisions of the arbitration profession rendered on the basis of commonly accepted principles of right and wrong. It constitutes the rules of the arbitration game pertaining to just cause, and, as such, guides decision making in disciplinary dispute resolution. Presumably it brings predictability to this aspect of arbitral decision making much as the principles of contract law bring predictability to nondisciplinary contract construction disputes. The best known component of this body of law is the checklist of seven tests devised by Carrol R. Daugherty. This article examines this element of common law, its origins, and whether it does, in fact, bring grater predictability to the disciplinary phase of arbitral decision making and, if so, at what cost. Besides questioning the degree of predictability achieved by Daugherty's tests, the paper cautions that greater predictability may only be possible at an unacceptably high cost: the sacrifice of those characteristics that make arbitration the preferred dispute resolution technique.     

浅谈投标阶段的合同管理

合同作为项目实施双方的最高法律,一经签订双方均受约束,项目实施过程中出现的任何问题将按照合同有关规定进行解决。作为承包商应该重视招投标阶段的合同管理工作,对合同进行有效的管理,以保证合同质量,争取对承包商执行项目有利的合同条件。结合笔者在招投标阶段对招标文件及合同条件的审查工作,文章概述了承包商在招投标阶段招标文件及合同条件的审查要点和注意事项。     

Flexibility in Strategic Decision Making: Informational and Ideological Perspectives

Adaptation is a crucial challenge for organizations, and an important theme in the strategy and organization theory literature. We still have much to learn, however, about the strategic processes by which adaptation is achieved. In this paper we focus on a basic element in the adaptation process, i.e. flexibility within the strategic decision-making process. We concentrate on strategic decisions because these choices are the most important adaptations the firm makes. We suggest that the core of all organizational adaptation is a decision-making process. Unless the decision-making process itself is flexible, it is unlikely the organization can be flexible enough to adapt. We derive hypotheses concerning the factors that lead to flexibility (versus rigidity) from both information processing and ideological perspectives, and test them in a study involving 57 strategic decisions in 25 companies. Our results identify three contextual factors related to both perspectives -- including competitive threat, slack and uncertainty -- that are helpful in understanding flexibility in strategy decision making. While managers appear to be more flexible when decisions are uncertain, we found that in the very conditions where managers need the most flexibility (high competitive threat and low slack), they are least likely to be flexible.     

The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

This paper studies the impact of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in international transfers of technology. Analyzing a sample of contracts written by Spanish firms in 1991, the main empirical finding is a positive relationship between contract duration and the probability of the parties including variable payments in the first period of the agreement. This result suggests that the parties choose the type of payments to be made, whether fixed or variable, so as to avoid early termination of the relationship, even in the absence of opportunistic behavior or risk aversion.     

论未足额出资股权转让中的责任归属——兼评司法解释的相关规定

未足额出资股权转让中责任归属的判断基础为转让合同效力的认定,而转让合同效力认定应遵循民法中的合同效力规则。转让合同确认有效或因未撤销、被追认而有效时,应由受让股东单独承担对公司的补缴责任和对公司债权人的赔偿责任;转让合同确认无效或因被撤销、未追认而归于无效时,对公司的补缴责任除恶意串通情形下由合同双方当事人承担外,一般应由出让股东承担,但对债权人的赔偿责任则应由合同双方当事人承担。