Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Has a quarter-trillion-dollar settlement helped the tobacco industry?

This paper builds on a growing body of literature analyzing the economic effects of the so-called Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the “big four” tobacco companies and the State Attorneys General. Because the marginal cost imposed by the settlement is a function of the market sales of the original four participants, subsequent participating firms will most likely be at a disadvantage. Consistent with increased market power for the original signers, the data since the settlement show increased price overshifting of taxes. Additionally, price undershifting is shown to have occurred prior to the MSA, which would be a rational response of a firm facing a settlement that imposes marginal costs inversely related to sales volume at the time of the agreement. These results suggest that efficiency evaluations may overstate the social benefits of the agreement and the persistent profitability of the industry may be due to the MSA.     

Pricing Internal Trade to Get a Leg up on External Rivals

The pricing of transfers from parent to subsidiary is an oft-explored issue. Linking the cost of internal transfers with external market prices is one common approach, typically justified when the market for the good is perfectly competitive. This paper shows that imperfect competition may also justify market-based transfer prices. Concern that transfer price will deviate from marginal cost and thereby distort subsidiary choices can lead a parent to undertake actions to influence the market price of the upstream good. Such efforts can provide a desirable strategic posture in the upstream market.     

The dynamic annihilation of a rational competitive fringe by a low-cost dominant firm

A low-cost dominant firm will drive all competitive fringe firms out of the market if all firms have rational expectations; however, the dominant firm will not predate (price below marginal cost). Since a dominant firm will not drive out fringe firms if they have myopic expectations, it may be in the dominant firm's best interests to inform the fringe. The effects of governmental intervention on the optimal path and welfare are presented.     

Monopsony and the production-location decision of the firm

This paper incorporates monopsony power in one of the input markets within the context of the Weber-Moses triangular framework and examines the effect of an increase in monopsony power on the production-location decision of the firm. In particular, this paper shows that the optimum location of the firm is independent of monopsony power if the production funstion is homogeneous of degree one. However, if the production function is not homogeneous of degree one, the firm possessing monopsony power will have an incentive to move its location away from the monopsonized input market towards other markets under certain reasonable assumptions. Finally, some important policy implications are generated from the analysis.     

Vertical Disintegration: A Dynamic Markovian Approach

In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its intermediate‐input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of independent suppliers decrease when their number increases), the assembler’s marginal return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than the market value of an independent supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm’s initial number of upstream subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads to a mixed strategy whereby the assembler keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability.     

基于政府补贴分析的新能源战略博弈模型研究

企业在新能源战略中如果不发展新能源战略带来的成本节约率ε1越高,其边际成本C1越低,新能源产品和传统产品的价格差异越大。随着消费者对每个环境满意度愿意支付的K值的增加,两个厂商的产品价格都会增加,也就是说,随着消费者环保意识的增加,环境满意度支付意愿也会增加,这样的结果不仅仅是生产新能源的厂商2受益,厂商1也会受益;政府提高市场最低绿色程度准入标准,低绿色程度的传统产品和新能源产品的价格都会增加。政府设定的市场最低绿色准入标准会对两个厂商的市场份额有影响。     

Cost-based decision rules for output,quality, and price

The present paper develops a theoretical model to address the relationship between a firm's pricing policy and its cost of increasing product quality. The model expresses both firm costs and firm revenues as functions of the quantity of a firm's output and overall product quality, where quality is expressed as quantity times quality per unit. The model starts with a generic good that measures output, and models quality as priced quality enhancement for each unit of the generic good. The model leads to decision rules by which the price of quality is a mark-up over the marginal cost of increasing product quality. The relationship between the price of quality and revenues from increasing output is also determined, and is conditioned by the sign and magnitude of the elasticity of demand for quality.     

Integration, Complementary Products, and Variety

This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.     

Winner Take All: Competition, Strategy, and the Structure of Returns in the Internet Economy

In this paper, we develop an economic rationale for the following stylized fact: Web-based firms spend profligately on advertising and marketing and usually lose money. Our rationale is based on the winner-take-all structure of high fixed cost, low marginal cost, markets for information goods. This market structure ensures that market participation and investment policy are highly stochastic. Moreover, if a firm chooses to participate in a Web market, it is optimal to act very aggressively through saturation advertising. Although increases in advertising costs reduce the probability of entry, once the decision to enter is made, firm strategies are insensitive to advertising price. Consistent with empirical studies of the profitability of internet firms ( Hand, 2001 ), our model predicts returns that are highly positively skewed, that is, even the firms that survive the competition for market position have a small chance of huge gains combined with a large probability of very modest returns. In dynamic competition, firms weakened by early rounds are less likely to challenge in subsequent rounds. However, when a challenge is attempted, it is always aggressive. In addition, because large expenditures in the first period produce valuable strategic real options in later periods, which are treated as expenses using traditional accounting methodology, the financial valuation of Internet firms may actually be negatively related to performance when using standard accounting measures of profitability that fail to capitalize these strategic real options.     

Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.     

Optimal dynamic durability

Consider a firm that adjusts its production and the choice of durability for its products instantaneously. We show that when the marginal cost with the respect to durability is nonincreasing, (a) the optimal durability for both the competitive firm and the monopolist decreases over time and (b) the monopolist will produce a good with lower durability than the competitive firm. We thus lend support for empirical findings and causal observations that found the phenomenon of declining durability over time.     

Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs

We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.     

Economic fluctuations,market power,and returns to scale: Evidence from firm-level data

Recent research on aggregate fluctuations, coupled with ongoing work in industrial organization, has renewed interest in the existence, magnitude, and cyclical pattern of market power and the extent of increasing returns to scale. By exploiting restrictions from dynamic theory and information from financial markets, we present a framework for generating quantitative evidence on market power and returns to scale. Tailoring the econometric model to firm-level panel data, we calculate the percentage differential between price and marginal cost (the Lerner index) in terms of the parameters from the econometric system. Results for firms in eleven industries indicate that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the extent of market power. Industries with significantly positive Lerner indices tend to have substantial increasing returns in the production technology. We find that there is only a modest relation between our estimated Lerner indices and traditional measures of market power and that, when market power varies temporally, it is usually procyclical. Thus, variations in the markup of price over marginal cost may help dampen aggregate economic fluctuations.     

企业规模扩张的战略选择:基于成本动因分析

随着市场经济的发展,客观上需要企业锐意改革,不断进取,才能保证企业在日益激烈的市场竞争中取得竞争优势,而取得竞争优势的重要途径之一便是规模扩张。而企业规模则是一个重要的结构性动因,企业规模的扩张程度将引起结构成本的变动。本文主要从成本动因的角度,为投资者提供规模扩张的有效方式和途径,并分析了成本变动的原因。     

From mind to market: A global,dynamic analysis of R&D

Existing models of R&D are not easily reconciled with four observable aspects of R&D: initial technologies (ideas) need to be developed further, only a minority of initial ideas are successfully brought to the market, production and process innovations take place simultaneously (whereby, initially, there is no production at all), and process innovations are implemented for technologies that are destined to leave the market. We present a detailed bifurcation analysis for a dynamic model of R&D that captures these observations in one, unifying framework. As we provide a global analysis, we do not limit initial technologies to carry marginal costs that are below the choke price. We show that there always exists a critical value of initial marginal cost above which the firm does not initiate any (R&D) activity; the path to the saddle-point steady state is never globally optimal. We also sketch some tentative policy implications of our analysis.     

Vertical differentiation,product innovation,and dynamic competition

This paper presents an infinite horizon dynamic model in which two firms compete in a market vertically differentiated by the qualities of their products and consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Given the product qualities offered, the firms engage in price competition that segments the market. In each period each firm can spend on product innovation that if successful increases the quality of its product. Three types of Markov perfect equilibria are identified. A running–coasting equilibrium exhibits increasing quality dominance with one firm undertaking innovation and the other coasting to free ride on the innovation by the first firm. The firm that coasts can have the larger dynamic payoff, so quality dominance does not imply payoff dominance. A second is a leap‐frog equilibrium in which the trailing firm undertakes innovation to leap into the lead. The trailing firm never innovates solely to narrow the gap with the leader, so catch up strategies are never used. In the third both firms undertake innovation, but if both have innovation successes, product differentiation remains the same and profits are reduced by the cost of innovation. The rivalry between Intel and AMD in microprocessors for personal computers provides a motivating example.     

Managerial overconfidence,overinvestment, and R&D spillover

This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.