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1.
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. 相似文献
2.
This study explores ordering effects and response strategies in repeated binary discrete choice experiments. Mechanism design theory and empirical evidence suggest that repeated choice tasks per respondent induce strategic behaviour. We find evidence that strategic opportunities provided by the order in which choice sets are presented to respondents affect choice decisions (strategic response). The results suggest, however, that respondents may solely respond to high cost rather than low cost inconsistencies. That is, respondents are more cost sensitive, and thus have a lower willingness to pay (WTP), if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a lower cost than if it was not. Yet, the cost sensitivity, and thus WTP, remains unaffected if the same or a similar level of provision was offered in a previous choice set at a higher cost. Our findings further indicate that cost sensitivity increases (and thus WTP decreases), when respondents progress through the choice task, with this increase (decrease) lessening as more choice questions are answered. Possible explanations are value learning and strategic learning. 相似文献
3.
We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a “rational” ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. Our main idea is that any method of ascribing welfare to an individual as a function of choice is subjective, and depends on the economist undertaking the analysis. We provide a simple example of the type of exercise we propose. Namely, we define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a “prior view” about how important or representative a choice of x at a given situation is. 相似文献
4.
Allan Feldman 《Journal of Economic Theory》1979,21(3):473-482
This paper examines rules that map preference profiles into choice sets. There are no agendas other than the entire set of alternatives. A rule is said to be “manipulable” if there is a person i, and a preference profile, such that i prefers the choice set obtained when he is dishonest to the one obtained when he is honest. It is “nonmanipulable” if this can never happen. The paper indicates how preferences over choice sets might be sensibly derived from preferences over alternatives, and discusses seven different notions of manipulability associated with seven different assumptions about preferences over sets of alternatives. The paper has two sections of results. In the first I show that the Pareto rule, that is, the rule that maps preference profiles into corresponding sets of Pareto optima, is nonmanipulable in four of the seven senses of manipulability, and manipulable in three of them. In the second section, I examine this conjecture: If an arbitrary rule is nonmanipulable and nonimposed, and if indifference is disallowed, then every choice set must be contained in the set of Pareto optima. The conjecture is true under the strongest definition of nonmanipulability. 相似文献
5.
Jakob Kapeller Bernhard Schütz Stefan Steinerberger 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2013,23(1):39-60
In this paper we show that a rational consumer choice along the lines traditionally suggested might lead to paradoxical results if one considers multidimensional goods, which incorporate a series of incommensurable aspects. Thereby, we explore the similarity between the resulting paradox and Kenneth Arrow’s well known Impossibility Theorem. Based on these considerations we suggest a solution for the former problem along the lines of Herbert Simon and Amos Tversky, which might—if driven to its extreme—even provide a unique and arguably rational solution for consumer choice among multidimensional goods. Eventually, we argue that the resulting framework poses a potentially useful starting point for further developing an evolutionary theory of consumer choice. 相似文献
6.
Klaus Nehring 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):269-305
We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the “multi-dimensionally single-peaked” preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized single-peaked preferences if and only if it takes the form of voting by issues (“voting by committees”) satisfying a simple condition called the “Intersection Property.”Based on the Intersection Property, we show that the class of preference domains associated with “median spaces” gives rise to the strongest possibility results; in particular, we show that the existence of strategy-proof social choice rules that are non-dictatorial and neutral requires an underlying median space. A space is a median space if, for every triple of elements, there is a fourth element that is between each pair of the triple; numerous examples are given (some well-known, some novel), and the structure of median spaces and the associated preference domains is analysed. 相似文献
7.
Recent literature has made significant progress in characterizing those social choice functions that can arise, or be “implemented,” as the equilibria of an underlying noncooperative game. This paper studies the implementability of social choice functions via cooperative games. Specifically, we show that if a social choice function arises, in each environment, as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution of an underlying cooperative game, whose dominance structure is monotonic and neutral, then the social choice function is essentially oligarchic, in exactly the same sense that “core” selecting choice functions are oligarchic. 相似文献
8.
Graciela Chichilnisky 《Economics Letters》1979,3(4):347-351
This note explores the relationship of social choice paradoxes to fixed point theorems. A special case of the paradox proven in Chichilnsky (forthcoming), the non-existence of a continuous anonymous rule that respects anonymity with two voters and two dimensional choice spaces, is proven here to be equivalent to a fixed point problem. We indicate also how the results can be extended to higher dimensional choice spaces and any finite number of agents. 相似文献
9.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2010,68(2):720-735
In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight. 相似文献
10.
An allocation rule is called Bayes–Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents' types form a Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paper provides a characterization of Bayes–Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social choice settings where agents have multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characterization is derived by constructing complete directed graphs on agents' type spaces with cost of manipulation as lengths of edges. Weak monotonicity of the allocation rule corresponds to the condition that all 2-cycles in these graphs have non-negative length. For the case that type spaces are convex and the valuation for each outcome is a linear function in the agent's type, we show that weak monotonicity of the allocation rule together with an integrability condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for Bayes–Nash incentive compatibility. 相似文献
11.
Rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic in the context of social choice, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow?s is the most prominent. We propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets of alternatives (set-rationalizability) and introduce two consistency conditions, and , which are defined in analogy to Sen?s α and γ. We find that a choice function satisfies if and only if it is set-rationalizable and that it satisfies and if and only if it is self-stable, a new concept based on earlier work by Dutta. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions. 相似文献
12.
We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents? preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others? preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost. 相似文献
13.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2008,62(2):344-358
An allocation rule is called Bayes–Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment rule, such that truthful reports of agents' types form a Bayes–Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paper provides a characterization of Bayes–Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social choice settings where agents have multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characterization is derived by constructing complete directed graphs on agents' type spaces with cost of manipulation as lengths of edges. Weak monotonicity of the allocation rule corresponds to the condition that all 2-cycles in these graphs have non-negative length. For the case that type spaces are convex and the valuation for each outcome is a linear function in the agent's type, we show that weak monotonicity of the allocation rule together with an integrability condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for Bayes–Nash incentive compatibility. 相似文献
14.
Lu?&#x;s M.B. Cabral 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(2):471-479
I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance (the property whereby, in dynamic games, the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms). The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that, in equilibrium, the laggard chooses a less promising path, in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the leader. This results in increasing dominance and holds true even if no joint-payoff (or efficiency) effect is present. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, L1. 相似文献
15.
The concept of ‘fully permissible sets’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel–Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction. 相似文献
16.
《Journal of economic behavior & organization》1988,10(3):255-286
I give an explanation for why agents react with a delay to decision and expectation parameters, by showing that imperfect agents must adjust very slowly relative to optimally adjusting agents if they begin reacting as soon as the latter agents would react. The results follow from the hypothesis of imperfect choice alone irrespective of whether there are any information, search, transaction, or other costs of adjusting decisions. The results thereby provide a general reason for observing inertially lagged behavior, and also agree with recent asset market experiments whose dynamics are governed by adaptive rather than ‘rational’ expectations. 相似文献
17.
Mehmet Barlo 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(1):312-336
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games can be obtained by 1-memory strategies. We establish the following in games with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1-memory. Second, for arbitrary level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported with 1-memory if the number of players exceeds two. Furthermore, in this case all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approximately supported by an ε-equilibrium with 1-memory. In two-player games, the same set of results hold if an additional restriction is assumed: Players must have common punishments. Finally, to illustrate the role of our assumptions, we present robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff profile that cannot be obtained with 1-memory. Thus, our results are the best that can be hoped for. 相似文献
18.
Ricardo Arlegi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):131-143
This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's α condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms. 相似文献
19.
《Games and Economic Behavior》1999,26(1):22-39
We propose a solution to the hold-up problem: the parties in a contract can avoid the inefficiencies caused by the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and implement the first best level of investment if they make their investment decision sequentially, one party observing the choice made by the other party before making his own choice. Unlike the existing literature, the proposed solution leads to the efficient choice of investment even when there are two-sided direct externalities.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D23, D82. 相似文献
20.
In Ghirardato et al. (2004) [7], Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker?s reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a subclass of α-MEU preferences. If attention is restricted to finite state spaces, we show that any α-MEU preference relation, satisfies GMM?s axioms if and only ifα=0 or 1, that is, the preferences must be either maxmin or maxmax. We show by example that these axioms may be satisfied when the state space is [0,1]. 相似文献