Corrigendum to “Reserve price signaling” [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]

We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium is not challenged, but the related comparative statics, while valid in the case without informational externalities between bidders, do not generalize to the case with informational externalities as claimed by the authors. General results on the influence of the number of bidders are obtained in a linear specification of the informational externalities.     

Corrigendum to “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sönmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers.     

A comment on “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6] and [7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency.     

Comment on “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210–217]

We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210–217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Crémer and McLean [J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents? types. Instead, such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent?s set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of Blackwell dominance.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

A comment on “Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247-262]

We identify an error in Bhaskar?s (2000) Proposition 4. We provide counterexamples to this result and demonstrate that it is not correctable.     

Corrigendum to “When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods?” [Journal of Economic Theory 90 (2000) 204-221]

This note corrects a slip in Fraser's (J. Econ. Theory 90 (2000) 204-221) treatment of the necessary condition for partial separation of efficiency from distribution in providing a club good. His corrected Theorem 1 shows that many families of utility function can generate partial (and total) separation, thereby considerably extending the scope of his analysis.     

Corrigendum to “Dynamic multidimensional assessment of sustainability at the macro level: The case of Austria” [Ecological Economics 68 (2009) 2560-2573]

This paper explores the issue of sustainability at the macro scale employing multi-criteria decision aid (MCDA) methods. The incommensurability of values and the essentially multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of sustainability challenge the use of composite measurement indices. This determined the choice of MCDA methods. Austria was chosen as a case study, due to the wide availability of data, especially on indicators of strong sustainability. The structure of the multi-criteria problem comprised the evolution of different sustainability dimensions over time. The process for selecting criteria included a critical assessment of institutional sustainability agendas (UN, EU and Austrian Government) and theoretical recommendations.After an assessment of MCDA methods, the NAIADE method demonstrated the most suitable properties for sustainability assessment. The application of this outranking approach was undertaken in two separate settings: long-term from 1960 to 2003 and medium-term, 1995-2003 with varying numbers of criteria. The response of results to the addition of evaluating criteria and periods was tested. The degree of credibility for accepting preference relations was also employed for sensitivity analysis.According to the results of the long-term assessment, especially in the weak sustainability setting, sustainable progress is taking place in Austria. In the medium term, in the stronger sustainability setting and, especially as the number of criteria increases, more incomparable periods appear and trends are less determined. Moreover, it is shown how results crucially depend on the methodological choices. This is one of the first applications of the multi-criteria tools to the dynamic analysis of sustainability at the macro scale.