Currency crises and the real economy: The role of banks

This paper attempts to explain the divergent output effects of currency crises through a very simple and intuitive model that relates the effects of a devaluation not only to the financial fragility of banks, but also to the degree of financial market imperfection. The model shows that countries with higher degrees of financial market imperfection and/or a banking sector whose balance sheets are weak, in terms of having low net worth and high foreign currency exposure, are much more likely to suffer a contraction in the wake of a currency crisis.     

Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques

Financial crises are widely argued to be due to herd behavior. Yet recently developed models of herd behavior have been subjected to two critiques which seem to make them inapplicable to financial crises. Herds disappear from these models if two of their unappealing assumptions are modified: if their zero-one investment decisions are made continuous and if their investors are allowed to trade assets with market-determined prices. However, both critiques are overturned—herds reappear in these models—once another of their unappealing assumptions is modified: if, instead of moving in a prespecified order, investors can move whenever they choose.     

Empirical models of short-term debt and crises: Do they test the creditor run hypothesis?

A positive correlation between short-term debt and crises has been interpreted as evidence in favor of self-fulfilling creditor runs, which have been blamed for financial crises in developing countries. We show that this correlation can also be explained by a standard model of optimal borrowing without creditor runs. In such a model, imposing capital controls on short-term external debt is not Pareto-improving.     

A portfolio model of capital flows to emerging markets

Since the crises of the late 1990's, most emerging market economies have built up substantial positive holdings of US dollar treasury bills, while at the same time experiencing a boom in FDI capital inflows. This paper develops a DSGE model of the interaction between an emerging market economy and an advanced economy which incorporates two-way capital flows between the economies. The novel aspect of the paper is to make use of new methods for analyzing portfolio choice in DSGE models. We compare a range of alternative financial market structures, in each case computing equilibrium portfolios. We find that an asymmetric configuration where the emerging economy holds nominal bonds and issues claims on capital (FDI) can achieve a considerable degree of international risk-sharing. This risk-sharing can be enhanced by a more stable monetary policy in the advanced economy.     

Emerging market sovereign spreads,global financial conditions and U.S. macroeconomic news

We investigate the impact of global financial conditions, U.S. macroeconomic news and domestic fundamentals on the evolution of EMBI spreads for a panel of 18 emerging market (EM) countries using daily data. To this end, we consider not only the conventional panel cointegration procedures but also the recent common correlated effects method to tackle cross-section dependence that may stem from common global shocks such as contagion. The results suggest that the long-run evolution of EMBI spreads depends on global financial conditions, crises contagion and domestic fundamentals proxied by sovereign ratings. The results from panel equilibrium correction models suggest that EMBI spreads respond substantially also to U.S. macroeconomic news and changes in the Federal Reserve's target interest rates. The magnitude and the sign of the effect of the U.S. news, however, crucially depend on the state of the U.S. economy, such as the presence of inflation dominance.     

Financial Globalization,Financial Crises,and the External Portfolio Structure of Emerging Markets*

We study the transitional dynamics of financial integration in emerging economies using a two‐sector model with a collateral constraint on external debt and trading costs incurred by foreign investors. The probability of a financial crisis displays overshooting; it rises sharply initially and then falls sharply, but remains non‐zero in the long run. While equity holdings fall permanently, bond holdings initially fall, but rise after the probability of a crisis peaks. Conversely, asset returns and asset prices first rise and then fall. These results are in line with the post‐globalization dynamics observed in emerging markets, and the higher frequency of crises that they display.     

A cautious note on the use of panel models to predict financial crises

Panel data framework has often been used to build Early Warning Systems for financial crises. This paper questions the implicit assumption that crises are homogenously caused by identical factors. It suggests a preliminary step aiming at forming optimal country clusters.     

Sudden stops, financial frictions, and labor market flows: Evidence from Latin America

While the aggregate effects of sudden stops and international financial crises are well known, the disaggregated channels through which they work are not well explored yet. In this paper, using job flows from a sectoral panel dataset for four Latin American countries, we find that sudden stops are characterized as periods of lower job creation and increased job destruction. Moreover, these effects are heterogeneous across sectors: we find that when a sudden stop occurs, sectors with higher dependence on external financing experience lower job creation. In turn, sectors with higher liquidity needs experience significantly larger job destruction. This evidence is consistent with the idea that dependence on external financing affects mainly the creation margin and that exposure to liquidity conditions affects mainly the destruction margin. Overall, our results provide evidence of financial frictions being an important transmission channel of sudden stops and in the restructuring process in general.     

Interest rate policy and interbank market breakdown

Using a DSGE-model with interbank market frictions, calibrated to match the frequency of financial crises, I investigate central banks' ability to prevent credit-related recessions by following an interest rate rule which accounts for financial conditions —an approach called ‘leaning against the wind’. The model's key feature is that boom-bust cycles emerge as a result of a savings glut and moral hazard in the banking sector. Although financial conditions predict crises, the policy maker cannot break the boom-bust cycle and reduce the crisis-frequency. When crises become more likely, low inflation forces the central bank to decrease the interest rate despite its intention to do otherwise. Responding to crisis-predictors eventually dilutes the primary objective of stabilizing inflation and leads to higher inflation volatility. The results suggest that central banks should refrain from leaning against the wind.     

A modern reincarnation of Mundell-Fleming's trilemma

A modern incarnation of the trilemma is essential for understanding the evolving global financial architecture, and for coming up with ways to mitigate financial fragility. The scarcity of policy instruments relative to the policy goals implies complex country-specific tradeoffs between the policy goals. The financial crises of the 1990s induced Emerging markets to converge to trilemma's middle ground -- managed exchange-rate flexibility, controlled financial integration, and viable but limited monetary independence. Capital flight crises added financial stability to trilemma's policy goals. New policies were added to deal with financial fragility associated with financial integration, including precautionary management of international reserves by emerging markets, swap lines among OECD's central banks, and macroeconomic prudential regulations. These trade-offs are impacted by a country's balance sheet exposure to hard currencies, the exchange-rate regime, and the growing sensitivity to shocks emanating from the U.S. and the Eurozone in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.     

A methodology for constructing a financial systemic stress index: An application to Greece

The paper develops a financial systemic stress index (FSSI) for Greece. We present a novel methodology for constructing and evaluating a systemic stress index which i) adopts the suggestion of Hollo et al. (2012) [“CISS — A ‘Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress’ in the Financial System” ECB working paper] to incorporate time-varying correlations between different market segments, but uses a multivariate GARCH approach which is able to capture abrupt changes in correlations, shown to be a prerequisite for correctly identifying financial crises, ii) utilizes both market and balance sheet data which is a novel feature for systemic stress indicators and iii) evaluates the FSSI utilizing the results of a survey, conducted among financial experts, in order to construct a benchmark chronology of financial crises for Greece, which in turn is used to investigate whether changes in the FSSI are good leading indicators for financial crises. The results show that the FSSI is able to provide a precise periodization of crises. Our findings suggest that accurate depiction of the systematic nature of stress is pivotal in order to provide proper policy guidance with respect to financial crisis identification.     

The real effect of financial crises in the European transition economies1

The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies (CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long‐term output by about 12–17 percent. The effect is larger in smaller countries in which the banking sector presented more important financial disequilibria. We also found that fiscal policy has been the most efficient tool in dealing with the crises, whereas the effect of monetary policy has been rather modest. Flexible exchange rates are found to attenuate the impact of the crises in the short and medium term, but to amplify the effect in the long run. International Monetary Fund support is found to moderate the effect in the long run. Finally, the effect in the CEECs is considerably larger than in the EU advanced economies.     

Lessons from the 1997 and the 2008 Crises in Korea

The Korean economy was hit harder than anticipated by the global financial crisis. In the first phase, large capital outflows led to a severe liquidity strain in the foreign exchange market, resulting in a rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. Then, in the second phase, the contraction of global demand led to a collapse of exports and a sharp decline in economic activity, raising concerns about a full‐fledged financial crisis in Korea. This paper describes how the global financial crisis spilled over into the Korean economy and how the Korean government responded to the financial turmoil. It also provides the background and rationale for the Korean government's decisions to adopt specific policy measures. Based on Korean experiences during the 1997 and the 2008 crises, this paper documents the lessons learned from the past two crises and identifies several important policy issues.     

Sudden stops: Determinants and output effects in the first era of globalization, 1880-1913

We study the determinants and output effects of sudden stops in capital inflows during an era of intensified globalization from 1880 to 1913. Higher levels of exposure to foreign currency debt and large current account deficits associated with reliance on foreign capital greatly increased the likelihood of experiencing a sudden stop. Trade openness and strong reserve positions had the opposite effect. Sudden stops accompanied by financial crises are associated with drops in output per capita below trend equal to three to four percent. Frictions in the international capital markets of the day are a likely candidate for these output losses. Sudden stops connected with crises do not seem to bring trend growth downwards. Sudden stops not connected with crises appear to be associated with significant declines in trend growth.     

What is really common in the run-up to banking crises?

Arguing that crises are similar if they are predictable from historical experience, we employ panel logit models to examine similarities in the run-ups to the current global financial crisis and historical banking crises. Asset bubbles are the most common precursors.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

OPTIMAL FOREIGN BORROWING REVISITED

Foreign capital has become increasingly important in financing investment and growth in developing countries. Foreign capital flows, however, can be volatile as is evident from the recent financial crises. It has also recently been noted by researchers that there is little systematic empirical evidence that foreign capital contributes to the economic growth of developing countries. In this context, this paper attempts to theoretically reevaluate the borrowing behaviour of a developing economy that relies on foreign borrowing for its capital formation. In particular, this paper investigates the implications of different lending policies of international financial institutions. It is found that no matter whether the borrowing interest rate increases with the level of foreign debt per capita or with the foreign‐capital/total‐capital ratio, the economy always moves toward the stationary state. The result holds even when the representative agent regards the interest rate given as constant. This implies that foreign borrowing does help economic growth, irrespective of lending policies of international financial institutions.     

Window of Opportunity Opens: Asian and American Views of the International Economic Architecture

This paper compares US and Asian views of the international economic architecture including Asia's evolving regional institutions. Lessons from the global financial crisis are used to assess reforms of the financial institutions better to prevent and manage future crises. While G-20 leaders have increased the resources of the International Monetary Fund, much work remains to restore its legitimacy and independence and to define clearly the Financial Stability Board's mandate to strengthen financial oversight and regulation. The paper critiques proposals for a global super-regulator and concludes that while the global architecture is important, the tests of its success will be fewer government actions to self-insure and the willingness to heed warnings of future problems and take timely corrective actions.     

Interdependence or contagion: A model switching approach with a focus on Latin America

Empirical research analysing contagion has become increasingly fragmented. Different definitions of contagion have resulted in different methods being deployed to analyse financial transmission channels. This paper devises a novel econometric strategy where the nature of interdependencies, magnitude of interdependencies and transmission channels selected for inclusion can change over time. We thus appeal to multiple definitions of contagion, distinguishing between: interdependence, contagion through interdependence and abrupt contagion through changing linkages. Using our approach we analyse different crisis episodes in Latin America. Results generally indicate interdependence not contagion during the currency crises of the 1990s and Argentine crisis of 1998–2002. During the global financial crisis, results indicate abrupt contagion from the US to Argentina and Brazil. Mexico, however, experiences contagion through existing interdependencies with the US. Results also show that macroeconomic and uncertainty channels play a role during different crises not just financial channels. By establishing whether or not different interdependencies and transmission channels are present during different crises our model switching approach provides new insights.