Willingness‐to‐pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence from a laboratory experiment

Abstract Debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles. This paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject's willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for parallel private health insurance. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Cuff et al. (2010), subjects’ average WTP is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care based on need rather than randomly and when the probability of receiving health care from the public system is high.     

Stock markets and terrorist attacks: Comparative evidence from a large and a small capitalization market

An expanding body of literature has investigated the economic impact of terrorist attacks. A part of this literature has focused on financial markets. We examine three research questions: whether markets' reactions to terrorism have changed through time; whether market size and maturity determine reactions, and whether reactions depends upon either the type of targets or the perpetrators of the attack. To this effect, a large – the London stock exchange – and a small – the Athens stock exchange – capitalization markets are used as the vehicles for the empirical investigation. Results from an event study methodology as well as from conditional volatility models suggest that size and maturity as well as specific attributes of terrorist incidents are possible determinants of markets' reactions.     

The acquisition of information in a dynamic market

Summary This paper models the information acquisition process in an intertemporal rational expectations framework. It demonstrates that equilibria do not generally exist in intertemporal economies in which agents are assumed to know the state-contingent price path and the information acquisition process is endogenous. In addition, an example of a fully revealing equilibrium in which agents pay a strictly positive amount for information is provided. Finally, we also show that it is possible for an equilibrium to exist in which agents choose to purchase information even if all agents, including the agents who purchased the information, are made strictly worse off by the purchase.The author would like to thank Kerry Back, Gerry Feltham Rich Kihlstrom, Vasant Naik, Bryan Routledge, Harald Uhlig and Josef Zechner for their comments and suggestions. A special note of thanks is due to the (anonymous) referee.     

Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse

We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a ‘survivor's curse.’ Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly.     

The life insurance market: Asymmetric information revisited

This paper finds evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the life insurance market, a conclusion contrasting with the existing literature. In particular, we find a significant and positive correlation between the decision to purchase life insurance and subsequent mortality, conditional on risk classification. Individuals who died within a 12-year time window after a base year were 19% more likely to have taken up life insurance in that base year than were those who survived the time window. Moreover, as might be expected when individuals have residual private information, we find that the earlier an individual died, the more likely she was to have initially bought insurance. The primary factor driving the difference between our and the prior literature's findings is that we focus on a sample of potential new buyers, rather than on the entire cross section, to address the sample selection problem induced by potential mortality differences between those with and those without coverage.     

The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation

We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents' actions. We characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. If the private learning channel is present, convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect-information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents. If, however, there is no private information sharing, then convergence is exponential at a rate strictly lower than the mean arrival rate of public information.     

The effectiveness of pre-release advertising for motion pictures: An empirical investigation using a simulated market

We use data on a movie’s stock price as it trades on the Hollywood Stock Exchange, a popular online market simulation, to study the impact of movie advertising. We find that advertising has a positive and statistically significant effect on expected revenues, but that the effect varies strongly across movies of different “quality”. The point estimate implies that the returns to advertising for the average movie are negative.     

The impact of information technology on the relationship between the public and the private realms

This paper is based on the hypothesis that public and private 'space' is becoming blurred and ambiguous and that a series of factors linked to the spread of information technology (IT) could be influencing this phenomenon. Moreover, this paper argues that the demise of the 'public realm' represents a serous threat to democracy flourishing in a pluralistic society. For polic-makers the potential adverse impact of IT on the relationship between public and private space should be of concern. The author believes there needs to be serious evaluation leading to a new set of govermance decisions on the wider social repercussion of IT.     

Transmission of information within transnational social networks: a field experiment

Several studies have shown a relationship between the stocks of migrants and country-level investment in the home country; however the mechanism through which this relationship operates is still unexplored. We use a field experiment in which participants who are recent immigrants send information about risky decisions to others in their social network in their home country. The results demonstrate how this information influences decisions in the home country. We find that the advice given by family members and decisions made by friends significantly affects an individual’s risky decision-making.     

Transaction costs and the collection of information: presale measurement on private timber sales

Measurement efforts to reduce the uncertainty concerning theattributes of heterogeneous goods may simply redistribute wealthand result in social waste. Individuals bearing the cost ofsuch distributional measurement have incentives to develop buyingand selling practices that limit such measurement. We examine,both theoretically and empirically, the determinants of thelevel of distributional measurement efforts in a competitiveauction framework. The empirical application, which uses a sampleof private timber sales, provides strong support for the implicationsof the theoretical model of presale measurement.     

Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek.     

Selling licences for a process innovation: the impact of the product market on the selling mechanism

Abstract.  This article considers the sale by a research lab of licences for a cost-reducing innovation. The marginal cost of a firm that wins a licence is private information and the acquisition of a licence imposes a negative externality on the other firms. The lab's optimal revenue is determined from a class of mechanisms in which the lab selects the number of licences and the reserve price before the sale. The role of the downstream product market in the determination of the number of licences is analyzed. Furthermore, it is also shown that the optimal reserve price may be zero.     

The overlooked costs of the permanent war economy: A market process approach

How does the permanent war economy interact, and subsume, the private, non-military economy? Can the two remain at a distance while sharing resource pools? This paper argues that they cannot. Once the U.S. embarked upon the path of permanent war, starting with World War II, the result was a permanent war economy. The permanent war economy continuously draws resources into the military sector at the expense of the private economy, even in times of peace. We explore the overlooked costs of this process. The permanent war economy does not just transfer resources from the private economy, but also distorts and undermines the market process which is ultimately responsible for improvements in standards of living.     

The impact of public and semi-public information on cotton futures market

This study estimated the impact of all major public and semi-public reports on the cotton futures market from 1995 through 2012. The estimation was based on the event study approach with the events measured by the release of five major reports: Export Sales, Crop Progress, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) and Prospective Plantings (public reports from US Department of Agriculture) and Cotton This Month (semi-public report from International Cotton Advisory Committee). The best-fitting IGARCH(1,1)-t model that accounted for the day-of-week, seasonality and stock levels was used to measure the report effects on daily nearby cotton close-to-close futures returns. Prospective Plantings and WASDE reports appeared to be the most important sources of information in the cotton markets moving the conditional standard deviation of returns by an average of 14.4 and 9.6 percentage points, respectively. However, significant market reaction was not found for the other three reports. Our analysis revealed that, in the presence of clustering, ignoring the impact of other reports would have resulted in about 18% overestimation of WASDE impact.     

Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations

Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals. Received: August 27, 1997; revised version: February 11, 1998     

Electoral information in developed stock market: testing conditional heteroscedasticity in the market model

By about 1988, the consensus among leading health economists was that no meaningful differences existed among hospitals of differences owernership form, and this position was embraced by the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice. But behavioural differences among hospitals of different among hospitals of different owernership has continued to be a matter of both academic and judicial interest. Recent empirical studies have concluded that real differences do exist, while many earlier studies reached the opposite conclusion. This contradiction in finding over time, as competition intensified, is exactly opposite to what expense-preference theory would predict. We examine this apparent paradox, using a very general test of behavioural differences by hospital ownership. We find that the omission of location-specific variables can lead to biased estimates of ownership effects, and that no significant behavioural differences exist among private California hospitals in 1986–90, when this source of ownership endogeneity is eliminated.     

Labour market effects of public capital stock: evidence for the Spanish private sector

This paper provides a new rationale for the positive effect of public capital stock on employment and wages. We show that higher levels of public capital reduce wages along the wage equation and enhance employment due to the resulting larger elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages. The estimation of a structural model for the Spanish private sector reveals that this wage channel is empirically relevant. We use the estimated parameters to simulate the recent incidence of the ratio of public to private capital stock on the private sector economic performance. We find (i) sizeable effects on employment, capital stock and gross domestic product, and (ii) that the wage channel is particularly important for employment.     

Evidence on the internal labor market during a process of rapid economic growth

We examine the nature and extent of labor market segmentation in Brazil through a survey of 82 modern sector firms in São Paulo. Hiring, training and promotion patterns are found to differ significantly between occupations and a key to understanding these patterns is the nature of skill acquisition, particularly ‘learning on the job’. Furthermore the presence of skill- specificity and internal labor markets for supervisory personnel provide a possible explanation for why relative wages have widened during Brazil's period of rapid economic growth.