Modeling Financial Integration,Intra-EMU and Asian-US External Imbalances

Intra-EMU external imbalances in the pre-crisis period up to 2008 are traditionally explained by EMU-oriented factors, e.g. euro-related financial integration. Chen et al. (2013) also emphasize external trade shocks, such as the competitive challenge of emerging Asia and oil exporters to EMU-periphery’s exports. Moreover, Asian-U.S. external imbalances are attributed to financial integration between East Asia and the USA in the aftermath of the East-Asian currency crises in the late 1990s (Angeletos and Panoussi 2011). Acknowledging these empirical facts this paper develops a Buiter (1981) three-country (EMU, Asia, US), two-region (EMU core, EMU periphery) OLG model to investigate the effects of both intra-EMU and Asian-U.S. financial integration on intra-EMU, Asian and U.S. external imbalances. We find that the widening of the intra-EMU external imbalances, in particular of trade imbalances, is related to the growth in Asian-U.S. imbalances and the dynamic inefficiency of the world economy, caused by excessive saving in Asia.     

The Impact of Environmental Policy Stringency on Industrial R&D Conditional on Pollution Intensity and Relocation Costs

Stringent environmental regulations may encourage industrial innovation, as technological advancements lower the cost of pollution abatement (Popp et al. in Handbook of the economics of innovation, vol II. Academic Press, Burlington, pp 873–938, 2010). The pollution-havens hypothesis, on the other hand, indicates that, rather than innovating, dirty industries may relocate to countries with less stringent environmental regulations (Copeland and Taylor in J Econ Lit 42(1):7–71, 2004). Thus, more stringent environmental regulations may increase or decrease innovative activities. This paper examines empirically the impact of environmental regulations on R&D intensities and R&D expenditures in 21 manufacturing industries in 28 OECD countries from 2000 to 2007. I consider pollution intensity and the relative ease of relocation (immobility) as industry characteristics that determine the optimal industry response to increased environmental policy stringency. I find that more pollution intensive industries innovate less as regulatory environments become more restrictive relative to less pollution intensive industries. At the same time, more immobile industries innovate more than more mobile industries as environmental regulations become more stringent, illustrating innovation as an alternative to relocation.     

The role of the German Historical School in the development of Mises’s thought

Hülsmann (2007) and Hayek ([1922] 1981) have argued that Mises’s first book The Development of the Relationship between Lords of Manor and Peasants in Galicia, 1772–1848 (1902) is written in the tradition of the German Historical School. Historicist contemporaries of Mises also considered his first academic work a continuation of the Knapp-Grünberg tradition (Kaser Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 28(1), 374–79, 1904; Wimbersky, 1906). We argue that von Mises (1902) does not represent the younger German Historical School. First, Mises provides a rationalization of the history rather than ethical and cultural explanation of historical events. Second, he does not support the Knapp-Grünberg argument about the historical development of serfdom under a Slavic rule. Finally, von Mises (1902) does not adhere to the ideology of the Historical School regarding the virtues of the Prussian bureaucracy.     

Malaysia-EU trade at the industry level: Is there an asymmetric response to exchange rate volatility?

Aftab et al. (Empirica 43:461–485, 2016) in this journal assessed the impact of exchange rate volatility on Malaysia-EU trade at commodity level using the linear ARDL approach of Pesaran et al. (J Appl Econom 16:289–326, 2001) and did not find significant effects in most of the 81 Malaysian exporting and 66 importing industries. In this paper, we argue for asymmetric effects of exchange rate volatility on the same industries’ trades which implies using Shin et al.’s (Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt, Springer, New York, 2014) nonlinear ARDL approach. While we find short-run asymmetric effects of volatility in almost all industries, we find evidence of adjustment asymmetry in 17 exporting and nine importing industries. We also find significant impact or short-run cumulative asymmetry in 12 exporting and six importing industries. The most important finding is significant long-run asymmetric effects in 36 Malaysian exporting industries and 25 Malaysian importing industries. Clearly, trade flows react to an increased exchange rate volatility differently than to a decreased volatility.     

Accounting Price of an Exhaustible Resource: Response and Extensions

Wei (Environ Resour Econ 60:579–581, 2015) presents a novel derivation of the accounting price for an exhaustible resource in a non-optimal economy subject to an allocation mechanism. We show that Wei (2015) and Hamilton and Ruta (Environ Resour Econ 42:53–64, 2009) are in fact employing different and mutually exclusive allocation mechanisms for the economy, and this explains the differences between the respective accounting prices. Because accounting prices must be defined subject to the allocation mechanism for the economy, the prices derived in the two papers are equally valid within their respective allocation domains. Further analysis shows that if there is declining marginal product of factors, a ‘Hartwick investment rule’ for the model economy (set investment just equal to depletion, valued at the accounting price) will lead to declining consumption for the Wei (2015) accounting price, and increasing consumption for the Hamilton and Ruta (2009) accounting price. This result is extended to consider the accounting standards recommended in the UN SEEA (System of environmental-economic accounting 2012: central framework. United Nations, European Commission, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank, 2012), as well as accounting for environmental externalities from resource use.     

Evolution and correlated equilibrium

Given a normal form game and a signal generating process, we construct an expanded game in the spirit of Aumann (Econometrica 55(1):1–18, 1987) in which agents condition their strategic choices on perceived signals. We collect results on evolutionary selection dynamics of Ritzberger and Weibull (Econometrica 63(6):1371–1399, 1995), Swinkels (J Econ Theory 57(2):306–332, 1992b) and Samuelson and Zhang (J Econ Theory 57:363–391, 1992) to apply them to normal form games with payoff irrelevant signals. We suggest a selection dynamic for the evolution of signals and characterize the set of signal distributions and induced payoffs for sets that are asymptotically stable with respect to this evolutionary selection on signals.     

Surplus measures and luenberger Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator

This paper extends to production theory some notions of compensated and equivalent variation analyzed in Luenberger (Econ Theory 7:445–462, 1996) in a consumer context. Along this line the Luenberger–Hicks–Moorsteen productivity indicator introduced in Briec and Kerstens (Econ Theory 23:925–939, 2004) is derived from these concepts for multi-output production technologies. The dual properties of this productivity indicator are analyzed and an aggregate indicator is introduced inspired from the resource function proposed in Luenberger (1996). A connection to a suitable Slutsky matrix is established.     

Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination

This paper compares behavior under four different implementations of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: the standard random termination method [proposed by Roth and Murnighan (J Math Psychol 17:189–198, 1978)] and three other methods that de-couple the expected number of rounds and the discount factor. Two of these methods involve a fixed number of repetitions with payoff discounting, followed by random termination [proposed by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (J Econ Behav Organ 48:37–50, 2002)] or followed by a coordination game [proposed in (Andersson and Wengström in J Econ Behav Organ 81:207–219, 2012; Cooper and Kuhn in Am Econ J Microecon 6:247–278, 2014a)]. We also propose a new method—block random termination—in which subjects receive feedback about termination in blocks of rounds. We find that behavior is consistent with the presence of dynamic incentives only with methods using random termination, with the standard method generating the highest level of cooperation. Subject behavior in the other two methods display two features: a higher level of stability in cooperation rates and less dependence on past experience. Estimates of the strategies used by subjects reveal that across implementations, even when the discount rate is the same, if interactions are expected to be longer defection increases and the use of the Grim strategy decreases.     

Rank based cointegration testing for dynamic panels with fixed <Emphasis Type="Italic">T</Emphasis>

In this paper, we show that the cointegration testing procedure of Binder et al. (Econom Theory 21:795–837, 2005) for Panel Vector Autoregressive model of order 1, PVAR(1) is not valid due to the singularity of the hessian matrix. As an alternative we propose a method of moments based procedure using the rank test of Kleibergen and Paap (J Econom 133:97–126, 2006) for a fixed number of time series observations. The test is shown to be applicable in situations with time-series heteroscedasticity and unbalanced data. The novelty of our approach is that in the construction of the test we exploit the “weakness” of the Anderson and Hsiao (J Econom 18:47–82, 1982) moment conditions. The finite-sample performance of the proposed test statistic is investigated using simulated data. The results indicate that for most scenarios the method has good statistical properties. The proposed test provides little statistical evidence of cointegration in the employment data of Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (J Bus Econ Stat 17:36–49, 1999).     

Markups and bargaining power in tradable and non-tradable sectors

This article jointly estimates product and labour market imperfections for narrowly defined sectors in the Portuguese economy for the period 2006–2009, following Roeger (J Polit Econ 103(2):316–330, 1995), Crépon et al. (Ann Econ Stat (79/80):583–610, 2005), Dobbelaere (Int J Ind Organ 22(10):1381–1398, 2004) and Abraham et al. (Rev World Econ 145(1):13–36, 2009). In addition, we propose a criterion for the identification of tradable and non-tradable sectors based on the export-to-sales ratio and compare markups and workers’ bargaining power along this dimension. Our findings suggest that markups are higher in the non-tradable than in the tradable sector but workers’ bargaining power is similar. In addition, there is a significant level of heterogeneity across markets, particularly in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, the article confirms that, if labour market imperfections are disregarded, markups are significantly understated.     

A Monte Carlo comparison of estimating the number of dynamic factors

Based on a Monte Carlo simulation, this study compares the finite sample performance of five of the most widely used methods for estimating the number of dynamic factors. The simulation results show that although the performance is affected by the data generating process, the methods proposed by Hallin and Li?ka (J Am Stat Assoc 102(478):603–617, 2007) and Bai and Ng (Bus Econ Stat 25(1):52–60, 2007) generally outperform the others. Specifically, Amengual and Watson’s (J Bus Econ Stat 25(1):91–96, 2007) method is sensitive to cross-sectional correlation, and Breitung and Pigorsch’s (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 75(1):23–36, 2013) estimator is sensitive to the overestimation of the number of static factors. The results of this study are further supported by an empirical application to a Chinese macroeconomic dataset.     

Export,R&amp;D and new products. a model and a test on European industries

In this article we extend the model developed by Bogliacino and Pianta (Industrial and Corporate Change 22 649, 2013, b) on the link between R&D, innovation and economic performance, considering the impact of innovation on export success. We develop a simultaneous three equation model in order to investigate the existence of a ‘virtuous circle’ between industries’ R&D, share of product innovators and export market shares. We investigate empirically – at the industry level – three key relationships affecting the dynamics of innovation and export performance: first, the capacity of firms to translate their R&D efforts in new products; second, the role of innovation as a determinant of export market shares; third, the export success as a driver of new R&D efforts. The model is tested for 38 manufacturing and service sectors of six European countries over three time periods, from 1995 to 2010. The model effectively accounts for the dynamics of R&D efforts, innovation and international performance of European industries. Moreover, important differences across countries emerge when we split our sample into a Northern group – Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – and a Southern group – France, Italy and Spain. We find that the ‘virtuous circle’ between innovation and competitiveness holds for Northern economies only, while Southern industries fail to translate innovation efforts into export success.     

Finance–growth nexus: does causality withstand financial liberalization? Evidence from cointegrated VAR

The main finding of the paper is that, contrary to Rousseau and Wachtel (Economic growth and financial depth. Is the relationship extinct already? UNU-Wider discussion paper no. 2005/10, 2005), a long-run equilibrium relationship between financial and economic development is identified with data up to 2006—well over the financial openness boom of the nineties—in countries whose history is characterized by numerous years of high inflation and/or episodes of crisis or other structural change. Also, financial openness, or lack thereof, proves to be an important feature both in explaining differences in sensitivity of financial development to capital accumulation and in determining the direction of causality between financial and economic development. The paper finds that bidirectional causality between economic and financial development is not as frequent an outcome as in Luintel and Khan (J Dev Econ 60:381–405, 1999), and in several cases, Joan Robinson’s (The generalization of the general theory in the rate of interest, and other essays, Macmillan, London, pp 67–142, 1952) statement on the primacy of economic development over finance is supported by the estimations.     

Austrian theories of entrepreneurship: Insights from complexity theory

This paper examines various Austrian theories of entrepreneurship through the lens of complexity theory, more specifically via the concept of a dancing fitness landscape. Problems in many fields (including economics) can be characterized as attempting to find the highest peak on a fitness landscape (which corresponds to an efficient or optimal resource allocation). A rugged fitness landscape is one characterized by many peaks and troughs, while a dancing fitness landscape is one where the peaks and troughs change over time due either to exogenous or endogenous activity. I argue that several key disagreements among Austrian economists can be better understood through the metaphor of a fitness landscape. The implications of this insight for various branches of Austrian economics are also considered. This study is timely as radical Austrian views are starting to percolate into business schools leading to increased debate among management scholars about the precise nature of the entrepreneurial process (Chiles et al. 2007; Sarasvathy and Dew 2008; Alvarez et al. 2010).     

The impact of personal beliefs on climate change: the “battle of perspectives” revisited

The paper proposes a multi-agent climate-economic model, the “battle of perspectives 2.0”. It is an updated and improved version of the original “battle of perspectives” model, described in Janssen (1996) and Janssen/de Vries (1998). The model integrates agents with differing beliefs about economic growth and the sensitivity of the climate system and places them in environments corresponding or non-corresponding to their beliefs. In a second step, different agent types are ruling the world conjointly. Using a learning procedure based on some operators known from Genetic Algorithms, the model shows how they adapt wrong beliefs over time. It is thus an evolutionary model of climate protection decisions. The paper argues that such models may help in analyzing why cost-minimizing protection paths, derived from integrated assessment models à la Nordhaus/Sztorc (2013), are not followed. Although this view is supported by numerous authors, few such models exist. With the “battle of perspectives 2.0” the paper offers a contribution to their development. Compared to the former version, more agent types are considered and more aspects have been endogenized.     

Applying a microfounded-forecasting approach to predict Brazilian inflation

We investigate whether combining forecasts from surveys of expectations is a helpful empirical strategy for forecasting inflation in Brazil. We employ the FGV–IBRE Economic Tendency Survey, which consists of monthly qualitative information from approximately 2000 consumers since 2006, and also the Focus Survey of the Central Bank of Brazil, with daily forecasts since 1999 from roughly 250 professional forecasters. Natural candidates to win a forecast competition in the literature of surveys of expectations are the (consensus) cross-sectional average forecasts (AF). We first show that these forecasts are a bias-ridden version of the conditional expectation of inflation using the no-bias tests proposed in Issler and Lima (J Econom 152(2):153–164, 2009) and Gaglianone and Issler (Microfounded forecasting, 2015). The results reveal interesting data features: Consumers systematically overestimate inflation (by 2.01 p.p., on average), whereas market agents underestimate it (by 0.68 p.p. over the same sample). Next, we employ a pseudo out-of-sample analysis to evaluate different forecasting methods: the AR(1) model, the Granger and Ramanathan (J Forecast 3:197–204, 1984) forecast combination (GR) technique, a Phillips-curve based method, the Capistrán and Timmermann (J Bus Econ Stat 27:428–440, 2009) combination method, the consensus forecast (AF), the bias-corrected average forecast (BCAF), and the extended BCAF. Results reveal that: (i) the MSE of the AR(1) model is higher compared to the GR (and usually lower compared to the AF); and (ii) the extended BCAF is more accurate than the BCAF, which, in turn, dominates the AF. This validates the view that the bias corrections are a useful device for forecasting using surveys. The Phillips-curve based method has a median performance in terms of MSE, and the Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) combination method fares slightly worse.     

Measuring market power when firms price discriminate

We propose conduct parameter-based market power measures within a model of price discrimination, extending work by Hazledine (Econ Lett 93:413–420, 2006) and Kutlu (Econ Lett 117:540–543, 2012) to certain forms of second-degree price discrimination. We use our model to estimate the market power of US airlines in a price discrimination environment. We find that a slightly modified version of our original theoretical measure is positively related to market concentration. Moreover, on average, market power for high-end segment is greater than that of low-end segment.     

External and internal consistency of choices made in convex time budgets

We evaluate data on choices made from convex time budgets (CTB) in Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) and Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), two influential studies that proposed and applied this experimental technique. We use the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) to test for external consistency relative to pairwise choice, and demand, wealth and impatience monotonicity to test for internal consistency. We find that choices made by subjects in the original Andreoni and Sprenger (Am Econ Rev 102(7):3333–3356, 2012a) paper violate WARP frequently; violations of all three internal measures of monotonicity are concentrated in subjects who take advantage of the novel feature of CTB by making interior choices. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience monotonicity violations. We substantiate the importance of our desiderata of choice consistency in examining effort allocation choices made in Augenblick et al. (Q J Econ 130(3):1067–1115, 2015), where we find considerably more demand monotonicity violations, as well as many classical monotonicity violations which are associated with time inconsistent behavior. We believe that the frequency and magnitude of WARP and monotonicity violations found in the two studies pose important confounds for interpreting and structurally estimating choice patterns elicited through CTB. We encourage researchers employing CTB in present and future experiments to include consistency tests in their design and pre-estimation analysis.     

Do internal references lead to wage rigidity?

This paper analyzes three prominent models of internal references and their impact on wage rigidity (Danthine and Kurmann in Scand J Econ 109(4):857–881, 2007; J Monet Econ 57(7):837–850, 2010; Koskela and Schöb in J Econ 96:79–86, 2009). With one exception, these studies find that internal references, nested in reciprocal worker preferences, unambiguously increase wage rigidity. In contrast to that literature, the present study provides analytical proofs, calibration results as well as impulse response functions which show that the effect of internal references on wage rigidity is in fact ambiguous. Several model extensions are discussed and robustness checks conducted. The intuition for this result is similar in all models: as internal and external references are modeled as weighted average, an increase in the weight on the internal reference implies a simultaneous decrease in the weight on the outside option. Therefore, the effect of the internal reference relative to the external reference determines whether wage rigidity increases or decreases.     

Entrepreneurship,search costs,and ecological rationality in an agent-based economy

Since Coase’s paper on the firm, transaction costs have occupied much attention as a field of economic inquiry. Yet, with few exceptions, neoclassical theory has failed to integrate transaction costs into its core. The dominant mode of theorizing depends upon Brouwer fixed points which cannot integrate transaction costs in more than a superficial manner. Agent-based modeling presents an opportunity for researchers to investigate the nature of transaction costs and integrate them into the core of economic theory. To the extent that transaction costs reduce economic efficiency, they provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to earn a profit by reducing these costs. We employ an extension of Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape to demonstrate this point one type of transaction costs: search costs. When agents do not face the cost of finding a trading partner, the system quickly reaches a steady state with tightly constrained prices regardless of agent production strategies. When search costs are present, entrepreneurs may use competing strategies for production and exchange that allow them to earn higher revenues than they would earn otherwise. These cost reducing innovations tend to promote concatenate coordination (Klein 2012). The agent’s production strategies represent technology in the form of mental models (Denzau and North 1994) that shape agent action with regard to the agent’s environment. The success of these are dependent on their ability to overcome search costs. The average profit, market rate of return, earned by each of these mental structures tends to equalize as a result of competition.