Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

Influential ownership and capital structure

This paper explores the relation between ownership structures and capital structures in Russia—an economy with a state‐run banking sector, weak corporate governance, and highly concentrated ownership. We find that firms with the state as controlling shareholder have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. Both firms controlled by the state or oligarchs finance their growth with more debt than other firms. Profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling owners, indicating a preference for internal funding over debt. The results indicate that firms with owners that have political influence or ties to large financial groups enjoy better access to debt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Capital Structure and Labour Demand: Investigations Using German Micro Data

The paper analyses the interaction between capital structure and employment decisions of firms. For this purpose, a theoretical model is developed in which a firm determines employment along an optimal path taking into account financial considerations. The empirical analysis using West German micro data proves that a negative relationship exists between employment and the debt asset ratio of the firm. We also demonstrate that as real wages (sales) increase, employment decreases (increases).     

Moral hazard,debt overhang and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of managerial moral hazard on the debt overhang of a firm by constructing a contingent claims model in which the manager faces costly effort. Using a calibrated capital structure model, we show that the costs of debt overhang become more serious in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Such costs even account for more than half of the total agency costs at a high level of cash flow. Moreover, in contrast to the results of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the leverage ratio and investment opportunities of a firm, which is caused by managers’ moral hazard. Finally, by considering this moral hazard, we also show the coexistence of low leverage ratios and high credit spreads, which explains the phenomenon of “low debt levels and high credit spreads” observed in practice.     

The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

关于债务期限结构影响因素之研究——来自沪深股市上市公司的经验证据

本文对2001至2006年度沪深股市中的575家上市公司债务期限的影响因素进行了研究。结果表明：影响上市公司债务期限的因素主要有流动性风险的一次方、流动性风险的二次方、资产期限、企业规模、财务杠杆、增长期权和边际税率;上市公司的债务融资决策考虑到了其自身的财务风险状况,因而尽管上市公司的债务期限偏短,但却是其理性思索的结果;偏短的债务期限导致上市公司存在着固定资产投资不足的倾向,因此当前应积极发展长期债务市场,努力降低上市公司进行长期债务融资的成本,从而诱使其借入更多的长期债务,以便有更多的长期资金用于其长期资产的投资,最终切实提高其盈利能力的可持续性。     

企业债务期限结构配置及其治理对策——湘火矩汽车股份案例

本文认为,债务期限结构错配是我国许多高速扩张企业出现流动性财务危机的主要原因之一,但在现有商业银行信贷期限结构错配和企业债券市场不发达的金融背景约束下,我国企业很难通过增加长期债务的方式来改变债务期限与资产期限错配的问题,唯有通过降低财务杠杆的方法来降低流动性风险。在现有金融市场条件下,企业现实的选择是债务期限结构错配和低财务杠杆,不能采用高财务杠杆方式来实现企业的高速增长,否则很容易陷入财务困境。     

Asset sale,debt restructuring,and liquidation

This paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time. In the model, we show the following results. Fewer asset sales, lower financing, debt renegotiation, and running costs, a lower premium to the debt holders, a lower cash flow volatility, and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders׳ incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation. In the debt renegotiation process, the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders. The timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation. Most notably, the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs. The possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure.     

The effect of ESOP adoptions on corporate performance: are there really performance changes?

Employee Stock Ownership Programs (ESOPs) have long been promoted as a motivational tool: employees become profit‐minded owners. Latterly, however, more ESOPs are being used as part of a takeover defense: here the ESOPs main purpose is to put more company stock in friendly hands—the employees—who, like existing management, could suffer layoffs, etc. in a hostile takeover. We find that, as a group, only the takeover‐related ESOPs are associated with increased leverage (itself a takeover defense). Non‐target firms show no long‐term increase in debt‐to‐assets. We find little evidence to support the motivation hypothesis: while actual labor costs are lower for ESOP firms, after industry‐adjusting they tend to be unaffected or higher. We find that a few measures of firm financial performance [return‐on‐equity (ROE), return‐on‐assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM)] do improve significantly, but this appears to be largely a short‐term effect. Industry‐adjusted holding period returns appear to be unaffected by the ESOP; however, ESOP firms that leverage show evidence of long‐term market underperformance. We conclude that ESOPs provide, at best, only a short‐term boost to corporate performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

上市公司分散化战略分析

本文调查了747家上市公司的成长性及其产业特征,考察了分散化的价值效应,探索了分散化战略对企业价值的影响方向。研究结果显示,分散化企业较之非分散化企业具有更高的成长性,即使在控制了企业规模、资产结构、财务杠杆以及股权结构等因素的影响之后,分散化对企业价值仍然存在显著的正向解释力。通过分析企业成长性的产业效应,进一步验证了分散化的溢价效应。同时还预测了分散化组织优势源于债务融资的税盾收益以及有效的内部资本市场所产生的财务协同效应。研究表明,在不发达的金融体系中分散化战略具有价值创造功能。     

Asset specificity,capital intensity and capital structure: An empirical test

Capital investment and capital financing decisions interact. To resolve current controversies in investment-leverage-growth relationships requires an integrated industrial organization/financial economics empirical model of profit margins, capital investment intensity, leverage and risk. Using cumulative future losses in discontinued operations to measure the asset specificity of the firm's investments, empiricai results support a complementary (positive) relationship between debt and investment, the debt financing of verifiable contemporaneous growth, equity financing of future growth and the debt financing of specific assets. This evidence rejects the transactions cost theory of capital structure in Fortune 500 firms.     

Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure

We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.     

银行信贷中第三方监督创新研究——以资产管理公司为例

本文针对我国传统的银行信贷业务中资产管理公司被动收购不良资产的问题,设计银行-企业-资产管理公司的三方契约,资产管理公司参与并监督企业信贷,能够降低企业信贷中的道德风险问题.通过对企业自有资金与银行可提供资金对于投资、银行与资产管理公司收益的分析,发现企业的自有资金以及企业主是否尽职决定了企业自身的融资能力.在投资项目固定不变的情况下,只有自有资金充足的企业可以直接得到银行的融资,自有资金不够充足的企业,需要通过银行-资产管理公司-企业的三方契约来获得融资,在企业的融资过程中需要接受资产管理公司的监督.同时银行与资产管理公司收益受到累计企业自有资金数量与累计银行信贷资金数量的影响.     

Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt

This paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders' risk taking decisions. We show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders, it also implies a lower leverage, which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields. We then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt. We find that this option mitigates equityholders' risk shifting incentives. Compared to standard short term debt, this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation, it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution.     

Cyclical capital structure decisions

Past literature has documented clear trends in the leverage ratio and other capital structure choices made by US firms. We expand this line of research by showing that aggregate capital structure ratios of US firms, during the last decades, are characterised not only by time trends but also by clear cycles. We set the start and end dates of these cycles using a ‘classical approach’. The cycles relating to the ratio of new shares versus debt are shorter and are more intense than the cycles regarding the term of the new debt obligations. The cycles that describe the ratio of retained earnings versus new equity issues are wider in relative terms and with similar duration to the cycles of decisions on external versus internal financing. This means that the decision to substitute debt for shares (or vice versa) is much more common, frequent and significant, than the decision term debt.     

Firm leverage decisions: Does industry matter?

We use a standard capital structure mode l to investigate the firm leverage decisions of 1620 companies listed in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) across a span of 13 years (2000–2012), dividing the sample into mining and other industries (non-mining). We also test for significant differences in leverage decisions between these two groups by applying a dummy variable approach. Our findings show that fundamental differences exist between mining and non-mining companies when making leverage decisions. We find evidence that mining firms are more sensitive to profitability and asset tangibility where neither profitability nor asset tangibility has significant association for non-mining firms. Overall results suggest that industry-type does matter for firms making leverage decisions.     

To What Extent Does the Interest Burden Affect Firm Survival? Evidence from a Panel of UK Firms during the Recent Financial Crisis

Using a panel of mainly unquoted UK firms over the period 2000–09, we document a significant effect of changes in the interest burden from debt‐servicing on firm survival. The effect is found to be stronger during the recent financial crisis compared with more tranquil periods. Furthermore, the survival chances of bank‐dependent, younger, and non‐exporting firms are most affected by changes in the interest burden, especially during the crisis. Our results are robust to using different estimation methods and different interest burden measures They suggest that one way for policymakers to mitigate the effects of financial crises by limiting firm failures would be to prevent financing costs from rising, especially for those firms more likely to face liquidity constraints.     

Does capital structure differently affect incumbents' responses to entry threat and actual entry?

Some theories predict that firms with higher financial leverage compete more aggressively in product markets than firms with lower financial leverage, whereas others predict that lower‐leverage firms compete more aggressively than higher‐leverage firms. This paper studies how incumbent airlines' capital structure affects their responses to Southwest Airlines' entry threat and actual entry. The results indicate that, when responding to entry threat, lower‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than higher‐leverage incumbents; in contrast, when responding to actual entry, higher‐leverage incumbents cut prices more aggressively than lower‐leverage incumbents.     

Contingent capital,capital structure and investment

We examine the interaction between investment and financing policies in a dynamic model for a firm with existing assets-in-place and a growth option, of which investment cost is financed with equity and contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). We attempt to clarify how CoCos impact on investment timing, capital structure and inefficiencies arising from debt overhang and asset substitution. We show that there is a conversion ratio (the fraction of equity allocated to CoCo holders upon conversion) to eliminate the inefficiencies. Our conclusions predict that debt leverage decreases with investment option payoff factor and the average appreciation rate of the cash flow. In contrast to traditional corporate finance theory saying that a firm's value decreases globally with business risk, our model indicates that it might first decrease and then increase with asset volatility.     

Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring

Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt.