Asymmetry in mobile access charges: is it an effective regulatory measure?

This paper analyses the regulation of the market of voice call termination on mobile networks, by considering the remedy of asymmetric access charges and the hypothesis of discriminatory retail pricing. In the two way interconnection, the operators revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on-net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off-net), the competition is more complex, involving positive networks externalities for the incumbent operator. In order to reduce the competitive disadvantage for new entrants and smaller operators many European regulation authorities have introduced the remedy of asymmetric access charges. This paper is aimed at analysing the effectiveness of this regulatory measure, assuming that operators are differentiated in terms of brand loyalty and cost structure.     

Competition Effects in a Liberalized Railway Market

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are vertically separated. We analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally set the charges that operators have to pay to the infrastructure manager for access to the tracks and how these charges change with increased competition in the railway market. Our analysis shows that an increased number of competitors in the freight and/or passenger segment reduces prices per kilometer and increases total output in train kilometers. The regulatory agency reacts to more competition with a reduction in access charges in the corresponding segment. Consumers benefit through lower prices, while individual profits of each operator decrease through a higher number of competitors. We further show that the welfare effect of increased competition in the freight and/or passenger segment is ambiguous and depends on the level of competition. Finally, social welfare is higher under two-part tariffs than under one-part tariffs if raising public funds is costly to society.     

Competition in Local Telecommunications

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 created a framework for competition in local telecommunications. Under its rules and under the jurisdiction of state regulatory authorities, competitive local telephone companies were to gain access to some or all parts of the incumbent’s network through known wholesale tariffs and offer retail local telephone service. As customers Competition in Local Telecommunications adopt other technologies for communications—mobile wireless service, broadband for email, messaging, and information retrieval—additional competitive pressures are put on the core voice telephone market. The substitution of usage and access from local telephony to other modes of communication is regarded as intermodal competition and is the subject of this paper. This study concerns local telecommunications competition between incumbent and competitive service providers in the United States. In addition to measuring competition from within the wireline market, we find significant intermodal competitive impacts resulting from wireless and high-speed development. We report empirical results from an econometric model that measures line loss impacts between carriers and the effects of wireless and high-speed services on the wireline market. The paper offers interpretation of the strategic and policy implications of these results.JEL Classification L120,L400,L960     

Selective Price Cuts and Price Discrimination Bans in Network Industries

In order to encourage competition in network-based industries such as telecommunications, some jurisdictions have adopted regulatory rules which prevent the incumbent service provider from selectively cutting prices in response to market entry. Given such bans on price discrimination, the incumbent cannot react to competition by selectively adjusting prices, based on the competitive situation in a given market, but has to maintain the same price across all markets. This paper analyses the welfare effects of such a rule for both one-way networks (access model) and two-way networks (interconnection model) when consumers have switching costs. We find that, even though bans on price discrimination can induce inefficient entry for a range of parameter constellations, there are also cases where they induce efficient market entry. This is the more likely to be the case the higher the fixed costs of entry.     

Hedonic study on mobile telephony market in France: pricing–quality strategies

This paper provides a hedonic price analysis of mobile telephony services for the French market. We adopt the hedonic price theory to examine the relationship between changes in price levels and the evolution of the market for mobile telecommunications industry in France from June 1996 to December 2002. The results support the hypothesis that there was price competition between service providers in the earlier period. There were also large differences in prices set by individual service providers which, however, did not persist over time. Next, using estimates from hedonic-price equation for each operator separately, we found that the three-mobile providers seemed to adopt similar pricing strategies over the period 1996–2002. Quality indexes are also calculated. The results of a comparative analysis indicate that in the period 2000–2002 neither the quality nor the price indexes show significant changes for the three mobile providers. These results are of some consequence, especially after the French competition authority decision in December 2005 which stated the existence of collusion on the mobile market during the same period (2000–2002). Surprisingly, our primer results supporting the assumption of potential collusive conduct in France are not re-affirmed when comparing the French and German markets.     

Manufacturer-owned retail stores

Increasingly, manufacturers sell their products in their own retail stores, and many of these stores appear to be in direct competition with independent retailers; i.e., both types of retail stores are physically co-located. We analyze one way this practice affects the retail market. We find that, when independent retailers compete against company stores (instead of just against other independent retailers), they (1) charge higher prices and (2) are more willing to engage in marketing efforts on behalf of the manufacturer’s brand. Furthermore, when company stores and independent retailers compete in the same market, the company store charges higher prices and provides more marketing effort. Anecdotal data are consistent with these model predictions.

Price Differences in Consumer Goods in Retail Markets

Abstract

This study analyses the effects that competition causes on the dispersion of prices in the mass market products. Therefore, a model is proposed that integrates the vertical, spatial and market environment factors that make up the competitive structure of the retail trade distribution sector. The results obtained, after processing a database of more than 19,000 records, indicate that various indicators of these three levels of competition exercise a decisive influence on determining the final prices of the analysed products. Likewise, the research allows verifying that there are significant differences in the effect caused by the analysed factors on the dispersion of prices, thereby depending on the considered product category (packaged goods versus fresh food).     

A Normative Model for Improving Services Quality

Abstract

As services businesses continue to proliferate, competition among professional and retail service providers rapidly intensifies. Amidst the competitive wars, service marketers are seeking new, innovative ways to improve services quality in order to maintain their competitive position. Many of the existing approaches are geared toward larger operations. This article proposes a normative model of services quality for service organizations of varying types and sizes with an emphasis on the small service provider. The utilization of this model can assist service providers in improving the quality of their service and overall customer satisfaction.     

Neue Finanztechnologien — Bankenmarkt in Bewegung

Digitalisation opens new channels for financial transactions. Crowdlending and Digital Advice offer additional opportunities for customers to manage their assets. In the banking market, “FinTechs” are the most notable example of what Schumpeter described as “creative destruction”. They could threaten the existence of established banks. Therefore the banks should use the FinTechs as a testing laboratory for customer behavior and testing ground for a more modern marketing policy. This environment gives rise to concerns that there may develop an unregulated area of shadow banks. But it should be considered that a level playing field has to be ensured and that innovative processes and products are not stalled. A potential advantage of Digital Advice is that consumers can have the possibility to access the relevant information they need to make their financial decisions. Consumers, in turn, are only able to benefit from this advantage if competition between financial service providers leads to a supply of clear and comprehensible information about financial products and an appropriate degree of data security. The rise of Big Data analyses in retail banking allows a more precise estimation of creditworthiness risk as well as a consumer’s willingness-to-pay, propensity to switch and responsiveness to marketing offers. This not only impacts on competition, it represents major challenges for policymakers, authorities and consumers alike.     

Product-Market Competition in the Water Industry: Voluntary Non-discriminatory Pricing

Since franchise bidding in the piped water industry is problematic due to extensive investment requirements, product-market competition or common carriage is a valuable alternative for the introduction of competition. This paper analyses product-market competition by considering a simple model of interconnection where competition is introduced between vertically integrated neighbouring water suppliers. The model contains water markets specificities such as local and decentralised networks and related difficulties of regulating access charges. Even without any regulation, we show that: (i) an inefficient incumbent will give up its monopoly position and lower the access price far enough so that the low-cost competitor can enter his home market; (ii) efficiency of production will rise due to liberalisation; and (iii) in contrary to prejudicial claims, investment incentives are not destroyed by the introduction of competition for the market. Investments of low-cost firms may even increase.JEL classification: L95, L43, D21, Q25     

Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power?

Like any new product, private label entry increases competition within a category leading to downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices. But, given the higher margins for private labels and potential bargaining benefits for retailers, they have incentives to help private labels gain market share. The paper addresses two questions: First, do private labels enhance a retailer’s bargaining power with respect to manufacturers? Second, given the higher profitability and potential increase in bargaining power, does the retailer strategically set retail prices to favor and strengthen the private label? We find support for the “bargaining power” hypothesis, but qualified support for the “strategic retailer pricing” hypothesis. Retailers gain bargaining power through lower wholesale prices on imitated national brands. But the gain is greater in niche categories than in mass categories, suggesting that niche national brands with limited “pull” power lose greater bargaining power. In terms of strategic pricing, the retailer, on initially introducing the private label, strategically sets prices to help private labels gain market share in high volume mass market categories. But retail prices revert to the category profit maximizing price after a year when the private label gains a stable market share.     

Opening the OTC drug market: The effect of deregulation on retail pharmacy’s performance

Governments in many countries have deregulated the retail pharmacy market to offer easier and broader access to pharmacy services. Such deregulation has spurred the competition by allowing the entry of new drug distribution channels. Current research leverages the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law revision introduced in South Korea in November 2012. The policy change allowed 24-hour convenience stores to sell 13 first-aid drugs directly to patients. This research investigates the causal effect of new retailers’ entry on incumbent pharmacies’ financial performance in terms of pricing, revenue, and market exit. The findings, based on the panel data of 2,795 pharmacies in a 36-month period from 2011 to 2013, suggest deregulation posed a significant competitive threat to incumbent pharmacies, resulting in lower average prices for the deregulated drugs, significant drops in revenue and accelerated financial failures. A significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect is found across pharmacies. Pharmacies with less loyal customers and poorer financial performance suffered more after deregulation. Our findings suggest that although such deregulation is intended to enhance consumers’ access to health care, opening the OTC drug market to new retailers may hamper consumers’ access to pharmacy services because of the exit from the market of underperforming incumbents.     

Duopolists’ Retail Pricing Behavior in Multiple Markets

The law of one price asserts that, with costless trade, prices for identical goods in different countries should be equal after accounting for the exchange rate. The empirical literature suggests that exchange rate pass-through to prices is low and that the law of one price fails; instead, firms are more likely to price to market. This study adds to the literature by examining the pricing strategy of comic book firms within the context of the competition’s pricing behavior in a duopoly industry. Comic books, uniquely, display their retail prices in multiple countries on their cover giving us detailed information about the pricing behavior of each individual firm and their competition which allows us to test a pricing-to-market model. We find that an empirical model of an imperfectly applied law of one price outperforms a simple competitive, pricing-to-market model of pricing. Retail exchange rate pass-through rates between Canada and the United States average 76.8 %. This high exchange rate pass-through rate for comic books exists despite the existence of sticky prices and convenience pricing.     

Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains

Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price.     

通道费的市场规则:基于弱自然垄断行业特征的解释

现代零售商既具有明显的网络产业特征,又具有双边市场特征的竞争性交易平台,进场费的费率可以视作供货商接入零售商网络向消费者提供产品时的接入价格.同时,连锁零售商具有显著的弱自然垄断行业特征,对于通道费规制效应的研究应当从这一重要特征入手.文章研究结论认为针对大型零售商通道费的规制行为违背了经济理性,而大型专业零售商的通道费水平则需要相关机构进行经济性规制.     

Price formation in channels of distribution with differentiated products: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of price formation in markets where goods differ in two attributes, perceived quality of each variety, and service provided by the store where the good is sold. Price competition in the vertically differentiated market is modeled as a two-stage game where manufacturers choose the contract that determines wholesale prices, and retailers choose consumer prices. One important novelty of the paper is that it contemplates competition between brands of different quality in the same store, and competition between brands of the same quality sold at different stores. This is in fact the situation observed in the domestic detergent market and the predictions of the model can be used to guide the empirical analysis of the data available for such market in the area of Barcelona, Spain.     

“同品不同价”:价值感知与定价差异——基于当当网自营与入驻商家的比较

平台经济发展日益加剧网络零售市场竞争和价格离散,商家间同商品定价差异背后的理论逻辑亟待厘清。由于消费者对商品各价值特征存在差异偏好,从而产生不同程度的溢价意愿。研究表明:商家在质量、服务、评论反馈方面所代表的价值感知差异对不同商家商品定价差异的传导机制有显著影响。其中,商家间的服务体验价值差异对网络商品定价的提升影响效用明显,评论反馈所代表的信息价值在初次购买后的影响力减弱。面对价格分档,市场上价格敏感者更看重功能价值,追求物美价廉;中高价位商品的消费者更注重增值服务的体验价值感知。互联网零售商要有针对性地制定相关价值感知提升策略;相关管理部门要防范"感知过度"式哄抬物价以维护市场竞争秩序。     

The Effects of Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers on Hospital Costs and Prices

Antitrust advocates believe that horizontal consolidation in hospital markets can reduce competition and increase prices while merger advocates believe it can benefit consumers by reducing service duplication. This study analyzed the market conditions, operating characteristics, and costs and prices of approximately 3500 short-term general hospitals (including 112 within-market-area mergers) from 1986 to 1994 to investigate the effects of market concentration, hospital mergers, and managed care penetration. The results show: a shift away from non-price competition toward price competition in health care markets; that this shift was fueled by increased market penetration by price-sensitive buyers; that horizontal hospital mergers produced average cost savings of approximately 5%, which were generally passed on to consumers as lower prices; that cost savings were generally greater for mergers of similar-size hospitals, with a higher degree of duplicative services, and with lower pre-merger occupancy rates; and some evidence that post-merger price reductions were smaller in less-competitive markets.     

Dynamic Price Competition with Consumption Externalities

The dynamic price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly when consumers value previous market shares is analyzed. The conditions for the existence of stable Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in linear strategies are established. When they exist, the optimal pricing policies suggest that a firm with a higher previous market share charges a higher price, all else equal. It is possible to observe pricing below cost for some periods. In the steady state, the MPE leads to a more competitive outcome (lower prices) than the case where there are no consumption externalities. The model can produce outcomes where the steady state is reached very slowly which provides an alternative explanation for slow emergence of competition when entrants face an established incumbent: It may be due to persistence in consumer tastes.     

Is the Retail Gasoline Market Local or National?

This paper studies the effect of station density on prices in the retail gasoline market in the Czech Republic. We estimate the impact of the number of competing stations in various driving-distance ranges around each station on prices. We find that station density has a negative effect on prices; the effect decreases with distance and is statistically significant up to six kilometers. This suggests that the retail gasoline market is local rather than national.