加强专利推广 促进技术创新

文章从技术创新的角度出发,围绕专利制度对技术创新扩散的效应展开,分析了专利制度的经济动因,指出专利制度是一种有利于技术创新的产权制度,并能够有效的推动创新的扩散,同时提出了完善我国的专利制度的一些措施。     

专利制度阻碍技术扩散的模型分析

专利制度的创制目的是为了激励创新，但它是否能有效地促进技术扩散却是研究的热点问题。本文通过建立一个简单的模型来阐述专利制度对技术扩散的影响，通过分析明确了在一定情况下，技术扩散并未在专利制度下有所加快，却是延迟了。     

专利制度存在的问题及对策

专利制度是市场经济的产物,是国际上通行的利用法律手段确认和保持发明人对其发明享有专有权的专项制度,是推动知识创新、技术创新的动力机制。我国实施专利制度以来,对保护知识产权发挥了积极作用。但由于多种因素的影响,我国的专利研发与保护还处在起步阶段,专利制度实施过程中仍存在一些问题亟待改进。本文主要从我国专利制度存在的问题入手,分析我国专利制度存在问题的原因,并在此基础上探讨完善我国专利制度的对策。     

制度创新与企业技术创新的互动及作用机理

制度创新和技术创新相互作用,共同促进。企业和政府双方要想获得合理的收益,双方都只有采取创新策略。制度创新可以保证技术创新的顺利进行,技术创新可以引致制度创新,从而实现政府和企业的双赢。产权制度的核心专利制度将技术创新外部性内在化;科技制度通过促进产学研合作网络的建设促进并规范创新主体的研发活动;金融制度对创新活动具有节约功能、约束功能、激励功能、稳定功能的作用。政府应当完善产权制度、科技制度、金融制度,为各创新主体构造有效的激励机制、稳定的运作机制和技术创新系统的保障机制。     

我国农业标准化专利战略的建立和完善

农业标准化与专利战略是将农业标准化和农业专利结合起来,在农业标准化过程中充分依靠和利用专利制度,使专利制度成为促进农业科技技术创新动力机制和保护机制,从而保证在市场竞争中获得最大经济利益,维持长久竞争优势的深层次、全局性的策略.     

企业技术创新的产权因素分析

产权激励是技术创新激励系统中四种激励制度之一,它通过确立创新者与创新成果的所有权关系来推动创新活动,是影响技术创新的重要因素之一。因此,对影响技术创新的产权因素进行分析是十分必要的。文章针对影响技术创新的4种产权因素进行逐一剖析,旨在为应用技术创新的产权激励,促进技术创新提供有益的借鉴。     

浅析专利制度的激励功能及其发生机制

专利制度诞生已经有500多年的历史了.经济学理论界对专利制度的关注也由来已久.一种观点认为,专利是鼓励发明所绝对必需的,这种观点由边沁提出,萨伊、穆勒和克拉克也持同样观点.其理由在于,专利制度本身只需要花费极小的成本,却能够激励发明创造,给社会带来前所未有的发明,从而推动社会向前发展.     

企业技术创新的财税激励方式及路径选择

技术创新是经济增长的动力,企业是技术创新主体,如何通过恰当的财税政策激励企业技术创新,进而推动我国经济增长是一项重要的研究课题.本文基于企业技术创新的不同阶段探讨政府的财税政策选择问题.结果显示,在企业技术创新研发阶段相比企业所得税的税负水平,财政拨款补贴对企业技术创新的激励效果更好.在这一阶段,政府加大对企业技术创新的财政补贴,能够更有效激励企业在技术创新研发上的投入.同样地,在企业技术创新成果转化阶段财政拨款补贴对企业技术创新的激励效果仍然更好.     

技术创新的知识产权激励

前言技术创新是企业活力之源，是提高国家经济发展质量的最重要因素。纵观发达国家莫不重视技术创新，加大技术创新的投入强度，促使企业得到持续的发展。然而我国技术创新的投入结构比例不合理、企业技术创新的投入相对不足的现象到现在仍然没有得到根本改观，影响了技术进步对经济发展的贡献率。其中一个重要的原因是技术创新的激励不够。一般地，技术创新的激励要素有四种：市场激励、企业激励、政府激励、产权激励。其中知识产权作为一种成本较低的激励手段对技术创新发挥着持久的安全的促进作用。本文将从知识产权的角度来探讨技术创新…     

河南省专利申请现状及对策

文章系统分析了河南省2001-2015年专利申请与授权及其构成的变化情况,运用比较研究方法,从不同角度进行专利统计分析,以展示河南省专利申请综合状况,提出进一步增强技术创新能力和专利制度运用能力、提高专利申请数量和质量的建议措施。     

Public policy and innovation: The case of pharmaceuticals

The pharmaceutical industry has been subject in recent years to an expanding set of regulatory constraints and related policy actions adversely affecting its level of innovation. The experiences of this industry provides some important insights for recent national policy discussions on declining innovation in the U.S. and the need for economic “revitalization”. The first section of the paper considers the societal benefits resulting from new drug therapies and other kinds of industrial innovation. An analysis of the basic characteristics of the R and D investment decision is then undertaken along with recent trends in various determinant factors. The last half of the paper evaluates the effects of government regulatory, patent, and reimbursement policies on R and D incentives and the level of pharmaceutical innovation. The paper concludes with several recommendations for policy changes to improve the incentives for industrial innovation in this and related high technology industries.     

REAL OPTIONS AND PATENT DAMAGES: THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF NON-INFRINGING ALTERNATIVES, AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Abstract.  Patent litigation has become an increasingly important consideration in business strategy. Damage awards in patent litigation are supposed to compensate the patent owner for economic harm created by infringement and are therefore important for protecting returns to innovation. We analyze the effects that a recent court decision in the United States, called Grain Processing , has had on the incentives of potential infringers to infringe and innovators to innovate. We find that Grain Processing has decreased the expected value of damages awards in patent cases by conferring a 'free option' on infringers. Grain Processing also concluded that the patent owner in the case did not suffer lost profits due to the infringement because the infringer would have adopted an (inferior) non-infringing technology had it not infringed. We demonstrate that this conclusion is inconsistent with standard economic models.     

Markets for standardized technologies: Patent licensing with principle of proportionality

In this paper, we study the licensing of standard-related patents among companies that employ a two-level licensing model where (i) the aggregated value of technology in the end product is divided among the integrated technologies in the product, and (ii) the value of each technology is then shared among the patent owners in proportion to the strengths of their patent portfolios in these technologies. Specifically, we develop a system dynamics simulation model for analyzing the effects of licensing costs on product and technology markets. This model is based on the modeling of three types of companies whose interactions are analyzed using non-cooperative game theory. The numerical results suggest that none of the three companies benefit from very low or very high royalty rates. In this setting, our model for two-level proportional sharing of licensing payments helps identify royalty rates which benefit all types of companies and which provide incentives for technology development and innovation.     

Analysis of technological innovation based on citation information

The paper discusses the dynamic properties of the patent network. Technological innovation occurs frequently, and predicting where it will happen is difficult because an economic system can adapt to changing technology. We construct a patent network based on the cited relations between patents and analyze the properties of the patent network from January 1976 to December 2005 by using USPTO patent data. We find that technology trends, which are calculated by our measures, are similar with historical trends of technology, showing that our measures would be useful to predict future technology relations. Also, we find that the change of similarity between patents shows meaningful results in terms of technological innovation.     

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strategically whether to apply for a patent with probabilistic validity or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rivals’ beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. A Cournot competitor tends to patent big innovations, and keep small innovations secret, while a Bertrand competitor adopts the reverse strategy. Increasing the number of firms gives a greater (smaller) patenting incentive for Cournot (Bertrand) competitors. Increasing the degree of product substitutability increases the incentives to patent the innovation.     

Financial globalization and technological innovation: International evidence

Country’s technology progress and innovation development not only depends on internal knowledge stock and human capital, but also external financial resources. This paper explores the effect of financial globalization on technological innovation through empirical investigations by using the system generalized method of moment method and panel data from 110 countries over the period of 1985–2015. Our empirical results suggest that financial globalization exerts a significant enhancing effect on technological innovation and this effect becomes stronger for countries with better institution quality. A one unit change of financial globalization can bring about a 0.6 % increase in patent applications. The comprehensive evidence shows that financial development, not trade integration, is the main channel through which financial globalization promotes national innovation. Subsample analysis shows that financial globalization only promotes innovation development of Non- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Our findings offer new insights into the influence of financial openness on technology progress.     

湖南省重点实验室专利战略管理

重点实验室的专利战略管理是指利用国家法律框架下的专利制度,在专利研究、开发、申请、经营等方面的对策与方法,为促进湖南省的科技发展和科技创新,文章提出了湖南省重点实验室实施专利战略管理的建议。     

A theory of socially inefficient patent holdout

This paper proposes a framework to analyze holdout in patent licensing negotiations. We show that when the validity of a patent is probabilistic, a potential downstream user has incentives to shun to pay the price offered by a patent holder to license the technology and risk being brought to court. These incentives are exacerbated when jurisdictions are local, and the downstream producer can approach courts sequentially. The informational spillovers across trials imply that this firm often finds optimal to go to court aiming to invalidate the patent in a jurisdiction due to the knock-on effect on future jurisdictions. This process results in excessive litigation compared to when the jurisdiction is global. The distortions from sequential litigation are likely to be aggravated when final competition is accounted for or when patent injunctions are not allowed.     

论专利文献对中小企业技术创新的作用

文章介绍了我国中小企业的实际情况,从专利文献与技术创新的关系出发,分析专利文献在中小企业技术创新过程中的作用,并提出了中小企业在技术创新中利用专利文献的一些建议。     

Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate

With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.