Client Importance and Audit Quality at the Individual Audit Partner,Office, and Firm Levels

We investigate whether audit partner level data provides a more powerful measure than office or firm level measures of client importance. We find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of audit fees to the total audit fees received by audit partners from all their clients. We also find that the likelihood of issuing a going-concern opinion (any and first-time) increases, and the absolute value of discretionary accruals decreases, in relation to the proportion of non-audit services fees from a client to total non-audit service fees, and the proportion of total audit and non-audit service fees from a client to total fees from all their clients at the office and firm levels. Our findings provide evidence to regulators, audit clients, and stakeholders that audit partners do not succumb to pressure from economically more important clients as audit quality has a positive association with client importance.     

The effect of non-audit services on client risk, acceptance and staffing decisions

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited auditing firms from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients and left open the possibility that other currently non-prohibited services could also be banned. This prohibition hinges, in part, on regulatory concerns that auditors were willing to accept prospective higher risk clients in order to obtain more profitable non-audit service engagements. Accounting firms rejected this claim. Given the prospect that more non-audit services could be prohibited, we revisit this debate by examining these competing claims in an experiment in which we manipulate risk and the potential to sell non-audit services and then observe the impact of these variables on auditors’ client acceptance and subsequent staffing decisions. Specifically, audit partners received client information and were asked to make an acceptance decision and propose a staffing plan for a potential engagement. We find that a higher (lower) level of risk decreased (increased) the likelihood of acceptance and this relation did not vary with the potential to provide non-audit services. These results do not support the regulators’ claims but are consistent with the firms’ claims. Further, we found that more experienced auditors were assigned to the prospective client whose management had lower integrity. This staffing plan is consistent with a risk adaptation strategy for the client with lower integrity. The prohibition of certain non-audit services has been justified on the grounds that auditors might engage in systematic opportunistic behavior. However, our results do not find such behavior which should inform the current PCAOB deliberation over whether additional services should be banned. Alternatively, different justification must be found for the prohibitions.     

Characteristics of non-audit services and financial restatements in Malaysia

Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year observations during the period 2007–2009, evidence of a negative relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements. Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements for non-politically connected firms.     

Non-audit services and financial reporting quality: evidence from 1978 to 1980

We provide evidence on the long-standing concern about the potential conflicts of interest of auditors that provide clients with non-audit services using rarely explored non-audit services fee data from 1978 to 1980. In this setting, we find evidence of improved earnings quality when auditors provide non-audit services, especially those related to information services. This is consistent with better audit quality resulting from knowledge spillovers in the joint offering of audit and consulting services. Events related to the 1982 repeal of mandatory non-audit services disclosures are associated with a small positive stock price reaction, suggesting that the disclosure repeal has no adverse economic consequences. Furthermore, following the repeal we find no change in the earnings quality of client firms. In sum, our data suggest that non-audit services offered by audit firms can be associated with improved audit and reporting quality in client firms via auditors’ reputational incentives, synergies, and knowledge transfers.     

UK investors’ perceptions of auditor independence

The auditor’s role in society is that of validating the truth and fairness of financial statements. If owners of organisations doubt the auditor’s independence, financial statements will lack credibility. This questionnaire-based study investigated how investors perceive three potentially independence-impairing auditor–client relationships: the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, an audit firm’s economic dependence upon a client and long-term relationships between auditor and client. The objective was to determine whether, after a series of high-profile corporate collapses, owners retain faith in the integrity of the auditor. The results suggest that economic dependence and the provision of non-audit services are perceived as greater threats to auditor independence than long-term relationships between the auditor and client.     

Are audit partners’ compensation and audit quality related to their consulting revenues?

Recent accounting scandals have triggered renewed interest in the debate concerning whether audit firms should be banned from providing consulting services. Compared to the voluminous studies on consulting services to audit clients (i.e., non-audit services, hereafter NAS), little has been done to investigate consulting services to non-audit clients (hereafter CS). This study examines whether audit partners' revenues from CS are associated with: i) partners' compensation, and ii) audit quality (AQ), while controlling for revenues from NAS and auditing. We choose the Norwegian setting because of the unique and proprietary data on CS at the audit partner level. Our results provide initial evidence that partners' compensation is positively associated with their revenues generated from CS. Regarding AQ, our findings indicate no relation between AQ and partners' revenues from CS. This study contributes to the recent debate on multidisciplinary audit firms and should be of interest to regulators, audit firms, and users of audited financial statements.     

Non‐audit Services and Auditor Independence Depending on Client Performance

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on auditor independence in Korea is based on audit client performance. Further, we suggest that an audit client with low performance has an incentive to purchase non‐audit services (NAS) from an incumbent auditor to facilitate earnings management and steer accounting practices in a preferred direction. We find evidence that as non‐audit fees in Korea increase, auditor independence is reduced only for low‐performing audit clients. Thus, unconditional prohibition of NAS seems unnecessary. Regulators and policymakers should examine the motivation for purchasing NAS, particularly among audit clients with poor performance.     

Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees and Auditor Going-Concern Reporting Decisions in the United Kingdom

The accounting profession has come under increased scrutiny over recent years about the growing number of non-audit fees received from audit clients and the possible negative impact of such fees on auditor independence. The argument advanced is that providing substantial amounts of non-audit services to clients may make it more likely that auditors concede to the wishes of the client management when difficult judgments are made. Such concerns are particularly salient in the case of reporting decisions related to going-concern uncertainties for financially stressed clients.
 This study empirically examines audit reports provided to financially stressed companies in the United Kingdom and the magnitude of audit and non-audit service fees paid to the company's auditors. We find that the magnitude of both audit fees and non-audit fees are significantly associated with the issuance of a going-concern modified audit opinion. In particular, financially stressed companies with high audit fees are more likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion, whereas companies with high non-audit fees are less likely to receive a going-concern modified audit opinion. Additional analyses indicate that the results are generally robust across alternative model and variable specifications. Overall, evidence supports the contention that high non-audit fees have a detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. companies.     

Audit report information content and the provision of non-audit services: Evidence from Spanish lending decisions

This study examines whether auditor economic independence affects the information content of going concern audit reports in the European setting. We conduct an experiment where 80 experienced Spanish loan officers from the second largest European commercial bank review a loan request under two lending scenarios: (1) a potential borrower receiving an unqualified but modified going concern opinion, and (2) a potential borrower receiving a qualified going concern opinion. Auditor economic independence, measured by the provision of non-audit services (NAS), is manipulated (absence vs. presence of significant NAS). We find that a qualified going concern audit report is interpreted as a primary warning signal (death penalty). However, the provision of NAS acts as a second order mechanism that only activates loan officers’ professional skepticism in the case of an unqualified but modified going concern report scenario. Therefore, we find evidence suggesting that the potential negative impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence depends on the nature of the audit report. Our findings have important implications for the European regulator, which is currently considering establishing an auditor independence regulation framework similar to that in the United States of America.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Non-audit services provided to audit clients,independence of mind and independence in appearance: latest evidence from large UK listed companies

This paper investigates whether the provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients impairs auditor independence of mind and independence in appearance. The main contributions of this paper are in terms of its timeliness with respect to regulatory changes, the simultaneous examination of both forms of auditor independence and the methodological innovation whereby it uses a variable derived from the level of abnormal audit fees as a moderating variable in order to capture the direct impact of the NAS fee level on auditor independence as well as how its influence is moderated by the level of unexpected audit fees. Our results indicate that auditor independence of mind is compromised by the size of NAS fees, particularly for clients who pay below the level of expected audit fee. The stock market perceives that auditor independence is compromised by NAS fees but, at the same time, additional tests indicate that there are benefits that accrue from NAS and, in particular, the relation between return and non-discretionary net income is increasing in NAS fees. The balance of evidence suggests that the European Union is correct in undertaking some reform of the auditing market.     

The joint determination of audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals

Prior research has estimated piece-meal the determinants of audit fees, non-audit fees and abnormal accruals. Intuition, informal analysis, and a variety of theories suggest that audit fees, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals are jointly determined. We address this endogeneity issue by modeling the confluence of audit fees, fees for non-audit services and abnormal accruals in a system of simultaneous equations. Our joint estimation provides a starting point to look simultaneously at several competing theories. Using audit and non-audit fee data from the UK for 1994–2000, we find evidence consistent with knowledge spillovers (or economies of scope) from auditing to non-audit services and from non-audit services to auditing. While knowledge spillovers from non-audit services to auditing have been found in prior research [e.g. see Simunic, 1984], the presence of knowledge spillovers from auditing to non-audit services is a new result. Contrary to recent results in Ferguson et al. (2000) and Frankel et al. (2002), we do not find support for the assertion that fees for non-audit services increase abnormal accruals. In fact, contrary to the results in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Chung and Kallapur (2003), we find that non-audit fees decrease abnormal accruals, which we attribute to the productive effects of non-audit services. We also find evidence that audit fees increase abnormal accruals, consistent with behavioral theories of unconscious influence or bias in the auditor-client relation. The findings are robust to tests with US data. JEL Classification C30 · M40 · M41 · M49     

Do Big-Four affiliates earn audit fee premiums in emerging markets?

The paper investigates whether Big-Four affiliated (B4A) firms earn audit premiums in an emerging economy context, using Bangladesh as a case. The joint determination of audit and non-audit service fees is also examined using a sample of 122 companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Our findings reveal that although the B4A firms do not generally earn a fee premium in Bangladesh, they charge higher audit fees for clients not purchasing non-audit services. This suggests that the B4A firms may actually lower audit fees to attract non-audit services, and cross subsidizes audit fees through non-audit-services fees. The lack of a B4A premium implies that there is lack of quality audit in emerging markets. We also document that audit and non-audit service fees are jointly determined in Bangladesh. Thus, we provide evidence of joint determination of audit and non-audit service fees in an emerging economy context.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

Non-audit fees, institutional monitoring, and audit quality

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with high institutional ownership. Our results are robust after controlling for auditor industry specialization, firms’ operating volatility, size effect, and potential endogeneity between institutional ownership and audit quality.     

EC Green Paper Proposals and Audit Quality

In order to restore confidence in financial statements the European Commission proposes different measures to enhance audit quality. This paper examines potential effects of selected proposals on audit quality in the light of prior research findings. It concludes that an increased emphasis on substantive audit procedures may not be beneficial and that joint audits potentially improve competition and audit quality, but might increase audit fees. An appointment by a third party would strengthen auditor independence. The overall impact of a mandatory rotation of audit firms is unclear due to opposite effects on auditor competence and auditor independence. The provision of non-audit services might affect independence in appearance negatively. However, a total ban would not be necessary. Finally, a limit to the proportion of fees an audit firm can receive from a single client as well as a capping of non-audit fees seem to be desirable.     

Client influence and auditor independence revisited: Evidence from auditor resignations

Financial scandals such as the Enron-Andersen debacle provoke concerns that auditors lack independence when faced with influential clients. Unlike previous studies that examine whether client influence affects audit quality on ongoing engagements (providing mixed results), we investigate whether client influence (which engenders “independence risk”) at the audit-office level affects auditor resignations from high engagement-risk clients. We construct summary measures of engagement risk, using client disclosures on Form 8-K filings, potential risk factors (e.g., litigation risk), and auditor action (e.g., issuance of a going concern opinion) on the previous year’s financial statements. Focusing on risky clients, we find that auditors are more likely on average to resign from influential clients, and this positive association holds for auditors that are less likely to have mechanisms in place to mitigate independence risk. Also, importantly, influential clients are prevalent across the spectrum of client size, and the positive association between client influence and auditor resignations holds for both large and small clients.     

An Assessment of the Provisions of Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 on Non-audit Services and Audit Firm Tenure: Evidence from Spain

On May 27, 2014, Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Aiming to enhance audit quality, the new regulation establishes important limitations to the selling of non-audit services by the audit firm to audit clients and a maximum tenure of ten years with the audit firm. However, it should be noted that the extant research has not consistently supported that non-audit services or long tenures impair the quality of audits. This research studies whether these provisions have been empirically associated with reduced audit quality for Spain. Because of its low litigation risk, the potentially negative impact of both non-audit services and tenure on audit quality should be clearly observed in the Spanish audit market. Nevertheless, we do not find significantly lower levels of audit quality associated with either non-audit services or long audit tenures. However, these results are conditional on the validity of using abnormal accruals to measure audit quality.     

Effects of auditor-provided tax services on book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences

Over the last decade, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services has been criticized for compromising auditor independence and affecting audit quality. Since 2005, the SEC has enacted rules restricting the types of non-audit services audit firms can provide clients. While most non-audit services are prohibited, a range of tax services are still allowed. Therefore, if compromises can emerge from allowing non-audit services, permitting tax services could be problematic. This study investigates the effect of auditor-provided tax services (ATS) on firms' levels of book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences. Using a propensity-score matched sample from 2000 to 2013, I find strong evidence that firms acquiring ATS exhibit a low level of temporary book-tax differences, which in turn mitigate investors' levels of firms' mispricing. These results do not support regulators' claim that the provision of ATS compromises auditor independence. Instead, it suggests that purchasing ATS can improve overall accounting quality through knowledge spillover and thus help investors better price the value of firms.     

Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions

Large clients create an economic dependence that may cause auditors to compromise their independence and report favorably to retain valuable clients. Economic dependence is measured as a client's size relative to the size of the office that contracts for the audit and issues the audit report. We find no evidence economic dependence causes Big Five auditors to report more favorably for larger clients in their offices. However, larger clients also pose greater litigation risk, and we do find that Big 5 auditors report more conservatively for larger clients, suggesting that reputation protection dominates auditor behavior.