Growth and innovation during economic shocks: A case study for characterising growing small firms

Why do some firms successfully grow while others are severely affected by economic shocks? Does innovation play any role in this? By adopting a multi-theoretical approach, this study explores the characteristics of firms that grew during the Great Recession (2008–2009). The data were collected from 12 small firms located in Finland, Ireland and the UK. Furthermore, this study elaborates the entrepreneurship and management literature by characterising the firms that thrived during the recession. The findings reveal the uniform characteristics of four grower types: gazelles, high relative growers, high absolute growers and high growers of both. It can be concluded that there are more homogeneous characteristics within the grower profiles than across the profiles, suggesting that firms growing during the Great Recession comprise an internally heterogeneous group of businesses. We found that innovation is the only common characteristic of firms that grew during these economic shocks.     

The Impact of the 2008 Crisis on UK Prices: What We Can Learn from the CPI Microdata1

This paper takes the locally collected price quotes used to construct the CPI index in the UK for the period 1996–2013 and explores the impact of the Great Recession (2008-9) on the pricing behaviour of firms. We develop a time series framework which captures the link between macroeconomic variables and the behaviour of prices in terms of the frequency of price change, the dispersion of price levels and the size, dispersion and kurtosis of price-growth. We find strong evidence for inflation having an effect, but not output. The change in the behaviour of prices during the Great Recession is largely explained by the changes in inflation and VAT. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the inflation effect is sufficiently small that it need not influence monetary policy.     

The Impact of the 2008 Crisis on UK Prices: What We Can Learn from the CPI Microdata1

This paper takes the locally collected price quotes used to construct the CPI index in the UK for the period 1996–2013 and explores the impact of the Great Recession (2008‐9) on the pricing behaviour of firms. We develop a time series framework which captures the link between macroeconomic variables and the behaviour of prices in terms of the frequency of price change, the dispersion of price levels and the size, dispersion and kurtosis of price‐growth. We find strong evidence for inflation having an effect, but not output. The change in the behaviour of prices during the Great Recession is largely explained by the changes in inflation and VAT. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the inflation effect is sufficiently small that it need not influence monetary policy.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare

I analyze the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. Standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.     

Bargaining and strikes: Towards an evolutionary framework

Conventional models of strikes start with the assumption that the bargainers' uniquely rational beliefs can be worked out in advance. Strikes are then explained as either the result of institutional constraints or of the possibility of irrationality. By contrast the evolutionary approach begins with a recognition that bargaining is naturally indeterminate and that, in the absence of a unique model of rational bargaining, conflict-free agreements between rational trades unions and firms reflect the evolution of one out of many possible conventions. This paper explores the alternative interpretation of strikes afforded by this perspective. In particular, it shows how strikes help shape the dispositions of bargainers (as opposed to just revealing it), how periods of conflict are succeeded by periods of industrial peace (and vice versa), and how the stability of bargaining protocols depends not only on the conventions regulating the relations between unions and firms but also on those between workers and union leaders as well as on technological innovations.     

Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.     

The industrial relations practices of multi-plant foreign owned firms

Data from a survey of 143 enterprises indicates that foreign-owned firms are likely to devote more resources to, and be more advanced in, modern human resource management techniques while being similar in the extent to which unions are recognised for collective bargaining.     

The Great Depression versus the Great Recession in the U.S.: How fiscal,monetary, and financial polices compare

This study reviews the financial distress that triggered and amplified the financial crises of the Great Depression and Great Recession and compares macroeconomic and financial policy responses. Shadow banking funded the build-up of the financial excesses that preceded both. The quicker and forceful response of monetary and fiscal policy during the Great Recession and stronger action to restore market functionality mitigated the downturn and aided recovery. Nevertheless, actions to address the mortgage debt overhang were slower. Post-Depression reforms focused on preventing deposit runs and post-Great Recession reforms on preventing runs on bank debt and shadow banks while boosting capital buffers.     

How do socially controversial companies do during a stressful time? Evidence from the Great Recession

This study investigates the performance of socially controversial companies during a financial crisis. Companies are usually considered controversial if they are involved in controversial businesses such as alcohol, tobacco, firearms, nuclear etc. The results show that controversial firms exhibit higher firm value as well as better accounting performance during the Great Recession than otherwise similar, albeit non-controversial, firms. The results are consistent with the notion that the demand for controversial products remains relatively stable even during a stressful time. Further analysis confirms the results, including random-effects analysis, GMM dynamic panel data analysis, and instrumental-variable (IV) analysis. The results of this paper are particularly relevant to portfolio management, where controversial firms may be added to portfolios to inoculate them from a negative shock brought about by an economic crisis.     

On the Time-Varying Effects of Economic Policy Uncertainty on the US Economy

We study the impact of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on the US Economy by using a VAR with time-varying coefficients. The coefficients are allowed to evolve gradually over time which allows us to discover structural changes without imposing them a priori. We find three different regimes, which match the three major periods of the US economy, namely the Great Inflation, the Great Moderation and the Great Recession. The initial impact on real GDP ranges between −0.2% for the Great Inflation and Great Recession and −0.15% for the Great Moderation. In addition, the adverse effects of EPU are more persistent during the Great Recession providing an explanation for the slow recovery. This regime dependence is unique for EPU as the macroeconomic consequences of Financial Uncertainty turn out to be rather time invariant.     

Verifying the state of financing constraints: Evidence from U.S. business credit contracts

Many policymakers are concerned that tight financing constraints for small businesses are stalling the recovery from the Great Recession. This paper empirically assesses two agency problems that induce such financing constraints—one resulting in a “firm balance sheet channel” and one resulting in a “bank balance sheet channel”. Evaluating specific models of these two agency problems against a comprehensive data set of U.S. small business credit contracts, I find strong support for the firm balance sheet channel but only weak support for the bank balance sheet channel. A complementary regression analysis confirms this result. Hence, policies seeking to improve firms’ balance sheets may be desirable to support small business lending in the recovery from the Great Recession.     

Investment, expropriation, and unionization

In this paper, I examine an economy where output is produced from labor, capital and public services, and where firms and labor unions bargain over labor conditions and lobby the government over union bargaining power and public services. I compare three institutional cases: (a) competitive wage settlement, (b) bargaining over wages and employment, and (c) bargaining over wages only. I show that in cases (a) and (b) the government expropriates investment rents, but right-to-manage bargaining (c) protects investors from this expropriation.      

Leverage Dynamics and the Burden of Debt

In addition to leverage, the debt service burden of households and firms is an important link between financial and real developments at the aggregate level. Using US data from 1985 to 2017, we find that the debt service burden has sizeable negative effects on expenditure. Its interplay with leverage also explains several data puzzles, including the lack of above-trend output growth during credit booms and the severity of ensuing recessions, without appealing to large shocks or nonlinearities. Estimating the model with data up to 2005, it predicts credit and expenditure paths that closely match actual developments before and during the Great Recession.     

Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The temporary shutdown decision: Lessons from the Great Recession

The temporary shutdown condition provides guidance on dealing with a serious transitory downturn in demand. The traditional condition says managers should stop production when revenues fall below avoidable costs. This condition is flawed because it ignores how lost human capital and reputational damage harm future profits. As a consequence, firms may optimally operate with losses far larger than stipulated by the traditional condition. We provide the first broad empirical analysis of the temporary shutdown decision, focusing on the Great Recession. We show that large operating losses were common and temporary shutdowns were exceedingly rare, even among very small public firms.     

Centralization of strategic decisions during the Great Recession

We use a survey dataset of more than 14,000 manufacturing firms from seven European countries in order to examine changes in the degree of centralization that followed the Great Recession in 2009. We document three findings. First, we find that a larger fall in sales is associated with a tendency to centralize. The finding is consistent with a theoretical prediction that organizations facing substantial demand shocks are more likely to centralize. Second, we show that the change in the level of centralization during the crisis was accompanied by other decisions characteristic of short‐term optimization. Third, we show that increased centralization has led to slower postcrisis growth even when controlling for the size of the shock and other decisions taken during the crisis.     

Performance Pay,Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*

Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.     

Bargaining: separately or together?

This paper explores conditions under which economic agents will want to bargain collectively instead of individually with a common third party—when, for example, two firms (or unions), who are bargaining with the same, indispensable, outside party, will want to merge and bargain as one. I use a non-cooperative sequential bargaining model to analyze this question. Previous work has shown that agents prefer to bargain collectively if they are substitutes for each other in production. This result, however, depends on an exogenously fixed sequence of bargaining. I allow the bargaining sequence to be determined endogenously and investigate how incentives for collective bargaining vary with heterogeneity when delay is costly. The previous results are not robust when the agents are substitutes. In particular, substitute agents prefer individual to collective bargaining if they are heterogeneous and sufficiently patient. In the presence of transaction costs, substitutability of agents is no longer the sole determinant of collectivization. Rather, the degree of heterogeneity in production, in conjunction with the degree of substitutability between agents determine the incentives for collective action.