Risk Management—the Revealing Hand

Many believe that the recent emphasis on enterprise risk management function is misguided, especially after the failure of sophisticated quantitative risk models during the global financial crisis. One concern is that top‐down risk management will inhibit innovation and entrepreneurial activities. The authors disagree and argue that risk management should function as a “revealing hand” that identifies, assesses, and mitigates risks in a cost‐efficient way. In so doing, risk management can add value by allowing companies to take on riskier projects and strategies. But to avoid problems encountered in the past, particularly during the recent crisis, risk managers must overcome deep‐seated individual and organizational biases that prevent managers and employees from thinking clearly and analytically about their risk exposures. In this paper, the authors draw lessons from seven case studies about the ways that a corporate risk management function can foster highly interactive dialogues to identify and prioritize risks, help to allocate resources to mitigate such risks, and bring clarity to the value trade‐offs and moral dilemmas that often must be addressed in decisions to manage risks. Developing an effective risk management system requires, first, an agreement about a company's objectives, values, and priorities; second, a clear formulation and communication of the firm's “risk appetite”; and, third, continuous monitoring of a firm's risk‐taking behavior against its declared risk limits. Quantitative risk models should not be the sole—or even the most important—basis for decision‐making. They cannot replace management judgment and are best used to trigger in‐depth discussions among managers and employees about the most important risks faced by the firm and the best ways to respond to them.     

Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They Happen?

The difficulties of the past year have convinced many observers that current risk management practices are deeply flawed, and that such flaws have contributed greatly to the current financial crisis. In this paper, the author challenges this view by showing the need to distinguish between flawed assessments by risk managers and corporate risk‐taking decisions that, although resulting in losses, were reasonable at the time they were made. In making this distinction, the paper also identifies a number of different ways that risk management can fail. In addition to choosing the wrong risk metrics and misidentifying or mismeasuring risks, risk managers can fail to communicate their risk assessments and provide effective guidance to top management and boards. And once top management has used that information to help determine the firm's risk appetite and strategy, the risk management function can also fail to monitor risks appropriately and maintain the firm's targeted risk positions. But if risk management has been mistakenly identified as the culprit in many cases, current risk management practice can be improved by taking into account the lessons from financial crises past and present. In particular, such crises have occurred with enough frequency that crisis conditions can be modeled, at least to some extent. And when models reach their limits of usefulness, companies should consider using scenario planning that aims to reveal the implications of crises for their financial health and survival. Instead of relying on past data, scenario planning must use forward‐looking economic analysis to evaluate the expected impact of sudden illiquidity and the associated feedback effects that are common in financial crises.     

The Theory and Practice of Corporate Risk Management*

The financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting recession caught many companies unprepared and, in so doing, provided a stark reminder of the importance of effective risk management. While academic theory has long touted the benefits of risk management, companies have varied greatly in the ways and extent to which they put theory into practice. Drawing on a global survey of over 300 CFOs of non‐financial companies, the authors report that while most CFOs felt that their risk management programs have significant benefits, the risk management function in general needs more attention. A large percentage of the finance executives surveyed acknowledged that the most important corporate risks extend far beyond the CFO's direct reports, and that risk‐based thinking is not incorporated into everyday business activities or corporate strategies. A large majority of executives also said they were seeking a more widespread understanding of risk throughout their organizations—and many confessed their firms' inability, or lack of interest, in evaluating their own risk management functions. At the same time, the efforts of most companies to develop enterprise‐wide risk management (ERM) programs were said to fall well short of the comprehensive and highly coordinated programs envisioned by the proponents of such programs. Three areas of opportunity were clearly identified as having potential to improve corporate risk management in ways that increase firm value over an entire business cycle:

• ? Incorporate risk management thinking into the strategic planning process. Line executives, and not just technicians, need to be sensitive to risks, thereby building flexibility into the firm's business plan and its execution.
• ? Clearly define the objectives of the risk management function, in part by developing appropriate benchmarks. The risk management process should be subject to the same rigorous evaluation process that is used when measuring risks throughout the business.
• ? Instill a risk management culture throughout the organization. While an effective risk management function is necessary, only when employees at all levels of the company embrace risk management as part of their daily operations will the firm get maximum value from risk management.

     

Another victory of retail investors: Social media's monitoring role on firms' earnings management

Stock forums are expected to complement individual investors' sophistication via collective wisdom, thus triggering extreme market reactions through uniform scattered opinions. This paper investigates whether stock forums improve corporate governance and decrease earnings management among firms. We found that increased posts, views and comments in a stock forum raise firms' potential costs for obfuscating corporate performance and constrain their upward earnings management. Stock forum discussion tends to increase the likelihood of and the penalties for earnings management detection. By decomposing the cost of earnings management into tangible and regulatory costs, we find that the stock forum governance effect is more pronounced in firms with higher managerial ownership and higher regulatory risk. Social media is a complement and intensifier of traditional mass media. Firms with broader media coverage are more sensitive to the stock forum governance effect. Our results are robust after considering the likelihood that executives will account for stock forum discussion in their reporting decisions.     

Government's Say-on-pay Policy and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from China

This paper investigates whether the restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) imposed by the Government's say-on-pay schemes is conducive to corporate risk taking. Using a sample of listed SOEs over the period 2005–2018, we find that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with corporate risk taking, suggesting that regulatory intervention in executive pay may produce unintended consequences. Our analyses also demonstrate that this negative regulatory effect on corporate risk taking is driven by listed SOEs in the growth stage of the business life cycle and by those in the provinces with a significant degree of government intervention. An additional test shows that the negative effect of the pay restriction on risk taking disappears in the SOEs in which managers hold shares, suggesting that an alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders mitigates the negative effect of the pay restriction. Our finding is robust to a batch of tests to alleviate the concerns about self-selection and reverse causality.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Regimes of risk management in corporate annual reports: a case‐study of one globalizing Australian company

An approach to the study of the ‘risks’ of ‘globalization’ that are increasingly the focus of global protest is outlined. By enrolling a blend of Mary Douglas' cultural approach to ‘risk’ and Ulrich Beck's theory of the ‘risk society,’ it is argued that three distinct ‘regimes of risk management’ are evident in corporate activity. After showing that corporate annual reports are useful for analysis of those effects, the argument is tested/illustrated through a case‐study of the reports of Amcor, a typically internationalizing Australian company. It is concluded that disputes over the ‘risks’ of ‘globalization’ are likely to become even more intense.     

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program—one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework—can be a source of long‐run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a “macro” or company‐wide level and a “micro” or business‐unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are “owned,” and risk‐return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects—information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk‐return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk‐adjusted levels of “imputed” capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk “appetite,” measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit “non‐core” exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the “information‐intensive, insurance‐ specific” risks at the core of its business and competencies.     

Analyst coverage and earnings management

What is the role of information intermediaries in corporate governance? This paper examines equity analysts’ influence on managers’ earnings management decisions. Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? Using multiple measures of earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To address the potential endogeneity problem of analyst coverage, I use two instrumental variables based on change in broker size and on firm's inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, and I find that the results are robust. Finally, given the number of covering analysts, analysts from top brokers and more experienced analysts have stronger effects against earnings management.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

Influence Costs and Capital Structure

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.     

Active timing decisions of equity mutual funds

In this paper we examine an aspect of professional investment management which has not been adequately documented and studied; the extent to which equity mutual fund managers actively adjust their portfolio's equity risk exposure over time. Estimates of a portfolio's quarter-end beta are developed using the actual stock holdings of the portfolio at the quarter-end. Changes in these beta estimates from one quarter to the next are shown to arise from both passive and active asset allocation. We find that active risk adjustment dominates passive rebalancing and that equity risk exposure is quite variable over time. Thus, individual investors who estimate the equity risk inherent in a portfolio based on a single time series return beta might seriously misestimate the portfolio's current equity risk. We also test whether active risk management is better characterized as anticipatory of future market events or reactive to past market events.     

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA ROUNDTABLE ON: Enterprise‐Wide Risk Management

For many years, MBA students were taught that there was no good reason for companies that hedge large currency or commodity price exposures to have lower costs of capital, or trade at higher P/E multiples, than comparable companies that choose not to hedge such financial price risks. Corporate stockholders, just by holding well‐diversified portfolios, were said to neutralize any effects of currency and commodity price risks on corporate values. And corporate efforts to manage such risks were accordingly viewed as redundant, a waste of corporate resources on a function already performed by investors at far lower cost. But as this discussion makes clear, both the theory and the corporate practice of risk management have moved well beyond this perfect markets framework. The academics and practitioners in this roundtable begin by suggesting that the most important reason to hedge financial risks—and risk management's largest potential contribution to firm value—is to ensure a company's ability to carry out its strategic plan and investment policy. As one widely cited example, Merck's use of FX options to hedge the currency risk associated with its overseas revenues is viewed as limiting management's temptation to cut R&D in response to large currency‐related shortfalls in reported earnings. Nevertheless, one of the clear messages of the roundtable is that effective risk management has little to do with earnings management per se, and that companies that view risk management as primarily a tool for smoothing reported earnings have lost sight of its real economic function: maintaining access to low‐cost capital to fund long‐run investment. And a number of the panelists pointed out that a well‐executed risk management policy can be used to increase corporate debt capacity and, in so doing, reduce the cost of capital. Moreover, in making decisions whether to retain or transfer risks, companies should generally be guided by the principle of comparative advantage. If an outside firm or investor is willing to bear a particular risk at a lower price than the cost to the firm of managing that risk internally, then it makes sense to lay off that risk. Along with the greater efficiency and return on capital promised by such an approach, several panelists also pointed to one less tangible benefit of an enterprise‐wide risk management program—a significant improvement in the internal corporate dialogue, leading to a better understanding of all the company's risks and how they are affected by the interactions among its business units.     

The changing nature of financial disclosure in Japan

This paper investigates whether Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) altered their voluntary accounting disclosure behavior over the period of the 1990s. It implicitly tests for whether the collapse of Japan's “Financial Bubble” in the late 1980s altered the incentives of Japanese managers to be more forthcoming about corporate information. Previous research on Japanese disclosure practices highlights the “secretive” nature of Japanese managers and suggests that cultural preferences strongly discourage disclosure. Our findings suggest that Japanese disclosure practices are sensitive to economic conditions.     

Risk Management,Corporate Governance,and the Search for Long-Term Investors

This discussion explores a number of ways that more effective risk management, corporate governance, and communication with investors can help companies increase their effciency and long-run value. According to one of the panelists, recent surveys of corporate directors suggest that companies should devote more time and attention to three issues—strategy, risk management, and succession planning—and that strategy and risk are the “flipsides of the same coin.” As the panelist argues, “You can't talk about strategy without talking about what risks you're going to take—and what risks you decide to take has to depend on the core competencies that drive the corporate strategy.” In addition to making risk management a critical part of corporate strategy, another notable recommendation is to communicate a company's strategy and business plan as clearly as possible to investors, with the aim of attracting more sophisticated, long-term shareholders. Contrary to popular belief, such a group may well include some hedge funds and other activist shareholders. According to a newly released report on shareholder activism (produced and cited by another panelist), corporate boards should work harder to identify and engage the “largest 10 shareholders in the organization,” with the ultimate goal of cultivating a shareholder base that buys into the company's strategy.     

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk‐averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian mechanisms when one is well ahead, they gamble in the opposite direction when their performance is close. We also examine multiple and mixed‐strategy equilibria. Equilibrium policy of each manager crucially depends on the opponent's risk attitude. Hence, client investors concerned about how a strategic manager may trade on their behalf should also learn competitors' characteristics.     

Managerial foreign experience and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between managerial foreign experience and corporate risk-taking. We find that foreign experienced managers in Chinese firms are positively associated with corporate risk-taking and that this mainly exists in private firms rather than in state owned enterprises (SOEs). In privately owned firms, the degree of corporate internationalization and operating leverage are potential channels through which foreign experienced managers affect corporate risk-taking. Moreover, the positive association is more pronounced for managers' practical, rather than educational foreign experience and for managers who gain their foreign experience from countries or regions with advanced management practices and better corporate governance. Short-term visits overseas has no impact on corporate risk-taking. Additionally, the relationship is more persistent among private firms with better corporate governance and those operating in weak local economy. Finally, we find evidence that the risk-taking behaviour from foreign experienced managers is an important mechanism for companies to enhance their value.     

Does property rights protection affect corporate risk management strategy? Intra- and cross-country evidence

Recent studies in the law and finance literature have shown that property rights protection is central to corporate financing and investment decisions and economic growth at large. We extend this literature by examining the effect of property rights security on corporate risk management decisions — an important element of a firm's business strategy. Using a unique dataset covering over 55,000 Chinese firms and employing both institution- and firm-level measures of property rights security, we find that secure property rights lead to higher corporate demand for property insurance, suggesting that property rights security is an important determinant of corporate risk management decisions. The effect of property rights protection on insurance consumption is also validated by a cross-country analysis that uses data from 93 countries over the period 1995–2008. Our study sheds light on the importance of property rights protection to corporate risk management decisions.     

Value Maximization,Stakeholder Theory,and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in increasing corporate productivity, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. Because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a “single-valued” objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy aims to maximize its total market value. The main contender to value maximization is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should attempt to balance the interests of all corporate stakeholders, including not only financial claimants, but employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. By refusing to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, the advocates of stakeholder theory leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors.