Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

This paper examines how the presence of an antitrust authority (AA) affects market‐sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s markets. The set of agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that in the absence of an AA, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, and in the presence of an AA, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a procompetitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.     

Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers

Bidders in hostile takeovers have colluded in five separate instances. It is found that these collusive agreements did not affect the target's price significantly. A model is developed to explain this observation. A welfare analysis indicates that a positive probability of cartel formation can be socially beneficial and may or may not be beneficial to the target's shareholders, depending on the process generating takeover attempts. This sheds light on the existing policy debate concerning regulations of collusive agreements. An analysis of the existing case law is provided, which indicates that such collusive arrangements are legal at present.     

Knowledge flow and inter-firm networks: The influence of network resources,spatial proximity and firm size

The objective of this paper is to analyse the characteristics and nature of the networks that firms utilize to access knowledge and facilitate innovation. The paper draws on the notion of network resources, distinguishing two types: social capital–consisting of the social relations and networks held by individuals; and network capital–consisting of the strategic and calculative relations and networks held by firms. The methodological approach consists of a quantitative analysis of data from a survey of firms operating in knowledge-intensive sectors of activity. The key findings include: social capital investment is more prevalent among firms frequently interacting with actors from within their own region; social capital investment is related to the size of firms; firm size plays a role in knowledge network patterns; and network dynamism is an important source of innovation. Overall, firms investing more in the development of their inter-firm and other external knowledge networks enjoy higher levels of innovation. It is suggested that an over-reliance on social capital forms of network resource investment may hinder the capability of firms to manage their knowledge networks. It is concluded that the link between a dynamic inter-firm network environment and innovation provides an alternative thesis to that advocating the advantage of network stability.     

Dynamic credit contagion and aggregate loss in networks

We develop a dynamic model to illustrate the credit risk contagion mechanism caused by interaction between firms. Specifically, we formulate the sources of risk into idiosyncratic risk and contagion risk, and introduce recovery ability to model the scenario of a firm changing from default into normal status. Our result shows that there always exists a steady state in a network under some trivial conditions. For quasi-regular networks and bipartite networks, the expected aggregate loss remains unchanged as long as the product of the contagion probability and the partner number is fixed.     

The evolution of free trade networks

This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model under random perturbations and identify long-run outcomes to remove prediction uncertainty inherited from static analysis. The results show that both partial free trade and global free trade will result when there are only three countries. However, when more countries are involved, only the complete FTA network emerges.     

The effects of free trade agreements on regional wages in China

We empirically study the effects of free trade agreements on regional wages in China using Redding and Venables’ (2004) extended model and manufacturing firm-level data in China from 2000 to 2007. We show that although free trade agreements can, in general, increase firms’ average wage level, they also contribute to increasing the wage gap in China. We also find that free trade agreements can have different effects on firms’ wages across China. In particular, they have stronger effects on average wage levels in land border regions than in coastal regions. Moreover, although firms in land border regions may be located closer to the partner countries of free trade agreements, they may still prefer to use shipping to transport goods. Our findings have important policy implications. In particular, we suggest that free trade agreements with China’s western neighbors should be accompanied by the development of appropriate land transportation networks. Moreover, income tax policy regimes should be differentiated across regions in China.     

Home Country Taxation and the Theory of International Production

This paper addresses the taxation of foreign source income from the perspective of a multinational firm. It demonstrates how differences in home country fiscal regimes of multinational firms can lead to variations in the cost of transferring cash resources across the borders of national jurisdictions. In the framework of international production theory, it shows how the home country fiscal regime can be a source of ownership advantage when the firm creates an appropriate network of assets, liabilities and equity. Taxation is the link between some financial decisions to the theory of international production. Observations are taken from the tax calculations of three hypothetical multinational firms.     

The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion

Using a two‐period model this paper examines the quantity decisions of leveraged duopolists that are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the first period. When the firms have symmetric costs, a bankrupt firm reorganizes under Chapter 11. If a Chapter 11 firm experiences marginal cost relief, each firm produces a collusive output in period one in order to prevent its rival's financial demise. When the firms have asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm is liquidated under Chapter 7 upon bankruptcy. A predatory equilibrium exists, whereby the inefficient firm is driven from the market. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contagion of network products in small-world networks

We formulate a model in which agents embedded in an exogenous social network decide whether to adopt a new network product or not. In the theoretical part of the paper, we characterize the stochastically stable equilibria for complete networks and cycles. For an arbitrary network structure, we develop a novel graph decomposition method to characterize the set of recurrent communication states, which is a superset of stochastically stable equilibria of the adoption game presented in our model. In the simulation part, we study the contagion process of a network product in small-world networks that systematically represent social networks. We simulate a generalization of the Morris (Rev Econ Stud 67(1):57–78, 2000) Contagion model that can explain the chasm between early adopters and early majority. Our numerical analysis shows that the failure of a new network product is less likely in a highly cliquish network. In addition, the contagion process reaches to steady state faster in random networks than in highly cliquish networks. It turns out that marketers should work with mixed marketing strategies, which will result in a full contagion of a network product and faster contagion rates with a higher probability.

     

Network effects,trade, and productivity

We consider network effects in the monopolistically competitive model of trade developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We show that a larger network effect intensifies competition by allowing more‐productive firms to raise prices and earn higher profits, but forcing less‐productive firms to reduce prices and earn lower profits. As a result, low‐productivity firms are driven out of the market. We also show that when network effects are asymmetric, it may be difficult for firms from a country with a small network effect to compete with firms from a country with a large network effect.     

-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model

Q-learning is a reinforcement learning model from the field of artificial intelligence. We study the use of Q-learning for modeling the learning behavior of firms in repeated Cournot oligopoly games. Based on computer simulations, we show that Q-learning firms generally learn to collude with each other, although full collusion usually does not emerge. We also present some analytical results. These results provide insight into the underlying mechanism that causes collusive behavior to emerge. Q-learning is one of the few learning models available that can explain the emergence of collusive behavior in settings in which there is no punishment mechanism and no possibility for explicit communication between firms.     

Quality Meets Structure: Generalized Reciprocity and Firm‐Level Advantage in Strategic Networks

In this paper we extend previous research by combining network structural and network process approaches. Specifically, in a six‐year, three‐wave study of 41 firms in two strategic networks, we found that the interaction between generalized reciprocity among a focal firm's partners and network tie intensity and betweenness centrality improved firm performance. No influences were observed for the interaction involving degree centrality and generalized reciprocity. Our research suggests that managers in strategic networks may need to consider the balance between relationship‐extensive and relationship‐intensive strategies.     

Emergence of innovation networks from R&D cooperation with endogenous absorptive capacity

This paper extends the existing literature on strategic R&D alliances by presenting a model of innovation networks with endogenous absorptive capacity. The networks emerge as a result of dynamic cooperation between firms occupying different locations in the knowledge space. Partner selection is driven by absorptive capacity which is itself influenced by cognitive distance and R&D investment allocation. Under different knowledge regimes, we examine the structure of networks that emerge and how firms perform within such networks. We find networks that exhibit small world properties which are generally robust to changes in the knowledge regime. Certain network strategies such as occupying brokerage positions or maximising accessibility to potential partners pay off, especially in ‘young’ industries with limited involuntary but abundant voluntary spillovers. This particular result is driven by endogenous absorptive capacity.     

Predictability in international stock returns using currency fluctuations and forward rate forecasts

We find that currency risk, specifically dollar exchange rate risk, is a determinant in firm stock returns worldwide. Firms exposed to various dollar exchange rate risks worldwide exhibit strong differences in expected returns, and firms with previously high sensitivity to their home country’s exchange rate fluctuation subsequently outperform during the following six to twelve months. This effect is robust across countries, time, exchange rate policies, and macroeconomic environments. We find that information in currency forward rates provides additional, useful information when predicting future returns of these currency-sensitive firms, and dynamic, state-space estimation of currency forward rate term structures complements the predictability.     

On the emergence of scale-free production networks

We propose a simple dynamical model for the formation of production networks among monopolistically competitive firms. The model subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach à la Arrow–Debreu but displays a wide set of potential dynamic behaviors. It robustly reproduces key stylized facts of firms׳ demographics. Our main result is that competition between intermediate good producers generically leads to the emergence of scale-free production networks.     

The competitive advantage of cluster firms: the priority of regional network position over extra-regional networks – a study of a French high-tech cluster

This paper extends research on industry clusters by unbundling network from cluster effects and by analysing how network effects drive the performance of cluster firms. The results show that a firm's connectedness in a regional network is positively associated with firm performance. However, we found that for cluster firms, it is even more important to build strong network positions by developing rather exclusive alliance networks. In addition, a weak position within a cluster cannot be compensated for by strong extra-regional networking activities. From this perspective, cluster-specific advantages are firm-specific and the basis for competitive advantage. Regional competitiveness is therefore a non-substitutable pre-condition for the overall performance of cluster firms.     

The Resource-Based View of Competitive Advantage in Two-Sided Markets

abstract    Using two-sided markets as a specific market context, we show that cross-group network effects can turn the participants of a two-sided network into critical resources. In two-sided markets such as payment cards and personal computer operating systems, two groups of agents interact with each other via a common network platform; the value of joining the network for agents in one group depends on the number of participants in the other group. In these markets, resource heterogeneity is represented by different sizes of existing networks; resource accumulation possesses all five characteristics of asset-stock accumulation summarized by Dierickx and Cool. The unique resource accumulation process provides an isolating mechanism for large networks to sustain their resource and competitive advantages. Using two dynamic systems models, we show that resource heterogeneity (i.e. varying initial network sizes) is a source of sustained competitive advantage for two-sided networks and has significant impact on long-term competition dynamics. The findings illustrate the importance of incorporating market context in the research of the resource-based view of competitive advantage.     

Firms in financial distress: evidence from inter-firm payment networks with volatility driven by ‘animal spirits’

This paper elaborates an agent-based model of a pure market economy to provide theoretical evidence on how volatility-induced changes in inter-firm payment networks affect the financial distress of firms. This volatility is driven by ‘animal spirits’ in that it arises from the feelings of optimism/pessimism independently of rational decision-making, and influences the liquidity available to each firm through the inter-firm payment network; consequently, some firms may enter financial distress. The model first determines the inter-firm payment network. Then, a mean-reverting square-root process introduces volatility into the inter-firm payment network through firms’ propensity to pay suppliers according to the payments that firms expect to receive from customers. The model is calibrated for compatibility with relevant macro- and microeconomic stylized facts. According to computational experiments, financial distress in the business sector is minimized when feelings of optimism/pessimism generate the lowest volatility in firms’ propensity to pay suppliers. In addition, this volatility must materialize around an intermediate value of firms’ propensity to pay suppliers, and firms must keep this intermediate value over time.

     

Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium with minimal information

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

     

Null models of economic networks: the case of the world trade web

In all empirical-network studies, the observed properties of economic networks are informative only if compared with a well-defined null model that can quantitatively predict the behavior of such properties in constrained graphs. However, predictions of the available null-model methods can be derived analytically only under assumptions (e.g., sparseness of the network) that are unrealistic for most economic networks like the world trade web (WTW). In this paper we study the evolution of the WTW using a recently-proposed family of null network models. The method allows to analytically obtain the expected value of any network statistic across the ensemble of networks that preserve on average some local properties, and are otherwise fully random. We compare expected and observed properties of the WTW in the period 1950–2000, when either the expected number of trade partners or total country trade is kept fixed and equal to observed quantities. We show that, in the binary WTW, node-degree sequences are sufficient to explain higher-order network properties such as disassortativity and clustering-degree correlation, especially in the last part of the sample. Conversely, in the weighted WTW, the observed sequence of total country imports and exports are not sufficient to predict higher-order patterns of the WTW. We discuss some important implications of these findings for international-trade models.