存货质押融资中银行与物流企业的演化博弈分析

以授信融资模式为例,借助演化博弈理论建立了存货质押融资中银行和物流企业的演化博弈模型,解析了双方的博弈过程,研究了影响博弈双方策略选择的决定因素及在不同策略下的收益分配。结果表明：银行的核查成本、对物流企业的罚金及物流企业的隐瞒收益等参数都直接影响系统的演化方向及博弈双方的策略选择。为存货质押融资健康有序的发展提供了一定的参考。     

基于B2B平台的线上供应链金融授信模式研究

以买方电子订单融资为例构建联合授信和委托授信模型,分别计算银行、平台个体收益与银行加平台总体收益最大化时的努力水平、期望收益及分配比例并进行对比分析。结果表明:两种模式总体收益最大化恒大于个体收益最大化之和,且委托授信下银行调查复核时总体收益恒大于不调查复核时总体收益,与业界银行选择调查复核行为一致;B2B平台工作效率决定线上供应链金融授信模式的选择。当平台工作效率低于某临界值,选择委托授信模式,反之则选择联合授信模式。最后,算例分析验证上述结论。     

政府预算绩效第三方评价中的博弈分析

尽管第三方政府预算绩效评价能有效促进国家治理现代化改革,但其中涉及的博弈问题可能会产生评价结果偏差.从静态博弈与动态演化博弈相关理论入手,分析了第三方评价机构和被评价单位之间的博弈关系及不同条件下的策略选择.研究结果和相关实践表明,委托方应加大第三方评价机构与被评价单位的违规成本和惩罚程度,转变相关理念,变"罚"为"奖...     

心理账户视角下互联网平台消费者金融信息保护行为演化博弈

随着互联网平台过度收集、违规使用消费者金融信息等事件频繁发生,加强金融监管及保护消费者金融信息安全成为亟待解决的热点问题。将前景理论和心理账户结合引入互联网平台和监管部门的博弈决策过程,构建双方演化博弈模型,并对相关影响因素进行仿真分析。结果发现,影响金融信息安全系统达到理想状态的关键在于互联网平台和监管部门的价值感知;强化第三方监督有助于促进监管部门强化监管以及改善互联网平台金融信息安全治理;成本参照点、风险偏好系数、损失规避系数会影响博弈双方的策略选择;降低监管成本、加大对平台的处罚力度、提高监管能力具有良好的政策引导效果,对互联网平台消费者金融信息保护有积极影响。     

互联网银行与传统银行合作策略选择的博弈研究

互联网银行的出现和发展倒逼传统银行加快信息科技建设步伐,目前趋势是两者选择互利合作。本文运用演化博弈中的捕鹿博弈构建了传统银行与互联网银行之间合作策略选择的演化博弈模型,通过参数变化、相位图和数值仿真,分析两者之间演化稳定策略与演化影响因素,为相关领域的进一步探索提供理论支持。研究结果表明,沉没成本、市场收益增量、社会声誉、合作成本变化量是双方选择合作策略的关键因素。通过数值仿真发现,在互联网银行发展初期阶段,收益分配比例对最终演化稳定影响较小。     

互补效应:银行与平台努力水平与利润分配契约

在线供应链金融发展迅速,银行与B2B平台合作已经成为主流模式。本文基于银行与平台双向道德风险的视角,采用委托代理理论和博弈论对银行与平台合作时努力水平存在互补情况下的利润分配问题进行研究。结果显示:在银行与B2B平台的合作过程中,双方付出的努力水平都会随着对方付出努力水平的增加而增加,且存在使得各自剩余份额最大的努力水平;最优剩余份额是由成员的相对重要性即谈判话语权唯一决定的,随着自身在授信审查过程中的相对重要性的上升而增加,但是最优的剩余份额分配偏离帕累托最优分配。     

地方商业银行与第三方支付平台的竞合关系思考——以福建A银行为例

近年来,第三方支付平台展现出巨大的影响力,其在冲击银行传统零售业务的基础下,也促进了银行创新与转型发展。通过构建地方商业银行与第三方支付平台的博弈模型,将地方商业银行和第三方支付平台依次作为决策方,设定选择合作或竞争作为双方之间的博弈策略,通过动态博弈选择,获得地方商业银行和第三方支付平台的博弈结果。并且,以福建A银行为例,对其与第三方支付平台的竞合关系进行现实考察,验证博弈分析的结果。基于地方商业银行视角,从竞争层面看,应提高自身渠道功能,增强竞争实力;从合作层面看,应积极开展业务合作,实现业内共赢。     

政府引导基金、创业投资与企业创新——基于演化博弈视角

本文通过构建初创企业、创投机构和政府的三方演化博弈模型，运用Matlab数值仿真模拟，研究政府引导基金如何通过设定不同运作模式利用市场化运作达到政策性目标。结果发现，政府引导基金可以通过实施不同程度的让利激励或监管惩罚，影响创投机构投资策略和初创企业创新策略选择，使初创企业、创投机构和政府三方达到理想的演化均衡。在当前政府引导基金实施的让利机制中增加监管惩罚能更有效解决政府引导基金特殊的双重委托代理问题，使引导资金真正流向初创企业、促进创新。本文建议，政府引导基金应该有选择地进入创投领域；通过加强知识产权保护以提高创新预期收益、利用区块链技术建立政府引导基金私链以降低监管成本、提高惩罚力度以威慑创投机构违约等都可以打破劣后均衡转向理想均衡。     

基于公平偏好的银行对B2B平台激励机制研究

银电合作是目前在线供应链金融的主要实施形式,在传统的委托代理模型中加入"公平偏好"因素,从信息对称与非对称两个方面,研究银行对B2B平台的激励问题,并分析非对称信息下银行的代理成本。结果显示:为了降低"道德风险",银行无须采取监督与控制的办法,只要雇佣横向公平偏好程度尽可能高的代理人,就会尽可能减少代理成本,增加银行的期望收益,这为银行如何争取更高的话语权,解决高监督成本难题提供新的思路。     

P2P平台下农村供应链融资的风险控制策略研究

农村供应链融资是P2P平台服务农村金融的新型模式,基于演化博弈理论构建借款农户、核心企业与P2P平台的三方演化博弈模型,分析各融资主体行为选择及演化稳定策略,并采用数值仿真模拟系统探讨决策参数对演化轨迹的影响。研究发现:融资主体间的行为策略彼此相互影响,任何一方行为决策同时受到其他两方制约;控制融资额度、降低违约获取的超额收益能够有效降低融资风险;融资审核、监管成本对于核心企业与P2P平台的策略选择具有较大影响;违约成本、正向激励机制及完善的信息披露机制能够有效制约融资不良行为发生。     

Beyond the exchange--the future of B2B

Using the Internet to facilitate business-to-business commerce promises many benefits, such as dramatic cost reductions and greater access to buyers and sellers. Yet little is known about how B2B e-commerce will evolve. The authors argue that changes in the financial services industry over the past two decades provide important clues. Exchanges, they say, are not the primary source of value in information-intensive markets; value tends to accumulate among a diverse group of specialists that focus on such tasks as packaging, standard setting, arbitrage, and information management. Because scale and liquidity are vitally important to efficient trading, today's exchanges will consolidate into a relatively small set of mega-exchanges. Originators will handle the origination and aggregation of complex transactions before sending them on to mega-exchanges for execution. E-speculators, seeking to capitalize on an abundance of market information, will tend to concentrate where relatively standardized products can be transferred easily among a large group of buyers. In many markets, a handful of independent solution providers with well-known brand names and solid reputations will thrive alongside mega-exchanges. Sell-side asset exchanges will create the networks and provide the tools to allow suppliers to trade orders among themselves, sometimes after initial transactions with customers are made on the mega-exchanges. For many companies, traditional skills in such areas as product development, manufacturing, and marketing may become relatively less important, while the ability to understand and capitalize on market dynamics may become considerably more important.     

E-hubs: the new B2B (business-to-business) marketplaces

Electronic hubs--Internet-based intermediaries that host electronic marketplaces and mediate transactions among businesses--are generating a lot of interest. Companies like Ariba, Chemdex, and Commerce One have already attained breathtaking stock market capitalizations. Venture capitalists are pouring money into more business-to-business start-ups. Even industrial stalwarts like GM and Ford are making plans to set up their own Web markets. As new entrants with new business models pour into the business-to-business space, it's increasingly difficult to make sense of the landscape. This article provides a blueprint of the e-hub arena. The authors start by looking at the two dimensions of purchasing: what businesses buy--manufacturing inputs or operating inputs--and how they buy--through systematic sourcing or spot sourcing. They classify B2B e-hubs into four categories: MRO hubs, yield managers, exchanges, and catalog hubs, and they discuss each type in detail. Drilling deeper into this B2B matrix, the authors look at how e-hubs create value--through aggregation and matching--and explain when each mechanism works best. They also examine the biases of e-hubs. Although many e-hubs are neutral--they're operated by independent third parties--some favor the buyers or sellers. The authors explain the differences and discuss the pros and cons of each position. The B2B marketplace is changing rapidly. This framework helps buyers, sellers, and market makers navigate the landscape by explaining what the different hubs do and how they add the most value.     

张钢“涮”出50亿

一个小小的涮锅，却孕育出50亿的餐饮帝国。作为“小肥羊”创始人的张钢一定没想到若干年后他的火锅企业会被国际顶级投资商3i相中，会被追棒为“中国餐饮第一股”。[编者按]     

再论B股市场

文章对中国的B股市场有精彩论述。     

T. B. Sprague

1. Introduction.

The object of this work is to show that the effective rate of interest of loans practically can be calculated with so great an accuracy that all practical demands regarding accuracy are more than satisfied. As will be seen from section 5, the effective rate of interest can be very quickly calculated by use of inverse linear interpolation for ordinarily occurring cases with a result which in general is correct with 3, 4 or more figures all according to practical demands. These methods can generally be used for all types of loans.     

B2B电商平台供应链金融典型模式及其比较分析

在对电商平台供应链金融模式进行总结的基础上,聚焦B2B电商平台的供应链金融业务,对9家典型B2B电商平台开展的供应链金融业务及其产品进行了描述,并从平台涉及领域、供应链金融开始时间、金融产品模式等六个方面进行了对比分析。结果表明:B2B电商平台往往是采取与金融机构合作的方式获取供应链金融资金需求;开展大宗物资交易的B2B电商平台开展供应链金融业务相对较早;与传统线下供应链金融业务相比,B2B电商平台供应链金融在信用融资和订单融资方面更有优势;B2B电商平台供应链金融产品可以根据不同平台以及买卖双方的特点进行创新设计,最后为电商供应链融资业务的发展提出建议。     

B2C老大之争

在众多商家眼里,"金九银十"是一年中最重要的促销时节. 原本不怎么受节日气氛影响的网络销售现在也铆足了劲儿,不管是当当、卓越等B2C类网站还是淘宝、易趣等C2C类网站,都无一例外地推出了各种诱人的促销计划.     

Let's hear it for B players

In the much-heralded war for talent, it's hardly surprising that companies have invested a lot of time, money, and energy in hiring and retaining star performers. For most CEOs, recruiting stars is simply more fun; for one thing, the young A players they interview often remind them of themselves at the same age. For another, A players' brilliance and drive is infectious; you simply want to be in their company. Besides, in these troubled times, when businesses are so vulnerable, people who seem to have what it takes to turn around a company's performance are almost irresistible. But our understandable fascination with star performers can lure us into the dangerous trap of underestimating the vital importance of the supporting actors. It's true that A players can make enormous contributions to performance. Yet, as the authors have found, companies' long-term performance--even survival--depends far more on the unsung commitment and contributions of their B players. These capable, steady performers are the best supporting actors of the corporate world. Companies are routinely blinded to the important role B players serve in saving organizations from themselves. They counter-balance the ambitions of the company's high-performing visionaries, whose much-esteemed strengths, when carried to an extreme, can lead to reckless or volatile behavior. In this sense, B players act as a stabilizing force for charismatic A players who might otherwise destabilize the organization. Unfortunately, organizations rarely learn to value their B players in ways that are gratifying for either the company or these employees. As a result, they see their profits sinking without understanding why. This article will help you to rethink the role of your organization's B players. The authors show how you can mentor and nurture B players to ensure their continued participation in the company.