关于自然人破产的法律问题探析

自然人破产在保护债权人和债务人利益以及维护市场经济秩序等方面具有积极的作用.中国现行法律只允许商法人破产,不承认商自然人破产,这不利于市场经济的发展.新修订的<中华人民共和国破产法>(草案)虽出现了自然人破产条款,但仅限于商自然人,其弊端尤为明显.建立自然人破产制度是中国目前立法亟待解决的问题.     

论自然人破产法律制度的构建

中国的新破产法在内容与结构上有很大进步,但只是将适用范围扩大到合伙企业等商主体,仍未将自然人纳入进去,这不失为一个缺憾。建立自然人破产法律制度,可以促进公平竞争,是市场主体地位平等的体现,同时也是弥补新破产法的不足以及与国际破产规则接轨的需要。通过对自然人破产制度的必要性与可行性进行分析,并结合中国具体国情,构建自然人破产法律制度的框架。     

浅谈个人破产制度在我国的确立

个人破产即自然人破产制度是世界各国通行的一种破产制度,是市场经济下商品交换发展的产物。在破产法制史上,个人破产是破产法的起源,贯穿了破产法发展的全过程,法人破产不过是个人破产基础上的延伸。无论英美法系国家,还是大陆法系国家,也无论实行商人破产主义抑或一般人破产主义国家,自然人破产作为破产法调整对象之一始终在破产法中占有重要地     

我国自然人破产制度立法研究

自然人破产制度是破产制度的开端,它始终贯穿于整个破产法的发展。现在世界各国普遍准予自然人破产。为了实现法律体系的完善和与国际接轨,我国必须建立自然人破产制度。要构建符合我国国情的自然人破产制度,应当综合考虑多方面的因素。在立法上宜采用一般破产主义,制定《中华人民共和国破产法(试行)》,该法包括总则和分则两部分。总则为企业和自然人破产的相同规定;分则分别为企业和自然人破产制度的特有制度,后者如自由财产制度、破产免责制度、人格破产和复权制度。同时,还必须完善相关制度,如自然人财产管理制度,以助自然人破产制度的实施。     

遗产破产能力刍议

破产能力(R onrw rsfuh igke it)的概念来源于德国的破产法理论,是指有破产原因的债务人具有的法律上为破产程序之进行的资格。破产法建立的初衷首要解决的问题就是自然人破产,其面向的对象是自然人。自然人破产是破产制度的基础和起点,并自此发展出其他主体诸如遗产破产等的破产制度。我国破产法草案规定,具有破产能力的惟一主体是企业法人。目前,学术界对赋予遗产破产能力的讨论随着对自然人破产的倡导而日渐升温,只是囿于传统观念及意识形态的影响,尚未能达成共识。一、遗产破产能力的特点1.遗产破产的主体是遗产。在这里,遗产可以被认…     

建立我国个人破产立法适用范围的局限性

1994年,中国开始起草新的<破产法>,在当时引起了社会的广泛关注,但时至今日个人破产的立法制度仍未出台.这一法律始终未能出台的一个重要原因是个人破产立法制度的适用范围问题.其中,争议最大的就是农村问题.本文认为,按照我国目前的经济发展状况,个人破产制度的适用对象应当排除农村居民.     

从破产理念谈我国财产管理人制度的建立

我国破产法中关于清算组的选任制度与现行的破产法立法理念不相符合,导致了侵害社会利益、债权人利益及破产企业职工利益的问题时有发生。文章在研究和分析现行破产理念的基础上,针对我国破产清算组制度的缺陷,探讨在我国建立破产管理人以取代清算组,并引入政府公共办公室和私人管理人相结合的破产管理人双轨制度,以进一步完善我国的破产立法。     

浅谈个人破产制度的构建

鉴于我国现行企业破产法和民事诉讼法规定的破产原因,不仅缺乏可操作性,而且不利于企业摆脱困难,恢复生机,所以我国新破产法应与国际通行做法接轨,将不能清偿到期债务作为破产原因。为防止个人利用破产恶意逃债,应该制定相应的时候监督制度,更好的发挥破产的价值功能。立法上设立破产制度目的是一方面是平等的满足债权人的利益,另一方面也是为债务人提供了一次摆脱债务缠身的合法选择。     

我国破产管理人选任制度评析

2007年6月1日起施行的新《破产法》引入破产管理人制度。破产管理人作为破产法中最重要的机构之一,是破产程序中所有利益的焦点。而破产管理人选任问题是破产管理人制度的首要问题,关系到破产管理人能否公正、有效地行使职责。目前我国破产管理人选任制度还存在一定缺陷。因此,通过分析破产管理人法律地位、选任方式、选任时间、执业资格的确认等,以寻求完善破产管理人选任制度的解决之道。     

关于建立我国破产管理人制度的构想

关于建立我国破产管理人制度的构想王继红一、我国建立破产管理人制度的必要性随着改革进程加快，企业的破产将日益增多．为使破产案件得以公正、公平、有效地处理，加强其监督、管理机制，可适当借鉴国外破产立法中破产管理人的规定，在重新制定破产法时，增设破产管理人...     

Sale-Backs in Bankruptcy

When bankrupt firms are sold, they are often repurchased bytheir former owner or manager. These insiders are by defaultbetter informed than outsiders about the true value of the firmor its assets, so other potential buyers must worry about overpayingif they win. The presence of insiders may thus have a chillingeffect on the bidding. We ask how insiders should be treatedin bankruptcy sales: Should they be allowed to submit bids?If so, under what conditions? We derive properties of an optimalsale procedure and show that it must be biased against insiders.Specifically, it should be harder for insiders to win with lowbids than for outsiders. We show that the "market tests" thatare routinely required in bankruptcy sales are suboptimal sincethey treat all potential buyers alike and forgo the benefitsof biasing the procedure against insiders.     

破产的故事

破产故事,重组故事,谁的故事更好听?今年8月1日,最高人民法院《关于审理企业破产案件若干问题的规定》公布,并将从下月1日开始施行。新规定扩大了破产案件受理范围,股份制公司也在受理之列,为证券市场的上市公司破产提供了初步的法律依据。也许,破产还是重组的选择,十多年来第一次如此真切地逼近了中国上市公司。十多年来,中国股市一直拒绝听破产的故事,甚至一度连退市的故事也不愿听。重组不仅是永恒的主题,而且几乎成为压倒一切的理由。为此付出的代价不仅是经济上的,事实上重组一家濒于破产的上市公司的成本远远超过重新组建一家新的企业;更为严重的问题是,该破不破、该退不退,令资本市场制度性风险迅速积聚,虚假重组、虚假利润事件的发生频率急剧增大,投资者权益受到不应有的漠视和侵犯。     

Bankruptcy Decision Making

When a firm encounters financial distress, there is a significantpossibility that, at some point, the firm itself should be shutdown and its assets put to better use. But Chapter 11 and indeedall market-mimicking reorganization regimes other than a speedyauction entrust the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judgewho lacks information and expertise, as well as the abilityto control the timing of her decisions. Understanding the costsof entrusting the shutdown decision to a bankruptcy judge iscentral to assessing any law of corporate reorganizations. Thisarticle models the shutdown decision as the exercise of a realoption. The model suggests that the shutdown decision may loomso large in the early parts of the bankruptcy case that it erasesany significant difference between Chapter 11 and many alternativemarket-mimicking regimes. All these regimes take more time thanmandatory auctions and thus increase the cost of taking theshutdown decision away from a market actor. Moreover, the realoption itself gives parties an incentive to withhold information.Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount oftime the shutdown option resides with an inexpert decision makerand forces insiders to give that decision maker sufficient informationto value the option while it is in her hands.     

Bankruptcy and firm finance

This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.      

破产重整与破产和解程序之比较

作为破产预防的程序机制，重整与和解有许多相同之处，但是二者在价值层面和制度层面存在诸多差异，尤以价值层面差异为最。重整与和解各有优缺点，唯有两者同时存在，并互为补充，才有利于使破产法体系更臻于完善，更接近法律所致力追求的公平与正义。     

Bankruptcy regime and the banking system

Banks’ behavior as creditors relies heavily on the content of legal rights granted by the national bankruptcy laws. Using a sample of 87 countries over the period 2005–2016, this paper investigates whether the degree of such legal rights influences the following banking indicators: (1) private credit, (2) bank lending-deposit spread, and (3) foreign banks’ presence. Robust dynamic panel estimates indicate a significant and positive impact only on foreign banks’ presence in countries with a high level of creditors’ protection and bankruptcy systems that encourage the survival of financially distressed firms.     

Strategic Bankruptcy and Private Pension Default

Instantiated patterns of oil-based energy use have been difficult to change across sectors and societies. Although faced with price increases, diminishing supplies, and climate externalities, many sectors still depend on oil-based energy and have not fully adapted to changing resource conditions. Using a theoretical approach of institutional change, we offer a fine-grained analysis of factors limiting and facilitating energy adaptations. In this case study of farmers in Maine, we identify patterns in their perceptions of the macro-energy environment, adaptation strategies, and anticipated energy challenges. We segment the farms into groups representing small diversified farms and larger commodity farms, and investigate within and across farm sectors to understand farmer strategies for responding to changing energy prices. Significant differences in customs and beliefs, perceptions, and intended institutional changes are found between the small diversified and the larger commodity farms. The ability of farms within these sectors to successfully integrate positive institutional change will determine their possibility to evolve as sustainable enterprises.     

A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria.