Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice.     

Macroeconomic stability and economic justice

This article presents a proposal to broaden the right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital as a means of promoting sustainable economic recovery and growth. It would open the markets for real and financial capital acquisition more fully and competitively to poor and working people (1) to distribute more broadly the earnings of capital and (2) to profitably employ more capital and labor. Both the recession and the strategies advanced to promote economic recovery may be viewed as responses to the prospect of inadequate present and future earning capacity of both consumers and producers (1) to purchase what can physically be produced and (2) to repay existent and anticipated debt obligations. To increase the prospects of sufficient, sustainable earning capacity, the proposal advanced in this article would extend to all people the same protections and benefits presently provided by government that facilitate market transactions whereby capital is acquired with the earnings of capital primarily for well-capitalized people. Although in theory, all people in a market economy are able to acquire capital with the earnings of capital, reliable empirical data reveal that as a practical matter, the major determinant of the ability of individuals to acquire capital with the earnings of capital is the existing distribution of capital ownership. The theory of “binary” economic growth underlying this proposal holds that the market return on capital is positively related to the distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital. The prospect of a broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital carries with it the prospect of more broadly distributed earning capacity in future years, which in turn will provide the market incentives to profitably employ more capital and labor in earlier years. The idea that the broader distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital will promote growth is not found in any of the widely accepted theories and models of economic growth such as those proposed by Schumpeter, Solow, Roemer, and Lucas. By opening to all people the institutions of corporate finance, banking, insurance, government loans and guaranties, and monetary policy (the very institutions presently relied upon by the Federal Government to stimulate the economy) the practical ability to acquire capital with the earnings of capital can be more broadly extended to all people with the result that greatly enhanced prospects for greater and more broadly distributed earning capacity and growth can be reasonably expected and realized by all.     

Macroeconomic stability and economic justice

This paper has benefitted from discussions with Thomas Naylor, Edward Kane, John Westerhof, Walter Benjamin, Loren Eckroth, Forrest Smith and Jane Sheffield.     

Labour markets, social justice and economic efficiency

In conventional economic theory, a trade-off supposedly existsbetween social justice and economic efficiency. In reality,market and other economic institutions are dominated by powerrelations, so that the sponsorship of social justice is a productivefactor. Neo-liberal economic policies, by lifting the constraintson the exercise of unequal power, increased injustice and triggereda downward economic and social spiral. Reversing this requiresa revolution in economic theory and policy focused on full employment,the working of labour markets, the organisation of work, andhousehold organisation, social provision and self-sufficiency.     

Environmental decisions and theories of justice: Implications for economic analysis and policy practice

This article examines the implications of pluralism for environmental decision-making and governance in the globalizing world. It first discusses how environmental governance is needed to deal with environmental conflicts and interdependencies caused by the attributes of environmental resources and their users. The article argues that globalization engenders large-scale interdependencies and conflicts that involve increasingly heterogeneous individuals and organizations. The article suggests that the resulting radical pluralism will underline the role of justice in providing reasons and justifications for collective environmental decisions and will shift emphasis from distributive justice to procedural justice. The article concludes by discussing solutions that would take justice concerns into account in environmental governance. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A03DH034 00004     

Conjugate duality: Some applications to economic theory

A simple duality theorem in nonlinear programming is given using conjugate function concepts. This is applied to problems in the theory of the firm with Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions, to utility functions for consumer demand, and also to the problem of spatial market equilibrium.     

On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.     

Friendship,not altruism: an economic theory with cross-cultural applications

Friendship is both ubiquitous and economically important, but neglected in the economic literature. We provide a definition of friendship supported by anthropology research that we believe is plausible, widely accepted, and distinct from altruism. This motivates a game-theoretic model of friendship that provides a characterization of how friendship in a bilateral relationship can explain cooperation in a finite-horizon setting without the aid of altruism or pro-social preferences. We highlight the difference between two key equilibria of our model: opportunistic friendship that is short-lived and driven by material support, and sustained friendship that is long-lived and is distinguished from opportunistic friendship by the provision of support without the expectation of return. Opportunistic friendship seems more likely in environments characterized by economic uncertainty such as in developing countries or immigrant communities. We provide cross-cultural examples of friendship that are consistent with the conditions underpinning opportunistic versus sustained friendship equilibria.     

Rumors and the Financial Marketplace

In the contemporary financial marketplace, the consequences of speculation and decision making based on unfounded assertions and false rumors can be especially potent and undeniably dangerous. With the emergence of the Internet and other new communication technologies that facilitate the spread of misinformation, it has become essential for managers, investors, and other stakeholders to acquire a better understanding of the forces that give rise to rumors and the most effective strategies for dealing with them. This paper describes how the uncertainties and anxieties generated by ambiguous situations, coupled with a strong desire for information, can frequently lead to the generation and spreading of rumors in business environments. Although relatively little research attention has been paid to the particularities of financial rumors, the author identifies some key characteristics that appear to distinguish financial rumors from rumors about other aspects of business operations, such as greater conciseness, a shorter life cycle, and the potential for significant economic consequences. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research and for actions that can be taken to minimize the potentially harmful effects of financial rumors.     

Star-shapedness of Richter-Aumann integral on a measure space with atoms: theory and economic applications

This paper provides sufficient (as well as necessary) conditions for the integral of a correspondence defined on a measure space with atoms to exhibit star-shaped values. This result is used to analyze the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of agents with atoms and of a competitive equilibrium in economies with mixed markets. In either case it is shown that an exact equilibrium exists whenever atoms are “small enough”.     

The Tenuous Grasp: Possession and Loss in the Marketplace

Generally speaking, markets serve as provisioning mechanisms, facilitating the supply of goods and services to customers. Extensive supply chains with specialist intermediaries create a flow of diverse items to consumers. However, market institutions can also serve as a de-provisioning technology, taking things away from customers. That is, markets can work in reverse. One example is the repossession of a vehicle. The process is often detrimental to low income and minority individuals.     

On economic applications of the genetic algorithm: a model of the cobweb type

This paper explores the idea of using artificial adaptive agents in economic theory. In particular, we use Genetic Algorithms (GAs) to model the learning behavior of a population of adaptive and boundedly rational agents interacting in an economic system. We analyze the behavior of a GA in two versions of a model of the cobweb-type, one in which firms make only quantity choices, and the other one in which firms first decide to exit or to stay in the market, and subsequently decide how much to produce. We present simulations with different coding schemes and interpret the rather surprising differences between the results for different setups by employing the mathematical theory for GAs with state-dependent fitness functions. In particular, we explain the relationship between coding and convergence properties of GAs.     

Self-interest and fairness: self-serving choices of justice principles

We introduce non-enforceable property rights over a bargaining surplus in a dictator game with production, where the agent’s effort is differentially rewarded and subsequently determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data, we elicit individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian principles and provide evidence to support the inability of these justice principles to individually account for the observed behavior. We show that the justice principle that can be used to explain dictators’ choices depends on whether dictators are paid more or less than recipients for their effort. Our findings suggest that dictators do employ justice principles in self-serving ways and choose in each context the justice principle that maximizes their financial payoffs.