Truth,self, and feminism

Humanistic economics is founded on the reality of human needs. One of those needs is for truth. According to the correspondence theory, that truth is a relation between statement and objective reality. This reality serves as a constraint on the (ego) self. Therefore, it can also be shown that self-interest is an independent principle from the commitment to truth, and that these two principles can clash. These two principles of the self, or the “higher” and “lower” self, constitute what we call the dual self. In a critique of humanistic economics from a feminist direction, Julie Nelson has claimed that such dualisms form a hierarchy that is sympathetic of patriarchal hierarchies. In a previous response to that criticism we showed that Nelson’s own work involved similar hierarchies. Here we attempt to show how Nelson's conception of value hierarchies involving the feminine and masculine and our conception can be resolved into one coherent framework.     

The Economics and Ethics of Minimum Wage Legislation

Recent empirical studies have led the economics profession to question the proposition that minimum wage legislation necessarily leads to greater unemployment. This paper extends the analysis of these studies by providing several theoretical reasons why these empirical results may reflect a larger truth. Moreover, it addresses a relatively neglected aspect of the minimum wage debate - its ethical dimensions. Specifically, do the elementary principles of economic justice mandate that employees who “play by the rules”, should earn a “living wage”? This paper argues that the minimum wage is a successful economic policy that is consistent with economic justice.     

A Philosopher's Comment on Philosophico-Economic Relations

Scottish philosophers in the eighteenth century interpreted the market economy as a “civil society,” a path toward freedom and a new morality, separate from monarchal government. They expected markets to be self regulating and expected them to function with ties to a moral life. The market was a civil order, but that vision was destroyed when corporations rose to power in succeeding centuries, and governments were enlarged to regulate markets. Today we see a concern about big corporations and government bureaucracy, and a return to the idea of a “civil society.” This article proposes that today's vision of “civil society” is advanced by an economy that returns to its principles of self (civil) regulation. Markets become civil and self regulating when government, business, and nonprofits cooperate to create systems of social accountability for the common good. A self-regulating market is constructed experimentally through civil associations with self-enforceable codes of conduct, civic-oriented partnerships, legislation, banking, investments, and corporations whose policies are based on stakeholder studies that reduce moral and financial costs. Modest steps toward a self-regulating economy offers a foundation for today's version of a “civil society.”     

Exchange Rate Regimes and Currency Crises: an Evaluation using Extreme Value Theory*

We test whether the exchange regime in place has an impact on the vulnerability of countries to currency crises. Our paper is distinguishable from others (i) in its use of extreme value theory to identify currency crisis periods and (ii) in using two separate designations for the exchange regime in place. The first is the self‐reported or announced exchange rate system. The second classification scheme, by Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger, is based on the relative movements of international reserves and exchange rates. The Levy‐Yeyati and Sturzenegger procedure is intended to reveal the actual as distinct from the “legal” exchange arrangement. We find, interestingly, that the announced exchange regime has an impact on the likelihood of currency crises, while the “true” or observed regime does not. Announced pegged exchange regimes increase the risk of currency crisis even if, in reality, the exchange rate system in place is not pegged.     

资产专用性、网络扩展和私人秩序

“公地悲剧”自哈丁提出以来 ,该名词成了揭示并批判公有产权的理论依据。可是 ,回眸现实 ,我们常听到网络、网络外部性 ,也常看到经济中的许多现象是公有产权 ,并且这些公有产权还在不断地扩展并呈繁荣之势。对此 ,理论上的解释是一个模糊的概念———网络外部性。本人对此提出自己的解释。通过自我实施的合约分析 ,我认为由于资产专用性的存在 ,个人进入网络投下不可收回的沉淀成本 ,由此构成可置信性承诺 ,通过私人秩序扩展了网络 ,实现了“公地繁荣”①。本文分为四部分 :第一部分提出观点 ;第二部分是私人秩序的博弈分析与论证 ,第三部分理论应用 ;最后归纳全文。     

Lying,Integrity, and Cooperation

While talk is cheap to some, it is expensive to others for whom moral considerations come into play. We employ a simple two-stage modified prisoner's dilemma game where integrity is endowed on a continuum to analyze when agents will lie in random economic interactions. If there is sufficient integrity in the population, all agents make a promise in the first stage to cooperate in the second. Some agents always lie, some always tell the truth, and some behave conditionally. Enhanced cooperation is a byproduct of integrity. In a second random interaction without the possibility of exit, some agents “switch” their behavior, that is, some who lied in the first period now tell the truth in the second (they've “reformed”), and some who told the truth in the first period now lie in the second (they've become “cynical”).     

Epistemology and the tasks of feminist economics

This paper examines the implications of current epistemological debates for the work of feminist economists. Feminist economists must acknowledge (in accordance with recent developments in the study of science) that (a) inquirers can never be certain whether claims about the world are true; (b) scientific inquiry is permeated with “internal” and “external” values; and (c) beliefs are affected by inquirers' social locations. But feminists should not, it argues, embrace the “relativist” stance of some postmodern thinkers, or reject the ideal of “truth,” or argue that beliefs are strictly determined by inquirers' identities and interests. It seeks to outline an epistemological “middle ground” for feminist economics, between the extremes of exaggerated claims of certainty and a disempowering relativism.     

Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement

This article examines equilibrium self‐improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated—some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self‐improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self‐improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain “acceptable.” But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self‐improvement.     

Local perfection

We investigate solution concepts for normal-form games with large strategy spaces. “Trembling hand” perfection (THP) is extended to games with compact metric strategy sets. A Nash equilibrium is THP if it is the limit of equilibria in which agents face vanishingly small uncertainty. We refine THP by imposing some structure on the kind of uncertainty that agents face: a THP equilibrium is locally perfect if the uncertainty is “predominantly local” in nature, i.e., if agents' probability assessments assign, in the limit, an overwhelmingly lage proportion of the total probability mass to events “in the vicinity of the truth.”     

Online Discussion and Learning Outcomes

This paper describes how we used Facebook as a discussion tool in the instruction of a principles level economics course and reports empirical estimates of the affect of that use on learning outcomes. Social media as a tool for promoting classroom discussion has advantages and disadvantages. For example, its omnipresence and flat learning curve can promote academic discourse. However social media can promote nonacademic “chatting”, and its omnipresence means the user needs more than a passing knowledge of the privacy settings to have control of their “digital identity”. For a Principles of Microeconomics taught in 2011 we collected data, with permission from our institution’s Institutional Review Board, on student use of Facebook, academic and demographic characteristics, learning style preferences and learning outcomes. Our research hypothesis is that an empirical analysis will find a positive correlation between student in-class use of Facebook and learning outcomes. Among our findings are that students should receive more coaching on the use of privacy settings, and qualified evidence that there is a positive net effect on learning outcomes of using Facebook as a discussion tool.     

专用性、专有性与企业制度

本文认为 ,虽然剩余索取权和控制权安排是企业制度的重要内容 ,但企业制度的本质却是如何创造和分配组织租金。现有文献往往含混地将“专用性”视为当事人获得组织租金的法理甚至经济基础 ,然而事实上 ,“专用性”不但不是当事人获得组织租金的谈判力基础 ,反而削弱了这一基础。基于此 ,我们提出当事人获得企业组织租金的谈判力基础应该是“专有性” ,并且这一变量极大地影响着企业制度的选择和演变。总之 ,我们认为现实中的企业制度安排并非是社会福利最大化或交易费用最小化的产物 ,而是理性的当事人相互博弈的结果。     

“双一流”建设与经济学发展的中国贡献?

作为社会科学的“皇冠”,经济学的学科建设在中国“双一流”建设中,尤其在世界一流学科建设中具有重要意义,也将对中国全面深化改革以实现国家治理现代化提供重要的现实指导。文章首先分析了世界一流经济学科建设之于“双一流”战略导向的契合度,然后探讨了中国的世界一流经济学科建设所面临的难点及其突破点,进而阐述了中国可从哪些方面为经济学的发展和创新做出贡献。研究认为,打造中国的世界一流经济学科需要按照国际同行学术标准进行评价,所研究的问题(包括中国问题)应该是国际同行关注的问题,从而需要从完善学科分类评价体系、加强原创性研究和高层次人才集聚等方面加以突破。与此同时,针对经济学在中国的发展和创新,研究指出,对于中国传统经济思想的历史禀赋和现代价值的挖掘、具有原创性的理论研究和方法论研究创新以及基于中国经济改革发展实践的理论提炼升华,是中国经济学界可以且应该做出重要贡献的三个方向。     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

A POSITIVE THEORY OF GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE*

This article presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model explaining cross‐country data on geographical mobility, unemployment, and labor market institutions. Rational forward‐looking agents vote on unemployment insurance (UI). Agents with higher moving costs (larger attachment to their location) prefer more generous UI. Attachment is assumed to increase with the duration of residence. UI mitigates incentives for moving and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. This self‐reinforcing mechanism can yield two steady‐states: one “European” and one “American.” The former (latter) features high (low) unemployment, low (high) geographical mobility, and high (low) UI.     

Difference‐Form Persuasion Contests

We explore the equilibrium properties of two types of “difference‐form” persuasion contest functions derived in Skaperdas and Vaidya in which contestants spend resources to persuade an audience. We find that both types of functions generate interior pure strategy Nash equilibria unlike Baik and Che and Gale with characteristics different to existing literature. For one type of function, we find that the reaction function of each player is “flat” and nonresponsive to the level of resources devoted by the rival so that the “preemption effect” as defined by Che and Gale is absent. Further, the equilibrium is invariant to the sequencing of moves. For the second type of function, which applies when there is asymmetry among contestants with regard to the quality of evidence, we find that the reaction functions of the stronger and weaker players have gradients with opposite signs relative to Dixit and therefore their incentive to precommit expenditures in a sequential move game is also different. For both types of functions, the extent of rent dissipation is partial. From the equilibrium analysis, we are also able to establish the potential effects of some specific factors affecting persuasion such as evidence potency, the degree of truth, and bias on aggregate resource expenditures and welfare.     

Theory-driven facts and the growth in earnings inequality

It is widely accepted that the rise in U.S. wage inequality can be explained by skill-biased technological change: workplace computerization produced demand shifts that worked with a simply supply and demand “vision” of the labor market than with direct statistical evidence, which is remarkably limited. Indeed, the dominance of this elementary textbook vision has led, I argue, to a conflation between statistical facts and “theory-driven” facts—those statements about reality that are selected, interpreted, or simply created to confirm a vision of the way things work. The paper concludes by outlining an alternative explanation of the growth in wage inequality based on a sharply different, Gordonian, vision of the labor market.     

Starve all the lawyers: four theories of the just price

The only “sense in which we can meaningfully talk about just wages or just prices”, said Friedrich Hayek, is for wages and prices “determined in a free market without deception, fraud or violence”. Conversely, after reviewing three theories of the just price, this paper proposes a classical liberal theory of the just price, called the “catallactic” theory, according to which our understanding of just prices must account for the background institutions of markets. Some transactions could not happen in a market without a certain theory of just prices and such transactions will feed into our understanding of markets, hence making just prices a de facto reality.     

Incentives for Journal Editors

Scholars may become journal editors because editors may generate more citations of their own works. This paper empirically establishes that a scholar's publications are more likely to be cited by papers in a journal that is edited by the scholar. We then test if editors exercise influence on authors to cite editors’ papers by either pressuring authors (“editor‐pressure” hypothesis) or accepting articles with references to the editors’ papers (“editor‐selection” hypothesis), by using the keyword analysis and the forward citation analysis, respectively. We find no evidence for the two hypotheses, which leaves self‐selection as a possible cause for the editor effect. JEL classification: J01     

Normative economics and paternalism: the problem with the preference-satisfaction account of welfare

The normative turn of behavioral economics has led to a reconsideration of paternalism in normative economics. This article argues however that the preference-satisfaction account of welfare that still dominates welfare economics makes impossible to account for all the dimensions of the debate over paternalism. The laundered preferences approach and the alternative selves approach are two available frameworks to reconcile the consumer sovereignty principle that underlies the preference-satisfaction account with the fact that preferences are endogenous and context-dependent. I show however that neither of them is able to account for autonomy-related issues which are central in current debates over “soft” or “libertarian” paternalism. I suggest that a justification of paternalism compatible with liberal principles depends on the ability for reasonable persons to voluntarily consent to a collective choice rule with paternalistic tendencies. This argument relies on a distinction between preferences (which can be attached to other entities than persons) and values which is unknown to welfare economics.