Keynes’ Preface to the German Edition of the General Theory: Nazi Sympathies or Methodological Empathies?

In the (1936) preface to the German edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes contrasts his methodology with that of Classical laissez-faire economics. He also compares and contrasts his methodology with German economics, which members of the German Historical School had heavily influenced. Unfortunately, some view Keynes as arguing in this Preface that his theory could more deductively apply to fascism than to laissez-faire economies. This would suggest an endorsement of Nazism. Of course, any support offered for Nazism should be condemned. However, instead of displaying Nazi sympathies, this paper argues that the Preface more likely supports the widespread methodological rejection in German economics of deducing laissez-faire outcomes from Classical postulates. Furthermore, Keynes criticizes the more inductive approach of many German economists, and states that he provides them with the theoretical framework which they could deductively apply to their totalitarian economy. Keynes should be read as arguing that his theoretical framework would prove more applicable to a totalitarian system than would a theory based on Classical laissez-faire economics. Comments in the Preface which seem to some to support Nazism should be taken, then, as support for the applicability of his theory to such a system. Keynes’ methodological arguments in the prefaces to the other editions, which reflect his overall methodological approach in the General Theory, his familiarity with German economics, his support for liberal economic and political institutions, and his anti-Nazism, all support this alternative interpretation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago on March 16, 2008.     

Some Misunderstood Aspects of the Final Chapter of Keynes’s General Theory

ABSTRACT

Some seriously misunderstood issues arise in three paragraphs in the last chapter of Keynes’s General Theory concerning the relationship between his theory and orthodox theory. That these passages permit a form of theoretical reconciliation is a view shared by prominent commentators of opposing persuasions. Joan Robinson and John Eatwell strongly criticised Keynes for inconsistency and for opening the door to neoclassical elements that undermine his theorising, while Paul Samuelson made Keynes’s comments the foundation of his textbook neoclassical synthesis. The reconciliation view, however, is based on hasty non-contextual readings and is mistaken. More careful analysis leads to three conclusions: neither internal inconsistency nor neoclassical appeasement exists; Keynes’s paragraphs are aligned with the theoretical positions previously advanced in the General Theory; and what is actually deployed is a complementarity view relating his macro-theory to one particular part of orthodox micro-theory. Rejecting the dominant view, however, does not remove the issue of the absence in Keynes’s work of an adequately exposited micro-theory to accompany his macro-theory.     

Patinkin as a reader of Keynes’ General Theory: Are wage cuts a good remedy to unemployment?1

Abstract

This paper analyses Patinkin's appraisal of Keynes’ concept of involuntary unemployment while focusing on his reading of the General Theory Chapter 19. On several critical issues, Patinkin departs from Keynes’ original matters of concerns. He leans against an individual criterion for unemployment and implicitly endorses Wicksell's understanding of voluntary unemployment as chosen leisure. His appraisal of involuntary unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon ultimately relies on nominal rigidities and assumes the existence of a competitive adjustment process. On all these three critical points, Patinkin departs from Keynes but also initiates the contemporary New Keynesian programme that went even further from Keynes.     

On the “Generality” of the General Theory. Or Why Keynes Lost His Battle and What to Do to Re-win It Again

The paper emphasizes the true“generality”of the General Theory(GT)in the face of the dominant view,according to which Keynes’s theory is captured by“Keynesian o...     

Integrating Schumpeter and Keynes: Hyman Minsky’s Theory of Capitalist Development

Taking the idea that institutional reproduction is not obvious and that institutions are vulnerable has significant conceptual implications. Institutional vulnerability can arise through communication between actors in a common language. To apprehend this requires an elaboration of John Searle's (1995, 2005) argument that language is the fundamental institution. Ontologically, language delineates and circumscribes a community. A community cannot function without a common language, and language at the same time constitutes a community's boundaries, allowing for focused and effective communication within a community. Communication through language introduces ambiguity as well, however, and so institutional reproduction, mediated by language, is a deeply contentious process. Communication across boundaries may particularly "irritate" a system, as Niklas Luhmann has argued. How can institutions then be re-identified through change? Searle's general form for institutions is in need of elaboration. We develop arguments by drawing upon Luhmann's (1995) systems analysis and notion of communication.     

Keynes’s view of deficits and functional finance: a Modern Monetary Theory perspective

Abstract

The immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) was characterised by a resurgence of interest in the work of Keynes. Fiscal policy became at least temporarily acceptable again, in turn leading to government deficits and debt, as a proportion of GDP, reaching levels not seen since before the onset of the neoliberal period. Keynes’s own pronouncements on deficit financing generated renewed interest. Despite the strength of the neoclassical counterattack – which has been relatively successful in reassessing the crisis as a government failure – confidence in orthodox economics has not been fully restored, at least outside the confines of academia. Although the hopes of heterodox economists – that the GFC might mark the beginning of the end of the neoclassical hegemony – have not been realised, the upswing in interest in Keynes’s views has not entirely died away. This paper considers Keynes’s views of deficits and debt and then looks at the controversial area of Keynes’s position vis-à-vis functional finance. The paper concludes by considering how Modern Monetary Theory might increase our understanding of the nature of deficits and debt and thus provide valuable insights which might underpin the use of fiscal policy to pursue public purpose.     

Heckscher-Ohlin Theory or the Modern Trade Theory: How the Overall Trade Characterizes at the Global Level?

This paper has two objectives: to locate the global trade pattern and to compute the export potential of world economies. Considering the maximum number of countries and maintaining a good representative sample of the overall international trade, an empirical examination is conducted by utilizing the trade complementary index and the per-capita income variable in the standard gravity model. The main aim is to determine which of the two theoretical frameworks―either the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which is based on factor endowments or the Modern Trade theory of Krugman-Helpman and Linder, based on the intra-industry trade―is explaining the overall global trade flows. The estimated results support the factor endowments trade theory. In other words, the observed trade patterns conform to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade over intra-industry Modern trade theories. The inference drawn is based on the significantly positive coefficient of the trade complementarity index and the absolute differenced PCI variable. Furthermore, as far as export potential is concerned, there exists a vast scope for the export potential across economies. These countries can exploit the existing export potential through trade cooperation and integration at the regional and the bilateral level.

     

Leader of the pack? German monetary dominance in Europe prior to EMU

In this paper, the monetary policy independence of European nations in the years before European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is investigated using cointegration techniques. Daily data is used to assess pairwise relationships between individual EMU nations and ‘lead’ nation Germany, to assess the hypothesis that Germany was the dominant European nation prior to EMU. By and large our econometric investigations support this hypothesis, and lead us to conclude that the only European nation to lose monetary policy independence in the light of monetary union was Germany. Our results have important policy implications. Given that the loss of monetary policy independence is generally viewed as the main cost of monetary unification, our findings suggest a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of monetary integration. A country can only lose what it has, and in Europe the countries that joined EMU — spare Germany — apparently did not have much to lose, at least not in terms of monetary independence. Instead, they actually gained monetary policy influence by getting a seat in the ECB's governing council which is responsible for setting interest policy in the euro area.     

The ‘Americanisation’ of West German economics after the Second World War: Success,failure, or something completely different?

Abstract

The paper examines the intellectual and structural change that German economics experienced after the Second World War. This development often was described as ‘Americanisation’, since it seemed to rest upon the influences of the American occupation regime. In contrast, the paper applies another meaning of ‘Americanisation’. It is considered a ‘discourse’ that serves to structure the disciplinary procedures to produce progress. As it can be shown by the adoption of Keynesianism and neoclassical microeconomics, the change of the discipline was not primarily driven by direct American influences. Rather, in some respect the German reception took a path of its own. That contradiction can be solved by a theoretical modification of the classical concept of ‘Americanisation’. ‘Americanisation’ there meant a change of the operational procedure of German economics to generate progress.     

James M. Buchanan’s 1981 visit to Chile: Knightian democrat or defender of the ‘Devil’s fix’?

Nobel Prize winning economist James M. Buchanan has repeatedly argued that the “political economist should not act as if he or she were providing advice to a benevolent despot” (Boettke Constitutional Political Economy, 25, 110–124, 2014: 112), but an increasingly influential body of scholarship argues that Buchanan provided a wealth of early 1980s policy advice to Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile (e.g., Fischer 2009; Maclean 2017). In particular, Buchanan reportedly provided an analytical defense of military rule to a predominantly Chilean audience when he visited the country in late 1981. This paper draws upon largely ignored archival evidence from the Buchanan House Archives and Chilean primary source material to assess whether Buchanan provided a defense of Pinochet’s “capitalist fascism” (Samuelson 1983) or whether he defended democracy when he visited Chile in 1981. Aside from the importance of this for assessing Buchanan’s own legacy, his constitutional political economy arguments presented in Chile also provide an interesting and distinct perspective on the connection between democracy and growth, which remains highly relevant to current debates. Despite a general agreement about the desirability of democracy, the view that authoritarian regimes can spur “growth miracles”, or might even be a necessary stage in political-economic development, still has prominent supporters (e.g. Sachs 2012).

     

Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’

The hypothesis of divided government is applied to the development of deficits in Germany. Since the party system is relatively stable, divided governments emerge not from coalitional governments, but rather from the bicameral structure of the country. Different majorities in the two chambers promote deficits, especially in the case of central government deficits. The results suggest that under different majorities in the two chambers deficits are more than 0.5%-Point higher. Further, it is indicated, that only ideological polarization, but not unstable majorities per se induces higher deficits.

The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design?

The debt brake for German states, which demands that they are forbidden from taking up new net debt from 2020 onwards, has two major shortcomings. First, states do not have tax autonomy. In fiscal crises, they can only make adjustments to expenditure but not on the revenue side. Given the fact that most expenditure is—at least in the short term—predetermined by law, in such a crisis a balanced budget without new debt is hardly feasible. Second, the measure does not take into account that large investments, in particular in small regional units, can scarcely be financed by current expenditure. Thus, there is a high probability that at least some states will take up new net debt even after 2020 and, therefore, violate the rules of the debt brake.     

State-led or Capital-driven? The Fall of Bretton Woods and the German Currency Float Reconsidered

This article argues that the lead role of West Germany in the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates sits uneasily with accounts that conceptualise the breakdown of Bretton Woods in terms of hegemonic power politics, the influence of global economic interests or a neoliberal paradigm shift. Short of a convincing explanation, the German currency float seems to be a prime example of states surrendering to financial markets. The article offers an alternative interpretation that focuses on the nexus between state agency and capital accumulation. German authorities were indeed confronted with a destabilising influx of dollars that undermined their available policy options. But as they realised that these inflationary flows emanated from the same export-oriented forces in whose interest they had sought to hold on to an undervalued currency, they chose floating in order to regain command over liquidity and create an anti-inflationary programme that was at the heart of Germany's subsequent ability to better manage the 1970s crisis than its partners. Attention to the particular circumstances and consequences of these ‘structured choices’, I conclude, may offer a more compelling account of financial globalisation as a state-led project than those which generalise from the US context.